




Mogadishu rising?

Conflict and governance dynamics in the Somali capital



August 2012

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AUGUST 2012

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ASWJ	Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama'a
AU	African Union
CIS	Council of Islamic Scholars
CSO	Civil society organisation
DC	District Commissioner
EU	European Union
IDP	internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NSA	National Security Agency
PDP	Peace and Development Party
SOSCENSA	Somali South-Central Non-State Actors
SEMG	Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency
UNPOS	UN Political Office for Somalia
US	United States

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1

Introduction

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY SAFERWORLD as part of the design phase of a Conflict and Governance Mapping (CGM) project. The project aims to produce a credible research model to map conflict and governance dynamics in Somalia with a view to producing regular data and analysis and tracking trends over time. This pilot report focuses on Mogadishu¹ and uses original data collected between April and July 2012 in interviews, focus group discussions and Mogadishu-wide household survey and mapping exercises (see Methodology section for more detail). While this report provides a time-bound snapshot of current conflict and governance issues in a limited geographical area (Mogadishu), the project ultimately seeks to assist actors promoting peace and development in Somalia, including the new Somali authorities, by collecting firsthand data sourced at the local level and integrating it with data from secondary sources to provide timely analysis that is grounded in local realities.

After flagging key findings in Section 2, Section 3 offers an overview of the context followed by an updated analysis of domestic actors and their relationships in Section 4. Section 5 covers security dynamics in Mogadishu, including recent improvements in security, criminal activity and ongoing challenges in the areas of policing and privatisation of security. Section 6 on human needs describes migrations trends, food availability and the potential for land-related conflict. Section 7 then examines the influence of key external actors, both regional and international, and highlights the concerns felt by Somalis over their influence on the country. The conclusion flags key issues to consider based on the main findings of the report.

¹ Section 7 focuses more on Somalia as a whole, as geopolitical developments are not relevant to just Mogadishu.

2

Key findings

- There is a widespread perception in Mogadishu that security has improved considerably in the past year, with a decline in terrorism and insurgency-related violence in particular. This is largely due to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) consolidating power after al-Shabaab fighters largely withdrew from the city in August 2011.
- Nevertheless, security remains inadequate and uneven with significant areas of Mogadishu – particularly the city’s northern districts – almost entirely unpoliced. In the absence of state-provided security, residents and officials have formed an array of neighbourhood vigilante groups and private militias to protect themselves and their assets.
- A significant number – reportedly up to 50 percent – of police and military personnel work for private individuals, adding to the large number of freelance armed actors in the city and seriously undermining the security services’ ability to perform their duties. Criminal violence and violent deaths remain common, as do reported incidences of illegal arrests and physical torture.
- Residents are anxious that warlords and influential businessmen not included in the new political order could stage an armed revolt. Already there is evidence that some warlords and business people are arming themselves.
- Land is the most contested resource in Mogadishu and land claims by returnees from the diaspora and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are inflaming an already tense situation. Social unrest and wider instability could be the outcome of conflict over this key resource.
- President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s sub-clan dominates the city politically, creating grievances among rival clans which could also trigger unrest.
- External actors have given disproportionate weight to the transition roadmap and its six Somali signatories. As the roadmap has not been widely supported, this has contributed to the perception that external actors rather than Somalis have driven the recent political transition.
- Somalis have welcomed the injection of significant infrastructure funding by Turkey, but quiet criticism is growing that it has overestimated the institutional importance of the president and may have inadvertently concentrated its commercial dealings on a narrow section of his close allies and kinsmen.

3

Overview of the context

SOMALIA'S EIGHT-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD officially ended on 20 August 2012, bringing to a close the TFG and its fractious parliament.² A new, leaner parliament with 275 members (MPs), down from 550, is now tasked with finalising the country's provisional constitution over its four-year term. The parliament is also electing a new president who will then appoint a prime minister responsible for forming a cabinet. Though the roadmap to transition process has been welcomed outside Somalia it was largely forced through by external actors.³ This carries the risk of isolating dissenting Somali voices, including those who may try to disrupt the new political order.⁴ Indeed, Somalia is still no nearer to statehood than it was in 2004 when the transition began, in part because of the TFG's weak governance and widespread corruption.⁵ The challenge of providing security and any semblance of good governance in government-held areas therefore remains immense.

The transition process is hugely important, not least because it will set the stage for future international engagement with Somalia. If managed well and peacefully, it could help to cement recent security gains. This could result in increased engagement by donors, with more funds available to stabilise the country and provide tangible peace dividends for the Somali people. If, on the other hand, the transition gives birth to institutions and leaders that are perceived to lack legitimacy, a deterioration in security and international engagement could ensue.⁶ This could, in turn, lead to a decrease in international aid.

There has been tentative progress on security in recent months, particularly in Mogadishu, the largest and most populous city in Somalia with more than one million people living in and around the capital.⁷ The city remains sharply divided between north and south with the government and most international organisations based in the southern districts. These are more economically and socially vibrant (see Table 1) than those in the north which were controlled by al-Shabaab fighters until the end of 2011.

2 The end of transition roadmap was signed on 6 September 2011 by the TFG President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, the President of Puntland, the President of Galmudug and the leader of the Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama'a (ASWJ). The roadmap's original wide scope was subsequently narrowed to focus on two key goals: finalising a provisional constitution and creating a National Constituent Assembly that would endorse the provisional constitution and appoint a new parliament. Mosley J, 'End of the Roadmap: Somalia after the London and Istanbul Conferences', *Africa Programme Paper*, June 2012, p 3.

3 2012 was marked by a flurry of diplomatic activity on Somalia at meetings including the London Conference on Somalia in February 2012 and the Istanbul II Conference in May 2012. This focus on Somalia is in part related to international interest in piracy and terrorism.

4 A December 2011–January 2012 poll conducted by Opinion Research Business (ORB) found that a limited number of people in Mogadishu were familiar with the road map: 28 percent knew it very well; 13 percent knew it a fair amount; 23 percent knew just a little; 25 percent had heard of it but knew nothing about it; and 9 percent had never heard of it. ORB International, *Mogadishu opinion polling, December 2011–January 2012: Poll findings*, 2012.

5 See UN Monitoring Group on Somalia Report, June 2012, pp 11–19, for background on corruption. Nevertheless the TFG has legitimacy: an ORB Mogadishu opinion poll from December 2011–January 2012 found that 97 percent of respondents agreed that the TFG was the legitimate government of Somalia. *Op cit* ORB.

6 Interview with Abdirashid Hashi, Somalia analyst, August 2012.

7 See methodology section for explanation on the population figure used by Saferworld.

However, the security environment remains challenging. There is limited scope for external actors to engage in the design of conflict mitigation, peace building and governance-related programmes that are informed by local consultation. Independent monitoring of the impact of programmes is also extremely challenging. This has obvious negative consequences for programme design and delivery as external actors struggle to establish the necessary partnerships to ensure that projects are grounded in, and respond to, fast-moving local realities. Indeed, the remote control management of projects and funds disbursement in Somalia has often led to a disconnect between the intended aims of external actors and the impact of their actions on the ground.

