

Christine Bennett and **Saferworld**

Public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo: Time to act



May 2011

Public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo

Time to act

Acknowledgements

This report has been written by Christine Bennett with assistance from Astrit Istrefi, Julie Brethfeld and other colleagues at Saferworld. Important feedback and additional input has been provided by the Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ), other local civil society organisations, experts from the United Nations Development Programme Kosovo Small Arms Control Initiative (UNDP KOSSAC) and the Kosovar Gender Studies Center, and independent security analysts. The authors wish to thank specifically the people living in Kosovo who agreed to share their perceptions with us. Data collection and processing was carried out by the Centre for Psychological and Social Studies and Services – ENCOMPASS. The report has been edited by Deepthi Wickremasinghe and typeset and printed by NTSH Xhad.

This research was funded by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany through its support for the SafePlace project, and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

Acronyms

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
AKR	Alliance for a New Kosovo
CSAT	Community Safety Action Team
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	UK Department for International Development
EU	European Union
EULEX	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FGD	Focus group discussion
FIQ	Forum for Civic Initiatives
ICO	International Civilian Office
INPO	Initiative for Progress
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
KIA	Kosovo Intelligence Agency
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KNF	Ferizaj Students Council
KOSSAC	Kosovo Small Arms Control Initiative (UNDP)
KP	Kosovo Police (previously Kosovo Police Service)
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
LPSC	Local Public Safety Committee
MCSC	Municipal Community Safety Councils
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MLGA	Ministry of Local Government Administration
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PDK	Kosovo Democratic Party
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	UN Mission in Kosovo



Contents

Executive summary	i
1. Introduction	1
2. Context: Recent political developments in Kosovo and progress in the security sector	3
3. Public perceptions of and attitudes towards security and justice actors and institutions	6
4. Public perceptions on security and personal safety	20
5. Recommendations	32
Annex: Methodology	37

List of figures

Figure 1a. Trust in institutions and security providers – comparison 2009 and 2010	7
Figure 1b. Trust in institutions and security providers (High levels of trust)	8
Figure 1c. Trust in institutions and security providers (Low levels of trust)	8
Figure 2. Perceptions on the performance of police	9
Figure 3. Perceptions on the performance of the justice sector	12
Figure 4. Perceptions on the performance of customs	14
Figure 5. Trust in EULEX	16
Figure 6. Neighbourhoods considered as ‘safe’ or ‘somewhat safe’	21
Figure 7. Comparison of the change perceived levels of safety in neighbourhoods over six months	22
Figure 8. Types of crime that occur frequently in communities	23
Table 1. Respondents’ knowledge of MCSCs, LPSCs and CSATs	24
Table 2. Important factors that may cause future violent conflict as perceived by different ethnic groups	28
Figure 9. How likely is it that Kosovo will have another violent conflict in the next five years?	29
Table 3. Location, ethnic group, gender and age of FGD participants	38

Executive summary

THIS SURVEY IS THE SIXTH in a series which tracks changes in public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo over time. It tests how people believe access to, responsiveness and performance of security and justice institutions in Kosovo are developing and is based on qualitative and quantitative data collected through a household survey and focus group discussions. The survey was conducted by Saferworld with input provided by the Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ). It takes into account the role of different characteristics, such as ethnicity and geographic location and to a lesser extent gender and age, in shaping people's perceptions of both national and international security providers. The survey aims to contribute towards the development of responsive, accountable and people-focused security and justice provisions in Kosovo.

The survey findings are cause for concern that should be noted and trigger a response. They show that the political crisis in Kosovo in late 2010 which continues at the time of writing this report had a devastating effect on local safety and security perceptions, attitudes towards small arms and light weapons (SALW) and, even more so, on the trust placed in security and justice providers. Perceptions of day-to-day public safety and security have slightly deteriorated and an increasing number of people – particularly young people – would consider acquiring weapons. The reputation of the Kosovo Police (KP), which was previously held in high regard by the majority of the population, has particularly suffered in the last year. This may be linked to heated political debates about the security situation in Kosovo, the performance of the police and the high turnover in senior police staff in Autumn 2010. Findings indicate that people are tired of what they see as insufficiently accountable and ineffective institutions, both at national level – such as the police, customs and justice sectors – and international level, particularly with regards to EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The Government and institutions concerned must step up efforts to improve their credibility, in order to prevent further frustration and alienation from spreading.

People are hopeful that the talks between Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade will be constructive. However, they are also concerned that the outcome could put further strain on inter-ethnic relations, which could in turn lead to a deterioration of the security situation, or even renewed violent conflict. Such risks emphasise how important it is for this process to be carefully managed and clearly communicated to the population. Any 'fear mongering' for short-term political and populist gains from the side of political actors in Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade would be irresponsible and should be avoided. While fewer and fewer people think a new conflict is likely – a positive trend that has continued over the last years – the number of people who see such a likelihood as possible is still high (more than one third of the respondents) and indicates the limited trust people have in peace and stability in the region.

However, the survey also reveals some positive trends. The difference in perceptions regarding safety and security between ethnic groups is getting narrower. The number of Kosovo Serbs feeling unsafe continues to decline and a higher number of municipalities are described as 'very safe' or 'somewhat safe' places to live in. Key day-to-day safety and security concerns identified have less and less to do with the post-conflict situation or inter-ethnic tensions. Instead, they are mainly linked to poor infrastructure, traffic safety and environmental issues. High levels of crime are seen as less relevant than a year ago.

The presence of international actors is seen as a stabilising factor, although people voice (often sarcastic) criticism concerning what they perceive as international influence and interference in political decisions that should be taken by the Kosovo Government. In particular, EULEX continues to be criticised for performing below expectations. Surprisingly, this is not withstanding the fact that people increasingly think that the mission had a positive impact on the performance of key justice and security providers in the country.

The report begins with a brief overview on recent political developments in Kosovo and progress in the security sector to contextualise the findings. It then describes people's perceptions of trust in and satisfaction with security and justice providers and how people view their personal safety and security situation, both at local level and also with regard to developments at the political level. It concludes with a set of recommendations aimed at strengthening Kosovo's governing institutions and relevant supporting local and international agencies, namely:

Recommendations to the Government of Kosovo and its institutions

- **Take community concerns regarding the talks between Kosovo and Serbia into account.** The survey found that many people feel unsure about what the talks between Kosovo and Serbia might bring, what the results will be and how they will impact on their lives and security. Many have concerns that the security situation will deteriorate should the status of Northern Kosovo be put on the agenda, while others place a lot of hopes in its inclusion. Those participating in the talks should take these concerns into account. This implies that the Government needs to be well-informed about community concerns and challenges and at the same time, needs to communicate clearly and objectively which issues are put on the agenda, what has been discussed and what consequences this will have. Such action will avoid people getting frustrated or being indifferent about the talks and will counter the spread of rumours. This also means that it is important to refrain from using the talks as an opportunity for short-term political gains, especially on an ethno-nationalist basis, since this would run the risk of fuelling in unnecessary fear, or even tensions.
- **Continue to draft and further develop key safety and security legislation and strategies, using an inclusive and transparent approach.** The Government of Kosovo should draw on recent good examples, such as the drafting of the Community Safety Strategy,¹ as part of its commitment to transparency, inclusiveness and accountability. In future, when drafting key legislation and policies the process used should include equal and direct consultation with community representatives and NGOs, which would also help to regain trust.
- **Continue and strengthen support to municipal community safety structures.** Thanks to their composition, municipal community safety structures such as the Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSCs), which have representatives from different groups within society, are well placed to discuss and address a wide spectrum of security issues. The Government of Kosovo could allocate a specific budget for

¹ At the time of writing, the Government of Kosovo had entered into a process of consulting with representatives from security and justice as well as other key institutions, NGOs and experts in the framework of a three-day workshops (March/April 2011), and has agreed to a series of meetings with community representatives to get their feedback on and input into the Draft Community Safety Strategy.

community security initiatives and projects, such as awareness raising, public debates and community consultations on safety and security matters. In turn, MCSCs should be more proactive in reaching out to community members and make themselves and their roles better known, so that women, young people and minorities who might need extra encouragement to raise concerns, find them more approachable. In this respect, consideration should also be given as to whether and how socially sensitive issues, such as gender-based and domestic violence can be addressed.

- **Demonstrate that the Government and security and justice providers are serving the interests of all people living in Kosovo**, regardless of ethnic background, gender or location. It is important that these institutions respond to the criticism that at times their members discriminate against individuals or groups based on their ethnic identity or gender. Being seen to take such concerns seriously and responding to them, will reduce gaps in perceived levels of safety and security especially between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, which will help to increase trust and stability. In particular, security and justice institutions should adopt a zero-tolerance policy vis-à-vis ethnic or gender discrimination in law enforcement and the administration of justice, with clear sanctions for any violations to ensure that those policies are implemented.

Keep detailed records and statistics in security and justice provision that are ethnically and gender disaggregated and are monitored to ensure different ethnic groups and women and men receive equal services.

Introduce a regular independent performance evaluation of security and justice institutions and publish the results.

- **Improve performance in key sectors.** Findings from this survey should be seen as an incentive and commitment for justice and security providers to continue working on improving their performance in the key sectors identified and to step up efforts to improve their general performance and accountability. These sectors include:
 - **Accountable, transparent and timely security and justice provision.** People's lack of trust in security and justice providers stems largely from a perception that they are too slow and inefficient in their response. To regain trust, security and justice providers need to step up efforts to address those weaknesses and set themselves goals to improve performance. The KP should develop a police response plan and publicise its average response times. Furthermore, progress should be monitored and the results shared with the public. Positive developments, as well as initiatives to overcome challenges, should be communicated clearly.
 - **Confidentiality is crucial.** Findings clearly show that one main reason for people's limited trust in security and justice providers is the perceived lack of confidentiality and fears that community members and/or perpetrators will get information on reports made to the police. Clear policies are required to guarantee confidentiality as much as possible. These need to be clearly communicated to police officers, as well as to the public, and violations need to be sanctioned.
 - **Tackling corruption, a key obstacle to effective and efficient security provision.** It is an alarming development that many people perceive the police as corrupt. The Government must strengthen necessary measures to fight corruption among its own officials and within its institutions, including the security and justice sector. It should encourage and increase transparency and monitoring by independent actors. Allegations of corruption must be investigated and, where found to be true, prosecuted without exception. These efforts should be complemented by measures to create incentives for officials not to engage in any corrupt practices, to help curb and prevent such behaviour.
 - **Impartial security and justice provision free from political interference.** The Government of Kosovo and other institutions need to ensure and support impartial security and justice provision, free from political interference.

■ **Increase visibility in communities and strengthen police-community relationships.**

Positive steps have been made with community policing in the past, which seem to have had a positive impact on police-community relations. The fact that only a few respondents perceive police-community relations as improving, points to the importance of further strengthening those links. It needs to be ensured that the recent abolition of community-based police units, in favour of a more general approach that sees all police officers as interacting with communities, does not lead to reduced contact between the police and local communities. Instead, police officers assigned to specific geographic zones in the municipalities, should be encouraged to actively reach out to community members, including those that are usually more difficult to reach, such as young people or minority groups. Police officers need to make themselves known in order to build public confidence and constructive relationships. They should also have the authority and be prepared to respond instantly, where necessary, to needs and concerns raised by citizens. Adequate support regarding material and financial resources needs to be provided.

■ **Improve the processes for dealing with and solving domestic and gender-based violence cases.** According to the law in Kosovo, domestic and gender-based violence is a crime and should be treated as such.

- Security and justice providers should enforce the law and prosecute cases of gender-based and domestic violence.
- Public awareness of gender-based and domestic violence and of the legal rights of victims, as well as the services available, needs to be further increased.² The media, outreach efforts in schools and use of existing community-based policing initiatives are all potentially effective ways to reach the general public with such information.
- Human resource capacity to deal with these issues should be built up in security and justice institutions. A higher number of female police officers should be employed and all officers should receive targeted training on gender-based and domestic violence.
- It is important to provide appropriate infrastructure to support prevention and protect victims, e.g. safe places in police stations and reporting facilities that ensure anonymity, such as hotlines.

■ **Ensure that the draft school safety strategy is adopted and is properly implemented.**

As with other aspects of community security, multi-stakeholder and cross-ministerial involvement will be key to the strategy's successful implementation. Central and municipal institutions of the ministries and departments of education, health, youth and sports, police and justice, as well as social welfare and unemployment agencies, should be involved. As a second key pillar of success, a participatory approach to implementation is important. Civil society and in particular young people need to be involved in designing and implementing actions to improve school safety.

