

Promoting peace in the post-2015 framework

The role of Rising Powers




BRAZIL

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The role of Rising Powers

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Contents

1. Background	1
2. Summary	3
3. Introduction	4
4. A rising power	5
Foreign policy	5
5. Approach to conflict-affected states	7
Development	7
Conflict prevention	9
Peacekeeping	9
Responsibility to protect	11
6. Promoting peace in the post-2015 development framework	13
References	16

1

Background

IN AN INCREASINGLY MULTIPOLAR WORLD, a greater number of actors are involved in shaping the global development agenda. Beyond groupings of traditional donors, such as those affiliated with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), there are emerging powers with different perspectives that are exerting an ever greater influence in international affairs. Countries such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Turkey will be central to articulating a credible and effective framework for development in the coming decades.

While exhibiting considerable differences from each other, these states can broadly be characterised as ‘rising powers’. Owing to their rapid economic growth and expanding influence on global trade flows, they play an increasingly important role on the world stage. Some are fast becoming substantial providers of development and humanitarian aid, diplomatic support and security cooperation. Rising powers are also increasingly invested in conflict-affected states, with significant implications for peacebuilding, traditionally the preserve of OECD members. For these reasons, rising powers are assuming a critical role in promoting peace and stability, as well as development, in conflict-affected states.¹

The international consultations underway to set out a new development framework post-2015 present an opportunity to reassess and refresh policy approaches to conflict-affected states. For this to be effective, rising powers, such as China, India, and Brazil, must be involved in and contribute to the debate. There is now a real opportunity to develop a legitimate global framework for conflict-affected states, traditional donors, rising powers, and others to agree on a set of genuinely shared goals and indicators that can guide their engagement and facilitate greater cooperation, coordination, and coherence.

Achieving consensus will be no easy task, however, given the historical and political sensitivities involved. Avoiding deadlock will require shedding preconceptions, as well as evolving a more informed understanding of why and how different stakeholders engage in conflict-affected states. As the international community begins to draw up a new vision for development, it is imperative that there is deeper dialogue with these rising powers, with a particular focus on how best to engage in conflict-affected states so as to support peace and stability.

A first step towards such dialogue is to raise awareness of the principles and modalities that motivate the engagement of rising powers, and what lessons can be drawn from their experience. Saferworld produced a preliminary paper on these issues in November 2012, featuring brief assessments of the engagement of Brazil, China, India, South

¹ See Saferworld (2012) China and conflict-affected states: Risks and opportunities for building peace, www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/China%20&%20conflict-affected%20states%20briefing%20double.pdf

Africa, and Turkey in conflict-affected states.² Saferworld in conjunction with leading think tanks in the countries concerned is now publishing a series of more in-depth analyses of individual rising powers. These will delve deeper into the subject, drawing upon local perspectives and expertise in order to provide a more detailed and nuanced exposition both of the relevant policies and of how these play out on the ground. The aim is to raise awareness of the roles of rising powers in conflict-affected states and to stimulate debate about the issues raised, both within the countries concerned and more broadly among international policy actors.

This paper on Brazil's engagement in conflict-affected states – which is published in both English and Portuguese – was researched and written by the Igarapé Institute, based in Brazil, in partnership with the international NGO Saferworld.

² See Saferworld (2012) Issue paper three: Rising powers and conflict, www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/Saferworld-issue-paper-3---Rising-powers-and-conflict.pdf