Table 1. Distribution of major assets by district in Mogadishu

Southern districts	Major assets	Northern districts	Major assets
Wadajir	Medina hospital	Boondheere	
Dharkeenley	Benadir hospital	Shangaani	
Hodan	Airport Digfer hospital	Abdulaziz	Lido beach
Hawl-Wadaag	Bakara Market	Yaqshiid	Beach
Wardhigley	Villa Somalia Mogadishu Stadium	Kaaraan	Keysaney hospital
Hamar-Weyne	Martini Hospital Mayor's office	Heliwaa	
Waaberi	Seaport	Dayniile	Dayniile hospital
Hamar-Jajab		Shibis	

4

Key domestic actors

AN INCREASE IN AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM) troop levels to more than 17,000 as of July 2012,⁸ along with better co-ordination between AMISOM and TFG officials, has contributed to the decline of the militant movement **al-Shabaab** in the Somali capital.

The bulk of al-Shabaab was driven out in August 2011, including from the Bakara Market, but a small number of fighters remained in north Mogadishu until December 2011. In May and June 2012, al-Shabaab lost three other main towns-Elasha Biyaha and Afgoye in the Lower Shabelle region and Bal'ad in Middle Shabelle. Forced out of the outer rings of Mogadishu and bases that it had controlled for three to four years, this represented a major blow to its ability to strike at the heart of the capital.

These defeats came at a difficult time for the militants who had been struggling to find safe havens inside Mogadishu due to popular disapproval of their tactics. More than half the residents (53 percent) polled by Saferworld in July 2012 said that al-Shabaab had a negative impact on the lives of residents with just 6.4 percent reporting a positive impact. Community elders attribute the recent decline in popularity to, among other things, the attack in October 2011 that killed 70 people – mainly students and their parents.⁹ A day after al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, the Council of Islamic Scholars (CIS) criticised the militants and their declaration of jihad against unarmed civilians.¹⁰ The CIS said the attack was the strongest evidence that al-Shabaab was “being manipulated by a foreign entity to decimate the Somali people” and branded al-Shabaab “the enemy of the Somali people”.

Al-Shabaab responded by moving much of its manpower and equipment to Puntland in northeast Somalia. The United Nations (UN) Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) found that there has been “a steady influx of al-Shabaab fighters from southern Somalia into Puntland”¹¹ since February 2012. This relocation was driven by several factors including the deteriorating security in Puntland where al-Shabaab affiliated militants have carried out a number of targeted assassinations against politicians, district commissioners and judges.¹²

Also drawing al-Shabaab to Puntland has been the Galgala militia¹³ which declared allegiance to al-Shabaab in February¹⁴ – profoundly boosting its presence there. The Galgala are based in the vast, inaccessible Golis mountains in the Sanaag region

⁸ *Op cit* UN Monitoring Group Report, p 14.

⁹ Interview with clan elder, Mogadishu, June 2012.

¹⁰ Voice Of America Somali Service interview with Sheikh Bashir Salad, head of CIS, 5 October, 2011.

¹¹ *Op cit* UN Monitoring Group Report, p 15.

¹² Adde D, 'Puntland ready to fight al-Shabaab affiliated groups, officials say', *Sabahi Online*, 14 March 2012.


¹³ The Galgala militia is a group of fighters with long ties to violent Islamist groups in Somalia, dating back to the now defunct al-Ittihad al-Islami in the early 1990s.

¹⁴ Pelton R, 'Atom Militia declare allegiance to Shabaab', *Somaliareport.com*, 25 February 2012.

in northeast Somalia. Dubbed by some as ‘Somalia’s Tora Bora’, referring to the remote cave complex in Afghanistan where Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was thought to have hidden out, the area offers rugged terrain and an excellent hideout for al-Shabaab fighters.

The diminished importance of Mogadishu for al-Shabaab is evident in the group’s new structure (see Figure 1). The capital has been put under the command of the second deputy Bashir Mohamed Mohamud ‘Qoorgaab’ while the Lower and Middle Jubba regions fall under al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane. Godane is thought to have been living in the port city of Kismaayo which – with its lucrative charcoal exports¹⁵ – is now the jewel in the al-Shabaab crown following the loss of Bakara Market. In 2011 alone, nine to ten million sacks of charcoal were exported from ports in al-Shabaab-controlled regions in southern Somalia, generating \$25 million.¹⁶ The US government says “much of the charcoal exports from south central Somalia belong to, or are taxed by, al-Shabaab”.¹⁷

Figure 1. Al-Shabaab structure, July 2012



BOX 1. Biographies of the al-Shabaab leadership¹⁸

Ahmed Abdi Aw-Muhumed Godane has led al-Shabaab since May 2008 when Aden Hashi Ayrow was killed by a US cruise missile. Born in 1977 in northwestern Somalia (Somaliland), he studied in Pakistan where he is thought to have linked with Al-Qaeda leaders. His aim is to align al-Shabaab with the global jihadist movement.

Ibrahim Haji Jama Mii'aad, known by his nom de guerre al-Afghani, is the first deputy of Godane and a confidante. Also born in Somaliland in the 1960s, he lived in Washington DC in the 1980s and worked as a taxi driver before being recruited by the US-backed anti-Soviet mujaahideens fighting in Afghanistan. Like Godane, he advocates for global jihad.

Bashir Mohamed Mohamud, widely known as Qoorgaab, is the second deputy and head of operations. He is also the principal explosives expert for al-Shabaab. Born in Mogadishu in 1980, he joined the jihadist movement in Somalia at a young age and was mentored by Al-Qaeda cell leaders in Somalia.

The increased effectiveness of the Somali **National Security Agency** (NSA) has also contributed to the decline of al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. Superior training, technology allowing it to eavesdrop on phone calls between al-Shabaab operatives and the recruitment of former fighters as informants has allowed it to gain significant ground against the militants. Reportedly funded by the American and French governments,¹⁹ the NSA

¹⁵ *Op cit* UN Monitoring Group Report, p 148.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p 147.

¹⁷ Crawford, J, 'Obama Bans Charcoal from Somalia', *CNN.com*, 20 July 2012.

¹⁸ For background see Aynte, A, 'An anatomy of al Shabaab,' June 2010.

¹⁹ Scahill J, 'The CIA's secret sites in Somalia', *The Nation Magazine*, (1–8 August 2011), pp 1–6.

managed to pre-empt terrorist attacks in April and May 2012 including two militants who were planning to carry out suicide bombings on TFG targets such as the headquarters of the military.²⁰

Despite the improving security, criminal activity is still a significant problem in the capital, discussed in greater detail in section five. The city's police force is not up to the task of protecting citizens, so communities have taken matters into their own hands and organised **neighbourhood vigilante groups**. Armed with weapons including AK47s, the vigilantes can be seen at night behind barricades and fortified positions on the winding, narrow dirt roads leading into densely populated residential areas. In return, they are fed and paid by wealthy members of the community.

