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# Developing integrated approaches to post-conflict security and recovery

A case study of integrated DDR in Sudan

Developing integrated approaches to post-conflict security and recovery:

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Acknowledgements

Contents

Acronyms

ABC   Abyei Boundary Commission
ARC   arms reduction and control
AU   African Union
CAAFG   Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups
CJMC   Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission
CPA   Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC   community security and arms control
CSF   Community Security Fund
DDR   disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DSRSG   Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EU   European Union
GNU   Government of National Unity
GoS   Government of Sudan
GoSS   Government of Southern Sudan
ICG   International Crisis Group
IDDRP   Interim DDR Programme
IDDRS   Integrated DDR Standards
IGAD   Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
JDB   Joint Defence Board
JIU   Joint Integrated Unit
MDTF   Multi Donor Trust Fund
NCP   National Congress Party
NDDRCC National DDR Co-ordination Council

NSDDRC Northern Sudan DDR Commission
OAG   other armed group
OAGs CC Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee
PDSRSG Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SAF   Sudan Armed Forces
SALW   small arms and light weapons
SNG   special needs group
SPLA   Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM   Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRSG   Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSDDRC Southern Sudan DDR Commission
SSPS   Southern Sudan Police Service
SSR   security sector reform
SST   Security Sector Transformation
UK   United Kingdom
UN   United Nations
UNDDR   United Nations DDR
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIS   United Nations Mission in Sudan
US   United States of America

Executive summary

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to examine how integrated approaches to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and post-conflict security programming have been applied in the case of Sudan. The context for the analysis is the Sudan-wide Comprehensive Peace Agreement, while the primary focus is the design and implementation of DDR in the South of the country. The study covers the period from 2005 until the end of 2007. Significant positive steps have been taken in 2008 which have strengthened the conceptual and operational aspects of DDR in Sudan. Although these were not the focus of this study, they represent important and welcome progress. The paper concludes by suggesting lessons and recommendations that could contribute to improved policy and programme interventions to meet the diverging security needs of post-war societies. It is offered as a constructive contribution to policy dialogue around post-war security and recovery responses in Sudan and elsewhere.

The 'Comprehensive Peace Agreement' (CPA) between the North and South established the foundation for DDR in Sudan, from which an 'Interim DDR Programme' (IDDRP) was designed and agreed. Supported by the United Nations (UN) and international partners, the IDDRP utilised new principles for integrated approaches to DDR programme design, management and implementation that were heavily influenced by the development of the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS). While the DDR process in Sudan is widely regarded to have delivered limited results after over two years of implementation, it has demonstrated the significant challenges involved in putting these integrated approaches into practice in a complex post-war environment. These challenges have included managing the difficulties of national ownership and designing a programme that fits with complex contextual realities. Inconsistent engagement between the parties and by international partners in the process at the highest political levels has meant that political risks have not always been adequately managed. The initial challenges of management cohesion within the supporting integrated UNDDR Unit and basic inter-operability issues between the UN agencies involved in the Unit also contributed to difficulties in implementing the programme. Lastly, despite the heavy emphasis on integration, opportunities for co-ordinating DDR and wider security sector programming have until recently been largely missed, with the result that different security and justice sector processes have impacted one another in unforeseen and sometimes negative ways.

Ultimately, it is suggested that further analysis and practical guidance are required if integration and co-ordination of future DDR and post-war security responses are to demonstrate more positive results. This remains a fairly new and very challenging area of policy which will develop significantly over time and with the benefit of experience. As a contribution to this discourse, Saferworld offers the following recommendations for consideration by decision-makers, practitioners and donor agencies involved in the design and implementation of post-conflict security building policies and programmes:

1. Direct and consistent high-level international engagement with involved parties should be sustained following agreement on programme goals and direction.

2. Programming should take the context as the starting point and then match this with appropriate programmatic responses.

3. National and UN structures should take steps to ensure mechanisms exist to manage the risk and impact of changes in the political and security context.

4. Practical guidance on alternative institutional arrangements for DDR and post-conflict security provision, that reflect different contextual realities while still achieving the objective of national ownership, should be further developed.

5. National and international partners should ensure that genuine partnership arrangements are negotiated where both sides are jointly involved in strategic decision-making and are jointly accountable to one another.

6. Senior in-country UN management should consistently engage with and see DDR programming as much a part of the core post-war recovery and peace building agenda as other competing programme areas.

7. Greater emphasis should be placed on aspects of IDDRS guidance relating to joint implementation.

8. Involved UN agencies should consider negotiating and agreeing on practical operational and administrative arrangements that will allow them to work in close programmatic collaboration with one another.

9. International post-conflict security policy-makers and practitioners could explore more flexible ways in which to develop sequenced and co-ordinated approaches to addressing inter-related issues affecting post-war security as a whole.

1

Introduction

AFRICA'S LONGEST RUNNING CIVIL WAR officially ended on 9 January 2005 with the signing of the 'Comprehensive Peace Agreement' (CPA) in Nairobi between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) / Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan (GoS). The North-South conflict began in the 1950s[1] and re-started in 1983, following the breakdown of the 1972 'Addis Ababa Peace Agreement'. For more than two decades, the GoS, dominated by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLA, the main rebel force in the South, fought over resources, power, the role of religion in the state and self-determination. Over two million people died, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people fled the country as refugees.[2]

The parties to the CPA agreed to implement a number of steps towards securing lasting peace over a six-year interim period, at the end of which a referendum would be held on Southern self-determination. As part of the agreement's security arrangements, the CPA specifically included a section on "Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-Integration and Reconciliation".[3] With support from the United Nations (UN) and international community, the parties developed an 'Interim Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme' (IDDRP), which was considered important for building security during the interim period and preparing for an eventual large-scale disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme to help former combatants make a peaceful transition into civilian life.

This paper critically reviews the design and implementation of the first phase of DDR programming in Sudan from 2005 until the end of 2007; with a particular focus on Southern Sudan (field research was undertaken in Southern Sudan on numerous occasions from March 2007 until June 2008).[4] It does not attempt to comprehensively assess all expected outputs and aspects of the IDDRP; there have been a number of past exercises in this regard. Instead, it examines the design and implementation of the IDDRP with the goal of interrogating currently ascendant 'integrated' approaches to DDR and post-conflict security. Further, it aims to draw lessons from this specific period that highlight the significant programmatic, institutional, contextual and operational challenges of putting integrated approaches into practice in a complex post-conflict environment.

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1   It is widely understood to have started in 1956, but some commentators identify the origins of the Anyanya I movement in Southern Sudan in the early 1950s as the beginning of the conflict.
2   UNDDR Resource Centre, Sudan DDR country programme: <www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35>
3   CPA, Chapter VI: Security Arrangements, Annexure 1: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangement Implementation Modalities and Appendices, Part III: Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-Integration and Reconciliation, pp 118–121.
4   The particular focus on the South is for two reasons. Firstly, out of the two parties, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) is confronted with the greatest post-conflict recovery challenges while simultaneously building the institutions of state and implementing the CPA. Secondly, beyond the North-South political dynamic, the integrity of the CPA is crucially founded on achieving security and stability in Southern Sudan during the interim period.

Sudan is a useful case study because it is essentially a pilot for the UN's new Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), a comprehensive set of principles, standards and guidelines for integrated DDR programming. On paper, the IDDRP looks like a model of good practice as recommended by IDDRS guidance. However, until very recently, over two years into its implementation, the DDR process in Sudan is widely felt to have not achieved as much as was initially hoped. This raises questions about the effectiveness of 'integrated' approaches to DDR and post-conflict security programming. The experience of DDR in Sudan (and in the South particularly) highlights the significant challenges inherent in the 'integrated' approach and points to the need for creative new thinking on how to better address the wide range of security challenges in countries emerging from conflict.

2

The context for DDR

2.1 Brief history of the conflict

SUDAN'S CIVIL WARS date back to the colonial period and its hasty and poorly managed independence from the United Kingdom (UK), which left the country in the hands of a nationalist movement dominated by Northern Sudanese. The UK left behind a country with deep disparities in wealth and power between those at the centre around Khartoum and the rest of the country, and between the North and South – the remnants of a colonial administrative system that separated the South and delayed its development. Southern rebellion broke out even before the independent state of Sudan could be established in 1956, leading to Sudan's first civil war and a contest over the nature and identity of the state that has remained at the heart of the conflict to this day. In fact, the roots of Sudan's North-South conflict can be traced even further back, to a centuries-old pattern of uneven development, slave raiding, and exploitative religious and ethnic divisions. However, this paper concentrates on the most recent phase of history so as to provide a backdrop to the CPA and the environment in which the DDR programme was planned and is being implemented.