2

Summary

- **BRAZIL HAS A GROWING INFLUENCE** in the global political and economic system owing to the size of its economy, its expanding role in the Latin America region, and its increasingly assertive positions on international peace and security issues.
- Key underlying principles of Brazil's foreign policy include non-intervention and respect for sovereignty alongside South–South Cooperation.
- Brazil has a long tradition of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention initiatives both in its own neighbourhood and overseas.
- Brazilian development assistance has increased substantially in the past ten years so that, while difficult to measure, its aid spending is now on a par with that of Canada and Sweden.
- Brazil's approach to overseas development is nevertheless constrained by domestic pressures to give priority to internal investment over external assistance.
- Although over one quarter of the recipients of Brazilian aid are characterised as 'fragile states', Brazil does not subscribe to the fragile states discourse or prescriptions.
- Brazilian assistance often emphasises the links between development and security, reflecting the view that it is social and economic inequalities that lie at the root of violence, extremism, and conflict.
- This linked approach is manifest, at least partially, in Brazil's operations in Haiti and Guinea-Bissau, which combine security-building with support for traditional development sectors, such as health and agriculture.
- Brazil is a long-standing troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions, providing the bulk of troops to the UN mission in Haiti.
- Brazil's principle of non-interference explains its cautious approach to the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, and its counter-proposition of the concept of Responsibility while Protecting, which emphasises a preventative, proportionate, and rules-based approach.
- To date, Brazil has not been visibly involved in wider multilateral debates on aid effectiveness or the future development framework post-2015.
- Brazil can offer important lessons for the post-2015 agenda, drawing for instance from experiences of reinforcing South–South and triangular aid modalities in countries such as Timor-Leste.
- Brazil's focus on redressing social and economic inequalities indicates that it does not simply equate development with aggregate economic growth, but recognises that unless the root causes of conflict are addressed development cannot be sustainable.
- Despite such promising indications, there are equally reasons to doubt Brazil's support for the inclusion of peacebuilding in the post-2015 agenda – partly due to its rejection of the language and intentions of the peacebuilding and statebuilding discourse.

3

Introduction

BRAZIL'S POLITICAL POSITION on the international development and peacebuilding agendas is complex. On the one hand, its diplomatic corps have a profound and deeply ingrained respect for sovereignty and a lengthy tradition of support for non-intervention extending back a century or more. On the other, Brazil is animated by deep multilateral instincts and has expressed an inclination to engage internationally in peace operations and development activities, both in its own neighbourhood and further afield. Brazil clearly seeks a wider global role that is commensurate with its expanding political, economic, and military capabilities. The stated objective of its foreign policy establishment is to change the global order to ensure more favourable terms of trade for countries from the South, while also contributing to sustainable peace and security.

Although invested in the concept of peacebuilding in the context of United Nations (UN) activities, Brazil does not publicly support the terminology or discourse of 'fragile states' and 'statebuilding'. Instead, its foreign affairs officers emphasise the inter-relationships between 'security' and 'development', and, more importantly, the ways in which entrenched inequality and poverty give rise to crime and violence. It is through redressing social and economic inequalities, Brazilian authorities contend, that gains in peace and security can be realised on the ground. This is not to say that Brazil is not engaging in various ways in fragile contexts. Indeed, 23 of 80 countries included in its development portfolio are considered 'fragile' by the OECD and World Bank.

Even a cursory survey of its aid activities reveals that Brazil supports various types of conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, and peacebuilding activities. Its frequent declarations on the prevention of conflict in UN fora are backed by an extensive record of promoting conflict prevention in the Americas, Africa and Asia. Brazil has also taken part in 42 of 65 UN peacekeeping missions since the middle of the twentieth century. However, more recent contributions to multilateral institutions do not necessarily reflect Brazil's global aspirations: it is ranked 14th in financial contributions to the UN and 28th in peacekeeping contributions. Moreover, it is not abundantly clear whether or how Brazil will constructively engage in wider debates on the post-2015 development agenda.

This paper considers the evolving position of Brazil on issues of development and peacebuilding. It is organised in three main sections. It first considers Brazil's rising power status and its foreign policy priorities in its near and far-abroad. It then examines Brazil's particular approach towards conflict-affected states, considering its policies relating to development, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and drawing on specific examples from countries such as Haiti, Guinea Bissau, and Timor-Leste. The paper concludes with some reflections on how Brazil could engage on issues relating to conflict prevention in the context of the post-2015 development agenda.

4

A rising power

BRAZIL IS AN INCREASINGLY INFLUENTIAL PLAYER in the global political and economic system. With more than 200 million citizens, it is the fifth largest country in the world and the sixth largest in terms of gross domestic product. While not growing as fast as other rising powers, its US\$1.3 trillion economy is larger than both India and Russia and income per capita is nearly twice that of China. Likewise, Brazil has shown a high degree of resilience in the midst of the global financial crisis, having paid off its debts to the IMF and steadied its banking sector. Brazil's growing economic clout has enabled it to challenge United States (US) and European Union (EU) positions in the World Trade Organization (WTO), to secure membership of the G20, and to begin charting a 'third way' in foreign, financial, and military affairs.