These vigilantes are joined on Mogadishu's streets by a variety of **other militias**, most of which operate independently and are primarily loyal to their clans and clan leaders. These groups are better defined by what they are against – al-Shabaab – than what they stand for, as they work autonomously and lack a single command and control structure. The most important is **Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama (ASWJ)**,²¹ which is closely associated with Ethiopia and has heavily armed fighters in Mogadishu. It is led by Abdulkadir Moallin Nur. Other significant militias in the city include those operated by the district commissioners (DCs), including from Wadajir and Hawl-Wadaag districts.

Added into the mix are some of Mogadishu's **former warlords and businessmen** who are arming themselves before the end of the transition. The motive is invariably similar: uncertainty regarding the post-transition outcome and fear of being left out of positions of influence and power. This is a real possibility as new MPs are not permitted to have criminal backgrounds,²² which could affect former warlords vying for political positions, although they have never been convicted in a court of law.

Other domestic actors pursue a peaceful approach towards their goals. They include the **CIS** which comprises hundreds of scholars representing a plethora of Islamist organisations and wields a towering moral authority over the city. Its objective is to safeguard the religious values of the Somali people and it can mobilise tens of thousands of followers. Recently, it has called for the government to consult with religious scholars on the provisional constitution, which it deems non-compliant with Islamic law. Many of the political elite, including the president, have had ties with the CIS through their associations with Islamist organisations.

Political parties are increasingly influencing developments on issues like the provisional constitution, the role of external actors and federalism. While many of the parties are diaspora-based, most – including Hassan Sheikh's Peace and Development Party (PDP), the Somali Democratic Union (Hiil Qaran) and the Daljir Forum – have opened offices in Mogadishu and are fielding candidates for the parliament and the presidency. Although the top presidential contenders for the new government – the TFG president, prime minister and the speaker of parliament – are not running on a political party platform, a number of prominent candidates, including former prime minister Mohamed Abdullahi 'Farmaajo', have formed non-clan based parties with nationalist platforms.

Mogadishu's vibrant **civil society organisations (CSOs)** have begun to exercise more influence through better co-ordinated and inclusive engagement with policy- and decision-makers. The failure of successive peace agreements to end conflict or to establish an effective administration, particularly in South-Central, has resulted in the heavy engagement of civil society in social service delivery and other vital public services in Mogadishu. However, the recent history of conflict and the discouragement by successive Somali governments of independent associative activity has also limited

²⁰ 'Man with explosive jacket apprehended by NSA', *Radio Mogadishu*, 7 April, 2012.

²¹ ASWJ is a Sufi militia allied with the TFG.

²² This was a criteria agreed by signatories of the roadmap.

their effectiveness. Historically, few civil society groups represented constituencies within the broader population and have therefore tended not to reflect the needs and aspirations of communities, but rather the political, clan and class divisions within the country. CSOs have continued to be largely dependent on state sanction and donor funding for their existence. There remain significant criticisms about these organisations' capacity, accountability and transparency.

The **business community** also plays a vital role in shaping Mogadishu, primarily through its close connections with the political elite. The two groups often seem interchangeable as top politicians, including the TFG speaker of the parliament and at least a dozen TFG MPs, are successful businessmen. The SEMG found that Somali politics has become a revolving door – with politicians re-entering the business world and businessmen re-entering politics to further enrich themselves. Moreover, the SEMG report chronicles cases of politicians colluding with businessmen to shelter them from taxes – notably in the remittance (hawala), telecommunications and airline businesses – in exchange for financial support.²³ It also notes that corrupt politicians award lucrative contracts to their friends, often for a kickback.²⁴ Meanwhile, the absence of domestic financial institutions often forces the TFG to rely on businessmen to move money around the country and the world. In doing so the government loses control over how these funds are used.²⁵

Relations between the many domestic actors – and within the groups themselves – are often complicated by **inter-clan rivalries**. This is particularly true when it comes to dominant positions in the government, a frequent source of conflict. Clan elders allege that President Sharif has deliberately placed people from his Mudullood sub-clan of Hawiye in key positions in the capital to consolidate his power.²⁶ While people from other clans do hold some high profile positions in the city, the elders say the President's sub-clan dominates senior level government posts which were supposed to be apportioned based on the 4.5 clan rule,²⁷ in which all government posts are divided between four major clans and a group of smaller clans. The elders say that most Mogadishu district commissioners (eight out of 16) and police commissioners (nine out of 16) are from the President's sub-clan as well as the mayor and the heads of the seaport, the airport, national radio and television and the military court.

Leaders of the Habar-Gidir, Murusade and Reer Hamar clans have said they will not accept continued domination by the Mudullood after the August transition. They are advocating for a change in the presidency through the political system and an "equitable sharing of the capital".²⁸ They are not threatening the use of violence, but armed groups could exploit their grievances.

23 Successive prime ministers reportedly exempted several businessmen from tax. See: *op cit* UN Monitoring Group Report, p 12.

24 *Ibid* p 13.

25 In a rebuttal of the SEMG report, President Sharif admitted to 'inappropriate' handling of funds due to the absence of banking systems, but he vigorously defended his government from graft allegations.

26 Interview with Habar-Gidir and Murusade clan elders, Mogadishu, June 2012.

27 Some of the largest civil society groups in Somalia, such as Somali South-Central Non-State Actors and Puntland Non-State Actors Association, have criticized the 4.5 distribution mechanism. They say the model arbitrarily compartmentalises the Somali people into genealogical groupings that don't necessarily share political and social views.

28 Interview with Habar-Gidir and Murusade clan elders, Mogadishu, June 2012.


5

Security dynamics

5.1 Tenuous improvement

THOUGH VIOLENCE REMAINS A DAILY REALITY, Saferworld's Mogadishu-wide survey in July 2012 found that an overwhelming 93 percent of respondents reported an improvement in the security situation in the past 12 months, with 4.5 percent saying it had remained the same and only one percent reporting a deterioration. Fifteen percent said that security had improved in the past three months, 33 percent noted improvement in the last six months and 22 percent said the last nine months were improved (see Figure 2).


Figure 2. Perceptions of security in Mogadishu (Percentage noticing improvement)



Two-thirds of those surveyed classed Mogadishu as a middle risk city as of July 2012, meaning they cannot walk around at night, with only six percent labeling it high risk, meaning they cannot walk around during the day (see Figure 3). This confirms information obtained in focus groups and during interviews with officials that suggest security is generally perceived to be improving.²⁹ This optimism may be connected to the fact that for the first time since the fall of Said Barre in 1991 – with the exception of the brief period in 2006 when Mogadishu was taken over by the Islamic Courts Union – the city is under one administration.

Notably, attacks targeting aid workers were rare in Mogadishu in the first seven months of the year compared to other parts of Somalia (see Table 2) with the most recent incident occurring on 11 July 2012 when vehicles transporting three Kenyans working for International Aid Service were intercepted by gunmen in Baadweyn village, around 45 km north of Galkacyo. The Kenyans were abducted and a national staff member was shot and seriously injured.

²⁹ Interview with senior TFG police official in Mogadishu and focus groups in Mogadishu, June 2012.