In 1972, the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement put a temporary halt to North-South hostilities for 11 years. But Southern resistance resurfaced due to disillusionment and grievances over breaches of the peace deal, limited Southern autonomy and ultimately the imposition of sharia law. The exploitation of oil fields located mainly in the South by the Khartoum-based GoS further increased tensions. In 1983, the second civil war broke out between the GoS and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which emerged as the dominant rebel political force in the South.[5]

Over time, the North-South conflict developed into a much wider war, with the SPLM/A extending its support to other marginalised constituencies in the largely Muslim North and the GoS allying with non-Muslim militia in the South. By the time the CPA was signed in 2005, Sudan was divided by multiple conflicts affecting different regions: the South was entering into a tense peace agreement with the Northern authorities; Eastern Sudan was unstable; the conflict in the western region of Darfur had erupted into a major humanitarian crisis; and significant tensions existed in contested areas along Sudan's central belt between the North and South. In fact, Sudan remains unique in its complexity in that it is currently a signatory to three separate peace agreements within its own borders.[6]

Further complicating the situation, formal and functional governance and security infrastructure is still emerging in the war-affected areas of Southern Sudan. The implementation of the CPA and the stability of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) face innumerable additional challenges: internal political divisions, the

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5 For a history of the conflict see, Johnson D, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Indiana University Press, 2003).
6 The CPA (2005), the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006) and the East Sudan Peace Agreement (2006).

presence of militias and armed groups, the threat of a revived Lord's Resistance Army, elements opposed to or dissatisfied with the CPA, and persisting ethnic and resource based conflicts. The widespread presence of arms in the hands of civilians and armed groups and the vacuum in accountable security provision to communities throughout much of Southern Sudan is contributing to high levels of inter-community conflict and insecurity. Local tensions have the potential to escalate quickly into wider conflicts that could undermine the CPA. The security services in Southern Sudan are under enormous pressure to establish basic protection, safety and security for the civil population in this context with extremely limited resources and while undergoing fundamental institutional transformation.

2.2 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The CPA, signed on 9 January 2005, was a culmination of mediation efforts by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) which supported negotiations between the GoS and the SPLM to agree to a series of protocols between 2002 and 2004[7]. The CPA was agreed in the context of significant external pressure and engagement. The United States (US), in particular, had considerable leverage, while others were instrumental in supporting the agreement, including the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and the UN.[8]

The CPA established a six-year interim period, at the end of which in 2011 the people of the South will vote in a referendum to decide on Southern independence. The parties agreed to work to "make unity attractive" and, during the interim period, significant governance reforms are to be carried out, including: forming a Government of National Unity (GNU) with participation of Northern and Southern parties; the creation of the GoSS with considerable autonomy and powers in the South; the decentralisation of authority to State governments throughout Sudan; and general elections for all levels of government to be held in 2009. The CPA also stipulates that an independent commission will demarcate the North-South border along the 1956-line[9] and another commission will establish the boundaries of the contested oil-rich area of Abyei. A separate vote by residents of Abyei in 2011 will determine whether the region becomes part of the North or the South.

The CPA contains the core arrangements for security and DDR during the interim period. The initial security undertakings have focused on the redeployment of troops across the 1956-line, the formation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs)[10] and the incorporation of other armed groups (OAGs)[11] into the organised armed forces of either the SPLA or Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or their dissolution. The CPA also envisages key decisions regarding the downsizing of forces and security sector reform (SSR), though these were to take place after the deadline for the redeployment of SAF and SPLA troops to their respective geographic areas. Decisions regarding the ultimate shape of the armed forces are deferred until after the 2011 referendum on self-determination. The CPA also contains provisions relating to the control and use of arms by the SAF and SPLA during the interim period, requiring the parties to provide

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7   These are the Machakos Protocol (2002), Protocols on Security Arrangements (2003), Wealth Sharing (2004), Power Sharing (2004) as well as separate Protocols dealing with the resolution of the conflicts in the three areas: Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile (2004), and Resolution of the Abyei Conflict (2004). Detailed implementation modalities were also agreed in 2004 that detail how the protocols will be implemented, including the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, signed in December 2004.

8   For a detailed analysis of various peace initiatives in Sudan and the IGAD process, see Rogier E, 'No more hills ahead? Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to the Heights of Peace', Clingendael Security Paper 1, Clingendael Institute, August 2005.

9   The 1956-line refers to the boundary demarking North and South Sudan at independence, the precise demarcation of which remains a contentious issue between the parties.

10 Military units composed of equal numbers of SAF and SPLA to be deployed in selected areas of the ceasefire zone (particularly in contentious areas such as the transitional areas and the Southern oil fields) under the command of a Joint Defense Board to be established under the Presidency.

11 OAGs is the term used to refer to militias that were obliged under the CPA to officially cease to exist by disbanding or incorporated into the official military structures in Sudan, whether SAF or SPLA.

detailed data on their inventories and stocks of weapons and ammunition, including their locations, and to agree on ways of monitoring these stocks. However, the CPA contains little on the issue of civilian arms control or disarmament.[12]

The death of SPLM/A leader, Dr John Garang, shortly after he was sworn in as the First Vice-President of Sudan and President of the GoSS had a significant impact on CPA implementation.[13] Garang was a strong advocate for the vision of a united 'New Sudan', based on secular and democratic principles, and inspired confidence that unity was possible despite the aspiration of the majority of Southerners for independence. Under the leadership of Garang's replacement, the now GoSS President Salva Kiir Mayardit, there has been a much stronger shift in the political orientation of the South towards secession and an erosion of the partnership between the NCP and SPLM/A, which was largely built on trust between the personalities involved in the original CPA negotiations.

Despite progress in many areas, CPA implementation is behind schedule and the peace process is extremely fragile. The census was delayed and almost did not take place. The demarcation of the North-South border is at an impasse (demarcation is a pre-requisite for elections at all levels of government in 2009 and the referendum on Southern self-determination in 2011). The redeployment of SAF and SPLA to their respective sides of the 1956-line is now largely complete, though it was not achieved until well after the previous 9 July 2007 deadline for the full redeployment of forces.[14] Moreover, SAF-aligned groups remain in the South and their continued association, perceived or real, with the SAF is a source of tension.[15]

The most serious issue hindering the implementation of the CPA at the time of publication is contention over the status of Abyei. The CPA called for a ruling to be made on Abyei by the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) that would be "final and binding" and would be accepted by both parties. The ABC delivered its ruling to the GNU Presidency on 14 July 2005 but was rejected by the NCP. This, among other factors such as non-compliance of troop withdrawal and perceived inequality of oil revenue sharing, led to a recall by the SPLM of its ministers and advisors from the GNU in November 2007, constituting a major crisis between the NCP and SPLM. The parties overcame their difference towards the end of 2007 and early 2008, but the problems remain, as evident in May 2008 with the outbreak of serious fighting in Abyei between SPLA and SAF forces.[16] While progress has been made in addressing the immediate crisis in Abyei with agreement of a 'road map' between the parties, tensions over the 'Three Areas' (Abyei, Southern Blue Nile, and Nuba Mountains) and the North-South border remain a likely focal point for renewed conflict and require a step change in international attention and action.

Central to the challenges to the success of the CPA is the reality that it represents only a partial peace. Firstly, because it was an agreement between the two main parties and its success will be dependent on bringing in other contending groups during implementation. Secondly, the agreement defers major issues until 2011 – after the referendum on Southern self-determination – giving the impression that it is essentially a ceasefire permitting both parties to consolidate their positions and seek security and political gains during the interim period. Many Southerners believe that there will be war in

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12 The only CPA stipulation specific to civilian disarmament is that the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission (CJMC) will also, "monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed". CPA, Chapter VI: Security Arrangements, Annexure 1: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangement Implementation Modalities and Appendices, Part I: The Ceasefire Arrangements, Article 14.6.5.15, p 104.

13 For further analysis of the implications, see International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Garang's Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan', Africa Briefing No 30, 9 August 2005.

14 "Withdrawal of the Sudanese Armed Forces from garrison towns in the South is now largely complete. Sudan People's Liberation Army troops have withdrawn from Eastern Sudan and have begun movement out of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states [...] Both parties retain forces in the border area." United Nations Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan' (S/2008/267), 22 April 2008, paras 26–27.

15 For further details on the status and activity of armed groups in Southern Sudan, see Small Arms Survey, 'Allies & Defectors: an update on armed group integration and proxy force activity', Sudan Issue Brief No 11, May 2008.

16 This has caused a humanitarian emergency through the displacement of at least 50,000 residents from Abyei, see IRIN, 'SUDAN: Fighting could hamper Abyei aid operation – UN', 21 May 2008.

2011 regardless of the outcome of the referendum and they are preparing for this eventuality. Lastly, the CPA embodies competing visions of unity and separation that give rise to political contradictions at all levels.

The CPA is dependent upon a continued partnership between the NCP and SPLM and its implementation serves the interests of both parties.[17] However, this partnership is fragile as was demonstrated by the SPLM recall of its ministers and advisors from the GNU in November 2007 and the recent outbreak of violence in Abyei. So far, the partnership has largely shown resilience and political solutions were found to resolve these crises. However, there remains a high level of distrust between the parties and, until greater confidence is built, CPA implementation will remain a contested process.

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17 The NCP faces internal opposition and the threat of a multi-front war – the Omdurman attack by the Justice and Equality Movement in May 2008 demonstrated the NCP's vulnerability. The CPA is used to some extent as a tool to mitigate these risks. For the SPLM, the CPA is used to diffuse disillusionment that the South is not achieving what it struggled in terms of security and development, as well as to diffuse growing perceptions of corruption.

3

Design of a national interim DDR programme

IN EXAMINING THE DDR PROCESSES IN SUDAN, this paper will first look at the CPA as a framework for DDR and the contextual issues that influenced design of the IDDRP. It then examines specific IDDRP design issues – particularly in the context of Southern Sudan – in more detail with a focus on those that are relevant to the integrated approach to DDR and post-conflict security programming.

3.1 The national framework for DDR in Sudan

Negotiations for DDR in Sudan began during the IGAD sponsored peace negotiations, carried out between the SPLM's and GoS's Interim DDR Authorities well before the signing of the CPA. This process helped ensure that the CPA included provisions setting out necessary frameworks for DDR, SSR and other post-conflict security arrangements and was intended to build national ownership and strengthen the capacity of the parties to design, and later, to implement programming. The result was the design of an initial national programme, the IDDRP, to be implemented in both the North and South supported by the UN and international community.[18]

CPA provisions for DDR mainly outlined the establishment, composition and responsibilities of the national DDR institutions, broad guiding principles for the DDR process and that national ownership was central to the process. However, the CPA did not elaborate detailed implementation modalities for national authorities to carry out DDR.