■ **Create an effective response to the increased interest in weapons acquisition.** The fact that more people than in the past would consider acquiring a weapon if they could and would feel safer having one at home, is concerning. The reasons for this trend are not clear. They may be linked to the lower level of security, or to the new Law on Weapons, which for the first time allows civilians to acquire small arms under certain circumstances. An early response is required in order to prevent any further increase in the number of people who want to own a weapon, and particularly of those who ultimately decide to acquire one, possibly illegally:

1. Urgent investigation is needed into the reasons why people, particularly young people, feel increasingly attracted to the thought of owning a gun.
2. The Government of Kosovo should place a stronger emphasis on enforcing the Law on Weapons and implementing arms control and collection strategies. The Government

² Op cit Qosaj-Mustafa and Farnsworth p 71

needs to increase its efforts in raising awareness of the dangers of civilians owning weapons and enhance the implementation of weapons control legislation. With regards to armed violence among young people, the Government of Kosovo needs to involve youth stakeholders and young people in developing SALW control measures and encourage them to become champions against SALW violence.

Recommendations to the international community

- **Double efforts to provide appropriate security and justice in Northern Kosovo.** The fact that people in Northern Kosovo continue to feel that they do not have appropriate security and justice provision is often overlooked in reports of this nature – partly because it has almost become the norm. Addressing and improving this situation within their mandate must once more become a priority for international, as well as for local, actors working on security and justice provision. Civil society can play a crucial role in this respect and need to be part of the consultation process.
- **Within the framework of its mandate, EULEX must demonstrate its commitment to strengthen the rule of law** and not shy away from taking on cases that are difficult or concern high-ranking officials. In spite of criticism against EULEX, many people appreciate the instances when the mission has taken decisive action against corruption. There is also a perception that EULEX contributes to improving the performance of local security and justice providers and that it should build on such positive feedback. EULEX should continue taking action within the framework of its mandate. To avoid being seen as politically motivated and selective in the cases it handles, action should be based on strict transparent criteria, which are communicated to the public. EULEX needs to continue efforts to increase accountability and transparency within its own ranks, for example by conducting regular staff performance evaluations and acting upon them.
- **Communication with the public remains a challenge that EULEX needs to be overcome.** In order to respond constructively to negative sentiments and campaigns against EULEX, efforts to reach out to communities regularly and in a way that is perceived as meaningful and transparent should continue. EULEX should regularly publicise progress on cases it is dealing with in a variety of different media, including TV, radio, newspaper and the internet. This should include the number of cases under investigation and the number of cases solved.
- **Support the Government of Kosovo and other national actors in taking the lead in the development of security and justice policies and legislation.** In order to gain trust and to enhance the effectiveness of security and justice provision, it is important that changes come from within. Initiatives such as the Community Safety Strategy should be driven by Kosovo Government actors, in participation with civil society and in a manner that is participatory and reflects local needs, rather than political agendas and programmes set up by external actors. While guidance and mentoring on technical issues is still required, it should be provided in a way that increasingly encourages local actors to take the lead and own the process, thus reducing reliance on external advisors.

Recommendations to and on civil society

- **Increase co-operation with civil society.** Civil society has a crucial role to play in shaping the future of Kosovo and in strengthening the democratic, accountable and transparent provision of the rule of law. In order to do this, civil society not only needs material support and favourable conditions in which to work, but it also needs to be taken seriously as a key stakeholder in processes related to justice and security provision. Civil society should be consulted and encouraged to provide analysis and opinions, so that their views and concerns are fully considered in the planning and developing of security and justice related policies and programming. The Government of Kosovo and international actors should seek ways to co-operate constructively with

CSOs in addressing the areas of common concern, but it should also accept, be open and responsive towards criticism and concerns that CSOs raise.

- **Civil society should take a stronger role in monitoring and demanding transparency and accountability.** People in Kosovo are dissatisfied with the poor performance of and corruption within state institutions. Civil society has started to develop expertise and to take action on these issues, but it should take an even stronger role in demanding transparency, accountability and performance improvement from the Government and its institutions and should monitor progress critically. At the same time, civil society should provide constructive support to help the Government to make further improvements in this direction. Co-ordination, co-operation and strategic planning and action are crucial in this regard.

1

Introduction

THIS REPORT ASSESSES safety and security perceptions among the population of Kosovo, with the overall goal of contributing towards the development of responsive, accountable and people-focused security and justice provisions in Kosovo. Data collection for this study was undertaken between October and December 2010 and findings have been validated since then through additional key informant interviews, undertaken until March 2011 by Saferworld with input provided by the Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ). This is the sixth in a series of assessments carried out since 2006 in the framework of the SafePlace project³, allowing for comparison over time. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) have funded this project.

In addition to investigating people's view on how safe and secure they feel and how that changes over time, this survey focuses on the access to, responsiveness of and performance of key security and justice institutions in Kosovo, particularly with regards to the Kosovo Police (KP), the judiciary, customs and the European Union's Rule of Law mission (EULEX). Respondents were asked about the trust they have in different security and justice providers, how satisfied they are with their performance and whether they see improvements over time, in areas such as the speed of proceedings, impartiality, confidentiality and reduction of corruption. The report also looks at the impact of local and regional dynamics on safety and security perceptions, such as the political and institutional crisis since the end of 2010 and the talks between Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade.

At a time of political instability, this report is intended to support national and international actors in their efforts to make security provision in Kosovo more effective and accountable and ensure they are based on local needs. This is even more important in a situation where trust in the government and its institutions and also in regional peace and stability is dwindling. Thus, the report draws the attention of national and international actors to the urgency required to address issues that will turn this trend around. The report starts with a brief update on recent developments in politics and the security sector to explain the context in which local perceptions need to be interpreted. It then describes people's views on a number of selected security and justice institutions, before presenting their perceptions of the security situation at local and national level. It concludes with a number of recommendations for consideration by the Government of Kosovo and its institutions, as well as international stakeholders involved in security and justice provision.

Quantitative and qualitative data deriving from household surveys and focus group discussions (FGDs) have been analysed (see annex for methodology). The data were

³ The previous tracker survey can be found on the websites www.saferworld.org.uk and www.safeplaceproject.org

collected in the period immediately running up to elections, a period of uncertainty which is very likely to have affected some of the responses.

Data have been disaggregated by age groups, gender, ethnic groups, and regions/municipalities. The category 'other ethnic groups/minorities' refers to all ethnic groups living in Kosovo that consider themselves neither Kosovo Albanian nor Kosovo Serbs. All place names identified in the report have been provided in the two official languages.

When comparing data over time, the report refers to previous perception surveys carried out by Saferworld and FIQ, mostly (unless otherwise mentioned) to the last perception survey, covering the period of autumn 2009 to mid-2010 and published in 2010.⁴

⁴ Thus, references to late 2009, or Autumn 2009 refer to the 2010 report, because most of the data were collected at the end of 2009.

2

Context: Recent political developments in Kosovo and progress in the security sector

The political crisis

LATE 2010 AND EARLY 2011 will be remembered as a period that not only strained relationships and trust between Kosovo and external actors, especially with the EU⁵, but also the trust that citizens of Kosovo have in their Government and institutions. The governmental crisis, initially caused by a legal matter related to the position of the President of Kosovo, has exposed deeper-lying tensions within the coalition, as well as between parties and individuals. In addition, structural problems have emerged linked to corruption, alleged crime and slow progress, particularly with regards to driving forward the European integration process and improving the rule of law. Key factors and developments in Kosovo and Brussels that have shaped this period include:

- **Local elections:** In May 2010, Kosovo-Serbs held local elections in two majority Serb municipalities in Northern Kosovo. The vote sparked violent protests in the divided town of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.
- **International Court of Justice ruling:** In June 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the declaration of independence by the Kosovo Assembly did not violate any applicable rule of international law. Since then, Kosovo has been recognised by five additional countries, making a total of 75 UN Member States, including 22 out of the 27 EU Member States.
- **United Nations General Assembly resolution:** In September 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that paved the way for a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, supporting an initiative particularly promoted by the EU and other international stakeholders. This process is considered to be a factor for peace, security and stability in the Balkan region.
- **Collapse of the Government of Kosovo:** In September 2010, the Constitutional Court in Prishtinë/Priština ruled that it was unconstitutional to hold the offices of President of Kosovo and Chairman/President of a political party at the same time. Following

⁵ In December 2010, a draft report by the Council of Europe became public, putting forward allegations that during the conflict in Kosovo the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) committed serious crimes against prisoners held by the KLA.

this ruling, the first since the declaration of independence, Kosovo's President, Fatmir Sejdiu, resigned. Shortly after that, Sejdiu's party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), pulled out of the government coalition with Hashim Thaçi's Kosovo Democratic Party (PDK), citing disagreements between the LDK and PDK as the reason. Following a vote of no confidence in the minority government, parliament was dissolved and early general elections were called for 12 December.⁶

- **Elections on 12 December 2010:** These were the first parliamentary elections in Kosovo since the declaration of independence in 2008. This was also the first electoral campaign in which the platforms, that political parties designed and competed for, focused on issues rather than personalities. The campaigns had strong TV coverage and debates largely concentrated on the potential for economic development and employment, international recognition of Kosovo's independence, progress towards EU integration and visa liberalisation, the international presence in Kosovo, strengthening of the rule of law and planned talks between Kosovo and Serbia. While the public campaign debates provided greater visibility and transparency, thereby improving the quality of the democratic process overall, they also led to unrealistic statements and promises by all parties on a rapid improvement in the situation in Kosovo.
- **Irregularities and fraud during the election process:** The elections themselves were marred by numerous complaints and reports of irregularities and fraud throughout the entire process. As a result, elections had to be repeated in five municipalities and this led to stark divisions and increased tensions, primarily between parties competing in the elections, but also in civil society.
- **Report by Council of Europe:** In December 2010, the provisional draft of the Council of Europe report 'Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo' became public. This report deals with crimes committed during the Kosovo war and allegations against a number of politicians in Kosovo including the Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci. It sparked harsh controversy among politicians, civil society and international actors, both within Kosovo and in the international arena.
- **Isolation of Kosovo:** Kosovo remains the only country in the region that is outside the EU visa liberalisation process, after Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the visa-free zone in December 2010. Slow progress towards EU integration and the lack of a unified position on Kosovo within the EU, which has resulted ambiguities in the mandate of the international presence in Kosovo, all contribute to disappointment and dissatisfaction among people in Kosovo.
- **Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia:** In March 2011, the first round of talks between Kosovo and Serbia commenced in Brussels. Failure to reach consensus between the government coalition and opposition parties on a joint resolution determining the dialogue with Serbia meant that the Kosovo delegation attended the first round of talks without the approval by the opposition parties in the assembly.
- **Protests against arrest of former KLA veterans:** In March 2011, EULEX and the KP arrested eight former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in an investigation relating to war crimes during the 1999 war in Kosovo, among them current MP and former Minister of Transport and Telecommunications, Fatmir Limaj. The arrests have been condemned by both the Government and the opposition and public protests were held across Kosovo after the arrests were made.
- **Unconstitutional election of the President and renewed political crisis:** On 22 February 2011, Behgjet Pacolli (Alliance for a New Kosovo, AKR) was elected President and Hashim Thaci (PDK) was re-appointed Prime Minister. Leading opposition parties the LDK, Vetëvendosje and the Alliance for the Future Kosovo (AAK), refused to

⁶ European Commission, 'Commission staff working document: Kosovo 2010 Progress Report, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011, [COM(2010)660] Brussels, 9 November 2010, SEC(2010)1329, p 7, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/ks_rapport_2010_en.pdf, April 2011

participate in the vote for the President and the Government of Kosovo and left the Assembly before voting started. One week later, the opposition parties filed a request to the Constitutional Court of Kosovo asking for its interpretation of whether the election of the President was in compliance with the Constitution. In late March, the Constitutional Court found the election of Behgjet Pacolli “unconstitutional”. Thus, Kosovo was plunged into a renewed constitutional crisis and political turmoil. On 6 April 2011, there was an agreement between the PDK, AKR and LDK on a joint candidate for the Presidency of Kosovo and changes they intend to make to the constitution and electoral law, that ended the political deadlock for the time being.

Further progress in the security sector

At the same time, Kosovo has made progress with regard to the development, adoption and implementation of security and small arms and light weapons (SALW) control legislation and strategic policy planning and reform:

- **Laws adopted and implementation started:** The Law on Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, the Law for the Trade of Strategic Goods, the Law on Weapons, Ammunition, and Relevant Security Equipment for Authorised State Security Institutions, and the Law on the Kosovo Security Force Reserve Component have been adopted and implemented.
- **Drafting of the Community Safety Strategy:** The Department of Public Safety, within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), has started the process of developing a Community Safety Strategy. It is expected that the strategy will be adopted later this year. So far, there seems to be commitment to consult a broad number of governmental and civil society actors.
- **Kosovo Police strategic development plan:** The KP has drafted a strategic development plan for 2011-2015 and adopted a Strategy and Action Plan on intelligence-led policing. At the same time, the KP is undergoing a structural reorganisation process and adopted a new organisational structure in March 2011 that is in full compliance with legislation and the strategic documents of the Government of Kosovo. The restructuring of the KP is aimed at increasing efficiency and effectiveness and fulfilling its mission.
- **Increasing responsibilities:** Kosovo institutions have gained more competencies from international security actors present in the country, as exemplified by the handover of policing responsibilities for Kosovo’s border with Albania and part of the border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) to the KP. As a result of improved security conditions, NATO has further reduced its KFOR troops. There are currently 8,700 troops in Kosovo, compared with an initial 50,000 in 1999.