Figure 3. Perceptions of risk in Mogadishu, July 2012**Table 2. Attacks on UN, international NGO and local NGO aid workers, January–July 2012**

Source: Aid Workers Security Database

Year	Region	Killed	Injured	Kidnapped
2012	Mogadishu	0	0	0
	Rest of the country	7	1	3
Total		7	1	3

For its part, the TFG credits the establishment of a new military court in May 2012 as one reason for the improvement. Set up to clamp down on criminal activities including robbery, extortion and rape committed by soldiers, a May 2012 internal report submitted by the head of the TFG Military Court to President Sharif noted that “criminal violence has gone down significantly since the establishment of this court.”³⁰ However, the US State Department’s annual report on human rights criticised the court for not affording defendants sufficient legal representation or appeal opportunities,³¹ and Amnesty International said it lacks “fair trial standards” – noting summary executions which raise serious concerns about human rights violations.³²

5.2 Criminal activity

Mogadishu residents still face numerous security challenges on a daily basis, including violent deaths, kidnapping and criminal violence. Reports of illegal arrests and torture in detention are extremely high. Out of 800 households surveyed, 159 incidents of illegal arrest were reported in the previous 90 days, affecting 100 households (see Figure 4).³³ The majority of these incidents were reported in Dayniile (32), Hawl-Wadaag (24), Heli-Waa (17), Kaaraan (16) and Boondheere (16) districts. Sixty-six households said that at least one member had been physically tortured in detention over the same period, with a total of 125 cases of torture in detention reported overall.³⁴ Danyniile was the last stronghold of al-Shabaab which is said to retain networks of supporters and informers there. The survey did not reveal who the perpetrators were.

Incidents of violence, including criminal violence, are also high. One hundred and twenty-six households had experienced violence in the previous 90 days, while 177 violent incidents were reported in total. Table 3 shows that there were 82 cases of violent injury among survey respondents, 38 cases of armed robbery, 36 cases of physical assault, 13 incidents of rape and eight kidnappings. Heli-Waa (where 24 incidents of violence occurred), Kaaraan (20) and Yaqshiid (20) were found to be the most dangerous districts.

³⁰ Hussein H, ‘The Military Court: One year on’, *TFG Military Court Report*, May 2012, pp 1–12.


³¹ *2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia*, US State Department, p 3.

³² *TFG Military Court Must Stop Unfair Trials and Executions*, Amnesty International, 2 September 2011.

³³ ‘Illegal arrest’ was described in the survey as detention for more than 24 hours without the case being forwarded to the relevant court.

³⁴ Beatings and ‘half hanging’ were examples given to respondents.

³⁵ Capturing rape in a household survey is notoriously difficult. It is safe to presume that these figures are the tip of the iceberg.

Figure 4. Torture and illegal arrest per household in past 90 days

Violent deaths are also common. Fifty-six households out of 800 reported a violent death in the previous 12 months. The total number of violent deaths included 45 killed in war and weapons-related accidents, 14 extrajudicial killings and six civilian murders.³⁶

Insurgency related violence also poses a significant, although declining, threat. Since largely withdrawing from Mogadishu, al-Shabaab has continued to launch attacks against TFG officials, NGO workers, journalists and even critical Islamic scholars.³⁷ The fighters are assassinating soft targets including poorly protected civil society leaders and journalists.³⁸ Eight killings of journalists have been recorded in Somalia this year, including five in Mogadishu.³⁹ The last major attack by al-Shabaab, a suicide bombing on 4 April 2012, killed 10 people including senior TFG officials and MPs.

Figure 5, below, offers a snapshot of the types of violence recorded by the UN⁴⁰ during the first and second quarters of 2012, confirming the ongoing threat from terrorism and the overall decline in armed conflict.

Finally, extortion continues to be a problem for the people of Mogadishu. A Saferworld district mapping exercise found that 70 permanent⁴¹ and 30 mobile checkpoints⁴² manned by police, army, DC militias or other militias (see Map, p 14) are being used to provide security but also to extort money, particularly from public transport providers.⁴³

³⁶ 'War and weapon related' includes fighting as a combatant, grenades, landmines or unexploded ordnance, extrajudicial executions and stray weapons.

³⁷ *Country reports on terrorism 2011, Somalia*, UNHCR, 31 July 2012.

³⁸ Nuxurkey M, 'One year since al-Shabaab fled Mogadishu', *Somaliareport.com*, 5 August 2012.

³⁹ Interview with Tom Rhodes, East Africa Consultant for the Committee to Protect Journalists, August 2012.

⁴⁰ The definitions provided are those used by the UN. Each incident was reported by three separate sources, but the data must be treated with caution as, on average, data for seven days per month are missing. It is unclear whether there were no attacks on these days, whether they were not reported or were not reported by enough sources.

⁴¹ This figure includes 5 checkpoints considered to be 'semi-fixed' and manned by local militias.

⁴² In Dharkeenley, all recorded checkpoints belong to the President's clan and are manned by independent clan militias, operating under the guise of 'security agents' and freely collecting money.


⁴³ McConnel T, 'Mogadishu's super troopers', *Globalpost.com*, 9 August 2012.

Table 3. Non-lethal violent incidents per household in past 90 days

District	Violent injury	Armed robbery	Physical assault (robbery)	Rape	Kid-napping	Total
Abdiaziz	1	1	1	0	0	3
Boondheere	3	0	1	0	0	4
Dayniile	9	1	1	2	1	14
Dharkeenley	7	2	1	3	1	14
Hamar Jajab	1	1	0	0	0	2
Hamar-Weyne	1	1	0	0	1	3
Hawl-Wadaag	7	1	2	1	0	11
Heli-Waa	10	6	7	1	0	24
Hodan	10	3	2	2	0	17
Kaaraan	15	1	4	0	0	20
Shangaani	3	3	1	1	0	8
Shibis	4	3	3	1	0	11
Waaberi	2	3	1	0	2	8
Wadajir	5	4	4	0	3	16
War Dhiigley	1	0	0	1	0	2
Yaqshiid	3	8	8	1	0	20
Total	82	38	36	13	8	177

Figure 5. Security incidents in Mogadishu, January–June 2012


Source: UN Somalia Agency



Actual numbers are higher as some checkpoints are only set up at night and were not included in the survey for security reasons.

Some armed groups are more feared than others (see Figure 6) by residents of Mogadishu, with the TFG-allied militias causing the most concern. Among survey respondents, 41.8 percent fear them a great deal and avoid them in their daily lives. This compares to 33.6 percent⁴⁴ for the police and 32.4 percent for the army. Almost equal numbers fear and avoid other non-TFG allied clan militias (36 percent), AMISOM (35 percent), ASWJ (32.5 percent) and al-Shabaab (29.4 percent). Overall, al-Shabaab is *less* feared (55.4 percent fear it) in Mogadishu than both allied and non-allied militias (59.4 percent and 57.8 percent respectively), according to the findings of the survey.⁴⁵ This is because the militants, while brutal in their application of Sharia law, are less predatory than the TFG and many militias.