Foreign policy

Brazil's contemporary foreign policy is in fact markedly conservative and conditioned by a number of enduring priorities. These priorities have been set out in government resolutions, statements, and policy papers over the past five decades and include a principled commitment to: (i) non-intervention and respect for sovereignty; (ii) creating a positive space for the expansion of Brazilian economic interests; (iii) adapting international and regional rules to suit Brazilian political preferences; and (iv) avoiding real or perceived submission to US goals and interests, including regional integration. These priorities play a critical role in shaping many aspects of the country's political, economic, and military strategies as well as its positions on fragility, peacebuilding, and statebuilding.

Regionally, Brazil promotes what it refers to as a 'zero-problem strategy' with its ten neighbours and near abroad. In emphasising its natural leadership of South America, particularly in the wake of Argentina's protracted political and economic crisis, Brazil is also positioned in opposition to the US. While relations have warmed in recent years – for instance, regarding cooperation on counter-narcotics and cyber-crime – this stance can be traced to at least the 1960s (see Muggah 2013). Brazil also invests in regional organisations to further its interests. It is one of the founding partners of the so-called Rio Group, a forum of Latin American and Caribbean countries committed to conflict prevention and resolution across Latin America. The country has also aggressively promoted regional integration in South America, being a key proponent of both the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) – regional political and trading institutions that are highly critical of threats to democracy (Muggah 2013 and Muggah and Hamann 2012).

More broadly, Brazil has long presented itself as a champion of the global South. It publicly equates its national interests with the interests of other countries in the South, particularly in South America and to a lesser extent Sub-Saharan Africa. In its bid to

acquire 'big power' status, it has long sought a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It claims to do so in order to enhance the UN's representativeness and to ensure that UNSC positions reflect the realities of a new world order. It is also worth noting that Brazil has significantly expanded its investments in UN missions and programmes in recent years. Between 2005 and 2009, Brazil transferred \$1.23 billion to international organisations and financial institutions, which corresponds to more than three quarters of its entire development cooperation portfolio.³

Meanwhile, Brazil has recently invested in upgrading its defence infrastructure, being one of the only countries in the region with significant capacity to project its military capabilities.⁴ The 2008 *National Defense Strategy* prioritises the country's defense industry, including weapons and ammunition production, arms acquisitions, and defense technology agreements with neighbours. Although Brazil is a relatively small military player relative to other major powers, accounting for just one per cent of global military spending (SIPRI 2012), it is changing its posture to strengthen both global and regional interests. Brazil now accounts for a third of all military expenditure in Latin America and is the southern hemisphere's second largest exporter of small arms and ammunition (see Muggah and Szabo 2012).⁵

Underlying Brazil's increasing international engagements are some notable dynamics. Brazil claims to be mobilising its wider international development assistance and peacekeeping/peacebuilding activities around a South-South Cooperation strategy (Muggah and Hamann 2012, Cabral and Weinstock 2010). The country's emphasis on recalibrating global institutions – whether the UNSC or the WTO – appears to confirm this view. And while there is little doubt that Brazil is pursuing such agendas in the interest of solidarity and securing international legitimacy, it is also clear that the country's agenda is oriented around expanding relations and market opportunities for large- and medium-sized Brazilian companies and market interests. Indeed, following the opening of roughly 40 embassies during the Lula administration (2003–2010), the Brazilian National Development Bank has played a central role in extending the credit (and thus reach) of mining, manufacturing, and service entities abroad.

At the same time, it should be stressed that Brazil confronts a number of contradictory tensions domestically that also influence its foreign policy positions. There are strong voices on the home front that oppose a more proactive development and peacebuilding-oriented agenda. This can be traced to, among other issues, the tensions in the ruling Labour Party, which formed a large coalition made up of many left-wing and moderate right-leaning parties. A major emphasis of these parties is to privilege Brazil's domestic challenges before asserting influence abroad. It is also important to highlight President Lula's aggressive foreign policy agenda which, while bringing a high degree of visibility to Brazil, exposed the country's contradictory impulses. Lula drew attention to the differentiation between Brazil and the US, highlighted the country's desire to reorder global trade relations, and intensified the quest for permanent membership to the UNSC. While there is no doubt that Lula's extraordinary popularity abroad enhanced his ability to mobilise domestic agendas, it also exacerbated some fault lines within his own coalition.