In terms of institutional arrangements, the CPA established:

- a National DDR Co-ordination Council (NDDRCC) accountable to the GNU Presidency for the purpose of formulating and overseeing overall DDR policy;
- a Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) to design, implement and manage the DDR of SAF combatants;
- a Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) to design, implement and manage the DDR of SPLA combatants; and
- State DDR Commissions for the NSDDRC and SSDDRC, which are responsible for implementing DDR in the states in line with a decentralised federal structure called for in the CPA.

18 The IDDRP is available at: www.unmis.org/English/2006Docs/ddr_IDDRP%20Programme-Jul05.pdf.

The CPA was explicit that national institutions are responsible for leading and implementing DDR, while the UN and international partners are to fulfill a supporting role:

"[The] DDR process in Sudan shall be led by recognized state institutions and international partners shall only play a supportive role to these institutions."[19]

The IDDRP was initially designed to be a one-year preparatory programme that would lay the groundwork for developing and implementing a multi-year DDR programme. Formally endorsed by both parties in 2006 it set out a broad framework of objectives and principles intended to guide the way DDR was to be implemented in Sudan.[20] However, it did not provide much detail on how its objectives would be achieved or for the specific modalities of the DDR process. These were expected to be negotiated and developed through the course of implementation by the national DDR institutions, with support from the international community. Although the IDDRP technically remains in place until 31 December 2008, and some unspent funds remain, it has been superseded by a new Multi-Year DDR (MYDDR) Project Document agreed in June 2008 which will provide the central policy and operational framework for DDR in the future.

The IDDRP had a strong conceptual focus on human security:

"The overall goal of DDR in Sudan is to enhance human security through disarmament, demobilisation and sustainable reintegration of former combatants and special groups, and the promotion of community security and arms control."[21]

The IDDRP was expected to accomplish this goal by achieving the following objectives:

■ to set up and build the capacity of the DDR institutions and civil society;
■ to begin the DDR of selected priority target groups; and
■ to prepare for a multi-year DDR programme.

While providing the basic foundations for DDR in Sudan, the CPA also introduces certain contradictions for DDR. On the level of security provisions, the CPA committed the parties to ceasefire and withdraw forces, to establish a multi-layered ceasefire monitoring structure, to integrate OAGs and form JIUs and to initiate a DDR process. During the interim period, Sudan will continue to effectively have two separate armies that disengage and await the results of the referendum to determine whether they truly become one national force or separate completely. Fundamental security sector issues relating to the function, scope and oversight of force transformation were in most cases deferred until after the referendum and neither side is compelled to downsize existing force numbers.

At the least, this created an ambiguous context for SSR and DDR and challenged certain assumptions about what DDR could or should achieve. If the CPA did not represent a commitment by both sides to demilitarise and build peace, but was in effect a holding mechanism permitting a restructuring exercise that both parties could potentially use to enhance their position should they go back to war, then what genuine commitment to DDR could there be? As such, the scope of what the IDDRP could achieve in terms of formal DDR was always going to be limited. However, before this fundamental issue had been resolved, the IDDRP was being designed and personnel were deployed, offices established and expectations raised.

19   CPA, Chapter VI: Security Arrangements, Annexure 1: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangement Implementation Modalities and Appendices, Part III: Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-Integration and Reconciliation, Article 24.3, p 118. The UN Security Council resolution establishing UNMIS is also explicit about a strictly supportive role for the UN to the DDR process: "[UNMIS will] assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction." UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (S/RES/1590), 24 March 2005.

20   The GoSS and the GNU formally endorsed the IDDRP in January and May 2006 respectively, though active work began in January 2006.

21   IDDRP, p 22.

3.2 Influence of the Integrated DDR Standards

The IDDRS was jointly developed by staff from 15 UN agencies, departments, funds and programmes and the International Organisation for Migration and establishes:

"a comprehensive set of policies, guidelines and procedures covering 24 areas of DDR. The IDDRS consolidate[s] policy guidance on DDR, providing a United Nations integrated approach on the planning, management and implementation of DDR processes. They are also the most complete repository and best practices drawn from the experience of all United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes involved in DDR."[22]

Officially launched on 18 December 2006, the IDDRS guidelines direct the UN and agencies implementing DDR to specifically promote an approach that is:

- appropriate to local conditions;
- people-centred;
- flexible, accountable and transparent;
- nationally owned;
- integrated; and
- well planned.

At its core, the IDDRS places a strong emphasis on integrated programming (planning, management, implementation and support) between UN agencies as well as between the UN and relevant national and international partners. It provides the first extended (though not exhaustive) guidance to UN agencies on how they can collaborate in the design, management and implementation of multifaceted DDR programming.[23] Beyond guidance on integrating DDR actors, it also explicitly promotes linkages between DDR and other post-conflict security sector responses:

*"DDR is a key component of national and international efforts towards establishing a secure environment, without which reconciliation and long-term development will not be achieved. Links should therefore be established **from the start** among DDR and other security, humanitarian, peace-building and recovery programmes […] DDR should be adequately linked to other security-related interventions, such as mine action, SALW [small arms and light weapons] control and reduction, and security sector reform (SSR)".*[24]

The design of the IDDRP significantly reflected the development of the IDDRS (even if the Sudan programme preceded the launch of the standards) and contained many key IDDRS elements. The establishment of the integrated UNDDR Unit in Sudan was also undertaken under guidance of the development of the IDDRS and is the first such formally integrated unit in the world (alongside the unit within the Haiti mission). The Unit in Sudan is primarily composed of staff from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the peacekeeping mission responsible for monitoring the CPA, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). It has also included differing levels of involvement from the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Fund for Women and the UN Population Fund. However, as is explored below, the incorporation of IDDRS guidance into the design of the IDDRP and the establishment of the integrated UNDDR Unit in Sudan posed many challenges in practice.

3.3 Support to ex-combatants and communities

The expressed IDDRP goal of enhancing human security was to be achieved partly through the successful return and reintegration of ex-combatants to their communities. Adult special needs group (SNG) ex-combatants[25] selected for the IDDRP were expected to receive a benefits package (or "reinsertion package") to support their

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22   IDDRS, 'Introduction to the IDDRS': www.unddr.org/iddrs/index.php.
23   The IDDRS is available at: www.unddr.org/iddrs/framework.php.
24   The IDDRS Operational Guide, p 39.
25   The IDDRP generally defines SNG candidates as children, women, the physically and mentally disabled and veterans/elderly, p 74.

departure from the armed forces and then reintegration support to assist their establishment back in their home community as civilians.[26] In addition to this, communities were also to be supported as part of a wider DDR approach to address their security needs – a 'community security' response. A "Community Security Fund" (CSF) was specifically articulated in the IDDRP to support projects that enhanced community security and assisted the reintegration process.[27] The CSF would support community-led interventions developed through a participatory planning process, and important components of this would be support for arms control and community policing interventions. The DDR Commissions were to provide leadership in assisting the process of mapping out threats and interventions, as well as to liaise with demobilised individuals returning to communities so that this would bring a development benefit to the community.[28]

Providing both targeted reinsertion/reintegration packages for ex-combatants and support to the community has become an important feature of DDR programmes and falls within the principles contained in the IDDRS. The IDDRP itself supports the above principles and its guidelines state that:

- individual combatants and target groups were to receive personalised support;
- reintegration support for ex-combatants should aim to create a secure environment for the entire community where the ex-combatant(s) is returning to;
- support be provided to communities to identify, prioritise and address their immediate security needs; and
- families, women, youth and other local civil society groups be involved in reintegration planning through a participatory planning process.

3.4 Linking DDR with the security and justice sector

The IDDRP clearly articulated linkages between DDR and the security and justice sector. During the early planning for DDR, a comprehensive approach was taken as the basis for defining security arrangements and the IDDRP made specific reference to linking DDR and security sector reform:

"[*The*] *co-ordination of military aspects of the CPA and DDR should also make specific provision for Security Sector Transformation or Reform (SST/SSR) processes, which will enable effective preparation for Force Reduction*"[29]

The IDDRP went further by calling for the establishment of a Security Sector Transformation (SST) Unit within the UNDDR Unit and SST teams within the NSDDRC and SSDDRC. According to the IDDRP, the SST Unit would support the preparations for force reduction by the parties, co-ordinate with bilaterally supported defence review processes and co-ordinate with mediation processes relating to the incorporation of OAGs into the DDR programme. Despite these linkages with the security sector, the IDDRP did not describe how DDR actors and processes were to link with the wider ceasefire monitoring structures of the CPA (e.g. the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission (CJMC)) and other security structures, including the Joint Defence Board (JDB) and the OAGs Collaborative Committee (OAGs CC).

IDDRP linkages with rule of law and justice development were less explicit, focusing only on promoting community policing as a component of community security and

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26 UNICEF practiced a different approach of community-based reintegration for children where reinsertion and reintegration benefits were kept to a bare minimum. Reintegration support was focused on the receiving community.

27 IDDRP, Section 4: Community Security Fund, pp 65–69.

28 "Each individual supported by the DDR programme (except for the CAAFG [Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups]) shall receive a community support voucher, to be presented to the local DDR Commission of his/her community of return, or to the corresponding community authorities […] the local DDR Commission shall make available to each community the amount of funds equivalent to the number of vouchers collected, with additional complementary funds allocated from the IDDRP Community Security for Development Fund. The ratio of voucher funds to additional allocation will be defined by a set of priority criteria to be defined by the DDR Commissions." IDDRP, p 34.