Figure 6. Mogadishu: Levels of fear of armed entities



5.3 Policing and private security

Mogadishu Mayor Mohamed Nur, known as Tarzan, says a strong, coherent and well-paid police force is the ultimate answer to the city's security problems.⁴⁶ This is unlikely in the short term as up to 50 percent of police officers and soldiers are currently working as private security guards for hotels, restaurants, aid agencies, business leaders and politicians in order to supplement their wages.⁴⁷ In some cases, police officers – whose salaries are often late or missing – work at private locations wearing their uniforms and using government-provided weapons. The practice has become so prevalent that, on 9 August 2012, the TFG's National Security Committee⁴⁸ issued a directive barring both the police and military from working for private individuals.⁴⁹ However, it has not been heeded as soldiers and police officers can consistently earn up to \$200 a month in the private sector, double their ordinary wage.⁵⁰ The government, meanwhile,

⁴⁴ The police are paid by the United Nations Development Programme and tend to be better trained and older than the military. According to the Interior Ministry, the average age of a police officer is 32, while the average of a soldier is 10 years younger. Interview with TFG deputy Interior Minister, Mogadishu, June 2012.

⁴⁵ This is in stark contrast to a poll conducted in Mogadishu in December 2011–January 2012 which found that 92 percent of respondents perceived AMISOM as a 'friendly' force (up from 75 percent in November 2010 and 72 percent in January 2010). See: *op cit* ORB.


⁴⁶ Chonghaile C, 'Somali tale of two cities as Mogadishu's vulnerable miss out on progress', *The Guardian*, 18 June 2012.

⁴⁷ Interview with senior NSA official, Mogadishu, June 2012.

⁴⁸ Comprising the TFG President, Prime Minister and Speaker, in addition to the heads of police, military, NSA, the Mogadishu mayor, and the Minister of Justice.

⁴⁹ This came after former Prime Minister Mohamed Farmaajo hired dozens of police and military to provide protection during his presidential campaign.

⁵⁰ Interview with B Warsame, TFG soldier working for a hotel, Mogadishu, June 2012.



Sources: UN Somalia Agency, UN OCHA Somalia and Saferworld

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This map provides an overview of the divide in Mogadishu between northern and southern districts – relating to the threat to UN activities only – as well as IDP settlements and security checkpoints.

has been willing to look the other way as the soldiers and police officers are protecting installations and individuals that should fall under its remit.⁵¹

There are concerns that by protecting individuals or businesses owned by members of their sub-clan, the security services are increasingly carrying out sectarian duties at the expense of national responsibilities. This increases the possibility of uniformed officers being used against each other. Moreover, it erodes the credibility and legitimacy of the police and military, as they are perceived as disparate militias and not a national security service. A further point is that high wages for private security provision constitute a vested interest in prolonged insecurity for those working in the security sector.⁵²

Given these limitations, and despite having functioning police stations in all of the 16 districts of the city,⁵³ the TFG focuses its policing efforts on southern districts where almost all government and non-governmental institutions, as well as the offices of international organisations are located. This leaves the northern districts poorly protected during the day and virtually defenseless at night. The north also lacks the protection of neighbourhood vigilante groups. Table 3 confirms that most incidents of non-lethal violence over the last 90 days were reported by residents of three northern districts: Kaaraan, Yaqshiid, and Heli-Waa. However, there were also significant numbers of incidents reported by residents of southern districts. The most violent deaths were reported by residents of Hawl-Wadaag (a southern district) followed by Kaaraan and Dayniile (northern districts). The most violent deaths were reported by residents of Hawl-Wadaag (a southern district) and Karaan followed by Dayniile (both northern districts).

⁵¹ Interview with senior NSA official, Mogadishu, June 2012.

⁵² Also noted in: Menkhaus K, *Conflict analysis: Somalia*, UNPOS, February 2011, updated December 2011, p 13.

⁵³ Mapping exercise undertaken by Saferworld, July 2012.

6


Human needs: migration, food and resources

6.1 Population movements

IMPROVED SECURITY IN MOGADISHU has seen an average of 15,000 people returning to the capital each month since the beginning of 2012, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). As Figure 7 below illustrates, the number of returnees dropped in June but significantly more people are still coming back to the capital than departing. The National Disaster Management Agency says the vast majority of those who fled in 2007 have since returned, including a large number of Somalis from the diaspora who are trickling back and injecting huge capital into the city. The diaspora are highly visible as they own and operate most of the best restaurants, shopping complexes, hotels and other businesses. They form the undisputed engine behind the vitality of the Mogadishu economy, particularly in the booming real estate sector.

Figure 7. Movement of internally displaced persons in Mogadishu

Source: UNHCR



Poorer families who are moving into IDP camps or unoccupied public buildings are more vulnerable and over-looked, according to aid agencies.⁵⁴ These families have faced serious challenges since the TFG launched a campaign in January 2012 to evict squatters from public buildings – forcibly removing thousands with little or no notice, creating a huge shelter problem in the city. There were at least two incidents during the second quarter of 2012 in which neighbours attacked families returning from Elasha Biyaha who were seeking shelter in an abandoned public building. In May, for example, a young boy was seriously wounded as he defended his ailing mother from the rocks of neighbours who were trying to prevent families from forming an IDP settlement in their neighbourhood.⁵⁵

6.2 Food availability

Commercial food imports in Mogadishu were smaller last year than previously,⁵⁶ perhaps as a result of the overwhelming delivery of food aid provoked by the 2011 famine. However, food availability has improved considerably over the past year⁵⁷ with 84 percent of the surveyed population reporting ‘acceptable food consumption’ and only seven percent ‘poor’ consumption, according to the latest analysis.⁵⁸ This is partly due to decreased prices of rice, grain and sorghum (see Figure 8) and increased labour opportunities and higher wages due to the improved economy.

Almost a quarter of IDPs (23 percent) rely on humanitarian aid as their main source of income.⁵⁹ Rates of malnutrition among IDPs have decreased since mid-2011 but are still deemed ‘critical’ with 16.1 percent Global Acute Malnutrition and 3.7 percent Severe Acute Malnutrition⁶⁰ recorded as of April 2012.⁶¹ One third of IDPs (32 percent), the most vulnerable of whom are female-headed households, are coping by relying on donations from relatives, sending family members to eat elsewhere, begging or not eating on a daily basis. Humanitarian agencies worry that drought and a below-average harvest could lead to further displacement to the capital from affected areas. Between February and May 2012, tens of thousands left the Afgooye corridor for camps in Mogadishu where 184,000 displaced people were already living in deplorable conditions.⁶²

Obtaining quality information on aid distribution in IDP camps is extremely difficult, if not impossible. There are several layers of ‘gate keepers’ at some sites, who effectively run the distributions as a business and are often connected to both the DCs and local security personnel.⁶³ There is a complete lack of transparency on who is receiving what.⁶⁴ Clearer, however, is that significant food aid diversion and theft did take place during the famine and appears to be continuing.⁶⁵ Visits in June 2012 to some of the main markets in Mogadishu showed food sacks being sold with stamps from the World Food Programme, USAID and the Japanese government.

