



Working to prevent
violent conflict

Saferworld issue paper 3

Addressing conflict and violence from 2015

Issue Paper 3: Rising powers and conflict

In this series of three issue papers, Saferworld examines existing evidence and arguments - and poses key questions - to help inform a productive global conversation about the place of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the post-2015 development framework.

With discussions on the post-2015 development framework underway, Issue Paper 1 looks at the impact of conflict and violence on development – in particular efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Issue Paper 2 follows on to ask ‘what are the key challenges to peacebuilding and development in conflict-affected and fragile contexts?’ and ‘what works in addressing them?’ Issue Paper 3 then broadens the scope of the debate by considering the perspectives of new global actors on issues of conflict and peacebuilding.

The papers are working drafts prepared for the ‘Conflict and Fragility and the Post-2015 Development Agenda’ Global Thematic Consultation, 28-30 November 2012, Monrovia, Liberia. They are not intended to be comprehensive, nor do they put forward a particular Saferworld agenda. Issue Papers 1 and 2 summarise the findings and conclusions of studies that identify lessons from multiple countries and contexts, together with policy positions that are significant due to their wide circulation, endorsement or innovation. Issue Paper 3 represents a summary of original research by Saferworld and leading experts on rising powers.

All comments are welcome and should be sent to lattree@saferworld.org.uk

Introduction

Some development actors are already committed to including peacebuilding commitments in the post-2015 development framework. However, broader understanding and collective commitment by governments around the world will be needed to make this possible. Beyond the g7+ group of fragile states and groupings of major donors such as the OECD-DAC, there are other emerging actors with different perspectives, who have a growing influence in international affairs, including in conflict-affected states.

Issue Paper 3 focuses on five of these actors: Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Turkey. They could all have a major influence in shaping the post-2015 framework, but none have yet endorsed the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. While very different from each other, these countries can broadly be characterised as ‘rising powers’. Due to their economic growth in recent decades and the effects of globalisation, they play an increasingly important role on the world stage. They are fast becoming significant providers of development and humanitarian aid, diplomatic support and security cooperation. They are also increasingly expected to take on a share of the global responsibility for responding to conflicts and crises. Equally, these countries are asserting their role as political actors in their own neighbourhoods and beyond. For these reasons, rising powers will be key to developing and agreeing a credible and effective post-2015 framework.

The post-2015 process presents an opportunity to reassess and refresh policy approaches to conflict-affected states by including these new actors. Discussions on what should follow the MDGs provide a legitimate global framework for conflict-affected states, traditional donors, rising powers and other stakeholders to agree a set of shared goals that guide their engagement and facilitate greater cooperation. This will be no easy task. In fact, issues relating to conflict and insecurity – such as the relationship between states and their citizens - may become a significant obstacle to wider consensus on

a post-2015 agreement. Avoiding deadlock on such issues will require shedding some preconceptions on all sides, as well as developing a more informed understanding of the principles and modalities that underpin the engagement of different external actors.

Therefore, as the international community begins to draw up a new vision for development, it is imperative that there is deeper dialogue with rising powers – in particular about the inclusion of peacebuilding commitments in the post-2015 framework. A first step is to understand how and why these countries engage in conflict-affected states, and what lessons can be drawn from their experience. Through a review of the policies and practices of these five rising powers towards conflict-affected states, we assess their receptiveness to the peacebuilding agenda.

The five country studies are each organised in three sections: first, a brief summary of the global significance of the country and its credentials in being considered a ‘rising power’; next, a review of how the country engages in conflict-affected states, outlining key principles that underpin its approach, as well as its actual experiences of engagement in conflict-affected contexts; lastly, an analysis of how its approach and experience might shape its reaction to the peace and security aspects of the post-2015 debate. The latter section examines the likelihood that it would support commitments to address key drivers of conflict in relevant areas, for example commitments to improve security and justice, or to ensure greater inclusion, responsiveness, accountability and fairness in state-society relations. In doing so, this paper helps to identify both opportunities and challenges to engaging these countries in dialogue about the place of peacebuilding in the post-2015 framework.

1 Brazil¹

Global significance

Brazil is an increasingly influential player in the global political and economic system. With roughly 200 million citizens, it is the fifth most populous country in the world and the sixth largest in terms of its GDP. Brazil has long presented itself as a champion of the global South. In its bid to acquire ‘big power’ status, it seeks a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Brazil’s growing economic weight has also enabled it to secure membership in the G20, challenge United States (US) and European Union (EU) positions in the World Trade Organisation, exert more influence on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and begin charting a ‘third way’ in foreign, financial and military affairs.

Approach to conflict-affected states

Contemporary foreign policy in Brazil is conditioned by a number of enduring priorities. These include a principled commitment to: (i) non-intervention and respect for sovereignty; (ii) South-South solidarity and cooperation; (iii) creating space for the expansion of economic interests; and (iv) adapting international and regional mechanisms to support Brazilian interests. These priorities play a critical role in shaping many aspects of the country’s political, economic and military strategies as well as its positions on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Brazil articulates its international development assistance and peace-support activities primarily in terms of a South-South strategy.² Although Brazil provides technical assistance to a number of conflict-affected states, it does not officially endorse the fragile states, peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas as defined by the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the g7+ group of fragile countries. There is comparatively little mention of ‘fragile states’ in Brazilian statements at the UN or in regional organisations.³ Instead, Brazilian diplomats link conflict and unstable situations to “poverty” and “inequalities”, which in turn are described as giving rise to crime, extremism and terrorism.

The geographic spread of Brazil’s development portfolio is far-reaching: between 2003 and 2010 Brazil provided assistance to 80 countries.⁴ Twenty-three of these 80 countries – more than one in four – were considered to be alternately ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states by either the OECD (2011) or the World Bank (2012).⁵ However, as noted above, Brazil does not use or endorse the terminology or discourse of ‘fragility’ and ‘statebuilding’. Unsurprisingly, Brazil has yet to develop an explicit strategy for so-called ‘fragile states’. Rather, technical cooperation is guided by the same principles in these settings as in other countries. Brazilian technocrats describe a “demand-driven” approach premised on solidarity, non-conditionality, and respect for sovereignty. The predominant formulation of assistance adopted by Brazil in conflict and post-conflict settings is one of “technical cooperation” to alleviate “vulnerability”.