29 IDDRP, p 13.

arms control programming. There was concern that the withdrawal of forces, the dissolution of OAGs and civilian disarmament during the interim period would create security vacuums and negatively impact on the success of reintegrating ex-combatants. No provisions were made for connecting DDR or SSR to plans for the post-conflict development of the civilian security services (police, prisons and wildlife) or the justice system.

3.5 Linking DDR to civilian arms control and community security

The decision to include community security and arms control (CSAC) interventions in the IDDRP stemmed from the blurring of civilian and military roles throughout the conflict, the potential for OAGs and former SAF remnants in the South to cause instability and the need to address the myriad of local conflicts not addressed by the CPA. Seeing that these threats would undermine the stability of communities, the IDDRP proposed advance community CSAC interventions to create stable and secure enabling environments necessary for follow-on DDR reintegration to be successful.[30]

The planning for small arms control programming in Sudan began in advance of the design of the IDDRP and prior to the signing of the CPA. In 2003, UNDP developed a concept note for a 'Small Arms and Violence Reduction' Programme in Sudan, in co-operation with the Sudanese Ministry of the Interior, focusing on nomadic pastoralist communities. In 2004, UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery initiated a Preparatory Assistance Programme to develop a full small arms control programme for Sudan. The complementarities between DDR and small arms control were recognised and the decision was made to consider all of these issues together rather than treating arms control associated with DDR and arms control relating to OAGs, community-based defence forces and civilians as separate issues. Separate but parallel to IDDRP development, UNDP facilitated a process with small arms focal points from the SPLM and the GoS Interim DDR Authorities to jointly develop an arms reduction and control (ARC) programme.

The initial ARC programme covered both arms control for military forces of the parties (according to the ceasefire and security modalities of the then draft CPA) and broader civilian arms control. The components targeting the military bodies (focused on monitoring, verification and data collection of arms and ammunition during the withdrawal and downsizing of forces as called for in the CPA) were largely eclipsed by mechanisms instituted for CPA monitoring. The remaining civilian aspects of arms reduction and control were then subsequently incorporated into the IDDRP:

"The (ARC) component of the DDR deals with the development of programmes to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons amongst the civilian population of Sudan. As specified in Article 14.6.5.15 of the CPA, all illegally armed Sudanese are to be verifiably disarmed with the support of the UN. Specifically, these programmes will include preliminary workshops with military commander [sic], civil administration and police; civil society mobilization and co-ordination; community consultation and baseline community security surveys and conflict mapping; the creation or review of arms, ammunition and explosives legislation; the creation of Amnesty provisions for voluntary surrender of illegal military weapons held by civilians; safety and awareness campaigns to discourage the proliferation and use of SALW by civilians and to educate the civilian population and security forces on arms control new legislation and programmes; interim control measures, including the removal of light weapons, registration of small arms, containment or small arms, community policing, graduated non-monetary incentives for weapons surrender; arms for community development assistance; arms and ammunition collection and destruction, and cross border collaboration."[31]

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30 Interviews with former UNDDR official and security advisor to IGAD negotiations, July–August 2007.
31 IDDRP, p 59.

Civilian arms control and community security are highly relevant issues to DDR. However, at the time of designing the IDDRP, there were differences of understanding between the DDR Commissions and among UN managers about how to include civilian arms control and community security components in the IDDRP, as well as the practicality and utility of doing so at all. Some of this disjoint could be seen as a direct result of arms reduction and control programming being developed largely in parallel to and later being integrated with other community security-related concepts and components of the IDDRP, rather than all of these issues being planned, designed and integrated jointly from the beginning. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems probable that uneven implementation can be traced in part to this fragmented design phase.

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Implementation of the IDDRP to date

A FULL EVALUATION of every aspect of IDDRP implementation to date is beyond the scope and remit of this paper. Rather, while providing some general overview of progress, the emphasis of this section is placed on how the integrated programme approach was undertaken in practice (primarily in terms of the integration of related 'thematic' issues such as community security and arms control and security sector reform, but also in terms of the integration of the relevant and competent authorities and agencies charged with implementation).

4.1 Developing nationally owned DDR institutions and capacities

A crucial focus of implementing the IDDRP has been on establishing and building the capacity of the national DDR institutions.

The National DDR Co-ordination Council

The NDDRCC, under the GNU Presidency, is intended to act as the umbrella for the national DDR programme. The body is chaired by the Minister of the Presidency and is made up of Federal and State Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff of the SAF and SPLA, and the Commissioner/Chairperson of the NSDDRC and SSDDRC. Previous to 2008, the relationship of international partners to the NDDRCC and their access to its proceedings has been undefined. Its role is to oversee the DDR process and provide guidance on policy formulation, co-ordination of the DDR Commissions' work and evaluation, including intervention to overcome potential political blockages in the DDR process. However, this body did not formally meet until December 2006, almost a year after its legal establishment, and then only met occasionally throughout 2007. Positively, the NDDRCC has started to function more effectively in 2008 (having met five times so far this year) to push the process forward and develop a DDR funding request for the 5–7 May 2008 donor consortium in Oslo.

In addition to the NDDRCC, the National DDR Strategic Plan is a crucial high-level component of the DDR process in Sudan and aims to translate the objectives and guiding principles of the IDDRP into policy guidance and to indicate key modalities. The Strategy was endorsed by the NDDRCC in November 2007, with other key outstanding issues previously preventing DDR from commencing resolved by the middle of 2008, including: final signature of the National Reintegration Policy in March 2008;

signature of the MYDDR Project Document by the GNU and GoSS on 25 June 2008; and the reiteration by donors of their support to the Sudan DDR programme and the requirement of US$430 million over a four-year period for reintegration processes. Discussions on a national start-date for disarmament and demobilisation now appear to be well underway and the development of joint operational plans with the UN is in progress at the technical level.[32] A history of contention regarding these issues suggests that the NDDRCC did not fully play its envisioned role as a mechanism to negotiate and secure decisions by the parties until very recently. Its infrequent meetings and inability to take decisions in the initial phase of IDDRP implementation can be seen as a symptom of the lack of political will by the parties, as well as inconsistent political engagement by the UN and the international community to support and negotiate solutions.

It is important to note that similar problems are shared by many other 'national' CPA mechanisms and bodies which are either functioning poorly or do not having meaningful political support. For example, the same problems have affected the JDB and the OAGs CC. It would appear therefore, that the situation regarding the NDDRCC reflects a broader problem that relates to lack of will by the parties to establish meaningful 'national' structures beyond the important but ultimately limited act of establishing them on paper.

The Northern and Southern Sudan DDR Commissions

The NDDRCC and the NSDDRC were legally established by GNU Presidential decree in February 2006, while in Southern Sudan the SSDDRC Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson were appointed by GoSS presidential decree three months later.[33] In North Sudan, reflecting the relative wealth of the region and institutional development, the NSDDRC has been relatively well established and resourced. In Southern Sudan, however, the process of establishing and staffing the SSDDRC and state offices has been slow and the capacity of the SSDDRC is still very weak. While the SSDDRC was established at the Juba headquarters level in 2006, the state structures were only beginning to be fully set up in the middle of 2007. Many of the state offices still lack office space and infrastructure and have received little or no formal induction or training. They lack direction and clarity regarding their roles and responsibilities, while there is also confusion in the relationship between the state SSDDRC offices, the state authorities, the SPLA and the SSDDRC headquarters in Juba.

The SSDDRC is also under-resourced, with most of its allocated budget going to salaries. It is dependent upon the UN and donors to support most activities and to provide infrastructure, undermining the IDDRP's emphasis on national ownership. The UNDDR Unit's best efforts to support the SSDDRC have at particular points been hindered by the UN's complex bureaucracy in providing the required material and financial support. This has undermined and caused significant tension between the UNDDR Unit and the SSDDRC and damaged the trust and the opportunities for co-ordination that are required to make the process work.[34]

Challenges of national ownership

Although a cornerstone principle of the IDDRP, the IDDRS and the broader integrated approach to post-conflict security programming, the centrality of national ownership has arguably delayed the implementation of the DDR process in Sudan in at least three ways.

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32   All of these were identified as necessary items by the UN in April 2008 (UN S/2008/267, para 33) to move the DDR process forward; however, it is unclear whether agreement on the roles of the North and South DDR Commissions in the Transition Areas has yet been reached.

33   The Acts and regulations governing the work of the SSDDRC, still to be passed into law by the GoSS, are being held up by a backlog of draft legislation in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly that has arisen due to the large number of GoSS bodies also emerging and requiring full legal status.

34   Interviews with SSDDRC staff, July–August 2007.

Firstly, because the two parties are solely responsible for implementation, inherent mistrust has resulted in stalemate and indecision by the North and South on how to proceed with DDR. Unilateral demobilisation actions by the NSDDRC and SAF have not only added a reintegration burden onto the Southern authorities, but have also further increased tensions between the NSDDRC and SSDDRC. The inconsistent meeting of the NDDRCC until 2008 and its very slow progress in achieving conclusive national policy decisions is not only a reflection of mistrust but also serves to further antagonise relations between the Commissions. In this context, international partners have no mandate and little leverage to move the process forward, should they be willing to do so.