54 Interview with official from Concern Ireland, Mogadishu, June 2012.

55 Interview with a senior aide to the mayor, Mogadishu, June 2012.

56 Interview with Ali Mohamed, Ministry of Finance, Mogadishu, June 2012.

57 FSNAU, WFP and Fewsnet, *Mogadishu Food Security and Nutrition Situation Trends, July 2011–April 2012*, 19 July 2012, p 3.

58 The proportion of people with acceptable levels of food consumption increased from only 40 percent in August 2011, to 65 percent in December 2011, and 84 percent at the present time. *Ibid* p 3.

59 *Op cit* FSNAU, WFP and Fewsnet, p 4.

60 Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) is calculated with the Z-score defined as a weight-for-height index of less than 2 standard deviations from the mean weight of a reference population of children of the same height and/or having oedema. Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) is calculated with the Z-score defined as a weight-for-height index less than 3 standard deviations from the mean weight of a reference population of children of the same height and/or having oedema. See: CEDAT – Complex Emergency Database, *Glossary*, (available online).

61 *Op cit* FSNAU, WFP and Fewsnet, p 4.

62 Interview with Russell Geekie, spokesperson for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Somalia.


63 Interview with Somalia analyst, Nairobi, August 2012.

64 Interview with Somalia analyst, Nairobi, August 2012.

65 Houreld K, ‘AP Exclusive: How Somalia’s Famine Aid Went Astray’, *Associated Press*, 17 Mar 2012.

Figure 8. Prices of food per kilo in Mogadishu, April–June 2012

Prices are in Somali Shillings (SoSh), where 1 US dollar = 1,592 SoSh



6.3 Land

The emotive issue of access to land is raising tensions in Mogadishu. Up to 500,000 IDPs who have returned since al-Shabaab was expelled are seeking a place to stay with many squatting on government-owned property. The government has evicted tens of thousands, leading clan elders to claim that overzealous members of the President's Muddullood clan are orchestrating the evictions as punishment for their alleged opposition to the President.⁶⁶ The land crisis is being exacerbated by wealthy Somali diaspora who in the last year have been buying up residential and business plots, mostly in southern Mogadishu. Many of these transactions are dubious, given that official title deeds are hard to verify from the defunct Land Registry.⁶⁷ With no functioning judicial or traditional mechanism for regulating these purchases, or any credible means of arbitrating disputes, a full-blown social crisis driven by an acute shortage of land and housing is a real possibility.

⁶⁶ Interviews with clan members, Mogadishu, 25 May 2012.

⁶⁷ The Land Registry Department has not been operational since 1991.

7

Regional and international stakeholders in Somalia

THE KEY EXTERNAL ACTORS IN SOMALIA ARE THE UN, which co-ordinates the international community's efforts through the transition roadmap and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), whose member states Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti have troops in Somalia operating under the AMISOM banner. Ethiopia, another IGAD member state, also has troops in Somalia, but prefers to operate outside of the AMISOM framework. The UN and IGAD co-ordinate their approaches, with the former leading the political track via its Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the latter providing the troops to stabilise Somalia.

Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom remain significant external actors in Somalia and the presence of foreign Al Qaeda-affiliated fighters has also been reported.

7.1 AMISOM's progress

Backed by the UN, the US government and the EU,⁶⁸ AMISOM's role is to support the TFG and create conditions for the long-term stabilisation and reconstruction of Somalia. Military successes have been significant with AMISOM largely uprooting al-Shabaab from Mogadishu by the end of 2011. It displaced al-Shabaab from Daynille, on the outskirts of Mogadishu, at the end of March 2012 and from Afgooye, 30 km northwest of Mogadishu, in May 2012. In June, AMISOM and TFG forces claimed control of Bala'ad, 30 km north of Mogadishu, and the Esaley airstrip and Elma'an port 37 km northeast of the city. These victories were helped by an increase in troop numbers which are expected to rise to 17,731 by the end of 2012.

AMISOM soldiers are also being used to train, mentor, monitor and advise the Somali Police Force; provide security in Mogadishu to the traditional elders and committee tasked with facilitating the end of the transition period;⁶⁹ and protect both the TFG and the growing number of external actors who visit Mogadishu on political or

⁶⁸ *Op cit* UN Monitoring Group Report, p 22.

⁶⁹ Telephone interview with senior AMISOM official, August 2012.

development missions. Part of the external support for AMISOM includes ‘mentors’ – nationalities unknown – which are provided through Bancroft, a private security firm.

New deployments include Kenyan operations in Middle and Lower Jubba (4,600), Burundian and Ugandan deployments in the Bay and Bakool regions (2,500) and the Djiboutian deployment to Beled Weyn (850), in the Hiiraan region. The Kenyans, allied with the Ras Kamboni militia, successfully engaged with al-Shabaab forces at Hosingo in January 2012 and captured Afmadow in May 2012. AMISOM members Uganda and Burundi have stayed out of the political sphere but helped create a secure environment in the capital and the surrounding regions.

AMISOM representatives insist that recent successes against al-Shabaab have been achieved with minimal impact on civilians.⁷⁰ They say that AMISOM forces have avoided entering towns or large population centres and that al-Shabaab is avoiding confrontation with the superior force. This is confirmed by other sources.⁷¹ However, the 2012 SEMG report found that “Kenyan and Ethiopian military have shown little transparency with respect to operational procedures and battlefield damage assessments, making it difficult to ascertain whether they have adopted measures to avoid, mitigate and compensate harm to civilians.”⁷² Abuses of civilians – namely looting and rapes – occurred after the taking of Afgooye by TFG soldiers in front of AMISOM commanders in June 2012.⁷³

7.2 Non-mandated external security actors

Ethiopia is the most significant external security actor operating outside the framework of AMISOM. IGAD has sanctioned their intervention (at the political level) but Ethiopian forces also operate as part of a broad anti-Shabaab alliance without any specific mandate.⁷⁴

There have been no reports of Ethiopian troops in or near Mogadishu, and most of the reported activity has been in the west and central areas of south central Somalia. Ethiopian forces, alongside local ASWJ militias, took Beled Weyn on 31 December 2011. They took Baidoa, the capital of Bay region, in February in conjunction with TFG-allied local militias. Establishing new administrations in these locations has been complicated and has sometimes resulted in conflict as it is taking place amid fear of al-Shabaab reprisals.

The United States (US) is another key external actor and has largely focused on attacks against high value targets. That includes the killings of al-Qaeda operative Salah Nabhan and the former al-Shabaab leader, Aden Hashi Ayrow. In June, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice programme announced a bounty on the heads of seven al Shabaab leaders totaling \$33 million.⁷⁵ Surveillance activity using drones, reportedly from airbases in southern Ethiopia and Djibouti, also continues.⁷⁶

The **United Kingdom** (UK), meanwhile, has confirmed that it has sent a small advisory team that is mentoring AMISOM in areas such as stabilisation, strategic communications and medical advice. The UK has also said it will open an embassy in Mogadishu when the security situation allows. On 2 February 2012, Matt Baugh was appointed as the UK Ambassador to Somalia, the first such appointment in 21 years.⁷⁷

⁷⁰ All parties to Somalia’s conflict – namely AMISOM, the TFG forces, al-Shabaab and Kenyan and Ugandan forces – have been accused of violating international humanitarian law, mainly through the use of indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians. According to Human Rights Watch between August 2010 and August 2011 there were 4,000 combat-related civilian casualties in Somalia, including 1,000 deaths. See: *op cit* HRW, for background.