Brazil is a growing player in terms of the scale and volume of its development aid; however, it distinguishes itself from others in the development community. For example, it has avoided entry to the OECD, much less the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), opting instead to retain a degree of

autonomy in its profile. Brazil also avoids direct involvement in the OECD-DAC's International Network on Conflict and Fragility. Although Brazil did sign the *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation* in 2011, it was reluctant to endorse the 2005 *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, which it perceived as reinforcing northern donor priorities.

Brazil's peacekeeping record extends back to the middle of the twentieth century, having participated in 42 of 65 UN peace missions.⁶ Brazil has also shown support at a diplomatic level for an integrated approach to development and security, and this is being translated, at least partially, into practice in a few cases. In Haiti, which represents by far Brazil's largest overseas development engagement,⁷ it is effectively leading the peacekeeping arm of the UN Stabilisation Mission (MINUSTAH). In this case, Brazilian troops with MINUSTAH are deployed to rebuild wells, roads and housing at the same time as engaging in more assertive stability operations.⁸ This approach is endorsed by Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and funded through the Brazilian Co-operation Agency. However, while Brazilian peacekeepers are trained in community relations and pursue a wide array of relief interventions, investments in the peace operation remain disconnected from Brazil's wider bilateral development assistance in areas such as agriculture and health.

Brazilian cooperation with Guinea Bissau similarly reveals an effort to link security and development approaches. Brazil has historically provided bilateral assistance to Guinea Bissau in a variety of sectors, but more recently it has also engaged in support of the country's political reconciliation process.⁹ Since 2007 Brazil has overseen aspects of Guinea Bissau's activities as part of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, as well as providing police officers to the UN Mission. Brazil has also contributed to Guinea Bissau through the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Fund to support South-South cooperation.¹⁰ Brazilian expenditures in Guinea Bissau between 2005 and 2009 amounted to US\$3.3 million with the budget for 2012 increasing to US\$5 million.¹¹

Brazil's position on the issue of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) - a doctrine endorsed by the UN in 2005 - is aligned with the country's core principles of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty. Brazil resists the idea of R2P as a licence for military intervention, particularly when undertaken unilaterally or outside the framework of the UN. In September 2011, President Dilma Rousseff introduced the concept of "responsibility while protecting" (RwP) during her speech at the UN General Assembly. This concept endorses key aspects of R2P, while highlighting a number of related principles and rules of international humanitarian law that emphasise a "focus on prevention", a "proportionate response", "the use of force as the last resort", the importance of "do no harm", and the critical place of "monitoring and accountability".¹² Some other developing countries have welcomed both Brazil's resistance to the doctrine of R2P and the RwP formulation; although these concepts have found less favour with Western actors, and at times with China and Russia.

Implications for addressing conflict in the post-2015 framework

Brazil's explicit focus on conflict prevention and its track record of proactive preventive diplomacy and mediation initiatives, both in its own neighborhood and overseas, should be conducive to the general aim of bringing peace into the post-2015 development framework. Brazil has arguably reinforced this commitment by setting out the concept of RwP, which emphasises non-military means to resolve conflicts and the protection of all civilians when intervention is pursued. This view is consistent with a large proportion of global civil society, as well as with many developing countries.

The extent and direction of Brazil's involvement in the broader post-2015 development agenda is currently difficult to determine, although there are signs that the MFA is actively reflecting on the issue. Given its engagement on issues of international intervention and its expanding development portfolio, there is an expectation that Brazil will take a more active role in post-2015 development debates. While it has considerable capacity and willingness to provide technical assistance for overseas development, Brazil has diverged from traditional development actors on the aid effectiveness agenda. Its involvement in the sustainability agenda and the inclusion in the High Level Panel of Environment Minister Izabella Teixeira suggest that it will prioritise sustainability. Therefore the relationship between peacebuilding and sustainability could be a key factor.

Based on its existing policy and practice, Brazil is likely to sympathise with recent civil society calls to "*address key drivers of conflict – not only its symptoms*".¹³ The emphasis of Brazil's approach in conflict-affected states is on alleviating social and economic inequalities. These are considered to generate the conditions for criminal and political violence, so by reducing inequalities you help to prevent violence. Thus Brazil's approach to conflict-affected states can be seen to focus on 'key drivers' of conflict rather than just its symptoms.¹⁴

Another point of convergence may be Brazil's long-standing commitment to the transformation of wider economic relations – globally as well as domestically – as a fundamental pre-condition in shaping a more peaceful order. This commitment to redressing the global imbalance between the North and the South suggests common ground with the call from civil society actors to “*include commitments to address regional and global factors that fuel conflict*”.

In practical terms, Brazil has adopted an approach in Haiti and Guinea Bissau that at least partially connects development and security objectives. This has prompted some reflection on the possibilities of a more concerted peacebuilding approach in these and other settings – seeking to shift from a technical cooperation approach to one that is more integrated. Moreover, Brazil prides itself on its ability to export ‘social technologies’ and innovations developed internally to its development partners. The country's wide array of experiences in reinforcing South-South and triangular aid modalities may offer some valuable lessons for the wider post-2015 development agenda.¹⁵

At the same time, there are real possibilities of Brazil obstructing the post-2015 peacebuilding agenda. Brazil does not explicitly endorse the discourse of ‘fragile states’ and ‘statebuilding’ in the way it is used by many Western countries - although it does refer to ‘peacebuilding’. Indeed, Brazil purposefully avoids and tacitly rejects the language and intentions of the international ‘peacebuilding and statebuilding’ community. While it has endorsed the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in official statements – particularly in relation to Guinea Bissau – it has shown a marked reluctance to engage with the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

Nor has Brazil actively supported the G7+; weighing such support against its commitment to non-alignment and continued influence within the wider G77. Given Brazil's history and on-going resistance to perceived neo-colonial discourses, there is a risk that the association of this peacebuilding agenda with such a perspective may prove an obstacle to engaging Brazil. For instance, it objects to the *Paris Declaration* on the basis that its principles for aid effectiveness reinforce, rather than rethink, Northern aid modalities.

Instead, Brazil has long embraced the concept of South-South development cooperation which emphasises solidarity, respect for sovereignty, and non-intervention. It has not formally projected an approach to aid that is “*inclusive, responsive, fair and accountable to all people*”. Its emphasis on the principle of respect for sovereignty – which has predominated even in cases of gross human rights violations – suggests that it would not be in sympathy with any aspects of the post-2015 peacebuilding agenda that may challenge the legitimacy of the state.