3

Public perceptions of and attitudes towards security and justice actors and institutions

THIS CHAPTER ANALYSES which security and justice actors people trust and approach, how they rate their performance and efficiency and which challenges, if any, people encounter in approaching security and justice actors. Security and justice actors include the police, judiciary and customs, as well as international actors such as EULEX and KFOR. Respondents were particularly asked to assess the performance of the police, justice and customs in a number of selected categories. The main findings are outlined below:

- Overall, trust in security actors and institutions, both national and international, decreased considerably. Trust in the Government has also been affected.
- Levels of confidence in the KP show a significant drop compared with the previous year's survey. There is a perception of widespread corruption and nepotism among police officers. It is also considered that the police often lack the capacity to intervene; they are seen to arrive late when called to a crime scene and procedures for reporting a crime seem overly complicated and undermined by a perceived lack of confidentiality.
- Despite people's diminishing trust in the police, they are of the opinion that police work has improved since the last survey, albeit only a little. Remaining key challenges and shortcomings in their performance are; the speed of intervention, issues surrounding confidentiality and witness protection and co-operation between the police and the general public.
- Of all security providers the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) enjoys most trust, in particular from the Kosovo Albanians and non-Serbian minorities⁷, followed by the KP. Kosovo Serbs trust the police most, particularly Kosovo Serb Police Officers, although trust has also decreased among this group.
- The judiciary is trusted the least, because of flaws in witness protection and confidentiality mechanisms, as well as corruption and impartiality.

⁷ Owing to resource constraints, non-Serbian minorities in Kosovo were treated as one group of respondents in this survey. They include Turkish, Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians. For brevity, they are also referred to as 'other minorities' in this report.

- EULEX has not been able to gain people's trust in the last year. High expectations and disappointment in its performance have led to dissatisfaction. At the same time, and often in contradiction, people state increasingly that they think EULEX is contributing to a more secure environment.
- Of the international actors, KFOR remains the most trusted.

It comes as a surprise that the security and justice provider that has suffered the highest loss of trust is the KP. In previous years its performance was highly regarded. One reason why the police have been particularly hard hit could be because the KP was part of the political debate during the elections. The reaction of KP special units to Vetëvendosje protestors has been perceived as violence against citizens. Personnel changes at the highest level, after the resignation of the General Director of the KP, followed by the resignation of the Acting General Director, who joined the PDK, has not helped to regain people's trust. Trust in the KSF has also decreased with 50.1 percent of respondents in late 2010 trusting the KSF 'very much' or 'fully', compared with 76 percent in 2009. The two least trusted national institutions are the Kosovo Government and the judiciary, with 41.9 percent and 27.7 percent of all respondents respectively stating that they do not trust these two institutions at all. For the Government this figure was 22.8 percent in 2009 and for the judiciary it was 22.3 percent. It seems likely that factors affecting this reduction in trust, may include the turbulent political situation during the second half of 2010, high levels of corruption and the general economic situation, which is not considered to have improved much.

As in the last report, levels of trust in a given institution differ considerably between Kosovo Albanians and other ethnic groups, reflecting the political context within which these actors operate. According to percentages from the household survey, the Kosovo Serb population has the least trust in security institutions; 72.9 percent do not trust the Kosovo Government at all (more or less unchanged from a year ago), 71.4 percent do not trust the KSF at all (a slight improvement on 71.4 percent a year ago) and 56.7 percent do not trust the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) at all (an improvement on 71 percent in 2009). Although trust in the KIA has improved considerably, the figures are still overwhelmingly negative.

Figure 1a. Trust in institutions and security providers – comparison 2009 and 2010







Figure 1b. Trust in institutions and security providers (High levels of trust)**Figure 1c. Trust in institutions and security providers (Low levels of trust)**

Kosovo Police

While in the past, the KP has enjoyed the highest level of trust among the general population of all national security and justice providers, this year's survey showed a steep decline. In 2010, only 44.5 percent of all respondents trusted the KP 'very much' or 'fully', compared with 76.8 percent a year earlier. The number of respondents who trust the KP 'only a little' or 'not at all' has risen to 24.4 percent from 15.2 percent in 2009. Variations between ethnic groups are high, with Kosovo Serbs in particular having no or only little trust in the KP (71.4 percent), compared with 15.3 percent of Kosovo Albanians and 15.1 percent among other groups. Interestingly, trust among Kosovo Serbs in Serb KP officers also shows a decline. Only 18.7 percent trusted them 'very much' or 'fully', compared with 43.5 percent a year ago. Perceptions between male and female respondents hardly differ.

Figure 2. Perceptions on the performance of police



Not only has the KP lost a significant amount of trust, but also progress in its performance is seen to have slowed over the year. While overall, respondents continue to think that the police are doing their job better than in the past, people are frustrated by its weaknesses and poor performance. Only 46.9 percent of all respondents saw an improvement in the frequency of patrols, compared with 66 percent a year ago. FGD participants think that more frequent and visible patrols contribute to better security:

“...there are these foot patrols, who are more active in the streets, car patrolling police, so that I think that now safety/security of the population has improved. They keep walking on the streets, which are remote from town centre.”

Male, 18, other minorities, Prizren

Only 5.8 percent of respondents felt there had been an improvement in the respect with which police treat people. This compares with 43 percent in 2009, another significant drop. In responding to the statement that the police respond quicker to incidents than they have done in the past, just 6.8 percent of respondents agreed, compared with 39.4 percent in 2009.

People’s opinions of the performance of police officers in a number of given categories – timely response, procedures when reporting a crime, confidentiality, impartiality, corruption and community-police co-operation – were fairly mixed.

The KP is assessed as ‘very slow’ or ‘slow’ by 43 percent of respondents, while 44.5 percent regard its responses as ‘fast’ or ‘very fast’. FGDs indicated that negative opinions regarding the speed of police interventions are based on both experience and hearsay:

”...there was a case when somebody was in a fight. There was the police, and the police waited until the fight was over and then it intervened. You cannot rely on them.”

Male, 24, Kosovo Albanian, Gjilan/Gnjilane

“...you can make a pie or flia⁸ faster than the police coming to the scene.”

Female, 19, Gjakovë/Đakovica

A number of FGD participants highlighted the long and overly complicated procedures required when reporting a crime to the police. Participants felt too much time was taken up by giving personal details, although arguably these are vital data for the police. The reluctance in having to provide personal details when reporting a crime may well be linked to a perceived lack of confidentiality. Almost one quarter of respondents view the police as ‘not confidential at all’ or ‘not confidential’ (23.3 percent). This has implications for people’s general willingness to report a crime: many FGD participants stated that they would be hesitant to report cases, including cases of domestic violence, to the police because of a perceived lack of anonymity and fear of revenge. Respondents do not feel their identity would be sufficiently protected and that it might even be disclosed to those who they have reported against.

“...their anonymity cannot be guaranteed, and that’s why you don’t co-operate as you should. There is desire on the part of population, I am convinced about this, but for reasons of security, population has to be silent.”

Male, 53, Kosovo Albanian, Podujevë/Podujevo

“...[someone] happened to see a commercial premise being broken at the Technical Faculty. And he called the police...the police came at the scene, and caught the thieves. And the police called him [the guy who had called the police] for additional information or to give his statement... The Police put the thieves and the guy in the same car, and the police sent them to the police station at the same time, and the thief had seen the guy and threatened him that he would be out sometime, and when he gets out of there, he might have to deal with him.”

Male, 22, Kosovo Albanian, Prishtinë/Priština

Corruption and lack of impartiality are additional factors hampering people’s trust in the KP. Opinions on the level of corruption within the police are split: 37.3 percent regard the KP as being ‘fully corrupted’ or ‘corrupted’ (37.4 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 45.3 percent of Kosovo Serbs and 26.3 percent of other ethnic groups), and 39.6 percent of all respondents view the KP as ‘not corrupted’ or ‘not corrupted at all’. A high percentage of both Kosovo Albanians (44.9 percent) and other minority groups (40.2 percent) consider the police as ‘not corrupted’ or ‘not corrupted at all’, while only 15.8 percent of Kosovo Serbs share this opinion. With regards to impartiality,

37 percent of all respondents view the police as ‘totally partial’ or ‘partial’ (35.4 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 53.2 percent of Kosovo Serbs and 25.6 percent of other ethnic groups). Meanwhile at 50.6 percent, a marginal majority sees the KP as ‘impartial’ or ‘completely impartial’ (56.6 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 24.6 percent of Kosovo Serbs and 50.7 percent of other minorities).

Only 3.7 percent of all household survey respondents viewed the police as ‘working more with our community to solve our safety problems.’ Police-civilian co-operation is often seen as difficult or even non-existent. This might be a result of the police restructuring process, in the course of which the community policing units based in every police station were dissolved and replaced by designated police officers in charge of community policing. However, these police officers are assigned to a larger geographic zone within a municipality, which means that they might have less time to spend directly with communities and get involved in community activities. Furthermore, in the run-up to the elections, police officers spent a considerable amount of time working on security responsibilities related to the electoral campaign. Police priorities also seem to be focused more on intelligence-led policing – the prevention and reduction of organised crime, financial crime and border management. Hence, police-community co-operation has become less of a priority, whereas from the point of view of citizens, better co-operation would be welcomed:

“I think that police should be a little closer to citizens. There should be police controls in the city, when we know that there might be a crowd or somebody is beaten up but the police are nowhere.”

Male, 24, Kosovo Albanian, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica

Despite these reservations, the majority (88.1 percent) of all respondents would still be ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ to call the police if a crime was committed against them or their family. In line with the general decline in trust for the KP, this figure has decreased from 2009, when 98 percent of respondents said that they would report a crime to the police.

Judiciary

“Kosovo has some of the most beautiful laws in the world... if only they were implemented.”⁹


As in previous years, overall the justice sector comes off worse in people’s perceptions than any other national security and justice provider; 27.7 percent of respondents ‘do not trust the justice sector at all’ and 25.6 percent ‘a little’ (compared with 22.3 percent ‘not at all’, and 14.7 percent ‘a little’ in the previous survey). While Kosovo Serbs have the highest level of mistrust (52.2 percent), 25.5 percent of Kosovo Albanians and 7.9 percent of other ethnic groups do not trust the judiciary. Only 15.3 percent of all respondents trust the judiciary ‘very much’ or ‘fully’, compared with 40 percent in the last survey. The drop is most dramatic with Kosovo Albanians. Just 13.4 percent now trust the judiciary ‘very much’ or ‘fully’, a drop from 46.2 percent in Autumn 2009.

The justice sector is generally seen as being ineffective and very slow, due to a backlog of thousands of cases that have not yet been adjudicated and executed, while new cases accumulate.¹⁰ Among all respondents, 71 percent regard the performance of the justice sector as ‘very slow’ or ‘slow’, a view shared by all three respondent groups (80.4 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 51.2 percent of Kosovo Serbs and 42.1 percent of other minorities). The differences in perception between ethnic groups may result from the fact that Kosovo Albanians are more likely to file cases and thus are more likely to experience delays.

⁹ Qosaj-Mustafa A and Farnsworth N, *More than “Words on Paper?”* The response of justice providers to domestic violence in Kosovo, prepared for the Kosova Women’s Network,, (Prishtina, Kosovo United Nations Development Programme, 2009), p 13, www.womensnetwork.org/images/pdf/Women's_Network_eng.pdf, April 2011

¹⁰ USAID, Kosovo Judicial Council approves landmark National Backlog Reduction Strategy, (November 2010), www.drejtesia-ks.org/?cid=2,15,127, April 2011

Figure 3. Perceptions on the performance of the justice sector



“I think that judges are very small in numbers, while there are lots of case files. Even if you have a case file submitted to the court, you’ll have to wait for several years in order for it to be concluded. The number of judges should increase as well as the space where they can work.”

Male, 29, Ashkali, Prizren

Responses were mixed when people were asked how confident they were that their case would be resolved and the perpetrator brought to justice, should they or a member of their family become a victim of crime; 42.9 percent of all respondents were

‘not very confident’ or ‘not confident’ at all, while 32 percent were ‘somewhat confident’ or ‘very confident’. A look at the regions highlights differences of opinion depending on where people live; 56.9 percent of respondents from Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and 50.8 percent from Prishtinë/Priština are ‘not confident’ or ‘not confident at all’ that the judiciary would solve their case, whereas respondents in Ferizaj/Uroševac, hold the reverse opinion, with 68 percent ‘very confident’ or ‘somewhat confident’ that the judiciary would solve their case.