⁷¹ Interview with Somali peace activist, Mogadishu, August 2012.

⁷² See: *op cit* UN Monitoring Group Report, p 28.

⁷³ Interview with Somali peace activist, Mogadishu, August 2012.

⁷⁴ Davison W, ‘Ethiopia agrees to back Somalia military operations, says IGAD’, *Bloomberg News*, 1 December 2011.

⁷⁵ Voice of America, ‘US Offers Bounty for Somali Militias’, *VOA News*, 7 June 2012.

⁷⁶ Zenko M, & Welch E, ‘Where the drones are: Mapping the launch pads for Obama’s secret wars’, *Foreign Policy*, 29 May 2012.

⁷⁷ Information from UK government official, August 2012.

Elsewhere, there have been consistent reports of the presence of foreign fighters associated with **Al Qaeda** supporting al-Shabaab on the ground in Somalia. Estimates of their numbers vary between 200 and 500. Press reports in June suggested that foreign jihadists were still present in the al-Shabaab-held towns of Marka and Barawe in the Lower Shabelle region but that many were fleeing to Yemen.⁷⁸

7.3 Other external funding and support

External actors are largely funding the rising cost of the AMISOM mission whose budget will double to \$450–\$500 million⁷⁹ by the time the force is up to full strength, which is expected to be around the end of 2012. Funding arrangements are complex and include a Trust Fund,⁸⁰ payment of salaries by the European Union (EU) (from its African Peace Facility) and a growing proportion of funding from UN-assessed contributions. External actors are also providing funds for the training and development of the TFG soldiers who will eventually take over from AMISOM. Up to 600 TFG troops recently completed their military training in Uganda – the fifth graduation of its kind, bringing the number of troops trained under the joint EU/US/Uganda programme to 2,400. The target by the end of 2012 is 3,200.⁸¹

Elsewhere in South-Central Somalia, Ethiopia provides military training in the Hiiraan region to ASWJ and TFG forces, while Kenya supports its allies in the Ras Kamboni militia.

Separately, a long-standing United Nations Development Programme initiative has produced 5,300 trained police officers for south central Somalia who are mainly deployed in Mogadishu. The EU and Japan provide funding for their salaries – \$100 for a constable and \$150–\$200 per month for senior officers.⁸²

External actors, particularly Turkey, have become the main drivers of the political process and in focus groups and interviews Somali people welcomed the Turkish preference for direct contact with local people and the prominent involvement of its private sector. Up to 500 Turkish aid workers, teachers and engineers are currently in Mogadishu⁸³ and the country recently announced a \$100 million infrastructure project to rebuild the city. It has also given scholarships to more than a thousand Somali students; held the Istanbul II conference on Somalia in May 2012; sent 80 police cadets for officer training in Turkey;⁸⁴ and in March 2012 the Turkish national carrier was the first international airline to start flying into Mogadishu since 1991.

However, quiet criticism is also growing that Turkey has overestimated the institutional importance of Sheikh Sharif and the Presidency and may have inadvertently concentrated its commercial dealings on a narrow section of his close allies and kinsmen. Turkey decided to invite 135 elders who had been tasked with selecting the new 275 members of parliament to the Istanbul II conference on 30 May. The decision itself was unexpected and caught everyone by surprise. Turkey's motive may have been simple – to lend gravitas to the Istanbul conference and increase Somali-ownership. However, some within the TFG and outside have cast the move in a negative light, suggesting it was proof of Ankara's meddling and part of a plot to scuttle the process and sponsor a parallel peace initiative.

78 Hussein A, 'Foreign Al-Shabaab fighters spotted in Lower Shabelle', *Sabahi Online*, 19 June 2012.

79 International Contact Group on Somalia, Final Communique of the International Contact Group on Somalia meeting in Rome, *Garowe Online*, July 2012.

80 Although authorised by the UN, AMISOM is an AU operation. Since the AU does not have funds to pay for the mission, an AMISOM Trust Fund was established in 2007 to support it. The contributions to the Trust Fund are voluntary, unlike UN assessed contributions which are mandatory.

81 For background information see Delany M, 'Once mighty, Somalia's army struggles to rebuild itself', *The Daily Star*, 10 August 2012.

82 *Op cit* McConnel.

83 For background information see Aynte, A, *Turkey's increasing role in Somalia: An emerging donor*, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, March 2012, pp 1–5.

84 'Turkey trains Somali police', *Keydmedia.com*, 30 June 2012.

Despite driving – and in many cases shaping – the political process, external actors are meeting stiff resistance from some local actors on key issues facing the country. For example, external support for the provisional constitution, the presence of foreign troops and federalism is not shared by local actors including the CIS, civil society and the business community. Table 4 illustrates the fault lines on four important issues.

Table 4. Actors' attitudes towards key issues

✓ means 'in favour of' and ✗ means 'against'

Source: Public statements from actors and interviews. Where nothing is indicated, no public statements have been made.

	Provisional constitution	Foreign troops	Islamic law	Federalism
Council of Islamic Scholars	✗	✗	✓	✗
Civil Society	✗	✗	✓	✗
TFG	✓	✓	✓	✓
Business Community	✗		✓	✗
Eritrea		✗		
Ethiopia	✓	✓	✗	✓
AMISOM	✓	✓		✓
UNPOS	✓	✓		✓

The criticisms of Turkey's involvement in Somalia have also highlighted another problem – the perception that local politicians have been pushed by external actors to design and implement the transition roadmap, including the adoption of a new provisional constitution. Somali concerns grew after external actors ignored a parliamentary vote in December 2011 which ousted the then speaker, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden.⁸⁵ There is a fear that a similar scenario could emerge again, particularly if the presidential vote fails to produce a clear winner. Threats of sanctions by IGAD, the African Union (AU) and UNPOS against unspecified 'spoilers' of the political process is also a source of worry – and possible resentment – among Somalis, most of whom doubt the capacity of outsiders to second-guess what might constitute a representative or inclusive regime. Other risks relate to the international community's disproportionate focus on the six signatories of the roadmap, particularly when many Somalis do not see them as being sufficiently representative and legitimate.

BOX 2. Mogadishu Stabilisation Plan

New funds aimed at stabilising and rebuilding Somalia complement a surge of Somali investment in the aftermath of al-Shabaab's departure. One of the key recent developments has been the announcement in May of funding for a \$9.5 million Mogadishu Stabilisation Plan through a partnership between the TFG, USAID and the UK Department for International Development.⁸⁶ The plan is one aspect of a wider external strategy to provide quick impact projects in areas recently recovered from al-Shabaab control. One of its main functions is to establish Peace Committees in each of the 16 districts of Mogadishu which will develop community projects designed to promote stabilisation and reconciliation. They could range from road clearance and street lighting to community events.