2 China

Global significance

With a population of 1.3 billion people, a permanent seat on the UNSC, an established set of diplomatic ties across the world and a growing military budget, China is the foremost among the rising powers changing the world order. Tightly bound with globalisation, its economy is the second largest in the world. Trade with Africa, for example, hit US\$166 billion in 2011, three times the figure in 2006.¹⁶

China's changing status is visible in a number of conflict-affected states. China has long engaged with fragile states, in the 1970s providing aid to parts of Africa and South Asia, and at times directly supporting conflict actors. National security concerns have shaped its interest in neighbouring states such as Kyrgyzstan, Nepal and Myanmar. In the last decade or so, however, economic interests – specifically the pursuit of resource security and new markets – have driven a further expansion in Chinese engagement. Encouraged by the government, and with a higher tolerance for risk, Chinese economic actors have been drawn into what are often under-exploited markets in conflict-affected countries such as Sudan and South Sudan. Non-economic factors have also shaped China's engagement; policy makers in Beijing, for example, also recognise that China's global image is being forged in such contexts and are keen to be seen to address shared international challenges.

Approach to conflict-affected states

The language of ‘peace’, ‘stability’ and ‘development’ is central to Beijing's foreign policy discourse, reflecting China's desire to cultivate an image as a responsible great power. At the same time China has continued to identify itself as a developing country. Foreign policy remains strongly grounded in the ‘Bandung principles’ articulated by newly independent countries in 1955, in which states underscored the integrity of sovereign states and their opposition to great power interference. The principle of non-interference is a genuine and deeply held belief among many Chinese officials and academics, though it

is also recognised as a pragmatic means to maintain stable relations with host governments and facilitate economic cooperation. Chinese officials are also keenly aware of outside interference in China's internal affairs. 'South – South cooperation', 'mutual benefit' and 'non-conditionality' are the concepts underpinning China's approach to conflict-affected states.

There is no monolithic China: its engagement involves a range of actors outside the central state elite, including multiple government ministries, provincial governments and networked business investment. There is no overarching Chinese policy on conflict-affected states, and security issues are frequently divorced from development or economic cooperation. Labelling countries as 'fragile', 'failed' or even 'conflict-affected' is generally avoided. On the whole, policy approaches are shaped by the specific nature and extent of interests in the country concerned and pragmatically evolve in response to changing realities on the ground. Nonetheless, Beijing generally puts a premium on stability, understood as the state's capacity to control its territory. It follows that the Chinese government tends to support a state-oriented, top-down vision of stability.¹⁷

Equally, Beijing maintains that national governments alone should manage matters related to internal conflict. As such, China has avoided the role of conflict manager in its bilateral relations. For example, over the last decade it has stated its respect for the Sri Lankan government's position on the Tamil conflict, regardless of whether this involves negotiated or military solutions.¹⁸

However, while formal non-interference has served to maintain stable bilateral relations with host governments, policy makers in Beijing are also realising that 'attempts to separate politics and business do not generally succeed'.¹⁹ For example, Chinese interests in Libya were considerable at the time the revolution erupted in February 2011, with the resulting violence underlining the risks of Chinese investment in fragile states and forcing Beijing to confront questions about its principled reluctance to engage with actors outside the central state.²⁰ In fact, where Beijing judges its interests to be threatened by conflict tensions – as in Sudan and South Sudan – it has on occasion exerted political pressure on governments to pursue peaceful options, including through tacit development conditionality.

There are signs that China is gradually becoming more open to engaging on matters of security and stability, albeit cautiously. At the July 2012 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), President Hu Jintao announced that African peace and security would be one of five key priorities for deepening cooperation. Official pronouncements indicate an increased acceptance that China will promote conflict resolution through negotiations. There is evidence that China may have played the role of mediator, for example, in pushing Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Governments towards talks in late 2008.²¹ To date, however, such engagement has been relatively *ad hoc* rather than indicative of a real shift in policy. China's capacity to engage in sustained conflict management, and its experience of doing so, is also limited.²² Non-interference, stability and promoting stable relations overseas is thus likely to continue to guide Beijing's diplomatic relations with conflict-affected states in the medium term.

Linked to its understanding of stability, China has worked to strengthen the capacity of governments in conflict-affected states through military cooperation and arms transfers. For example, Chinese academics point to supply of arms to Sri Lanka as allowing its government to enforce peace.²³ State sovereignty is regarded as sufficient to legitimise the receipt of Chinese arms, in contrast with Western states which in theory authorise transfers based on their end use. Available data suggests that China's arms exports are growing,²⁴ and between 2006-09 more than 98 percent of its arms went to the developing world.²⁵ Mindful of international condemnation about the impact of arms flows to fragile regions, the government has committed to assist African states with small arms control programmes – though without visible progress to date – and has stated its support for a global Arms Trade Treaty.

China has underscored that international intervention – particularly when involving the use of force – should only be done with the consent of the host state and authorisation of the UNSC. Beijing has further argued that many internal conflicts fall outside the UNSC's mandate. Sanctions and other tools of coercion have generally been treated with scepticism, with officials arguing these simply exacerbate tensions. China's position on intervention in Libya in 2011 hinted at greater flexibility, with Beijing initially voting in support of sanctions, an embargo and other measures. However, China abstained on Resolution 1973, authorising further action, and later joined Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa in condemning NATO military intervention. Its steadfast opposition to intervention in Syria has underlined persistent opposition to humanitarian interventions and the use of external force.

Peacekeeping is an area where China has become more active. At present China is the largest troop contributor among the five permanent UNSC members and the seventh top financial contributor to UN peacekeeping globally.²⁶ Engagement has generally been limited to troop support, with Beijing historically reluctant to support multilateral missions with strong mandates to promote domestic reform.²⁷ There are

signs this is shifting. In 2005 President Hu publicly embraced a “comprehensive strategy featuring prevention, peace restoration, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.”²⁸ However, Chinese officials and leading Chinese thinkers have also urged against imposing predetermined governance solutions or promoting Western liberal democratic models of government, instead urging attention to poverty reduction and addressing unemployment.²⁹ It is also argued that the “focus of work should be on enhancing the concerned country’s capacity building instead of weakening its leadership.”³⁰

The recognition of underdevelopment as a driver of conflict is widely acknowledged in China. China’s growing economic cooperation with conflict-affected states, officials assert, is one means through which China is promoting peace. Another way is through the provision of aid, with non-conditionality as a guiding principle. Particular focus is placed on infrastructure development, seen as a prerequisite to socioeconomic development and a critical aspect of post-conflict reconstruction in countries like Angola, South Sudan, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Large-scale infrastructural projects are mostly financed through interest-free or concessional loans. Additionally, China provides aid through debt relief, humanitarian assistance, technical assistance, training, medical teams and volunteer teams. China rarely provides direct budget-support to recipient states. However, some exceptions are found in post-conflict countries. After the conflict in Liberia, China provided budget support worth US\$3 million in 2004, and a further US\$1.5 million in 2006.³¹ Nonetheless, this should not be taken to suggest that China has special aid policies for conflict-affected or fragile states. As one official notes, “There is not really a big difference between China’s aid to conflict and non-conflict countries.”³²