Secondly, in Southern Sudan specifically, the IDDRP over-estimated the capacity of GoSS institutions to deliver on DDR commitments, while at the same time there has been misjudgement on the UN's ability to provide the necessary support to assist the DDR Commissions. The process of establishing the SSDDRC and state offices has been much slower than anticipated as a result of poor infrastructure, a lack of appropriately skilled staff and still emerging GoSS governance and rule of law structures.[35] Now, as initial DDR caseloads are being outlined, neither of the Commissions appear prepared or equipped to manage the imminent demand effectively.

Lastly, it is clear that differences between the UN and national DDR institutions on the approach to national ownership have at times resulted in real tensions between the two, perhaps most acutely felt in the South. At the heart of the matter is whether the UN and international partners have been able to effectively fulfil the task of supporting national capacity and ownership of the DDR process. It is an important issue but a difficult one to examine given the obvious and understandable levels of confidentiality involved. From consultations with UNDDR personnel, it is apparent that some have found national ownership problematic and have experienced intense pressure to deliver a DDR programme within certain parameters while at the same time facilitating a process that is owned and driven by Sudanese stakeholders. This has led to situations in which, frustrated by lack of progress by the national DDR authorities, the UNDDR Unit and international partners have planned activities for the DDR Commissions and drafted policy or programming documents, consulting with national authorities only once these have been substantially developed. Often, these actions were undertaken with the best of intentions and initiated in response to requests by the DDR Commissions. The DDR Commissions themselves, as new and evolving bodies, have often sent mixed signals to international partners, have not always adequately articulated their capacity building requirements and have been inconsistent in setting parameters for collaboration. Nevertheless, at times actions by international partners have been seen as interference in the prerogative of national authority by the DDR Commissions and have adversely affected confidence in international partners.[36]

Until very recent, on the ground in Sudan there appears to have been a lack of clear understanding between national and international actors on what is meant by 'national ownership' and agreed guidance for building capacity and ownership. Using embedded UN technical advisors in the DDR Commissions and genuinely co-locating UNDDR staff with all DDR institutions (perhaps in UN facilities for the initial start-up phase) could have contributed towards providing necessary capacity and technical support and aided day-to-day co-operation. It has also been problematic that the UN and international partners have had little influence over and leverage with the NDDRCC, which ultimately has decision-making authority. This may have contributed to a perception at least that until recently the DDR Commissions have not

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35 The SSDDRC suffers from capacity gaps more so than the NSDDRC. It was not until 2007 that any state-level recruitment had taken place in the South, whereas the NSDDRC had established state offices before the end of 2006. Despite the recruitment process being almost complete in the Southern states as of May 2008, land allocations and the construction of facilities for DDR Commission state offices have not been fully accomplished and it is unclear whether the state-level SSDDRC staff are actually engaged in their work.

36 Interviews with SSDDRC staff, July–August 2007.

always clearly articulated their needs and expectations regarding the support that they require from the UN and other international partners.

4.2 Planning for DDR

Eligibility and identification of DDR candidates

Identification and pre-registration of combatants expected to be incorporated into DDR programming is underway in both the North and South and remains one of the tangible aspects of IDDRP implementation (outside of the establishment of institutions and child DDR). So far, according to the UN, the:

"Northern and Southern disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commissions have indicated their intent to demobilize and reintegrate two categories of personnel before 2011: (a) a group of up to 50,000 personnel, mainly veterans and special needs groups, to enter disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in 2008; (b) combatants absorbed into SAF and SPLA since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (i.e. former other armed groups), totaling approximately 132,000 personnel, to be demobilized between 2008 and 2011." [37]

However, despite these important commitments, the actual demobilisation of combatants has not started and will not begin until the latter half of 2008.

The NSDDRC and SAF have been accused by Southern authorities of not being fully transparent in their planning processes and taking unilateral actions. The SAF claim to have 'voluntarily' demobilised some 8,900 troops in the South. Southern authorities contend that these 'demobilised' still receive SAF salaries and should be considered active soldiers until they have gone through the formal DDR process. In May 2007, SAF unilaterally disarmed and discharged 827 soldiers from SAF-aligned OAGs in the South, collecting weapons in exchange for payments. This occurred outside the formal framework for DDR, raising serious concerns about planning and implementation of agreed approaches between the two DDR Commissions. [38]

Reinsertion and Reintegration

Almost two years since the inception of the IDDRP, the DDR Commissions agreed to a National Reintegration Policy in March 2008 to establish a definitive framework for reintegration. Even once the policy framework is in place, the operational modalities will need to be developed and agreed for North and South Sudan, as well as specifics at the state and local levels – these will take time and resources to develop before the respective DDR Commissions can approve them.

Beyond political issues between the Northern and Southern counterparts, it seems important to explore why reintegration planning has been so problematic. One important factor affecting planning in the South in particular is that it was difficult to develop a strategy to reintegrate DDR candidates without first: agreeing on selection criteria; obtaining candidate profiles, caseload numbers and locations; and under-standing the perceptions of candidates. This information is being derived through consultation with the SPLA, which (as further demonstrated below) is undertaking a transformation process that is in many ways disconnected from DDR actors and the wider security and justice sector. As part of its transformation, and in identifying DDR candidates, the SPLA is distinguishing between different groups – those who will go into the civilian security services, those who will become national reserves and those who will be retired from service and demobilised. In reality, the DDR programme will only benefit a narrowly defined group within a much larger force transformation

37 UN S/2008/267, para 32.
38 United Nations Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', (S/2007/500), 20 August 2007, para 7.

process. Without a wider security and justice sector development strategy to guide the transformation, it is reasonable to suppose that the SPLA process for selecting who will go where may be driven by its own internal processes as opposed to the objectives of the IDDRP (or those of the succeeding MYDDR Project) and may have unforeseen impacts on other security institutions and recovery processes (see below).

Child DDR activities proceeding

UNICEF is the lead agency in this area and, although formally part of the integrated UNDDR Unit, it is implementing child DDR activities largely independently in the South (though it does co-ordinate activities with the UNDDR Unit). It appears that UNICEF processes have allowed efforts to prepare for child DDR to proceed much more fluently than the UNMIS and UNDP parts of the Unit. UNICEF developed a formal agreement with the SSDDRC, signed in February 2006, allowing the organisation to engage directly with the Commission. Over 1200 children have been demobilised by the SSDDRC in Southern Sudan and 250 children are participating in reintegration programmes.[39]

UNICEF's Juba office co-ordinates activities through the UNICEF office in Khartoum for children returning from the South, or transition states, to guardians located in the North. This allows UNICEF South to work on demobilisation of children in the SPLA with the SSDDRC, and UNICEF North to work with their partner, the NSDDRC to finalise the reunification and reintegration of children. The separation of activities between the two offices in a 'one country/two systems' approach has worked well thus far for UNICEF. The relative success in implementing child DDR activities can partly be attributed to clarity over the programmatic role and leadership of UNICEF in this area within the UNDDR Unit, as well as the political commitment by the Sudanese authorities to child DDR.

4.3 DDR linkages with the security and justice sector

Progress towards SSR

Despite its inclusion in the IDDRP, the SST component of the programme has never been implemented and the SST Unit and Teams in the UNDDR Unit and DDR Commissions have not been established to date. Although these aspects were agreed in the IDDRP, the political space and needs for SSR were very different in the North and the South: in the North, there appears to be very limited interest in engaging on large scale security sector development or reform; while in the South, the SPLA has invited international support to assist with the task of its transformation. The lack of engagement from the North with the UN in particular on SSR issues is demonstrated by a decision not to proceed with a defence review to inform DDR and SSR planning despite previous negotiation and agreement[40] or a planned International Military Assistance Team (a joint operation to provide assistance with restructuring the security sector set up by the US, Norway, UK, and the Netherlands governments) in 2006.[41] In addition, because the IDDRP and the UNDDR Unit take a 'national' approach to DDR with decision-making effectively centralised in Khartoum, the UN has been unable to overcome a disinterested North when attempting to approach SSR within a DDR framework.

Regardless, the SPLA has begun to embark on a massive process to transform itself from a rebel army and social institution into a professional military. This has been driven in part by the requirements for OAG alignment stemming from the 'Juba Declaration' and the CPA, requiring the incorporation of some 34,000 former SSDF

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39 Information provided by former UNICEF Child DDR Officer, May 2008.
40 Interview with former security advisor to IGAD negotiations, August 2007.
41 ICG, 'Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead', Africa Report No 106, 31 March 2006.

combatants into the SPLA (in addition to many thousands from other smaller OAGs). Senior militia commanders have been given key positions within the GoSS, but full integration of lower ranking personnel into the SPLA and other organised forces is far from complete.

There are financial as well as security reasons for this transformation process. In 2007, the SPLA consumed over one-third of the GoSS budget[42] (mostly on salaries) at a time when the GoSS was in the midst of a fiscal crisis triggered by a reduction in transfers of oil revenues to the South. The SPLA remains under serious pressure to cut expenditure and is facing demands for greater accountability over military spending from the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. However, succumbing to this pressure to spend less by significantly reducing existing personnel numbers and recently integrated OAGs, including through reassigning them to other uniformed services (most of which currently have very low absorption capacities), would likely cause considerable resentment and insecurity across the South. So, while the financial and security case for reform is certainly compelling, it would seem that the downsizing and transformation strategy of the SPLA cannot be properly undertaken without fully understanding the contingencies and complementarities between, and acting consistently with, (a) the DDR process and criteria for DDR candidates, (b) the transformation strategies and plans for rule of law and justice institutions and (c) the net result of OAGs alignment. Linking SSR to DDR and broader justice sector processes would be the best means not only for greatly improved SSR but also for improving the planning and implementation of DDR and other broader security sector processes. For DDR specifically, it would be beneficial for identifying eligible DDR candidates and planning for demobilisation activities and reintegration.