Regarding impartiality, the justice sector has a poor reputation. More than half the respondents (53.8 percent) think that the judiciary is ‘totally partial’ or ‘partial, with only 2.6 percent regarding it as ‘completely impartial’. These trends are reflected in ethnicity-based analysis. The majority of Kosovo Albanians (60.7 percent), and 43.9 percent of Kosovo Serbs think that the judiciary is ‘totally partial’ or ‘partial’. By contrast, among other ethnic groups the largest percentage (46.7 percent) stated that the judiciary is ‘impartial’ or ‘completely impartial’. Again, this difference may result from the fact that other ethnic groups rarely file cases and thus do not have negative experiences with the justice sector. At times ethnic minorities feel discriminated against:

“No [I’m not satisfied with the work of courts], because here with the judges, an opinion still prevails that if a member of a certain ethnic community comes, he committed a violation and he is automatically found guilty...If the name and the surname are of a specific ethnic origin they impose a fine to you immediately. You complain, but the procedure may last up to five years and you have to pay these 300 Euros...It’s not just the fine, but also all other sanctions.”

Male, 40, Kosovo Serb, Graçanicë/Gračanica FGD participant

Of all respondents, 61.5 percent said that they view the courts as ‘fully corrupted’ or ‘corrupted’. By ethnicity, 70.1 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 41.4 percent of Kosovo Serbs and 37.5 percent of other minority groups view the justice sector as ‘fully corrupted’ or ‘corrupted’.

“I...think that the biggest problem that is hidden there are bribe and corruption; this is the biggest problem in the judiciary. There are cases which drag on for years, and which are not resolved due to judges’ interests, and concretely because of corruption.”

Female, 18, Bosniak, Prizren

Opinions are rather mixed when it comes to confidentiality. Of all respondents, 34 percent would assess the performance of the justice sector as ‘not confidential at all’ or ‘not confidential’ and 32.9 percent assessed it as ‘confidential’ or ‘fully confidential’. While 41.4 percent of Kosovo Serbs state that they ‘don’t know’, 16.7 percent regard the judiciary as ‘not confidential at all’ or ‘not confidential’ and 32.5 percent see it as ‘confidential’ or ‘fully confidential’. Among Kosovo Albanians, 40.2 percent rate the justice sector as ‘not confidential at all’ or ‘not confidential’, while 31.4 percent view it as ‘confidential’ or ‘fully confidential’. The majority of other minorities (42.8 percent) view this sector as ‘confidential’ or ‘fully confidential’, while 21.1 percent consider it as ‘not confidential at all’ or ‘not confidential’.

“...What needs to be done in order for that fear to disappear, first of all there needs to be improved work of the police, military, and still other factors which are a necessary prerequisite to improve work of the judiciary.”

Male, 19, other ethnic minorities, Prizren

Customs


Trust in the customs sector is generally low, with 24.4 percent of all respondents trusting customs ‘not at all’ and 21.3 percent ‘a little’. Trust varies among the three ethnic groups with 19.6 percent Kosovo Albanians, 53.2 percent Kosovo Serbs and 13.8 percent of respondents from other ethnic groups stating they do not trust customs at all.

“We have customs in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, and they are not functioning at all. EULEX came here, with the intention to establish customs as well. Customs are not there. Border

lines in Kosovo are in the middle of nowhere. Nobody guards them. I am not in favour of this for the time being, because there is no security. Law is not guaranteed."

Male, 24, Kosovo Albanian, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica

Figure 4. Perceptions on the performance of customs



Whether or not customs are trusted varies between regions, and very much depends on the geographical location of the respondents, or those who travel a lot and have personal experience in dealing with this sector. The regions with the least trust in customs are those close to the borders. In Ferizaj/Uroševac, 60 percent 'do not trust customs at all'

or ‘just a little.’ In Mitrovicë/Mitrovica the figure is 52.9 percent, and in Peja/Peç it is 49.3 percent, whereas only 16.6 percent and 16.2 percent respectively trust customs ‘fully’ or ‘very much.’ Trust levels are highest in Gjakovë/Đakovica and Prizren.

Corruption is perceived to be endemic among the customs sector, with more than half of all household survey respondents (50.7 percent) viewing it as ‘fully corrupted’ or ‘corrupted.’ When asked how participants would assess the performance of the customs in terms of impartiality, Kosovo Albanians and other ethnic groups were split between ‘partial’ and ‘impartial’, while the majority of Kosovo Serb respondents view the sector as being ‘partial.’ Only a minority of all respondents from all three ethnic groups think that customs are ‘totally partial’ or ‘totally impartial.’ Statements from FGDs show that corruption and partiality are probably the main problems that participants have experienced with customs. Customs officials are perceived to conduct random searches at border crossings and to change their mind quickly on an issue with the help of a few Euros.

“I think that there is a huge corruption and that they sell themselves for a Euro, two Euros for cigarettes, and for everything else.”

Female, 21, Graçanicë/Gračanica

“I think that customs officers are very corrupted... There was a BMW X6 if I am not wrong, and [the driver] gave one of the customs’ officers, together with the ID card and driver’s licence, 50 Euros and passed the border without having to wait, as there was a crowd, and one would need to wait at least half an hour there.”

Male, 18, other minorities, Prizren

Corruption within the customs sector facilitates the easy and unobstructed passage of illegal substances, as well as humans, across the border:

“There is import of illegal things, meaning human trafficking, drugs, alcohol, and for all of this they don’t pay customs taxes, and it enters Kosovo. Then we have problems with registration of drug addicts in both Kosovo and the region.”

Male, 19, other minorities, Prizren

“I live...nearby a Serb cemetery. Customs are located there, and we are aware of the developments there. We know it very well who does smuggling, we know cars, plates and we all know it, sometimes they let them go, sometimes they stop them. They stop it, when there is nothing, just to confirm to the neighbourhood that they are stopping them. When it is loaded they don’t stop it at all. They pretend like that they don’t see it, or something. They would sanction you due to some small bottles with petrol, while they would let go those with 2,000-3,000 litres.”

Male, 30, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica

There is however one positive development; half of all respondents (50.1 percent), as well as a significant part of all ethnic groups (54.8 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 36.9 percent of Kosovo Serbs, and 39.5 percent of other minorities) see an improvement when it comes to treating people with respect.

“...I have full trust on the border police. They would ask you for the ID card and they check it on the computer, and should a person be a suspect the light would turn on the computer and at the centre. Even if a customs police is corrupt, the police would stop him as a suspected person. The work is going pretty well, apart from those border crossing points in Mitrovicë-Mitrovica.”

Female, 37, Kosovo Albanian, Junik

“I travel a lot, I cross the border at Jarinje border crossing point, I travel by car, they mainly ask you whether you have anything to declare, we say no, and they let us pass.”


Female, 19, Kosovo Serb, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North

EULEX

People have mixed, and partly contradictory, feelings with regard to EULEX – some would like the mission to take more decisive executive action, particularly over corruption. At the same time, recent executive action by EULEX – namely the arrests of former KLA fighters – triggered widespread street protests calling for EULEX to focus strictly on its monitoring, mentoring and advisory functions. EULEX is thus faced with mixed and partly contradictory expectations. This may also be an indicator of people’s frustration with a perceived lack of effectiveness in the way the rule of law is currently administered by a mix of national and international actors in Kosovo. It also shows that tackling issues such as corruption or organised crime generally has more public support than dealing with the past and war related crimes.

Not only has EULEX not been able to gain people’s trust, but people felt even more disappointed in late 2010 that the expectations they had in EULEX have not been fulfilled, than they did a year earlier. Trust in EULEX is low, with 47 percent of all respondents trusting it ‘not at all’ or ‘a little’, and only 20.5 percent trusting it ‘fully’ or ‘very much’ In 2009, 41.8 percent had ‘no trust’ or ‘only a little trust’ in EULEX, while 33.6 percent trusted it ‘very much’ or ‘fully’. Slightly more men than women distrust the mission (50.1 percent and 43.5 percent respectively), while mistrust is highest among 18 to 29-year olds, with 53.5 percent saying they do not trust EULEX at all or only ‘a little’.

Figure 5. Trust in EULEX



There are significant regional differences. Prishtinë/Priština, where 55.9 percent of the population trust EULEX ‘only a little’ or ‘not at all’ and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, where the figure is 66.7 percent are the two regions where EULEX is least trusted. The region where people have most trust in EULEX (30 percent) is Gjakovë/Đakovica. The mistrust stems from frustration with the unclear EULEX mandate and also failure to prosecute cases of high-level corruption. While there may be some misperceptions about what EULEX can or cannot do, respondents blame EULEX for slow progress, particularly in the administration of justice.

“Until now I only have noticed that EULEX holds conferences, complaints and promotions about how they work, problems with which they deal, and literally I haven’t seen that they took any problems in their hands.”

Male, 18, Bosniak, Prizren

Where EULEX has taken decisive steps against corruption at higher levels of government, it is perceived by many focus group participants as positive and people

are disappointed that this attitude and commitment has been fairly short-lived. There was a desire to see more such action:¹¹

“I would like to see it as we had seen 4-5 months ago on TV. To put an end to corruption, as it started, but not to stop.”

Female, 37, Kosovo Albanian, Junik

In spite of these negative perceptions, more people think that EULEX has contributed positively to improving the work of key security and justice providers than it did a year ago, although figures demonstrate that opinions remain polarised about its added value. When asked whether or not they agree with the statement that “EULEX is contributing towards the rule of law in Kosovo”, 52.9 percent of all respondents ‘agree’ or ‘completely agree’ – slightly more than in 2009 (48.3 percent), whereas 34.8 percent ‘disagree’ or ‘completely disagree’. When respondents are viewed by ethnicity, 51.4 percent of Kosovo Albanians ‘agree’ and 39.5 percent of other minorities ‘agree’, while 48.3 percent of Kosovo Serbs ‘completely disagree’.

General opinion of the involvement of EULEX in improvements in police work and the judiciary is fairly positive. When asked for their opinion on the contribution of EULEX to improving the quality of the work of the police, more than half (57.1 percent) of all respondents state ‘very good’ or ‘somewhat good’ (compared with 46.9 percent in 2009). The Kosovo Albanian population (at 62.7 percent) follow this trend, as do the other minorities (73.7 percent), whereas 43.3 percent of the Kosovo Serb population regard the contribution of EULEX as ‘very poor’.

When asked for opinions on the contribution of EULEX to improving the quality of the work of the judiciary, opinions are split: 42.3 percent of respondents see it as ‘very good’ or ‘somewhat good’ (compared with 36 percent in 2009), while 44.7 percent regard it as ‘somewhat poor’ or ‘very poor’. For 44.6 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 67.1 percent of other minorities and only 13.3 percent of Kosovo Serbs, the contribution of EULEX to improving the quality of work of the judiciary is seen as ‘very good’ or ‘somewhat good’, while 42.4 percent of Kosovo Albanians and 27 percent of other minorities see it as ‘somewhat poor’ or ‘very poor’. Nearly half (49.8 percent) of the Kosovo Serb population regards the contribution of EULEX to improving the justice sector as ‘very poor’.

Opinions are also split with regards to the customs sector: 35.6 percent think EULEX makes a ‘good’ or ‘very good’ contribution (compared with 30.1 percent in 2009), and 40.4 percent see it as ‘somewhat poor’ or ‘very poor’. Non-Serbian minorities hold the most positive opinion, with 58.5 percent stating that the contribution was ‘good’ or ‘very good’, followed by Kosovo Albanians (36.5 percent) and Kosovo Serbs (14.3 percent). Again, Kosovo Serbs are the most critical respondents, with 67 percent viewing the contribution EULEX has made as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ (compared with 36.5 percent of Kosovo Albanians and 27.6 percent of other ethnic groups). One positive point is that more than half of the respondents (51.3 percent) ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that EULEX contributes to fighting corruption.

Asked whether EULEX should leave Kosovo, proportions have changed from 2009. Across all respondents, the number who ‘completely agreed’ or ‘agreed’ has fallen to 39 percent, from 47 percent in 2009 (38.5 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 48.7 percent of Kosovo Serbs and 28.9 percent of other ethnic groups). Today, 42.4 percent of all respondents (32.4 percent in 2009), 43.6 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 18.5 percent of Kosovo Serbs and 47.4 percent of other ethnic groups ‘disagree’ or ‘completely disagree’.

According to EULEX, the “mission is providing transparent and timely information on the mission’s activities to Kosovo’s civil society, journalists and people on a daily basis.