Actual aid figures are hazy: the Chinese government states that it delivered a total of US\$39.3 billion in aid before 2009 and that its aid budget has grown by 30 percent every year since 2004.³³ While aid from China is clearly growing, estimates often paint a very misleading picture since “much of what is believed by outside observers to be ‘Chinese aid’ is actually a market-rate line of credit.”³⁴ These commercial loans from state-owned banks finance Chinese companies to develop large-scale infrastructure projects which are subsequently handed over to local ownership. The commercial nature of the cooperation – understood as ‘win-win’ – may in some places be more sustainable and transformative than the Western model of giving aid through grants and projects. It should also be noted that China generally matches its financial assistance closely to host government requests, and so can be seen to strengthen national government ownership of the development process.

Implications for addressing conflict in the post-2015 framework

China’s presence in conflict-affected states is resolutely pragmatic: engagement has been primarily commercially driven to serve domestic growth, focused at the level of the state and sensitive to sovereignty, in line with Beijing’s own approach to development and stability. However, China’s approach has also been more nuanced than straight opposition to Western powers. Beijing is at pains to demonstrate that it contributes to international aid efforts, seeking to participate in international institutions and speak the language of MDGs.³⁵ Where there has been broad international consensus on norms and activities to promote stability and development, China has typically lent its support. China is a signatory of the Paris, Accra and Busan agreements on aid effectiveness. However, Chinese policy makers see these initiatives as less legitimate than frameworks developed under UN auspices. At the very least, China will become an actively engaged actor in post-2015 discussions and will want to demonstrate that it has valuable lessons to share from its own experience of meeting MDGs. Despite its aversion to taking the lead on international initiatives, Beijing may even see discussions as an opportunity for China to assert itself as a global power that can legitimately represent the developing world.

It is likely that peace and security will be among the most contentious for China. While generalities on global peace may be acceptable, any agreement seen to compromise principles of state sovereignty or prescribe improvements in governance will be hard to digest, as will language perceived as leaving China open to criticism about how it manages its own internal security. Nevertheless, due to China’s deepening engagement in conflict-affected states and its recognition of the links between stability and development, Beijing will find it difficult to ignore calls from its developing country partners for the inclusion of peacebuilding in a post-2015 agreement. African states have already convinced China to address issues of fragility within official FOCAC frameworks, even securing language underscoring the importance of democracy and good governance to peace.³⁶ As such, China’s desire to stand up for the developing world may also be what encourages Beijing to consider peacebuilding issues with an open mind.

3 India

Global significance

India's economy has grown rapidly in the past two decades: from a GDP of US\$292 billion in 1989 to US\$1,377 billion in 2009.³⁷ It is currently the tenth largest economy in the world, and third in terms of Purchasing Power Parity.³⁸ India's global significance also derives from the size of its population. With roughly 1.25 billion citizens it is the second most populous country after China and is also the largest democracy in the world.

As India's economy has grown, so too has its military expenditure. Defence spending has tripled over the past decade to make India one of the top ten military spenders.³⁹ India has sought recognition as a global actor by campaigning for a permanent seat on the UNSC.⁴⁰ Western powers have also encouraged India to play a leading international role.⁴¹ However, the country still faces immense internal social and economic challenges, with almost a third of India's population living below the poverty line.⁴²

Approach to conflict-affected states

Indian foreign policy is shaped by a number of core principles. These include 'strategic autonomy', which was evident in India's key role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and in its continuing caution about long-term bilateral alliances. Equally important is respect for the sovereignty of other states, which informs New Delhi's default position of not intervening in the 'internal affairs' of other countries. Another core principle is South-South cooperation, manifest in the long-running programme of Technical and Economic Co-operation, which provides training and other support to civil servants from developing countries.

With the growth of India's economy, aid expenditure too has grown: its annual aid budget now stands at about US\$500 million.⁴³ The majority (70%) of Indian development assistance is provided to neighbouring countries, such as Afghanistan and Bhutan.⁴⁴ However, with the establishment of new aid instruments, India is increasing its assistance to Africa and other parts of the developing world.⁴⁵

India's engagement in conflict-affected states reflects foreign policy principles and priorities. The main concern that has underpinned India's foreign policy over the past two decades has been to protect and sustain the country's economic growth. Several of India's neighbours are characterised by chronic political instability, which in some cases overlap with India's own security concerns. A distinction can be drawn between countries neighbouring India that have generally been seen as "sources of risk" to economic growth, and those further afield that are seen as "sources of opportunity".⁴⁶

Another factor shaping India's engagement in conflict-affected states is geopolitics. India has long been vying with China for influence in Asia, and this has intensified given the economic rise of both countries in recent decades. Indian concerns about China's growing influence in countries like Myanmar - in particular, that this influence may be used to 'contain' India⁴⁷ - are seen to shape New Delhi's approach. The India-China dynamic interacts with another critical relationship in the region - that between India and Pakistan. This in turn influences how India engages in conflict-affected states in Asia, notably Afghanistan.

Beyond Asia, India's presence in conflict-affected states is primarily motivated by commercial opportunities and energy security, and it is largely driven by the private sector. The past two decades have seen rapid growth in India's international trade and outward investment. Key to this expansion is the quest for oil and natural gas to fuel continued economic growth.⁴⁸ This has led to increased engagement with a number of conflict-affected states: trade between India and Sudan tripled between 2005 and 2009;⁴⁹ India is now a leading export destination for Nigeria.⁵⁰

It is also important to note the influence of domestic politics in shaping New Delhi's policy towards conflict-affected states in South Asia. This can be seen in the leverage of state-level political actors over the central government, with India's policy towards Sri Lanka often cited as an example.⁵¹

India's official engagement in conflict-affected states is often associated with its substantial contribution to UN peacekeeping. It has provided almost 100,000 troops to 40 different UN missions, and is currently the third largest contributor in the world, deploying troops to countries like the DRC and South Sudan.⁵²