In the absence of either an embedded SST Unit within the UNDDR Unit or an SST Team in the SSDDRC (or a similarly conceived arrangement), there has been a serious co-ordination gap between the DDR process and security sector transformation (including bilateral support to military reform) in Southern Sudan. Although the interdependences between SSR and DDR are becoming clearer, the two processes have largely been treated separately in design and implementation. By treating SPLA reform and DDR as separate programmes with little institutional co-ordination, a number of challenges have arisen which will need to be addressed in the near future to ensure that the two areas of conceptually related and operationally vital work complement and reinforce each other rather than further encumbering the potential success of either.

Potential foundations for improved GoSS SSR planning have emerged in 2008. Drafted by the Ministry for SPLA Affairs and the SPLA, a Defence White Paper that lays out the strategic vision of the SPLA and the basic policy framework for strategic planning for the next several years was approved by the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly on 24 June 2008. In addition, a SPLA Act has been developed and is moving through approval and enactment phases. Together these will provide the legal, policy and planning building blocks for developing a more efficient, democratically accountable and relevant SPLA that can contribute to the process of obtaining peace and security in Sudan.

DDR actors have had limited connection with the development of these two critical foundations for SSR, which were supported bilaterally by donors (including the US and UK). However, recently the UN has been asked by donors and the GoSS to play a stronger co-ordination role on SSR/SPLA reform more generally in the South. The latest UN Secretary-General Report states that, as a first step, the UN will establish an office in the regional co-ordinator's office in Southern Sudan to give policy guidance to UN activities related to justice, corrections, police, the SPLA and DDR aimed at developing a coherent UN strategy in support of the GoSS policy framework.[43]

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42 Young J, 'Emerging North-South Tensions and Prospects for a Return to War', Small Arms Survey, Sudan Working Paper 7, July 2007, pp 22–23.
43 UN S/2008/267, para 58.

In addition, the UN has also increased its support to formation of JIUs following a request by the JDB with the establishment of a "support cell" for this purpose.[44]

Progress in justice sector development

Like SSR, justice sector development processes and programming have proceeded largely separately from DDR. The challenges identified below further reflect the challenges of co-ordination and joint planning across the broader security and justice sector.

At present, the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and other rule of law and justice institutions remain in the early stages of development. The SPLA allowed former GoS police forces in the South (largely stationed in former garrison towns) and the SPLA police force (mostly ex-military with no training) to merge and established the SSPS. Core issues relating to the policy and legal framework, organisational structure and operational guidelines for the SSPS are currently still being resolved. The lack of capacity, unreliable payrolls, inappropriate or non-existent equipment and infrastructure are just some of the challenges which need to be addressed as part of the development of effective rule of law and justice institutions.

Priorities for the development and reform of the SSPS include putting in place a registration/vetting process for those already serving, establishing recruitment standards and more recently the establishment of basic physical infrastructure (training schools, police posts, prisons, uniforms, equipment and communications). In addition, there is recognition of the urgent need for comprehensive police training based on a common curriculum rooted in the principles of democratic policing.

In Southern Sudan, the police, prisons and wildlife services have absorbed a large number of former SPLA personnel in a short space of time, which, it has been claimed, has in some ways negatively impacted on the capacity of rule of law and justice development programmes to deliver on their original objectives.[45] This has posed considerable challenges to international partners supporting these programmes, which did not in most cases anticipate that they would have to contend with such significant increases in personnel. The integration of former military personnel into the civilian security services has often been poorly managed by the GoSS, which faces significant pressure to transfer personnel from the SPLA to other employment with highly constricted resources. In some cases, this has meant that former SPLA soldiers have received little more than two weeks training to "be friendly to communities, when these are people who only know how to kill."[46]

4.4 DDR linkages with community security and arms control

While programming to enhance community security and control arms was a major component of the IDDRP, implementation in these areas has been limited in both the North and South. While some pilot CSAC activities have been undertaken, these represent only a proportion of the wide-ranging activities originally envisioned.[47] This paper places specific focus on how implementation unfolded in the South as it represents a useful example of the difficulties encountered in translating an integrated approach from concept into practice.

44 UN S/2008/267, para 30.
45 These issues were raised at numerous meetings of the UN rule of law steering group in late 2007 as Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) funded police and prisons training and support programmes came fully online.
46 Interview with GoSS Minister of Internal Affairs, H E Paul Mayom Akec, March 2007.
47 In the South, the IDDRP has supported pilot civilian disarmament activities in Jonglei State and the Pact Sudan Community Security programme in Lakes, Warrap and Jonglei States.

Challenges with the institutional framework for CSAC

During initial implementation, little progress was made within the framework of the IDDRP to develop the policy, legal and institutional framework for arms control or to agree a longer-term CSAC strategy and programme in Southern Sudan.[48] This is partly a result of the design of the IDDRP which created confusion regarding the overlapping mandates of different GoSS institutions. Although the IDDRP itself 'mandated' the Interim DDR Authorities of the North and South with responsibility for leading on government action and policy for CSAC, the CPA and the interim constitutional and legal frameworks developed thereafter were not necessarily consistent with this mandate or were open to interpretation. For example, in the South, the IDDRP created significant overlap between the SSDDRC and other institutions that claimed a pre-rogative for security matters such as the SPLA, SSPS, Ministry of Interior and the GoSS Security Committee, as well as with other levels of government (such as the state and local government levels, many of which agreed their own civilian arms control laws).[49]

Contesting concepts and approaches to CSAC

Although CSAC is central to the IDDRP, there were, and continue to be, widely differing interpretations of the concept and how it should be applied. Some emphasise community security as a means for creating the necessary conditions for a successful reintegration phase of DDR. Community security has also been seen as a response to address the immediate security needs of communities in the post-conflict context, while others place stronger emphasis on longer-term national, state- or local-level security sector development. Furthermore, some see community security as a process in and of itself rather than necessarily an end state: one in which communities partici-pate in identifying and prioritising their security needs so as to develop appropriate and effective responses. There is also a common popular perception that community security refers to communities providing for their own safety and security, for instance, through community-based defence forces. In addition, some have also come to see CSAC as synonymous with civilian disarmament, rather than encompassing wider and complementary interventions to promote peacebuilding and the rule of law.

The linking of DDR and CSAC has also contributed to the blurring of perceived distinctions between the two complementary but substantially distinct areas of programming. The distinction that DDR deals with the disarmament of former-combatants while CSAC is concerned with civilian arms control is not widely under-stood and is further complicated by the blurring of civilian and military roles on the ground. Many believe that the civilian disarmament activities that have taken place are in fact best described using the terminology of DDR. This is particularly problematic if people believe that the same types of packages and support being provided to former combatants will then also be provided to disarmed civilians.

Just as there was lack of consensus in understanding the purpose and role of CSAC in the IDDRP, it is not surprising that there were also very different views on how to operationalise the concept – integrating CSAC within the IDDRP on paper did not necessarily translate into practical integration during implementation. Tensions remaining between UNDP and other agencies over leadership of the programme it had originally designed and diverging ideas of how community security should be operationalised within the IDDRP delayed the funding and implementation of activities as much as any other factor.

48 Interviews with UN officials involved in CSAC, May 2008.
49 Despite the SSDDRC's responsibility for CSAC within the IDDRP, it could be argued that the SSDDRC never fully incorporated CSAC as part of its strategic vision and many staff saw the Commission as a reluctant custodian of CSAC.

Emerging new institutional and programmatic framework for CSAC

In this context, it is not entirely surprising that the GoSS has tended to address civilian disarmament and threats to community security outside the IDDRP framework and largely without international support. In response to mounting pressure to address internal security threats, the GoSS, SPLA and some State Governors initiated disarmament campaigns led by the SPLA during the first half of 2006 in various parts of Southern Sudan, including Jonglei, Warrap, Unity and Lakes States. While some exercises were carried out peacefully and successfully collected weapons without ensuing violence, the SPLA met with organised resistance from some communities in Jonglei state in 2006, resulting in armed conflict and a humanitarian emergency.[50]

As an urgent response to the events in Jonglei and in an effort to prevent further violence, UNDP, the UNDDR Unit, UNMIS and Pact-Sudan supported local authorities to undertake a pilot voluntary disarmament intervention in Akobo country in Jonglei State. Support operations, including the involvement of the SSDDRC, were later extended to the neighbouring county of Pibor in 2007. The results of these reactive interventions have been mixed and consequently international partners have continued to advocate for the GoSS to provide policy and legal guidance for a fully comprehensive CSAC approach.

Recognising the need to support the GoSS to peacefully address civilian arms control issues, UNDP began developing a CSAC programme for Southern Sudan that would support the objectives of the IDDRP in the South, though IDDRP for the programme has never been agreed.[51] The establishment of UNDP CSAC Programme is intended to enable UNDP to take programmatic leadership on the issue of CSAC within the UN system (though, still in a collaborative inter-agency manner[52]), to mobilise donor resources independently and beyond the IDDRP and to work more flexibly with GoSS institutions including, but not limited to, the SSDDRC. The UNDP CSAC programme encompasses a broad range of measures to support the GoSS to non-violently reduce and control small arms, while enhancing community security in Southern Sudan. It envisages support to the development of the policy and legal framework for arms control, to peaceful civilian weapons control initiatives and to broader rule of law and local government-led development, all of which were activities originally to be accomplished by the IDDRP but which have, to date, not been attempted. The UNDP CSAC Programme has now been funded and it is anticipated the programme will be formally approved within UNDP and by GoSS in the coming months.