¹¹ At the same time, protest and initiatives organised by civil society organisations show that this opinion is not shared by everyone all of the time. In many cases where EULEX took action, such as when arrest warrants were issued in March 2011 against former KLA members accused of war crimes, the mission is perceived as selective and political. See: Norway official Kosovo site, Peaceful protest against the EULEX arrest of former KLA members, (23 March 2011), www.norway-kosovo.no/News_and_events/Peaceful-Protest-against-the-Eulex-arrest-of-Fatmir-Limaj/, April 2011

The EULEX website is a vital tool for this”.¹² While this is very important, it seems to be somewhat aspirational. Statements from FGDs show that the majority of participants still do not feel adequately informed. The information provided by EULEX does not appear to reach everywhere in Kosovo. Many people, particularly in rural areas, do not use the internet and hence cannot access information provided on the website. More coverage by mainstream media about the concrete results from its work would help demonstrate to the broader public how EULEX adds value. The lack of visibility makes it difficult for people to understand and trust what EULEX is doing. EULEX seems to be aware of its poor transparency and has recently undertaken a number of steps to increase public outreach.¹³

“I do not know at all what did EULEX do and what are they doing, they are simply not present with events, they are nowhere to be found.”

Female, 19, Kosovo Serb, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North

“...as far as EULEX is concerned, you can see them only when they pass through your place in a jeep. I even don't know where their office is and where could people address them in case of problems.”

Male, 32, Kosovo Serb, Graçanicë/Gračanica

Regarding co-operation with central and local administration and citizens, many respondents perceive EULEX to work from the top-down rather than from the bottom-up. They would like to see more interaction with the people.

“Co-operation is in favour of the government and in disfavour of the community, and this is what we don't like.”

Female, 37, Kosovo Albanian, Junik

EULEX is perceived to be co-operating better with central government than at local government level. The majority (55.1 percent) of all household respondents ‘completely agree’ or ‘agree’ that EULEX “co-operates well” with the central Government of Kosovo, while only 25.2 percent ‘disagree’ or ‘completely disagree’. The data for ethnic groups show 58.6 percent of Kosovo Albanians, 37.4 percent of Kosovo Serbs and 57.9 percent of other minorities ‘completely agree’ or ‘agree’. However, when asked whether they ‘agreed’ or ‘disagreed’ with the statement that EULEX co-operates well with authorities in their local area, opinions are more divided: 36 percent of all respondents ‘completely agree’ or ‘agree’, 30 percent ‘do not know’, while 31.1 percent ‘disagree’ or ‘completely disagree’. Among other minorities and Kosovo Albanians, 46.1 percent and 39.1 percent respectively ‘completely agree’ or ‘agree’, while a little over half of Kosovo Serbs (54.7 percent) ‘disagree’ or ‘completely disagree’.

KFOR

KFOR has kept pole position with regard to levels of trust among Kosovo's citizens. As in previous surveys, KFOR enjoys the highest levels of trust among the international actors. Nearly half of all respondents (47.6 percent) trust KFOR ‘very much’ or ‘fully’, a trend reflected among Kosovo Albanians and non-Serbian minority groups, with 53.9 percent and 67.1 percent respectively trusting KFOR ‘very much’ or ‘fully’. By contrast, an overwhelming majority (75.4 percent) of Kosovo Serbs trust KFOR ‘not at all’ or ‘a little’.

The data are reflected in statements from the FGDs. As in previous surveys, KFOR troop reductions are generally seen as a positive step, but there are also underlying fears of what this could mean in terms of security.

¹² EULEX Accountability, (2010), p 2 www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/Accountability/EULEX-Accountability-05.01.2010.pdf, April 2011

¹³ EULEX held a series of workshops with local civil society on the programmatic approach, introducing the latest results on monitoring, mentoring and advising activities to 35 Kosovo NGOs and outlining its current priorities. A new tool, the MMA tracking mechanism was launched on the mission's website on the same day. This tool will enable civil society and public opinion to follow the pace of implementation of each MMA initiative across the mission's three components. The EU mission's Public Outreach Campaigns include TV adverts on police ('organised crime'), justice ('prosecutions') and customs ('smuggling'), as well as a billboard on integration.

“[I feel] Very bad...Even if EULEX stays here, we don’t see any results from its work. KFOR so far was not corrupted, and I see it as a very important factor and it co-operated a lot with the community. We have central heating as a donation from the Italian community, made possible by Italian KFOR...If KFOR leaves, then we have to deal with Mitrovicë/Mitrovica ourselves.”

Female, 37, Junik

“I think that KFOR’s mission in Kosovo is finished. I think that it is EULEX now and we also have our police, our bodies, and it doesn’t make me feel unsafe.”

Female, 25, Podujevë/Podujevo

“As far as reduction of number of KFOR members is concerned I see it as a positive thing. The main reason for the time being is that security in Kosovo is good. As long as number of international members in general is small, it implies that Kosovo is safe/secure.”

Male, 24, Kosovo Albanian, Gjilan/Gnjilane

4

Public perceptions on security and personal safety

THIS SECTION ANALYSES people's perceptions of security and safety a local level, but also with regard to developments at political level. The main findings on security and personal safety are summarised below:

- Feelings of safety, security and overall stability have suffered from the political/governmental crisis in Kosovo in late 2010. This concerns perceptions of everyday safety and security, as well as the level to which people trust in and are satisfied with the performance of government institutions and justice and security providers. People also feel that the political situation is one of the most relevant reasons for a potential renewed outbreak of conflict.
- The talks between Kosovo and Serbia are seen by a sizable part of the population as a chance for improvement in the situation, but others fear that the outcome could put further strain on inter-ethnic relations within Kosovo. Overall, a substantive number of people still think that violent conflict may be likely during the coming five years.
- People have the impression that youth violence, both on the street and in schools, and often involving cold weapons, such as knives, clubs or even guns, has increased. This was raised as a matter of concern by a large number of focus group participants.
- While overall perceptions of day-to-day public safety and security have slightly deteriorated, the perception of safety by the Kosovo Serb population has improved when compared with the previous survey.
- Safety and security concerns ranked by respondents have moved away from conventional security issues. Traffic problems and pollution rank highest on the list of concerns, overriding for the first time high crime levels (now in fifth place).
- There are hardly any differences between the safety and security perceptions of men and women, except when it comes to possession of weapons, where more women than men say they would not feel safer having a gun at home. Although percentages in the household surveys indicate low levels of domestic violence – both with male and female respondents – it is nevertheless an issue of great concern for the majority of FGD participants.
- People remain hesitant to discuss the use and ownership of weapons. Just under half of the total respondents claimed that they would not feel safer with a weapon in

their house. The amount of people reporting to never hear gunshots during the year has doubled since 2009. However, there is evidence that young people find weapons increasingly attractive.

People feel less safe and secure


People's perception of safety and security has deteriorated when compared with the previous survey. Although most respondents indicated that they feel safe in the area where they live – 45 percent feeling 'very safe', 32.3 percent 'somewhat safe' – these percentages have decreased when compared with 2009 (46.4 percent felt 'very safe' and 42.9 percent 'somewhat safe').¹⁴ Statements of FGD participants indicate that this drop in perceived safety and security may be attributed to the rather turbulent and unstable political situation in the second half of 2010, at exactly the time when the data were collected.

"I believe that politics now, this mis-governance that brought us to point zero, hopefully is going to change after 12 December's Election. Now it depends, if we have a right government, with the right people in power, we would have security."

Female, 22, Kosovo Albanian, Prishtinë/Priština

The gap in safety and security perceptions between Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic groups has decreased further, with 76.3 percent of Kosovo Serbs feeling 'very safe' or 'somewhat safe' in the neighbourhood that they live in, compared with 70.5 percent in the previous survey and 56.6 percent in December 2008.¹⁵ A number of factors may have contributed to this positive trend: the participation of Kosovo Serb political parties in the December 2010 elections, progress with the decentralisation process, the establishment of new municipalities and some investment in infrastructure in these municipalities, including services closer to the people. However, more research is needed in order to identify the precise factors that contribute to the Kosovo Serb population feeling safer. The number of Kosovo Serbs who felt 'very unsafe' or 'somewhat unsafe' in their neighbourhood has fallen to 3.9 percent in 2010, from 11 percent in 2009 and 24.5 percent in 2008.

Figure 6. Neighbourhoods considered as 'safe' or 'somewhat safe'




¹⁴ Saferworld, *A Matter of Trust*, (2010), www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/A%20matter%20of%20trust_ENG_WEB.pdf, April 2011

¹⁵ *ibid* p 8

The household survey identified several municipalities as particularly safe areas, where over 90 percent of respondents described their neighbourhood as 'very safe' or 'somewhat safe'. Hani Elezit, Kacanik/Kaçanik, Deçan/Deçane. Podujeva/Podujevo and Malishevë/Mališevo are small municipalities with a strong Albanian majority, while Graçanicë/Gračanica, Kllokot/Klokot and Ranillug/Ranilug are small municipalities with a Serb majority and were only established after the decentralisation process and local elections and Novobërdë/Novo Brdo has a mixed community. These municipalities have very different characteristics indicating that how safe people feel does not depend on the specific ethnic composition of the municipality, or its geographic location. In 2010, no municipality was perceived to be 'unsafe' or 'somewhat unsafe' by the vast majority of respondents. This is a significant improvement compared with past surveys. For example, in 2010, only 8.0 percent of respondents in the municipality of Zveçan/Zvečan perceived their neighbourhood to be 'unsafe', whereas the 2007 perception study revealed that the vast majority of residents felt unsafe. This contrasts with the vast majority of respondents in Zveçan/Zvečan (80 percent) in 2010, who regard their neighbourhood as 'somewhat safe'.

Three-quarters (75 percent) of all respondents feel that levels of safety have remained the same when compared with those six months ago, while 15.8 percent said safety levels have improved (compared to 19.4 percent in 2009). Only 3.5 percent of all respondents said that safety levels have got worse. This trend can be observed across all ethnic groups.

Figure 7. Comparison of the change perceived levels of safety in neighbourhoods over six months



Safety and security concerns no longer dominated by crime and conflict

Day-to-day safety and security concerns have shifted slightly since the previous security perception study was conducted. Key concerns are moving away from post-conflict issues, such as weapons-related and inter-ethnic problems, but also from conventional security concerns that the police deal with, such as crime. This suggests a process of normalisation in everyday life in Kosovo. The household survey asked what respondents' see as the most serious safety and security issue for their community and the following concerns came out clearly as priorities:

Traffic problems: Among all respondents, 36.5 percent state 'traffic problems' as the first serious security issue their community faces. When compared to data from previous years (26.5 percent in 2009, 14.4 percent in 2008 and 14.3 percent in 2007), this issue has clearly increased in importance. Unsafe roads, poor street lighting and a rise in traffic accidents in recent years are all contributing factors.


Pollution: Increased awareness and concern about environmental pollution have raised this issue to rank as the second most serious issue facing communities. The survey data show 35.3 percent of respondents consider this a serious concern, compared with 21 percent in 2009. This increase may be due to debates between the political parties and civil society organisations on more environmentally sustainable energy policies before and during the elections¹⁶

Dangers posed by stray dogs: Stray dogs are a regional phenomenon encountered in many countries in the Western Balkans and has been ranked as third most serious security issue, being mentioned by 33.7 percent of all respondents. This is a significant increase from previous years – 12.8 percent in 2009, 9.7 percent in 2008 and 4.4 percent in 2007¹⁷.

Poor infrastructure: Municipalities and villages in Kosovo generally lack infrastructure, even though a lot of construction and improvement has been made, and this remains a key concern (28.5 percent). Again, infrastructure was one of the issues of public debate during the election process. Mitrovicë/Mitrovoica North has a problem with unsafe manholes¹⁸ and kiosks.¹⁹

Crime: As a perceived security risk, crime has decreased in importance for the first time and ranks in fifth place. Only 14.4 percent of respondents claim it is a serious concern. This is a significant decrease, especially when compared with previous years: 23 percent in 2009, 21 percent in 2008, and 19.1 percent in 2007.²⁰ Crime is of particular concern to the Kosovo Serb population, with 30 percent identifying it as a major problem, whereas only 15.1 percent of other ethnic minority respondents and 10.8 percent of Kosovo Albanians follow suit. Robberies and theft are the most commonly reported types of crime.

Figure 8. Types of crime that occur frequently in communities²¹



While no longer featuring as a priority concern for safety and security, inter-ethnic tensions and grievances from the war remain high. FGD respondents indicate that at times only a spark is needed to create bigger tensions. Even apolitical events, such as football or basketball matches, are being politicised and ethnicised and sometimes end up in violent clashes between members of different ethnic groups. Such incidents have also been witnessed in other countries in the region, that have experienced war

¹⁶ Current and future plans by the Government of Kosovo are to use lignite for energy production. Opponents have pointed out that the existing power plant is causing serious pollution, and that the Government of Kosovo should seek alternative energy resources and develop a strategy that contributes towards reducing the CO2 emissions.

¹⁷ Op cit Saferworld p 10

¹⁸ The lids of manholes get stolen and sold as scrap metal/iron. The manholes remain uncovered and pose a serious security risk for people. In one municipality, a person fell into a manhole and died.

¹⁹ Newspaper kiosks are constructed of metal and/or timber on the sidewalks, making it impossible for people to walk in the dedicated pedestrian area, and forcing them to walk on the road instead.