In Mogadishu, where the 16 DCs have reasonable control of their districts, a policy of even handedness between the different districts and the explicit involvement of the community-level peace committees is intended to ensure a conflict-sensitive approach. Outside Mogadishu, especially where local power struggles are still taking place to establish control, offers of large sums of assistance have the potential to fuel conflict between different contenders for power.

⁸⁵ Shabelle Media Network, 'Somalia parliament dismisses speaker Sharif Hassan', *AllAfrica.com*, 13 December 2011.

⁸⁶ British Office for Somalia, *UK and US fund Mogadishu Stabilisation program*, 8 May 2012.



Conclusion: Issues to consider

MOGADISHU IS AT A CROSSROADS. The expulsion of al-Shabaab from the city, the consolidation of TFG control, the widespread perception of improved security, mass returns, the revival of the economy and improved food security have all led to a sense of optimism among residents. It is essential that this turning point be seized by Somalis and international actors alike to consolidate and build on fragile gains.

There are many risks associated with the political transition, most notably the potential rekindling of violence by warlords and businessmen who feel excluded by the latest political settlement. Inadequate policing – particularly in the recently liberated northern districts – the privatisation of a significant part of the national security forces, the pervasiveness of neighborhood vigilantes and militias and the mix of corruption, clan-based nepotism and the absence of the rule of law mean that conflict could easily re-erupt to reverse the many gains the city has made in the past year. This must be avoided at all costs.

Recent developments present both opportunities and dilemmas. External actors approaching Somalia will need to balance commitments to supporting peace dividends and security for Somali citizens with efforts to avoid reinforcing the unsavoury aspects of the fragile security apparatus and increase transparency in aid delivery. In addition to addressing immediate humanitarian needs, special priority should be given to improving the provision of security and protection to local populations from high levels of violence and crime. This will require a concerted investment in professionalised community policing capacity, particularly in Mogadishu's northern districts. Experiences from other conflict-affected and fragile states, including in East Africa, give ample evidence that a failure to invest in citizens' security significantly undermines state legitimacy and efforts to support long-term peace and security.⁸⁷ Special consideration will be needed as to how and whether to integrate neighbourhood vigilante groups, which are currently fulfilling a kind of community policing function. Also, the current free-for-all approach to the privatisation of security in the city which is taking place in a regulatory vacuum poses an immense risk to human security and must be properly regulated.

⁸⁷ A concentration on citizens' security is in line with the recommendations made by the World Bank in its latest World Development Report and with international commitments made under the New Deal during the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea, in November 2011. See: World Bank, *The World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*, Washington DC.

As the new government takes shape, consideration needs to be paid to how it will differentiate itself from the TFG. Key to this will be the ways in which the new government demonstrates a commitment to providing security and services not only to the country's elite, but also to ordinary and particularly vulnerable residents. Also, the new government should place a concerted focus on facilitating and encouraging genuinely broad-based, inclusive and non-violent political debate and reconciliation, both at the national and the local level. The failure of the TFG to advance good governance practices, including the focus on reconciliation, left it lacking legitimacy for its entire tenure.

Finally, the nascent government needs to prioritise the establishment of the rule of law in the city and enforce it equally among all groups. A zero-tolerance policy on torture and illegal arrests would be a good starting point, as would the regulation of the land sector and the provision of credible land dispute resolution mechanisms. Clamping down on rampant corruption among political and economic elites is also essential.

Methodology

This report draws on more than 70 interviews and three participatory focus groups⁸⁸ conducted by four researchers in Mogadishu and Nairobi from May–July 2012. Additional material was added in August 2012. Interviewees included security officials, government officials, community elders, civil society representatives and western diplomats. A variety of methodologies were employed, including archival desk research, field-based research, key informant interviews, empirical analyses of raw secondary data, a household survey, estimation techniques based on survey data and a district-level mapping exercise on security, access to resources and political dynamics in Mogadishu. The researchers also drew on media reports, data from the UN and NGOs and existing literature. All websites cited in the report were accessed from May to August 2012.

The researchers were recruited based on their expertise, extensive contacts, and established track record of undertaking research in Somalia as well as their ability to manoeuvre in Mogadishu. Each was assigned a specific subject to research and a central analyst was charged with consolidating findings. All of the researchers undertook field research, three of them in Mogadishu.

A district-level mapping exercise was undertaken by Harvard Africa from 11–18 July 2012 in Mogadishu to map public services (e.g. police stations), facilities (e.g. health providers) and security checkpoints. It was conducted by a team of 16 data collectors and two data supervisors employed to cross-check the information over three days.

A household survey was also undertaken by Data and Research Solutions Ltd (DARS) on 23–24 July 2012. Twelve teams – each consisting of four interviewers and one supervisor – a total of 60 field operation members – were divided into teams comprising two males and two females.

A sample size of 800 was selected based on the limited budget and timeframe for the survey. The margin of error was 3.5 percent⁸⁹ with a 95 percent confidence level, necessitating a sample size of 783 households for an overall estimated population of 1,175,700.⁹⁰ Taking into account a likely non-response rate of four percent, based on previous surveys in Somalia, the total sample size was increased to 800. Sampling was undertaken in three stages with all 16 Mogadishu districts serving as the primary sampling unit; sub-districts (*Xaafadaha* in Somali) selected randomly using stratified cluster sampling as the secondary units; and wards (*Laamaha* in Somali) as the tertiary sampling units, also selected randomly. A total of 50 households were targeted in each district. The Date Code method was used to select the first household in each sampling unit and subsequent households were selected by using a skip pattern and the left thumb rule.⁹¹ Household respondents were selected using the Kish Grid methodology.⁹²

The source of all information presented is Saferworld unless otherwise stated.

⁸⁸ More than 30 people including diplomats, traditional elders, Islamic scholars, civil society leaders, business people and residents of Mogadishu participated in the focus groups.

⁸⁹ The standard margin of error of 2.5 percent would have necessitated a sample size of 1,536, which was beyond the scope of the design phase of the Conflict and Governance Mapping (CGM) project for which this paper was produced.

⁹⁰ Vaidyanathan, K E, 'Population Statistics of Somalia,' United Nations Development Programme Somalia, 1997.

⁹¹ If the day's date is the 27th, using a skip pattern and left thumb rule, two is added to seven to make nine and every ninth household on the left is surveyed.

⁹² The Kish Grid is a widely-used technique in surveying whereby interviewers who have been issued with a sample of household addresses can sample individuals by following simple yet rigorous rules for selecting one person to interview from among household residents. The system is devised so that all individuals in a household have an equal chance of selection. See www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-Kishgrid.html.

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Saferworld works to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote co-operative approaches to security. We work with governments, international organisations and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices through advocacy, research and policy development and through supporting the actions of others.

COVER PHOTO: Policewoman Khadija Haji Diriye investigates local complaints with a colleague in Mogadishu. © SVEN TORFINN



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