Alongside the UN institutional arrangements for CSAC, the GoSS established the Bureau for Community Security and Arms Control in January 2008 with the mandate to lead on and co-ordinate government action on CSAC issues. Under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Vice-President of Southern Sudan, the Bureau is currently composed of two staff in Juba and (as of June 2008) and has 'inherited' 13 SSDDRC CSAC-dedicated staff at the state level. These additional resources will undoubtedly help build the Bureau's capacity to fulfil its mandate, though the staff remain largely untrained on CSAC issues and it is unclear whether the Bureau will be able to obtain the budget required to continue to retain them. A group of international partners beyond the UN, including Pact Sudan, Saferworld, the Small Arms Survey and the Bonn International Center for Conversion, have committed their support to the Bureau and its CSAC programming which should serve to improve the co-ordination between actors as well as the quality of their collective support.

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50 For examples of this in Jonglei State in 2006 see, Small Arms Survey, 'Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: Recent experiences and implications', Sudan Issue Brief No 3, November 2006–February 2007.

51 UNDP began developing a CSAC programme, intended to be piloted in Jonglei State, in June 2006. A first UNDP CSAC programme document went through the 'Local Project Approval Committee' (LPAC) in February 2007, but has since been revisited and is now being revised for LPAC approval in 2008. It will then need to be approved by the GoSS Ministry of Finance Inter-ministerial Technical Committee (IMAC).

52 As part of continued collaboration, two UNDDR Unit staff posts are assigned to work with the UNDP CSAC programme and co-ordinate supportive UNMIS operational inputs, such as transport, communications, force protection, etc. This style of 'integration through close co-ordination' rather than one agency managing the other worked well in the previous Akobo and Pibor exercises; it is felt, however, that this approach should be explicitly institutionalised.

4.5 Challenges in managing an integrated UNDDR Unit

Positive steps have been taken to improve the functional effectiveness of the UNDDR Unit since 2007; however, the challenge of bringing UN agencies together under one integrated programmatic and operational management structure has impacted on the implementation of the IDDRP. While analysing internal organisational processes from the outside is problematic, understanding the nature of this challenge is important in contributing to enhanced DDR and broader post-conflict security building arrangements in the future.

Roles and responsibilities in an integrated unit and programme

A significant obstacle during the IDDRP phase of the DDR process in Sudan was the delineation of programme management within the UNDDR Unit, primarily between UNDP and UNMIS. The Unit is managed by a Unit Chief (UNMIS staff) and a Deputy Chief (UNDP staff), backed up by a UNDP supported Programme Support Unit (responsible primarily for managing and utilising voluntary donor contributions to the IDDRP). An in-country UNDDR Steering Committee (chaired by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG)/Resident Co-ordinator and composed of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (PDSRSG), Force Commander, UNDP and UNICEF) was originally intended to be the ultimate in-country level of UN oversight of the Unit and the programme.[53] Despite these management structures and a clear plan of action for the establishment of the Unit, disagreements emerged between UNMIS and UNDP on how to approach the programme, including: how to support the capacity of the DDR Commissions; what types of reintegration support to offer; and whether even to implement agreed CSAC components. Further, it is understood that cross-agency line management of personnel was further hampered by a situation in which UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and UNDP regulations do not permit their staff to be directly line managed by staff from another agency.

These internal management challenges were directly examined by a UNDPKO-UNDP joint review team mission (February–March 2007), which was followed-up by a '90-day Support Team' deployed to assist the Unit in achieving over 30 programmatic and organisational restructuring recommendations reached by the UN joint review team. Ultimately, however, the UNDDR Steering Committee proved unsuccessful in providing consistent oversight of the UNDDR Unit (including supporting the resolution of management challenges) until 2007, as senior UN engagement on DDR issues was significantly undermined by the absence of an SRSG between the *de facto* removal of SRSG Jan Pronk from Sudan in October 2006 and the appointment of Ashraf Jehangir Qazi as the new SRSG on 11 September 2007.

Operational integration

UNDDR Unit staff members have highlighted numerous examples where the logistical and administrative challenges posed by integration created obstacles to the day-to-day running of the Unit and to joint operations.[54] Despite integration within the Unit, UNDP and UNMIS maintain separate systems for recruitment, procurement, financial management, human resource management and communications and maintain separate offices in different locations in Juba. For example, in Juba, UNDP computers are not permitted to connect to UNMIS networks and telephone

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53 "The UN DDR Steering Committee is responsible for strategic policy decisions on UN support for DDR; providing overall guidance, and oversight to ensure conformity with programmatic objectives, activities, implementation plans and operational criteria within the framework of the unified approach." See, UNDDR Resource Centre, 'Establishment of a Unified UNDDR Support Structure and Programme in Sudan: Plan of Action for the period May 2005–June 2006', 28 April 2005, p 3.

54 Some of these are enumerated by the UN DPKO-UNDP joint review team (March 2007) and in interviews with UNDDR Unit staff (December 2007 and May 2008).

connections do not link UNDDR Unit offices based on different UNMIS and UNDP premises. This lack of inter-operability between UNMIS and UNDP has significantly hampered planning, undermined the ability to support the capacity of the DDR Commissions and contributed to a lack of cohesiveness within the Unit.

Delay in recognising the sub-national context

The decision to centralise UNMIS and the UNDDR Unit in Khartoum appears to have contributed to a relative lack of UN decision-making capacity and technical support in the South, arguably where it was needed the most. The UNDDR Unit, in particular, did not immediately adapt to the 'one country/two systems' contextual reality of Sudan until after recommendations by the UN joint review team in 2007 to establish a more decentralised and responsive structure. Centralisation of UN decision-making in Khartoum contributed to making the management of the IDDRP more challenging and more sensitive that otherwise may have been the case. At a political level, this undermined Southern confidence in the DDR process and contributed to weakening the UNDDR Unit's ability to engage with Southern actors. It also meant that the SSDDRC did not always receive the required level of technical and capacity-building support, partly as UN staff in Juba had limited decision-making authority to support requests made by the SSDDRC.

Progress towards management clarity

Decisions were finally taken to decentralise UNMIS and to increase the staff and decision-making capacity of the UNDDR Unit in the South from April 2007 onwards. A UNDDR Regional Co-ordinator (UNMIS) and a Deputy (UNDP) for Southern Sudan were appointed and deployed to Juba by mid-2007. Reporting to the Chief of the UNDDR Unit, they have responsibility for managing the Unit and for implementation of the IDDRP in the South.[55] The new UNDDR Regional Co-ordinator quickly took the opportunity to re-organise the staffing structure and field deployments in the South, to institute new co-ordination and planning mechanisms with the SSDDRC and to begin to examine and address the internal operational challenges of the integrated Unit. According to the latest UN Secretary-General's report on the Sudan (22 April 2008), clarity has also now been achieved on the programmatic division of responsibilities between the different agencies within the UNDDR Unit: UNMIS will focus on supporting the disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion phase; UNDP will support the reintegration of adult combatants; UNICEF will continue to support the reintegration of children; and the World Food Programme will provide food assistance to ex-combatants and their families.[56] Further arrangements for closer inter-operability between UNMIS and UNDP and greater UNMIS operational support to DDR were also agreed over the course of 2007.[57] Ultimately, strategic management issues began to be resolved following the appointment of the new SRSG in September 2007 (the SRSG now chairs the DDR Steering Group) and the appointment and deployment of a new UNDDR Unit management structure, including a new Chief and a Deputy Chief for the Unit. Although it is certainly the case that since the beginning of 2008, the challenges of rebuilding a common vision and shared purpose for the programme, and improving the internal cohesion of the Unit has begun to be addressed with notable success, this will necessarily take time and as such, will remain a priority for the coming months.

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55 This was a direct result of the recommendations of the UN joint review team.

56 UN S/2008/267, para 36.

57 Including the negotiation of an agreement on 'Administrative and Operational Arrangements for the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit in the United Nations Mission in Sudan' between the UNMIS Director of Administration and the UNDP country office.

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Findings and recommendations

ON PAPER, the IDDRP is a progressive programme document that goes a significant distance in moving DDR practice towards the guidelines envisioned in the IDDRS and the broader integrated approach to post-conflict security provision. However, despite significant recent progress, the IDDRP cannot be described as a total success to date. Major components have been delayed, only partially implemented, or even abandoned. Although the basic institutional components are in place, the NDDRCC as the key political and decision-making mechanism has only begun to deliver national consensus and action on how DDR will proceed since early 2008. The establishment and functioning of a pilot integrated UNDDR Unit has been a real challenge. However, it would be wrong to cast DDR efforts to date as a failure. Overall, the contextual, programmatic, institutional and operational complexities of implementing DDR in Sudan are daunting. Given this, and the application of a fundamentally new integrated approach, total success of the IDDRP should perhaps never have been expected.