²⁰ Op cit Saferworld p 9

²¹ The figures that make up these percentages derive from data collected in relation to survey questions 17 (1-5) "To the best of your knowledge, what types of crime occur frequently in your community?" of the data.

and where inter-ethnic reconciliation has been weak.²² These incidents illustrate how fragile and unstable the situation still is. Provocations are taken advantage of and can at times escalate.

The fact that safety and security priorities are increasingly related to public infrastructure and service provision, underlines the need to involve a broad range of actors in addressing community security issues. This has been taken into consideration when setting-up the Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSCs), instituted in 2009 through an Administrative Instruction²³ from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and Ministry of Local Government Administration (MLGA). The MCSCs include representatives from the municipal administration (the mayor), the municipal police station, religious and ethnic communities living in the municipality, civilian emergency management structures and civil society (including women, youth, the media, etc). The MIA has also reacted to this need by drafting a Community Safety Strategy that is directed not only at the MIA and conventional security and justice providers, but also at a wide range of actors from different ministries and civil society. A cross-section of stakeholders from key ministries, CSOs and international actors are involved in creating the draft.

Such measures highlight the potentially important role of MCSCs. Yet their visibility and that of other local safety and security bodies such as Community Safety Action Teams (CSATs) and Local Public Safety Committees (LPSCs) is very low. Although these actors have been present for a number of years, both quantitative and qualitative data from the perception study highlight that most respondents are not aware of these structures. An explanation for this might be that people are confused by the myriad of different structures, their mandates and last but not least, their names. The names of these structures are translated into Albanian and other local languages from English and often their translation makes little sense to local people. This lack of awareness is a concern. Given the MCSCs, LPSCs and CSATs were set up with the aim of identifying and responding to the different security needs and threats that people face in their communities, it is vital for their success that citizens know that they exist and can approach them.

Table 1: Respondents' knowledge of MCSCs, LPSCs and CSATs

	Yes (of total respondents)	No (of total respondents)
Have you heard of Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSC)?	9.6%	87.9%
Have you heard of Local Public Safety Committees (LPSC)?	6.2%	90.8%
Have you heard of Community Safety Action Teams (CSAT)?	4.9%	92.3%

The household survey shows low percentages for the occurrence of domestic and gender-based violence. Only 3.3 percent of all respondents regard domestic violence as a type of crime that occurs frequently in their community. When asked 'How many times (if any) have you or a member of your family been a victim of the following types of crime, in the last six months? Domestic violence' 94.4 percent of all respondents state 'never', with 0.3 percent of men and 0.2 percent of women responding 'once', and 0.4 percent of men responding 'twice' (no respective figure for women is available). During 2010 there were 11 reported cases of men being victims of violence caused by their spouses, but also a large number of cases of violence among men.²⁴

²² For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing similar problems. Mostar was an extreme example, with matches between the two local teams Velež and Zrinjski often leading to clashes between young men from opposite sides of the city, usually curbed by extensive police presence.

²³ Administrative Instruction No. 08/2009 MIA – 02/2009 MLGA for Municipal Community Safety Councils

²⁴ Written correspondence with Executive Director of the Kosovar Gender Studies Center, 10 March 2011

The highest figures can be found among the non-Serbian minority respondents, of which 1.3 percent said they have experienced domestic violence ‘once’ and 2.0 percent ‘twice’.

Despite these low percentages, the FGDs indicate that this issue is of great concern to a large number of respondents. Awareness that domestic violence is a crime is not yet widely acknowledged and more work remains to be done in this regard.²⁵ At the same time, it is not a subject that is raised and talked about easily, because of feelings of shame and fear of revenge.

Factors that prevent victims from talking about domestic and gender-based violence, or reporting such cases to the police include:²⁶

- **Cultural factors:** These include patriarchal structures and strong, traditional family roles.

“I think that our environment is considered patriarchal, we still have this stereotype that a man is a head of the household and he enjoys all rights over children, over his wife, and therefore a woman approves when her husband ill treats her and her children, because she deems and even blames herself for something like that. That is wrong of course.”

Female, 19, Kosovo Serb, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North.

- **Concerns over the lack of confidentiality:** When reporting domestic violence, concerns over the lack of confidentiality play a vital role in keeping this topic ‘taboo’. Fear of gossiping, as ‘everybody knows everybody’, is a powerful deterrent for victims to talk about their experiences. In the household survey a large number of respondents stated that they would be hesitant to report cases to the police because of fear of revenge, stigmatisation and humiliation if details of the case were to be known to others.

“...There isn’t any family that is within a town, which reports domestic violence within a family. It is not certain that its data shall remain confidential. It is sure well in advance that information would be spread throughout the town. This way a victim undergoes a double torture. One inner torture, while a second torture of victimisation which leads to isolation.”

Male, 27, Kosovo Albanian, Glogovac/Glogovac

- **Financial dependence:** Victims may be prevented from seeking help and getting justice, or decide to withdraw a case, because they are financially dependent on the perpetrator and have no other place to go. Sometimes a victim’s family will not support them because of the social stigma associated with divorce. The fear that they might lose their children, because they have no income and no place to live, makes the decision to seek justice very hard for women.

“Domestic violence exists and it’s increasing...considering that these women are mainly unemployed, they depend on the abuser, so in any case, she has to sit there, be silent and suffer.”

Female, 37, Kosovo Serb, Graçanicë/Gračanica

- **Insufficient response:** An additional reason why some respondents would not use the law to resolve cases of domestic violence is the expectation that security and justice providers will not offer a satisfactory response. There is a perception that the police will not take action, the law does not function,²⁷ or that there will not be enough co-operation between the police and the judiciary to resolve cases. While there now is a well trained KP domestic violence unit, providing a prompt response to victims calling for help, problems with the judiciary remain, as all cases, not only those involving domestic violence, suffer from delays.

²⁵ ibid

²⁶ These are based on findings from the household survey and FGDs, as well as written correspondence with Luljeta Vuniqi, Executive Director of the Kosovar Gender Studies Center, March 2011

²⁷ op cit Qosaj-Mustafa and Farnsworth p 47

- **Lack of knowledge and awareness about domestic and gender-based violence:** Many people are unaware that domestic and gender-based violence is a crime, let alone that there is a special legal framework to deal with it. Key legislation includes the Law for Gender Equality, the Anti-Discrimination Law, the Law Against Domestic Violence, and the Regulation against the Trafficking of Human Beings. This lack of awareness is an important impediment to tackling domestic and gender-based violence.

Less than a handful of respondents were aware of the institutions, services, infrastructure and actors set up to assist and help victims of domestic violence, such as the Victim Advocacy and Assistance Division of the Ministry of Justice, the municipal Centres for Social Work that are part of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and the Domestic Violence Units of the KP. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are also engaged in offering shelter, counselling and other forms of assistance to victims.

Increasing the number of female police officers was identified by one focus group participant as a possible means of specifically improving trust and encouraging women to talk about and report cases of domestic violence.

Violence among youth

Youth violence has come out as a more prominent safety and security concern than in the past. This was particularly highlighted during the FGDs. Unemployed youth – particularly young men – are seen to have too much time on their hands. They hang out in cafes and get into trouble and fights. Jealousy over girls/women was mentioned a number of times as one reason that fights start.

“Violence among youth is currently a problem in our municipality. A week would not pass without hearing that there was a fight in the school, among students, stabbings, and fist-fighting.”

Male, 21, Kosovo Albanian, Podujevë/Podujevo

“There is too much violence, in school and outside of it, in cafes and children increasingly carry [items] used for fights, knives, bombs, I even know some guys carrying weapons with them, and this is really, really too much.”

Female, 19, Kosovo Serb, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North

It is of concern that young people, who were born and raised after the war, are increasingly using violent means to ‘solve’ their problems. It seems to be increasingly normal for many young people that their peers carry weapons, whether at school, on the street or in cafes. This is illustrated by statements from FGDs where participants were asked how it would make them feel knowing someone in the group has a weapon:

“...if you are in a cafeteria and you know that a particular person has a gun, or you see the gun, you would feel less safe.”

Male, 20, Kosovo Albanian, Podujevë/Podujevo

Case study Promoting co-operation between all actors to improve school safety

In 2009 and 2010, serious incidences of school violence occurred in Kosovo. These often involved cold weapons and firearms, and sadly resulted in a number of casualties.

Following incidents of school violence in Klinë/Klina, where one student died, and in the municipality of Ferizaj/Uroševac, where a student wounded three other students with a gun, the Initiative for Progress (INPO), Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) and Ferizaj Students Council (KNF) organised meetings in schools. These meetings gave students an opportunity to discuss and analyse what had happened and helped to raise awareness of the risks of school violence.

On 29 September 2010, Saferworld, in co-operation with INPO, FIQ, KNF, Peace and Human Rights Council and the Women's Association 'Elena Gjika' organised a roundtable in Prizren on the topic School safety – searching for a long-term sustainable solution. Over 40 representatives of local institutions and CSOs from the municipalities of Ferizaj/Uroševac, Shtime/Shtimlje, Prizren and Klinë/Klina attended the roundtable, including directors of education, directors of high schools, professors, student and parent councils, psychologists, the KP, NGOs, the media, the Centre for Work and Social Welfare, a correctional centre and the MCSCs. They shared experiences and good practice from Prizren municipality, which is known for good co-operation between professors, students and parents, and between the KP and school authorities. Successful measures to prevent school violence in Prizren included developing internal school regulations in participation with parent and student councils and the installation of cameras in the school.

While one of the conclusions from the roundtable was that private security may be considered an option, it was not seen as a long-term and sustainable solution. However, cameras were installed in four secondary schools in Ferizaj, to allow better monitoring of the situation and to discourage students from using violence or carrying weapons. All the conclusions and recommendations of the roundtable have been presented and shared with the wider public and institutions including the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KP, judges, prosecutors, the media, student and parent councils and local governments institutions.

Saferworld and its local partners held a further event in Prishtina/Priština in co-operation with Student Councils from Ferizaj/Uroševac, Pejë/Peč, Prizren, Gjakovë/Đakovica, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Prishtinë/Priština and Gjiilan/Gnjilane, to plan joint activities to improve school safety. As a result, NGOs such as Community Building Mitrovica, Syri i Vizionit, the Kosovar Centre for International Co-operation, INPO and Elena Gjika, organised workshops in their municipalities with local government institutions, student and parent councils, MCSCs, psychologists, the KP, the courts, the media and local prosecutorial offices, and with participation from neighbouring municipalities. The participants developed action plans for improving school safety in their municipalities. In all, over 200 people participated in these events. Around 20 local and national media (printed and electronic) covered the events, producing over 20 interviews and articles.

Perceptions of the likeliness of renewed violent conflict

Renewed violent conflict over the coming five years is perceived as less and less likely. In 2010, 38.1 percent of respondents saw violent conflict as likely, compared with 44.1 percent in 2009, 51 percent in 2008 and 47.7 percent in 2007. This is an encouragingly positive trend, but at the same time it is still a high figure. This suggests that the overall political situation is still seen as unstable by a large part of the population and that there is limited trust in the ability of governments to resolve outstanding disputes by peaceful means. The fall in the perception that renewed violence is likely can be observed across

different ethnic groups, although Kosovo Serbs in particular, still consider renewed violent conflict more likely than the rest of the population (64.5 percent, compared with 67.5 percent in 2009).

Perceptions of the likelihood of conflict varied depending on the geographical location of respondents. Municipalities in Northern Kosovo, or near the border with Serbia, including Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North, where numerous violent incidents have taken place in the recent months,²⁸ consider a violent conflict as more likely. Three municipalities where more than half of the respondents viewed a renewed conflict as 'somewhat likely' were Mitrovicë/Mitrovica (North) with 60 percent, Podujeva/Podujevo with 57.5 percent and Ranillug/Ranilug with 50 percent. Zubin Potok was the only municipality where more than half of the respondents (53.3 percent) perceived conflict as 'very likely'. The five municipalities where a clear majority regarded a renewed outbreak of conflict 'very unlikely' were Lipjan/Lipljan with 66.7 percent, Obiliq/Obilić with 65 percent, Junik with 60 percent, Shtime/Shtimlje with 53.3 percent and Deçan/Deçane with 50 percent.

Generally, the majority of all respondents of the household survey see unemployment and the political situation in the country as important factors that may cause future violent conflict, closely followed by the issue of Northern Kosovo (Mitrovicë/North Mitrovica) and the overall economic situation. Additionally, discussions around possible talks between Serbia and Kosovo and heated debates about the agenda, with the Governments of Serbia and Kosovo holding opposing views, further contributed to feelings of instability.

Unsurprisingly, perceptions vary between groups of different ethnic identity. Kosovo Serbs and other minority groups consider inter-ethnic relations to be the main potential factors that could cause a future conflict, while the Kosovo Albanian majority regards the issue of the Northern part of Kosovo as the main potential trigger for conflict.