India is the largest donor to Afghanistan in the region, and the fifth largest bilateral donor overall. It is helping to develop infrastructure, such as roads, and human capacities through training for Afghan civil servants, as well as supporting community development projects.⁵³ India is seen to be taking a "strategic approach" in Afghanistan that combines development assistance with the promotion of security interests - notably to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base for terrorist activities against India - at the same time as generating commercial opportunities for Indian companies.⁵⁴ Public opinion surveys suggest that India's approach in Afghanistan is well-received.⁵⁵

In some other conflict-affected states, India's record is more mixed. For instance, Indian state-owned engineering companies are helping to develop road and rail infrastructure in Sudan,⁵⁶ but this assistance

has attracted some criticism for not being sufficiently inclusive. Projects tend to be geographically clustered in central Sudan, thus running “the risk of widening the developmental gap between the centre and the periphery”, which is regarded as a key cause of Sudan’s conflicts.⁵⁷ However, more recently in April 2012, New Delhi appointed a Special Envoy to help broker peace between Sudan and South Sudan, as well as “to protect India’s commercial interests”.⁵⁸

Implications for addressing conflict in the post-2015 framework

In general, the Indian government does not take a proactive approach to peacebuilding. Its engagement on conflict-related issues tends to be in order to respond to perceived threats to national security rather than to intervene to resolve conflicts or in support of local peace processes. In part this reflects a risk-averse approach, influenced by India’s historical experiences in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. But it also reflects India’s belief in the central role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security. For these reasons, New Delhi is expected “to continue on a conservative trajectory”.⁵⁹

It is also notable that, despite its own democratic credentials, New Delhi has not actively promoted democracy in other countries. In part this relates to the principle of non-interference, but there is also a reluctance to impose norms on other states and a suspicion of the Western tendency to preach about ‘good governance’. Insofar as the post-2015 process is perceived as exporting and promoting an agenda of good governance, it may be viewed with similar caution. Furthermore, Indian officials and policy makers do not generally refer to states as ‘fragile’. It is suggested that this “relates to its perceived connotation as challenging the sovereignty of a state by questioning its ability to govern”.⁶⁰

There are other reasons to doubt the likelihood of Indian support for a paradigm shift in the post-2015 framework. Despite the appointment of Indian economist Abhijit Banerjee to the High Level Panel on post-2015, there has been little evidence so far of proactive Indian engagement in the process of developing a new development framework. This may reflect a broader scepticism within Indian society regarding the relevance and efficacy of global development platforms and policies, such as the G20 and MDGs, to Indian policy-making processes.

It is also important to note the limitations of India’s institutional capacity to engage in this sort of process. The Indian Foreign Service is widely regarded as being under-capacitated and over-stretched.⁶¹ More broadly, since India is confronted with immense domestic challenges, foreign policy issues often take a back seat.

However, there are signs of a recognition that a global role entails taking on more responsibility to help build peace globally. In July 2012, India’s Chargé d’Affaires at the UNSC stated that “as a responsible global citizen ... India will not be found lacking in responding to challenges of the peacebuilding process”.⁶² Furthermore, India’s particular experience of postcolonial democratic development offers a valuable model for states emerging from conflict. In particular, the emphasis on an ‘inclusive’ approach to statebuilding resonates with the agenda of those promoting peacebuilding in the post-2015 framework. To quote India’s representative at the UN, “institutions must be locally relevant and must include all stakeholders ... in the governance process”.⁶³

In this regard, there may well be useful lessons that can be learnt from India’s engagement in Afghanistan - and not just for India but also for other international actors. It represents a strategic approach that links security and development objectives and has the potential to serve as a model for similarly integrated engagement by India in other conflict-affected states.

There is moreover growing awareness in Indian society of the risks to which their nationals working in conflict-affected regions are exposed – and of the responsibility of their government to counter these risks. When the crew of an Indian ship was taken hostage by Somali pirates in 2008, it led to intense pressure on the government to take action.⁶⁴ Increased public awareness and pressure regarding the risks of engaging in conflict-affected states may strengthen the case for a proactive peacebuilding approach by India.

4 South Africa

Global significance

South Africa is a significant global actor due to its economic strength, its political identity and role, and its regional and international diplomacy. It has sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economy (accounting for over a third of its GDP and some 40% of exports), and it is the dominant economy in the southern African region.⁶⁵ South Africa’s growing status on the world stage was confirmed when it became the fifth country to join the ‘BRIC group’ in 2011.

The unique political experience of South Africa has given it a special moral legitimacy. Furthermore, through its active international role since the end of apartheid in 1994 it has come to be regarded as a key player in the emergent African order and a key African actor in the international system.⁶⁶ So, there are high expectations of South Africa's role - though these are likely to differ between Western states and other strategic partners such as China. South Africa also has its own global ambitions, manifest in its wish to become a permanent member of the UNSC.

Approach to conflict-affected states

South Africa has multiple identities: African leader, key member of the global South with a leading role in South-South relations, and bridge between South and North. These inform its international relations and how it engages in conflict-affected states. South Africa is also heavily influenced by the weight of its history, not just at home but also in its regional and continental relations.

The cardinal principles of the African National Congress (ANC) – affirmation of human rights, justice, international peace, and democracy⁶⁷ – were reiterated in 1994 and remain fundamental to South Africa's foreign policy.⁶⁸ In addition to national interests, key objectives of South Africa's foreign policy include consolidating its African Agenda, deepening South-South cooperation and expanding South-North relations. Another key element is engagement in the global system of governance,⁶⁹ including participation in multilateral bodies, such as the NAM and the G77.

South Africa promotes integration of the Southern Africa region and plays a key role in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It has long recognised that conflicts threaten development in Africa.⁷⁰ It was instrumental in creating the New Partnership for Africa's Development, which enshrines the notion that without peace there can be no development.⁷¹ Beyond Africa, it views South-South cooperation as a means to promote international development, and tripartite relations with the IBSA Dialogue Forum growing.⁷² South Africa's relations with China and other rising powers like India are an increasingly important aspect of its international relations.