Nevertheless, DDR efforts in Sudan highlight the challenges experienced when putting integrated DDR and post-conflict security programmes into practice. As international policy discourse on these issues continues to evolve and their application on the ground increases, much further thought and practical guidance is required if future programmes are to demonstrate more positive results. Therefore, as a contribution to promoting more effective DDR and post-conflict security provision in future engagements, Saferworld draws the following lessons from the experience of DDR in Sudan, specifically Southern Sudan, and makes recommendations for consideration by decision-makers, practitioners and donor agencies:

5.1 Maintaining high-level international political engagement

Two and a half years after its signing, key aspects of the CPA have not been implemented and international engagement to keep both the CPA and the associated DDR process on track has been inconsistent. The overwhelming focus of international attention on Sudan in recent years has been on responding to the crisis in Darfur. While critical, this has also redirected the focus in Sudan away from the CPA and the South; UNMIS in particular has been caught up in supporting the deployment of the hybrid UN and African Union mission to Darfur to the likely detriment of its core mandate to monitor CPA implementation.[58]

58 See ICG, 'A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan', Africa Report No 130, 26 July 2007, p 13.

Recommendation 1: Direct and consistent high-level international engagement (bilateral and multilateral) with involved parties should continue following agreement on programme goals and direction. In the case of Sudan, just as the CPA process needs continued attention, the DDR process requires continuous high-level international engagement to support the negotiation of a genuine national consensus on how to proceed with DDR, manage political risks and ensure accountability of the parties and the UN.

5.2 Understanding and reflecting political and contextual realities

DDR is as political as any aspect of a peace process; it is not an apparatus that will simply function once all of the mechanics of programming are put in place. Given the context and the inbuilt contradictions of the CPA, it is questionable whether the parties could ever have been expected to commit to significant downsizing and demilitarisation during the interim period; this understanding, and the risks involved, could have been a more explicit foundation for the IDDRP and informed more realistic programme goals and expectations. A full understanding of context and a realistic assessment of its implications for programming was perhaps undermined by preconceived ideas of DDR and the pressure to be seen to be doing something. The IDDRP alludes to an understanding that DDR would not immediately take place in Sudan and the NDDRCC could be seen as a mechanism to manage political dynamics, but the programme still raised ambitious expectations about what could be achieved given the realities of the operating environment. If the institutions, processes and relationships between the UN and national actors had been founded on the premise that DDR would remain a political process (because consensus was not wholly achieved in the CPA on how DDR should proceed), this might have fostered more effective and realistic political engagement and ultimately improved programming.

Recommendation 2: Programming should take the context as the starting point and then match this with appropriate programmatic responses, even if in some cases this means a limited response. Contextual analysis needs to be undertaken, not only at the programme design stage, but also as a continuous part of the implementation process.

Recommendation 3: National and UN structures should take steps to ensure mechanisms exist to manage the risk and impact of changes in the political and security context. An agreed programme can only lay out a framework for implementation in a politicised post-conflict environment; robust mechanisms are required for the negotiation inevitably arising during implementation and for ensuring continuing high-level political engagement.

5.3 Addressing the challenges of national ownership

Although the IDDRS and IDDRP prioritise national ownership as a major strength, it appears that the emphasis on national ownership arguably delayed IDDRP implementation in Sudan. It is not suggested that the principle of national ownership is flawed and should be avoided, only that the challenges it introduces need to be realistically assessed and flexible approaches developed in response. In the case of Sudan, attempts to establish national DDR institutions with severe capacity development challenges seemed to take precedence over achieving genuine political consensus by the parties on how DDR was to proceed in reality. At the same time, although they remain crucial stakeholders in the process, existing institutional mechanisms did not promote a genuine partnership for international actors in the process. UN and international partners were both largely excluded from participating at the centre of DDR decision-making and lacked mechanisms to ensure they were also fully accountable to national authorities.

Recommendation 4: Practical guidance on alternative institutional arrangements for DDR and post-conflict security provision that reflect different contextual realities while still achieving the objective of national ownership should be further developed. The IDDRS provides certain generic standards and guidance, but further options are needed for more lightweight and flexible institutions and strategies for ensuring national ownership that are appropriate to highly politicised post-conflict environments where institutional capacities are inherently low.[59]

Recommendation 5: National and international partners should ensure that genuine partnership arrangements are negotiated where both sides are jointly involved in strategic decision-making and are jointly accountable to one another.

5.4 Defining the integrated UN management approach for DDR

The experience of establishing and managing an integrated UNDDR Unit in Sudan has been difficult. The IDDRS provides a framework for undertaking such a process, but the reality and practicalities on the ground have proven to be very challenging. Beyond the inherent difficulty of inter-agency friction (which is likely in many cases to be an unfortunate reality), this paper suggests that future UN missions should explore two issues in undertaking an integrated approach. Firstly, the issue of management and leadership should be considered. The mission DDR steering group (or the UNDDR Steering Committee in the case of Sudan) and UN country team DDR task force are ultimately responsible and thus accountable for whether the UN reaches conclusive decisions, manages high-level political engagement with national authorities, resolves problems (including inter-agency operability) and achieves results. These mechanisms need to meet regularly, supervise effectively and ensure continuous engagement from the highest political and management levels. Secondly, an integrated approach to DDR does not necessarily mean centralised implementation or full operational integration. The IDDRS promotes an integrated approach, but also emphasises that this can best be achieved through 'joint' action by UN agencies according to agreed plans or frameworks that are *co-ordinated* by the UNDDR Unit.[60] The approach taken by UNICEF in the implementation of the child DDR aspects of the IDDRP reflects a more flexible 'joint' approach. The recent move towards clearer division of roles and programmatic responsibilities between different UN agencies should mean more positive implementation results in Southern Sudan. The new challenge will be maintaining effective co-ordination and in ensuring that synergies between programmes led by different agencies are not lost in the process.

Recommendation 6: Senior in-country UN management should consistently engage with and see DDR (and wider security sector) programming as much a part of the core post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding agenda as other competing programme areas. The mission DDR steering group and the UN country team DDR task force have been established for these purposes and should be re-enforced as a matter of regular UN practice.

Recommendation 7: Greater emphasis should be placed on IDDRS guidance relating to joint implementation. As the UN system is still learning how to fully integrate, it is perhaps better to take incremental small steps towards joint and co-ordinated activities rather than a few difficult large steps towards full operational integration. A more

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59 For further IDDRS guidance on national ownership and arrangements for national DDR institutions, see IDDRS, 'Section 3.30: National Institutions for DDR'. <www.unddr.org/iddrs/03/30.php>

60 "Given the important differences among [agencies…] it is not possible to achieve complete operational / administrative integration. Instead, the goal should be complete integration at the planning level and in the methods of the various entities involved in the mission to ensure efficient and timely coordination of operations within this framework […] A joint – as opposed to fully integrated – approach to DDR operations and implementation should be adopted among all participating UN entities, involving close coordination using a common operational work plan. [Overall] authority for coordination and supervision of implementation should be delegated to those UN staff integrated into the DDR programme management structure, while the programme should be implemented by the appropriate agency staff." IDDRS, 'Section 3.10: Integrated DDR Planning – Processes and Structures', Sub-Section 6 'Institutional requirements and methods for planning'. <www.unddr.org/iddrs/03/>

'joined up' as opposed to 'unified' approach is relevant not just for DDR but also for wider security sector programming (see below).

Recommendation 8: Involved UN agencies should consider negotiating and agreeing on improved practical operational and administrative arrangements that will allow them to work in close programmatic collaboration with one another. This is a challenging issue and which could even require the engagement of the highest levels of the UN. However, unless this is achieved, inter-agency challenges will continue to endanger the potential success of future integrated programming.

5.5 Developing broad and responsive post-conflict security building programmes

The perceived short comings of DDR in Sudan can in part be seen as a result of un-realistic expectations about what DDR could potentially deliver. The framing of DDR as a programme to enhance human security may in fact set an unrealistic goal. While a human security focus is important, DDR programming may in fact only be able to achieve narrower objectives given both the political context and the capacities of local actors. The wider inclusion of SSR and CSAC elements in the IDDRP contributed to unrealistic expectations that the initial phase of a complex programme with limited resources and confronted by challenging contextual realities could address a whole range of post-conflict security priorities. External to the IDDRP, until recently, post-conflict security processes in the South have sometimes proceeded separately, impacting one another in unforeseen and sometimes negative ways. The existence of disparate security programmes suggests that a framework to assess all post-conflict security needs holistically and to design linked strategies and programmes accordingly has yet to emerge.

The Sudan case points to the need for an approach to post-conflict security building that does not necessarily assume that one overly-unified programme, such as the IDDRP, is the answer. If the context is taken as the starting point, appropriate programmatic responses may include differing combinations of parts of DDR, arms control, community security, rule of law and justice development and SSR. This requires a shift in thinking: peace support programmes as 'tools' that 'need to fit the job' instead of the other way around. Rather than trying to unify all these aspects into one fully-comprehensive DDR or other 'mega' security programme, DDR and SSR, for example, could be broken down into their constituent elements – or modules – which could then be utilised as a flexible set of 'tools' or responses matching the needs of a given context. These responses could remain as distinct individual programmes, but would compose complementary modules of a whole-of-sector strategy that would then be co-ordinated through a whole-of-sector decision making architecture. In this way, integration is achieved not through 'unifying' programmes but through a joined-up 'modular approach' that ensures complementary interventions are implemented in a co-ordinated and mutually reinforcing manner. This would allow responses to be customised on a country-by-country basis and appropriately meet the diverging security needs of different post-conflict societies.

Recommendation 9: International post-conflict security policy-makers and practitioners could explore more flexible ways in which to develop sequenced and co-ordinated approaches to addressing inter-related issues affecting post-conflict security building as a whole. Such approaches would need to:

■ achieve consensus among stakeholders (national and international) in assessing post-conflict security needs and then prioritising those needs;

■ establish linked goals and flexible but robust mechanisms to co-ordinate between different modules or programmes;

■ sequence and pace the implementation of different modules appropriate to the particular context and political sensitivities; and

■ be mirrored by a common donor and assistance strategy.

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