Table 2: Important factors that may cause future violent conflict as perceived by different ethnic groups

Total respondents	Kosovo Albanian ²⁹	Kosovo Serb	Other ethnic groups
Unemployment (12.1%)	Northern part of Kosovo (Mitrovicë/ Mitrovica North, 14.1%)	Inter-ethnic relations (31%)	Inter-ethnic relations (10.5 %)
Political situation (10.6%)	Unemployment (13.9%)	Albanian attacks on Serbs (15.8%)	Unemployment (9.8%)
Northern part of Kosovo (Mitrovicë/ Mitrovica North, 10.3%)	Political situation (11.6%)	Political situation (8.1%)	Political situation (7.3%) Economic situation (7.3 percent)

Many respondents from the FGDs think that international actors still have a role to play in preventing conflict, regardless of decreasing levels of trust in them. They are seen by many as a guarantor for peace and stability – a role people do not trust their Government, or society, to fulfil.

"I think that ethnic conflicts exist for several years now, and they will continue to exist because Kosovo is known for this. Social and economic conflict will generate further conflicts, because there are no mechanisms in place to put out these tensions. Conflicts will generate further conflicts."

Male, 29, Kosovo Albanian, Gilgovc/Glogovac

²⁸ Incidents in Northern Mitrovica included cars being set on fire, grenades being thrown at one of the bakeries, an MP of Kosovo Assembly being shot, one official of the Municipal Election Commission murdered, fights between different groups, a number of people injured including a EULEX police officer, etc www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/kosovo-north-police.840/, www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2010/12/09/nb-02 www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5756718,00.html, www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/another-incident-in-north-mitrovica-ahead-of-un-sc-meeting, April 2011

²⁹ The top three percentages derive from survey data in tables' 22A-C. High percentages for answers 'Don't know' and 'No answer' were not considered.

At the same time, external actors are viewed as playing a dominating role when it comes to deciding on the future of Kosovo, a view expressed with a certain amount of criticism and even cynicism:


“...I think that there won’t be a conflict because these matters will be fixed by a foreign factor, and it will be fixed without a conflict. For the time being I don’t see any conflict at all. Somebody else will decide on the issue of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.”

Male, 53, Kosovo Albanian, Podujevë/Podujevo

“They [international actors] are considered to be advisors, EULEX, ICO, but actually they are decision-makers.”

Male, 22, Kosovo Albanian, Prishtinë/Priština

Figure 9: How likely is it that Kosovo will have another violent conflict in the next five years?



More than one third of respondents across all ethnic groups have hopes that the planned talks between Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade will impact positively on the overall security situation. Of the household survey respondents, 36.4 percent expect their security to improve ‘a lot’ or ‘a little’, while 27.9 percent think it will ‘stay the same’. The fact that 28.4 percent of respondents do not have a clear opinion on whether and how their situation might be affected by the talks, suggests that more information on the process and its possible implications should be provided. Only 7.3 percent of respondents believe that their security will get worse ‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’ as a result of the talks. Opinions from focus group participants were mixed:

“Well, nothing will change in terms of security. This is only about connections, relations, borders they will talk about, and all of this will end as US wishes, not as we would wish or as they [government in Belgrade] would wish.”

Male, 19, Kosovo Albanian, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica

“No we will not be endangered. Because this will be a sort of bargain. I am convinced that Serbia will not be left with nothing, it will benefit somewhat, a sort of autonomy in the North, as that is at question.”

Male, 53, Kosovo Albanian, Podujevë/Podujevo

“We hope for the better, but we expect the same.”

Male, 24, Kosovo Serb, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North

Asked about whether and how their security would be affected if Northern Kosovo was to be given a special status, opinions differ considerably, particularly between people from different ethnic and geographic backgrounds. Of all respondents, 42.4 percent think security will get 'a lot' or 'somewhat' worse, and 20.7 percent believe it will improve 'a lot' or 'a little'. Kosovo Serbs express quite opposite views, with 45.8 percent thinking security will improve 'a lot' or 'a little' (compared with 14.4 percent of Kosovo Albanians), while only 20.2 percent think security will get 'a lot' or 'somewhat' worse (compared with 50.5 percent of Kosovo Albanians). Municipalities in Northern Kosovo feel optimistic. Interestingly, Kosovo Serbs living in other areas of Kosovo, such as Graçanicë/Gračanica, are worried that their security will deteriorate if Northern Kosovo gets a special status. FGDs indicate clearly that the question of Northern Kosovo is a very sensitive and emotional issue that needs to be managed carefully and in a way that takes into consideration existing post-war grievances:

"Security would deteriorate considerably throughout of Kosovo. Old wounds are still unclosed. Not one Kosovo Albanian would accept a special status for the North of Kosovo, only as part of Kosovo, and we hope that our leaders will not accept any special status."

Female, 37, Kosovo Albanian, Junik

"Well, I think it [my safety] won't [change], because northern and southern part are already divided, nothing will change in political terms."

Male, 18, other minorities, Prizren

"I think that it [security situation] will deteriorate in any case, if anything changes, because if the independence is declared, I suppose that the southern part would want the northern part, and if the independence is refused, then they will create problems for losing their independence, in any case bad days are ahead of us."

Male, 23, Kosovo Serb, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North

Weapons ownership and use

While there is evidence that a considerable number of SALW remain in the hands of civilians in Kosovo – confirmed by statements from focus group respondents – people do not talk about it and the number of serious incidences involving SALW is limited and continues to decline.³⁰ The fact that the wish to acquire a gun has increased – particularly among young people – might indicate decreasing trust in the ability of the state and its institutions to provide security and maintain peace. The household surveys found a regional consensus that firearms are viewed to be used mainly during celebrations (56.9 percent) and hunting (19.3 percent). However, asked for the reason why the respondent or his/her family would choose to own a firearm, most people gave the protection of their family as a reason.

"...as regards to whether we carry weapons, I know lots of people who carry weapons, but how necessary it is to carry a weapon? I find it very dangerous, first of all for the person who carries a weapon, but also for their surroundings. It is very easy to buy a gun, especially in the black market, it depends whether you're interested to find it."

Doni, Male, 21, Prishtinë/Priština

Compared with data from previous studies, the amount of people never hearing gunshots (16.3 percent) has doubled since the 2009 survey, when only 8.2 percent stated that they never hear gunshots. This is a positive development and a sign that normal everyday life is returning. The data show that 59.3 percent of people hear gunshots a few times a year, 6.9 percent a few times a month, 7.7 percent once a month and 16.3 percent never hear gunshots. Another positive development is that, although people living in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica tend to hear gunshots more frequently than others: 44.4 percent can hear gunshots a few times a year, 16.9 percent a few times a month, 13.8 percent about once a month and 11 percent never hear gunshots. These percentages have also changed for the better. In late 2010 only 5.8 percent of

³⁰ The Government has taken measures to increase SALW control. It has revised and approved a SALW strategy and action plan in October 2009, which is being implemented. Means to reduce the number of illegal SALW include confiscation (over 2000 firearms per year), voluntary surrender, legalisation and deactivation. This information was provided by UNDP KOSSAC, 18 March 2011.

respondents from Mitrovicë/Mitrovica heard gunshots at least once a week or more (and up to several times a day), a decline from 22.5 percent a year earlier. However, this could be attributable to the fact that the data for this survey were collected in the Winter, when fewer weddings take place and therefore fewer gunshots are heard, or to the fact that people increasingly use fireworks instead of guns to mark celebrations. A number of participants in the FGDs highlighted that they feel that shooting at weddings is no longer necessary and is a rather out-dated tradition.

“This originates from earlier, when there were many weddings or someone got a child, it was a custom at that time to shoot from a gun in order to inform someone on the other hill that he got a child, now we have a phone and there is no need for something like that any longer.”

Male, 24, Kosovo Serb, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North

As in previous years, there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the number of households possessing a firearm – 56.5 percent of all respondents’ state they do not know. However, 10.1 percent think that less than a quarter of households own a gun.

“I may have one at home, but I don’t know. Men keep it hidden from women and children, because of the danger.”

Female, 27, Kosovo Albanian, Junik

Half of all respondents (50.2 percent) stated that owning a weapon would not make them or their family feel safe – a considerable drop from 68.8 per cent one year ago. This view was generally shared among both genders and all age groups, but 56.3 percent women feel more strongly than men (45.1 per cent) that a gun in the house will not protect them. Young people, particularly aged 18 to 29 years, buck this trend. The percentage of respondents feeling safer with a gun has increased considerably to 30.7 percent in 2010, from 22.3 per cent in 2009. For other age groups that increase is lower. More Kosovo Serbs (36 percent, compared to an overall average of 29 percent) feel that a weapon would increase their and their family’s safety, while 26.6 percent of Kosovo Serbs disagree. Furthermore, there are regional differences: in Klinë/Klina and Zubin Potok, more than 70 percent of respondents think that owning a weapon would make them safer, while only 7.3 percent from Ferizaj/Uroševac do.

“It depends again on the environment and part of the city you are living in, more specifically on Bosniak Mahala,³¹ I think that people feel safer if they have a firearm near them, because we all know that the largest number of incidents in the city happen in Bosniak Mahala and the guns are pulled nonstop and on both sides, Serbian and Albanian, so I think that it’s safer, whereas if you go towards the north, there is no need to carry one.”

Male, 23, Kosovo Serb, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North

”I cannot say that security will improve as long as every second household has a gun at home, and each family member could use that gun.”

Male 22, Kosovo Albanian, Prishtinë/Priština

More than half of all respondents (56.3 percent) said they would not acquire a firearm if they were able to do so, while 28.3 percent stated they would. The percentage of people not wanting to obtain a weapon has decreased considerably when compared with 73.7 percent in the previous survey. Again, young people aged 18 to 29 years in particular, seem more inclined to get hold of a gun than in the year before: 27.4 percent would now acquire a gun, compared with 17.8 percent in 2009. This could be an effect of the new Law on Weapons, which, for the first time in years, will allow Kosovo citizens to possess a weapon legally, if they fulfill the criteria of the law.³² Again, there are strong regional differences, with only 16 percent of people in Ferizaj/Uroševac considering acquiring a gun, whereas in Gjakova/Đakovica the figure is 36.7 percent. When asked for the main reasons for owning a firearm, 19.8 percent state ‘to protect myself or my family’ and 3.2 percent for ‘gun sports/hunting’.

³¹ Bosniak Mahala is an area across the bridge of the river Ibar, which divides the northern part of Kosovo and the remaining country. It is an area of inhabited by mixed ethnicities (Serbs, Bosniacs and Albanians) and though there is a lot of trade and interaction between the different ethnic communities, it is seen as an area where violence takes place first. In some way Bosniak Mahala has turned into a ‘barometer’ or reference point to measure the stability and tensions in the Northern part of Kosovo.

³² Information provided by UNDP/KOSSAC, 18 March 2011

Recommendations

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA outlined in this report leads to a number of recommendations. These recommendations are aimed at supporting decision-makers in Kosovo to regain the trust of citizens in the ability of the Government, its institutions and its international partners to provide security and justice to all people living in Kosovo, so as to maintain peace and stability in the region. The Government of Kosovo will have to react quickly and decisively to prevent mistrust and dissatisfaction from increasing and leading to further alienation between people and the Government and its institutions. The Government needs to demonstrate – and communicate – that it has learnt lessons from the political crisis and is taking the mandate that citizens have given it seriously, by governing in a way that is accountable, transparent and responsive to the problems that most affect people in their everyday lives.

Recommendations to the Government of Kosovo and its institutions

- **Take community concerns regarding the talks between Kosovo and Serbia into account.** The survey found that many people feel unsure about what the talks between Kosovo and Serbia might bring, what the results will be and how they will impact on their lives and security. Many have concerns that the security situation will deteriorate should the status of Northern Kosovo be put on the agenda, while others place a lot of hopes in its inclusion. Those participating in the talks should take these concerns into account. This implies that the Government needs to be well-informed about community concerns and challenges and at the same time, needs to communicate clearly and objectively which issues are put on the agenda, what has been discussed and what consequences this will have. Such action will avoid people getting frustrated or being indifferent about the talks and will counter the spread of rumours. This also means that it is important to refrain from using the talks as an opportunity for short-term political gains, especially on an ethno-nationalist basis, since this would run the risk of fuelling in unnecessary fear, or even tensions.
- **Continue to draft and further develop key safety and security legislation and strategies, using an inclusive and transparent approach.** The Government of Kosovo should draw on recent good examples, such as the drafting of the Community Safety Strategy,³³ as part of its commitment to transparency, inclusiveness and accountability. In future, when drafting key legislation and policies the process used should include equal and direct consultation with community representatives and NGOs, which would also help to regain trust.

³³ At the time of writing, the Government of Kosovo had entered into a process of consulting with representatives from security and justice as well as other key institutions, NGOs and experts in the framework of a three-day workshops (March/April 2011), and has agreed to a series of meetings with community representatives to get their feedback on and input into the Draft Community Safety Strategy.