South Africa's foreign policy is grounded firmly in domestic concerns. In 2009, President Jacob Zuma stated that: "The main goal of government for the medium term is to ensure that our foreign relations contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to sustainable economic growth and development".⁷³ South Africa styles itself as the 'gateway' to Africa, but is threatened by the impact of instability and insecurity. The benefits of a peaceful continent include a more predictable investment environment and economic opportunities. Thus national interest "in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spillover effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood" is recognised as a factor in its engagement with conflict-affected states.⁷⁴

South Africa is an emerging development actor. It uses the language of partnership rather than donor-recipient, being "committed to development partnerships around the world".⁷⁵ A Development Partnership Agency is finally being established, which is expected to enhance engagement in international development policy. South Africa supports the MDGs, but they do not appear to feature prominently in official presentations of foreign policy.⁷⁶

South Africa has affirmed a strong commitment to engaging on conflict issues in the post-apartheid era.⁷⁷ In a 2011 White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy, the government committed to "continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction".⁷⁸ These objectives are equally prominent in official presentations; the Foreign Minister recently stated that South Africa's "focus on Africa has been on mediation, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction and development".⁷⁹

South Africa supports conflict prevention in multiple ways, including direct bilateral engagement and through regional and international organisations. This includes involvement in the UN Peacebuilding Commission⁸⁰ and efforts to enhance UN-African Union (AU) relations on security and peacebuilding.⁸¹ South Africa has an impressive record of multilateral engagement on conflict-related issues, including the renegotiation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the ban on anti-personnel landmines, and the signing of the Rome Statute. South Africa has also taken an active role in developing new norms in international affairs, including those related to conflict, such as the R2P. It was instrumental in negotiating the AU's shift of position on R2P from 'non-intervention' to 'non-indifference'.⁸² In addition, South Africa supports various continental bodies, such as the AU's Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force, the Early Warning Centre and Panel of the Wise.⁸³ South Africa also plays a key role in regional peace and security through its participation in SADC.

South Africa contributes troops for AU and UN peacekeeping missions. It is currently the 14th largest contributor of military and police to UN peacekeeping operations, deploying just over two thousand troops

to MONUSCO, United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur and United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan.⁸⁴ This may seem relatively small given South Africa's international stature and expectations;⁸⁵ however, capacity constraints in the military have prevented it from taking on a bigger role.⁸⁶ South Africa also engages in bilateral defence cooperation with other states, including arms exports, which has caused some controversy in relation to 'rogue regimes', notably in Libya.⁸⁷

In addition, South Africa has initiated or been directly involved in numerous conflict prevention initiatives, including in Burundi, the Comoros, the DRC, Ivory Coast, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. The moral capital and 'soft power' derived from its experience of liberation struggle and peaceful transition has been central to this engagement in that: "Africa and the wider world looks to South Africa as a key model for resolving intractable conflicts".⁸⁸ This has led to efforts to export the lessons of its transition, while mechanisms such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have attracted considerable external interest.⁸⁹ It is also worth noting the personal engagement of those involved in the liberation struggle in conflict resolution initiatives, with former Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki directly engaged in mediating various African conflicts.

South Africa has a mixed record in its conflict resolution efforts on the continent. Burundi "became a showpiece for... Mandela's power as a mediator and South Africa's new role as a peacemaker".⁹⁰ South Africa also helped facilitate the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the 2003 Sun City agreement. Mbeki has led the AU mediation process on Sudan and South Sudan, including facilitating recent talks between the Khartoum and Juba governments that resulted in an agreement on oil and related economic matters in September 2012.⁹¹ However, South Africa's role has not always been regarded as successful or consistent, as illustrated by divergent views on its policy of 'quiet diplomacy' with Harare.

This may be seen to reflect another aspect of South Africa's history, namely the ANC's anti-imperialist doctrine. Some argue that the post-apartheid governments' "privileging of anti-imperialism over human rights" helps explain Pretoria's policy regarding Zimbabwe and Darfur, for example.⁹² South African reactions to the Libyan intervention can also be seen to reflect an anti-imperialist orientation.⁹³ Despite playing a leading role in promoting R2P, Pretoria has disappointed Western expectations in terms of its interpretation of the doctrine and support for its application in cases such as Sudan and Syria. South Africa has sought to implement R2P through political processes and negotiations, rather than through sanctions or use of force.

Implications for addressing conflict in the post-2015 framework

South Africa's role is critically important in African terms, rendering engagement with Pretoria on this agenda imperative to the prospects for any post-2015 peacebuilding commitments. In principle, one would expect South Africa to be supportive. Conflict transformation is a core element of the country's identity. Its foreign policy has considerable overlap with the peacebuilding agenda, including its focus on preventive diplomacy, negotiated solutions and mediation. Its track record of support for peace initiatives in Africa demonstrates its commitment to this agenda. Moreover, South Africa's active engagement in multilateral processes suggests it could be a key player in post-2015 debates. Given its leading role in conflict prevention in Africa, the government should be supportive of the commitment to include peacebuilding in the post-2015 development framework. Indeed, it may be willing to champion the cause and would do so with unique moral capital.

With regard to the identified priorities, South Africa's use of the language of 'human security' suggests it recognises the need to go beyond the mere 'absence of violence' to address 'key drivers of conflict'. In terms of the *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals* set out in the New Deal, South Africa affirms support for 'legitimate politics' – although it may have its own interpretation of what this means. It supports 'security' – including civilian protection – and 'justice' – informed by its own truth and reconciliation experience. In terms of 'inclusive, responsive, fair and accountable' states, South Africa's official support for democracy might conflict with the actual conduct of its relations with other states. South Africa's active role in regional and international bodies would also help to address the 'regional and global factors that fuel conflict'. Lastly, South Africa's training of civil servants from conflict-affected states could link to the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda, as well as being a good illustration of intra-continental peer learning.⁹⁴

If South Africa could be persuaded to take up, and even champion, peacebuilding commitments, it might also play an influential role in the evolution of this framework with new actors. This includes China, which recently declared its engagement on security and peace under the FOCAC process. In the case of Sudan–South Sudan, for instance, Mbeki already has a brokering role in support of the AU with external partners like China. More broadly, Pretoria seeks to connect South and North, and it is well positioned to do so with regard to conflict prevention. It has the potential to play a constructive role helping the

agendas of other 'emerging powers' and more established ones to cohere. It is worth noting that South African civil society groups and think tanks would likely support and also be able to advocate for peacebuilding priorities.

Nevertheless, South Africa's history and politics may complicate it taking a direct role in promoting the peacebuilding post-2015 agenda. Its anti-imperialist orientation and the priority given to pan-African solidarity may mean that South Africa privileges relations with states that are not "inclusive, responsive, fair and accountable". This could inhibit its supportive engagement with this agenda. Furthermore, despite strong overlap with some of the priorities, challenges may arise from South Africa's wish to have a distinctive role unencumbered by any potentially sensitive or compromising association with what is perceived to be a Western-led process. Furthermore, as well as facing severe domestic challenges and political uncertainty, South Africa's capacity to play a leading role should not be over-estimated, since there is a growing recognition that it is "overstretching itself diplomatically".⁹⁵

For these reasons, the modalities for negotiating South Africa's engagement in and ownership of the process will be critical. In conclusion, there are good reasons to suggest South African support for the post-2015 peacebuilding agenda, but crucially it is subject to the process pursued.