■ **Continue and strengthen support to municipal community safety structures.**

Thanks to their composition, municipal community safety structures such as the MCSCs, which have representatives from different groups within society, are well placed to discuss and address a wide spectrum of security issues. The Government of Kosovo could allocate a specific budget for community security initiatives and projects, such as awareness raising, public debates and community consultations on safety and security matters. In turn, MCSCs should be more proactive in reaching out to community members and make themselves and their roles better known, so that women, young people and minorities who might need extra encouragement to raise concerns, find them more approachable. In this respect, consideration should also be given as to whether and how socially sensitive issues, such as gender-based and domestic violence can be addressed.

■ **Demonstrate that the Government and security and justice providers are serving the interests of all people living in Kosovo,** regardless of ethnic background, gender or location. It is important that these institutions respond to the criticism that at times their members discriminate against individuals or groups based on their ethnic identity or gender. Being seen to take such concerns seriously and responding to them, will reduce gaps in perceived levels of safety and security especially between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, which will help to increase trust and stability. In particular, security and justice institutions should adopt a zero-tolerance policy vis-à-vis ethnic or gender discrimination in law enforcement and the administration of justice, with clear sanctions for any violations to ensure that those policies are implemented.

Keep detailed records and statistics in security and justice provision that are ethnically and gender disaggregated and are monitored to ensure different ethnic groups and women and men receive equal services.

Introduce a regular independent performance evaluation of security and justice institutions and publish the results.

■ **Improve performance in key sectors.** Findings from this survey should be seen as an incentive and commitment for justice and security providers to continue working on improving their performance in the key sectors identified and to step up efforts to improve their general performance and accountability. These sectors include:

□ **Accountable, transparent and timely security and justice provision.** People's lack of trust in security and justice providers stems largely from a perception that they are too slow and inefficient in their response. To regain trust, security and justice providers need to step up efforts to address those weaknesses and set themselves goals to improve performance. The KP should develop a police response plan and publicise its average response times. Furthermore, progress should be monitored and the results shared with the public. Positive developments, as well as initiatives to overcome challenges, should be communicated clearly.

□ **Confidentiality is crucial.** Findings clearly show that one main reason for people's limited trust in security and justice providers is the perceived lack of confidentiality and fears that community members and/or perpetrators will get information on reports made to the police. Clear policies are required to guarantee confidentiality as much as possible. These need to be clearly communicated to police officers, as well as to the public, and violations need to be sanctioned.

□ **Tackling corruption, a key obstacle to effective and efficient security provision.**

It is an alarming development that many people perceive the police as corrupt. The Government must strengthen necessary measures to fight corruption among its own officials and within its institutions, including the security and justice sector. It should encourage and increase transparency and monitoring by independent actors. Allegations of corruption must be investigated and, where found to be true, prosecuted without exception. These efforts should be complemented by measures to create incentives for officials not to engage in any corrupt practices, to help curb and prevent such behaviour.

- Impartial security and justice provision free from political interference.** The Government of Kosovo and other institutions need to ensure and support impartial security and justice provision, free from political interference.
- Increase visibility in communities and strengthen police-community relationships.** Positive steps have been made with community policing in the past, which seem to have had a positive impact on police-community relations. The fact that only a few respondents perceive police-community relations as improving, points to the importance of further strengthening those links. It needs to be ensured that the recent abolition of community-based police units, in favour of a more general approach that sees all police officers as interacting with communities, does not lead to reduced contact between the police and local communities. Instead, police officers assigned to specific geographic zones in the municipalities, should be encouraged to actively reach out to community members, including those that are usually more difficult to reach, such as young people or minority groups. Police officers need to make themselves known in order to build public confidence and constructive relationships. They should also have the authority and be prepared to respond instantly, where necessary, to needs and concerns raised by citizens. Adequate support regarding material and financial resources needs to be provided.
- Improve the processes for dealing with and solving domestic and gender-based violence cases.** According to the law in Kosovo, domestic and gender-based violence is a crime and should be treated as such.
 - Security and justice providers should enforce the law and prosecute cases of gender-based and domestic violence.
 - Public awareness of gender-based and domestic violence and of the legal rights of victims, as well as the services available, needs to be further increased.³⁴ The media, outreach efforts in schools and use of existing community-based policing initiatives are all potentially effective ways to reach the general public with such information.
 - Human resource capacity to deal with these issues should be built up in security and justice institutions. A higher number of female police officers should be employed and all officers should receive targeted training on gender-based and domestic violence.
 - It is important to provide appropriate infrastructure to support prevention and protect victims, e.g. safe places in police stations and reporting facilities that ensure anonymity, such as hotlines.
- Ensure that the draft school safety strategy is adopted and is properly implemented.** As with other aspects of community security, multi-stakeholder and cross-ministerial involvement will be key to the strategy's successful implementation. Central and municipal institutions of the ministries and departments of education, health, youth and sports, police and justice, as well as social welfare and unemployment agencies, should be involved. As a second key pillar of success, a participatory approach to implementation is important. Civil society and in particular young people need to be involved in designing and implementing actions to improve school safety.
- Create an effective response to the increased interest in weapons acquisition.** The fact that more people than in the past would consider acquiring a weapon if they could and would feel safer having one at home, is concerning. The reasons for this trend are not clear. They may be linked to the lower level of security, or to the new Law on Weapons, which for the first time allows civilians to acquire small arms under certain circumstances. An early response is required in order to prevent any further increase in the number of people who want to own a weapon, and particularly of those who ultimately decide to acquire one, possibly illegally:

1. Urgent investigation is needed into the reasons why people, particularly young people, feel increasingly attracted to the thought of owning a gun.
2. The Government of Kosovo should place a stronger emphasis on enforcing the Law on Weapons and implementing arms control and collection strategies. The Government needs to increase its efforts in raising awareness of the dangers of civilians owning weapons and enhance the implementation of weapons control legislation. With regards to armed violence among young people, the Government of Kosovo needs to involve youth stakeholders and young people in developing SALW control measures and encourage them to become champions against SALW violence.

Recommendations to the international community

- **Double efforts to provide appropriate security and justice in Northern Kosovo.** The fact that people in Northern Kosovo continue to feel that they do not have appropriate security and justice provision is often overlooked in reports of this nature – partly because it has almost become the norm. Addressing and improving this situation within their mandate must once more become a priority for international, as well as for local, actors working on security and justice provision. Civil society can play a crucial role in this respect and need to be part of the consultation process.
- **Within the framework of its mandate, EULEX must demonstrate its commitment to strengthen the rule of law** and not shy away from taking on cases that are difficult or concern high-ranking officials. In spite of criticism against EULEX, many people appreciate the instances when the mission has taken decisive action against corruption. There is also a perception that EULEX contributes to improving the performance of local security and justice providers and that it should build on such positive feedback. EULEX should continue taking action within the framework of its mandate. To avoid being seen as politically motivated and selective in the cases it handles, action should be based on strict transparent criteria, which are communicated to the public. EULEX needs to continue efforts to increase accountability and transparency within its own ranks, for example by conducting regular staff performance evaluations and acting upon them.
- **Communication with the public remains a challenge that EULEX needs to be overcome.** In order to respond constructively to negative sentiments and campaigns against EULEX, Efforts to reach out to communities regularly and in a way that is perceived as meaningful and transparent should continue. EULEX should regularly publicise progress on cases it is dealing with in a variety of different media, including TV, radio, newspaper and the internet. This should include the number of cases under investigation and the number of cases solved.
- **Support the Government of Kosovo and other national actors in taking the lead in the development of security and justice policies and legislation.** In order to gain trust and to enhance the effectiveness of security and justice provision, it is important that changes come from within. Initiatives such as the Community Safety Strategy should be driven by Kosovo Government actors, in participation with civil society and in a manner that is participatory and reflects local needs, rather than political agendas and programmes set up by external actors. While guidance and mentoring on technical issues is still required, it should be provided in a way that increasingly encourages local actors to take the lead and own the process, thus reducing reliance on external advisors.

Recommendations to and on civil society

- **Increase co-operation with civil society.** Civil society has a crucial role to play in shaping the future of Kosovo and in strengthening the democratic, accountable and transparent provision of the rule of law. In order to do this, civil society not only needs material support and favourable conditions in which to work, but it also needs to be taken seriously as a key stakeholder in processes related to justice and security

provision. Civil society should be consulted and encouraged to provide analysis and opinions, so that their views and concerns are fully considered in the planning and developing of security and justice related policies and programming. The Government of Kosovo and international actors should seek ways to co-operate constructively with CSOs in addressing the areas of common concern, but it should also accept, be open and responsive towards criticism and concerns that CSOs raise.

- **Civil society should take a stronger role in monitoring and demanding transparency and accountability.** People in Kosovo are dissatisfied with the poor performance of and corruption within state institutions. Civil society has started to develop expertise and to take action on these issues, but it should take an even stronger role in demanding transparency, accountability and performance improvement from the Government and its institutions and should monitor progress critically. At the same time, civil society should provide constructive support to help the Government to make further improvements in this direction. Co-ordination, co-operation and strategic planning and action are crucial in this regard.

Annex

Methodology

THE METHODOLOGY FOR this tracker survey is the same as that used for previous surveys, particularly for the 2007 report 'Human Security'. This allows for comparisons to be made over time.³⁵ Therefore, the focus on gender-specific challenges and the perceptions of minorities other than Kosovo Serbs has not been strengthened, although we acknowledge the relevance of assessing these aspects more specifically.

The data were collected through face-to-face household survey interviews using a questionnaire, based on a template developed for previous surveys, and refined to meet this specific research requirement. The research sample for the household survey included 1,250³⁶ Kosovo citizens over the age of 18 years, of both sexes (54.1 percent male, 45.9 percent female). All age groups, all municipalities and regions of Kosovo and both rural and urban areas were represented. The sample has been divided into three sub-samples:

- 900 Kosovo Albanians (72 percent, indicative)
- 200 Kosovo Serbs (16 percent, indicative)
- 150 Kosovo non-Serb minorities, namely Turkish, Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian (12 percent)

The sample of non-Serb minorities has been increased slightly from last year, in order to make it more representative.

To complement the household survey data, the 10 FGDs were organised in selected key locations across Kosovo, in order to gain a deeper understanding of answers given in the household survey and to address any issues that either needed clarification or were not covered by the survey. The FGDs also allowed access to hard-to-reach target groups and social groups of particular interest (e.g. youth and women). FGDs were held in Prishtinë/Priština, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica South, Gjilan/Gnjilane, Gjakovë/Đakovica, Podujevë/Podujevo, Prizren, Graçanicë/Gračanica, Glogovc/Glogovac and Junik. To ensure that people could talk openly, the decision was taken to have separate FGDs for the different ethnic groups, two groups for women only and six groups with mainly young people, although older representatives were included to balance the views expressed.

³⁵ DFID, a co-funder of the survey, requested that the data should be used to assess progress on the trust in, and performance of selected security providers over time.

³⁶ This is an increase in the number of total respondents from 1,200 in the last survey; the sample size for non-Kosovo Serb ethnic minority groups has been increased to make it more representative and significant. However, a direct comparison with previous surveys is still given.

Table 3: Location, ethnic group, gender and age of FGD participants

Location	Ethnicity of respondents (KS = Kosovo Serbs, KA = Kosovo Albanians)	Specific focus (Y= youth, W = women, M = mixed)
Prizren	Other ethnic groups, esp. Bosniaks and Ashkali	Y
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North	KS	Y
Gračanicë/Gračanica	KS	M
Gjakovë/Đakovica	KA	F
Junik	KA	F
Gjilan/Gnjilane	KA	Y
Podujevë/Podujevo	KA	Y
Prishtinë/Priština	KA	Y
Glllogovc/Glogovac	KA	M
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica South	KA	Y/M (incl. older youth up to 31 years)

In addition, key informant interviews were carried out (both oral and written) with independent security analysts, UNDP KOSSAC staff and the Executive Director of the Kosovar Gender Studies Center.

The survey was conducted in October–December 2010, which coincided with the first parliamentary elections in Kosovo to be held since the Declaration of Independence in 2008. The elections followed a period of political turmoil. It is very likely that people's perceptions have been influenced by the political developments linked with these elections.

Saferworld works to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote co-operative approaches to security. We work with governments, international organisations and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices through advocacy, research and policy development and through supporting the actions of others.

COVER PHOTO: Public event in Pristina. DRITON PAÇARADA



Saferworld
The Grayston Centre
28 Charles Square
London N1 6HT
UK

Phone: +44 (0)20 7324 4646
Fax: +44 (0)20 7324 4647
Email: general@saferworld.org.uk
Web: www.saferworld.org.uk

Registered charity no. 1043843
A company limited by guarantee no. 3015948

ISBN 978-1-904833-63-5

c/o FIQ
Rr. Rexhep Mala 5/A
10000 Pristina
Kosovo

Phone: +381 (0)38 248 677
Mobile: +377 (0)44 20 20 50