5 Turkey

Global significance

Turkey has become a more visible international actor over the past decade. With a population pushing 75 million, Turkey's GDP grew at an average rate of six percent between 2002 and 2008, increasing to over eight percent in 2011 following the global financial crisis.⁹⁶ International economic interaction has affected this growth: while trade accounted for just 17.1 percent of GDP in 1980, it accounted for 52.3 percent by 2008.⁹⁷ Although slowing in 2012, the Turkish economy is currently the world's 18th largest, placing it within the ranks of the G20 and making it an upper middle-income country according to the World Bank.

Turkey's growing international profile has been closely tied to the ambitions of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in 2002. The AKP has promised that by 2023, the republic's centennial, "Turkey will be among the world's ten leading powers."⁹⁸ Under the AKP, Turkey has sought to assert its role as an active regional and global player and demonstrated new-found confidence in foreign policy. In 2009, Turkey announced the opening of 33 new foreign embassies and a sharp rise in its foreign ministry budget. In the same year it also secured a two-year seat on the UNSC. Turkey has pursued closer relations with Asian countries and increased engagement in Africa considerably, hosting the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in 2008 and watching exports to the continent grow by 390 percent between 2003 and 2011.⁹⁹

Approach to conflict-affected states

The AKP has used the concept of 'strategic depth' to describe its foreign policy agenda. This concept includes a focus on promoting a "zero problems neighbourhood" through improving economic and diplomatic ties in Turkey's neighbourhood countries. The Turkish government's own conflict with Kurdish militants in the south east of the country, which has a strong cross-border dimension, plays an important role in its regional considerations. At the same time, on-going conflict in other countries – most notably in neighbouring Syria but also in Israel/Palestine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – has been one of the major obstacles to the successful realisation of "zero problems".¹⁰⁰

Strategic depth also places emphasis on Turkey implementing "proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy," commitments that echo Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's foreign policy slogan of "peace at home and peace in the world".¹⁰¹ Attention has focused particularly on Turkey's wider neighbourhood, with the country's post-Ottoman bonds informing its identity as a "central power" and on continued close relationships with Central Asia, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian, the Middle East, North Africa and even the Horn of Africa. Turkey's claim to a distinctive strategic role in international diplomacy is also linked to its status as a majority Muslim country. It's involvement in Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere has arguably been more welcome by virtue of its Muslim identity. Equally, engagement overseas has won benefits at home: the high profile visit of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Mogadishu in 2011, for example, which occurred at the height of the Somalia famine and coincided with the holy Ramadan period, was thought to have endeared the AKP to its conservative base.¹⁰²

Energy and business considerations have also shaped Turkey's engagement in conflict-affected countries. Insecurity in the South Caucasus in August 2008 raised concerns for Ankara about the stability of energy and gas supplies. Economic growth has led to the expansion of Turkey's business class, who in

turn have begun to explore economic opportunities in neighbouring states and supported state efforts to promote regional stability as a means of furthering economic interests.¹⁰³ In Africa and elsewhere, Turkish business has also demonstrated interest in open and relatively under-exploited markets. For example, by 2011 Turkish firms had held 61 contracting projects in Sudan at the total value of \$2.1 billion.¹⁰⁴ In Somalia, Turkish businessmen are eager to “penetrate the Somali market and play a lead role in reconstruction and economic development.”¹⁰⁵

Turkey has been particularly active in a number of high-profile conflict situations over the past decade. The Turkish government attaches particular importance to mediation and preventative diplomacy.¹⁰⁶ Over the past ten years, efforts have been made by Turkey to mediate between Israel and Syria, Israel and Hamas and competing factions within Palestine. It has also sought to promote Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq, launch a diplomatic initiative between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and focus on Armenia’s territorial conflict with Azerbaijan. Turkey has hosted summits between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and its Foreign Minister has stated that his country would be in a position to facilitate a political settlement with the Taliban.¹⁰⁷ In Somalia there have been reports that it has been clandestinely establishing lines of communication between militant groups and the transitional government.¹⁰⁸

Turkey has not always taken the line of traditional global powers. The Prime Minister refuted Western criticism of the Sudanese government’s handling of the Darfur conflict, instead calling for Sudan’s territorial integrity to be respected and pursuing a path of quiet diplomacy and engagement.¹⁰⁹ In the Middle East, Ankara initially attempted to engage with the Syrian government and convince it to adopt political reforms as a means to stave off unrest. However, Turkey soon began to more extensively support the opposition and, by October 2012, relations with the government deteriorated significantly. The Prime Minister was also the first global leader to publically call on Hosni Mubarak to step down in Egypt and quickly established relations with the opposition, as he also did in Tunisia.

Turkey does not have an official policy of promoting democracy overseas.¹¹⁰ In reference to aid conditionalities, Turkish officials have stated that “our principle is not to interfere with the domestic policies of certain aid recipients, but concentrate on co-operation and co-ordination.”¹¹¹ However, Turkey indirectly supports democracy overseas through funding for governance initiatives, for example, sponsoring training for Afghan political parties. The Turkish government has also sought to reach out to civil society and local communities. The second UN Istanbul conference on Somalia controversially included 300 civil society representatives, with the Turkish Ambassador in Mogadishu stating that “we want the international community to hear the voice of the grassroots organisations of Somalia.”¹¹²

Turkey has sought to demonstrate leadership on conflict and security in multilateral fora. During its two year tenure on the UNSC, Turkey hosted a summit on “Ensuring the Security Council’s Effective Role in Maintaining International Peace and Security.” It has also hosted one Organisation of Islamic Countries and two UN conferences on Somalia. At the UN General Assembly in 2011, Turkey’s Prime Minister focused on Somalia for half of his speech.¹¹³

Despite still being an aid recipient, Turkey’s overseas aid has increased from US\$120 million in 1999 to an estimated US\$1.3 billion by 2011, mostly through bilateral channels.¹¹⁴ Its official development agency works in 30 partner countries. Turkey, a signatory of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, is also progressing towards full membership of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee.¹¹⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has explicitly boosted overseas development assistance to conflict-affected countries.¹¹⁶ In Afghanistan, Turkey had spent over US\$400 million between 2005 and 2009.¹¹⁷ Turkish officials in Somalia have stated that their aim is to demonstrate an alternative approach to support, involving an on-the-ground presence and a willingness to promote development despite ongoing conflict.¹¹⁸ Humanitarian aid from Turkey has also grown in recent years and has been extended to a wider set of countries. Turkish NGOs also play a very significant role overseas. The Turkish Red Crescent Society raised US\$60 million for Somalia in 2011, making it the fourth largest aid provider after the US, UK and EU – ahead of the Turkish government.¹¹⁹

Turkish participation in UN peacekeeping rose after the end of the Cold War and, as of August 2012, it was participating in missions in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan, South Sudan, the DRC, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Haiti. While the reach is wide, the numbers are fairly small, as these contributions comprised of 295 military personnel, 146 police and 2 military experts.¹²⁰ Although it has refused to deploy its troops on explicit counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan, Turkey provides 1,327 troops to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. It has also provided ships to the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia and provided planes for AU peacekeepers in Darfur. Turkey’s aid budget has funded police training programmes and over 3,055 police officers have been trained from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Cote d’Ivoire, Azerbaijan, Mongolia,

Kazakhstan, Albania, Somalia and Sudan.¹²¹ It has contributed to training initiatives for the Afghan military and police and it has promised US\$5 million in support for Somalia's security sector.¹²²

Implications for addressing conflict in the post-2015 framework

Although it has not endorsed the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, the relatively high profile of conflict issues in the Turkish government's foreign policy discourse suggests that it could support specific peacebuilding commitments goals in a post-2015 global agreement. In the past few years it has already committed itself to the MDGs by gradually increasing the volume of its overseas aid and diversifying recipients, with a notable focus on conflict-affected states.¹²³ Furthermore, in its bid for a return to the UNSC in 2015, Turkey's Foreign Ministry has stated that one of its key policies would be to "actively support efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, also bearing in mind the correlation between development and security."¹²⁴ Turkey wants to be seen as a central power on the world stage that can take the lead on mediation and diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts. Its support for security sector reform, development aid and governance in conflict-affected states, alongside its apparent willingness to promote the voices of civil society, suggest that it is willing to engage on the key drivers of conflict as well as their symptoms.

However, as illustrated by its statements on the Darfur conflict, the AKP has on occasion distanced itself from positions and policies perceived to be driven by Western agendas. Instead, it has sought to identify itself as taking a unique and distinct approach which offers both opportunities and challenges for realising international consensus. Despite its support for some of the Arab Spring opposition movements, Turkey is likely to remain wary of language related to democracy promotion and internal governance reform, given its general reluctance to be seen as intruding on others' domestic politics. Its on-going internal conflicts are also likely to shape its position. Turkey's leaders are unlikely to be willing to support international commitments at odds with their own internal security policies.

Concluding reflections

This set of case studies illustrates a number of key points with implications for post-2015 peacebuilding debates. Rising powers are increasingly engaged in conflict-affected states, both as state actors and through commercial activities. With their own set of interests, identities and ideological frameworks, it is evident that they engage in quite different ways and under different modalities both from one another and from traditional powers.

However, the concerns of rising powers in conflict-affected states are not necessarily at odds with those of traditional powers, especially where stability is concerned. Nor in some cases are their practices very different from those of established donors. Examination of the various cases also shows how rising powers' deepening engagement in conflict-affected states – and their growing stake in stability – is leading in some cases to greater involvement in conflict management and peacebuilding.

Most of the rising powers we have considered are developing countries themselves, and face their own domestic challenges from internal conflict or insecurity. Regarding themselves as still developing countries, they share an outlook that favours South-South co-operation and that resists agendas seen to serve the interests of the global North. It is important that those in the North understand the values and experience that underlie this distrust rather than viewing it as obstructionism.

As they are at once both donors and developing countries, rising powers are likely to view the post-2015 framework as something that may well be applied to their own domestic situations, and which they will also be accountable to. This may reinforce their resistance to any framework that is perceived to strengthen norms of external interference in sovereign affairs or to prescribe particular models of governance or conflict management – especially as the approaches of traditional powers have not always been seen as legitimate or effective.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the rising powers are self-evidently development success stories – certainly in terms of economic growth. Exclude these countries, and progress towards the MDGs over the past decade is far less impressive. It follows that the rising powers have valuable lessons to share, and should be champions of the developing world in post-2015 debates, pro-actively and constructively challenging traditional development models. The case studies also illustrate that the growing influence of these countries gives them a pivotal role in shaping the policy approaches of other governments to international peace, security and development policy debates. This makes engaging them in policy dialogue on the peace and security dimensions of the post-2015 debate an immediate priority.

The dual developed/developing identity of these countries strengthens the case for reconsidering the

donor-recipient paradigm. The nature of the rising powers challenges development thinking and the discourse of the MDGs, with their inference that development is primarily about what the North can do to aid the South. The focus should be on the responsibilities that countries are willing to share rather than on what agendas donors can push on developing countries in exchange for resources. The key to the post-2015 framework will be fostering a shared recognition that without a development paradigm that both reflects changing global dynamics and responds to our shared interest in sustainable peace, everybody will lose out.

About Saferworld

Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe that everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from insecurity and violent conflict.

We work in over 20 countries in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. We have staff based in Bangladesh, Georgia, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen and Uganda, as well as in London, Beijing, Brussels and Vienna.

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¹ Saferworld thanks and acknowledges the Igarape Institute in Brazil, and particularly Robert Muggah, who contributed a background paper that substantially informs the Brazil case study. See www.igarape.org.br. Likewise we thank and acknowledge Daniel Large, Research Associate at the South African Institute of International Affairs, who contributed a background paper that substantially informs the South Africa study.

² See Muggah R, Hamann EP, 'Brazil's Generous Diplomacy: Friendly Dragon or Paper Tiger?' *International Development Policy Series* (March 2012), available at igarape.org.br/brazils-generous-diplomacy-friendly-dragon-or-paper-tiger/ accessed 7 November 2012; Cabral L, Weinstock J, *Brazilian Technical Cooperation for Development: Drivers, Mechanics and Future Prospects* (ODI, London, 2010).

³ A review of statements made by Brazil to the UN General Assembly found that terms such as "weak", "post-conflict", and "threatened" were more commonly used than "fragile", "conflict-affected", or "failed".

⁴ See Itamaraty *Balanco de Política Externa 2003-2010* (2011) available at www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/balanco-de-politica-externa-2003-2010 accessed 7 November 2012.

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