³ (IPEA-ABC 2010:21) Of this amount, almost two thirds (62.7 per cent) corresponded to transfers to international organisations, while 37.3 per cent was provided to international/regional banks (IPEA-ABC 2010:38-39). These include the UN (for peacekeeping operations, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, and the World Health Organization) and the Pan-American Health Organization and Mercosur, as well as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Development Fund.

⁴ The extent to which Brazil's military power can be meaningfully projected, however, is open to debate. See <http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/08/sucateado-exercito-nao-teria-como-responder-guerra-dizem-generais.html>

⁵ See <http://pt.igarape.org.br/global-arms-trade/>

5

Approach to conflict-affected states

Development

BRAZIL IS A GROWING PLAYER in terms of the scale and volume of its development aid. In 2010 it gave an estimated \$4 billion in development and \$35 million in humanitarian assistance, roughly equivalent to the contributions of Canada or Sweden. It nevertheless distinguishes itself from OECD countries. For example, Brazil has not elected to join the OECD, and thus the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), opting instead to retain a degree of autonomy in its profile. Nor does Brazil accept the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*,⁶ which it sees as reinforcing Northern donor priorities.

The country is also wary of political conditionality that – it claims – contradicts its policy of non-interference. Moreover, Brazil is not prepared to adopt more assertive ‘rights-based’ diplomatic ventures since this would be at odds with its non-interventionist stance and wider doctrine on national sovereignty. While open to a range of aid modalities, including triangular cooperation, Brazil is strongly supportive of a South–South Cooperation agenda, with a focus on poverty, agriculture, education and vocational training, banking, HIV-AIDS interventions, and environmental protection.

The geographic spread of Brazil’s development portfolio is far-reaching: between 2003 and 2010 the country provided assistance to 80 countries, including through projects and other activities (Itamaraty 2011). It is notable that 23 of these 80 countries – more than one in four – were considered to be ‘fragile’ states by either the OECD (2011) or the World Bank (2012).⁷ However, Brazil does not officially endorse the fragile states agenda or the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda as defined by OECD member states or the g7+ group of countries. Unsurprisingly, then, Brazil has yet to develop a coherent much less a comprehensive strategy for engagement in so-called ‘fragile’ or conflict-affected states.

Similarly, there are comparatively few references to ‘fragile states’ in Brazilian declarations and statements at the UN or in regional organisations such as the Organization of American States (OAS). A review of key expressions used in statements made by Brazil to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council rather located several references to ‘weak’, ‘post-conflict’, and ‘threatened’ states.⁸ And technical cooperation in these sorts of context is guided by the same principles of development assistance as

⁶ See www.oecd.org/dac/aideffectiveness/34428351.pdf

⁷ These countries include Afghanistan, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, North Korea, Palestinian occupied territories, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor Leste, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

⁸ See www.igarape.org.br which features a list of statements to the UN.

in other countries. Brazilian technocrats typically describe a ‘demand-driven’ approach premised on solidarity, non-conditionality, and respect for sovereignty.

Even so, Brazil’s commitment to a more traditional conflict prevention and peace-building agenda is visible at the diplomatic level in debates at the UNSC. Diplomats are frequently supportive of agendas and mandates for conflict prevention and peace-building, describing this in terms of a “search for peaceful solutions” (Fonseca 2010) and leveraging the “instrumental role of Brazil in restoring peace and supporting development” (Viotti 2010). Brazilian diplomats often emphasise the linkages between “security *and* development issues” (Viotti 2011). This is manifest in an approach to conflict-affected states that is formulated in terms of ‘technical cooperation’ to alleviate ‘vulnerabilities’. ‘Vulnerabilities’ are linked to ‘inequalities’, which in turn are described as giving rise to crime, extremism, and terrorism. The focus, then, is on alleviating social and economic inequalities which are believed to generate the enabling conditions for criminal and political violence.

More recently, Brazil has sought to translate this approach into operational activities.⁹ The twin focus on security and development is to some extent visible in Brazil’s engagement in Haiti, which is by far its largest overseas operation. Since 2004 Brazil has supported multilateral efforts, effectively leading the peacekeeping arm of the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), while also providing bilateral and trilateral assistance through technical cooperation projects. Brazil has cooperation agreements with Haiti in the areas of agriculture, health, and the development of infrastructure, such as hydroelectric power plants (Cardoso and Patriota 2012).¹⁰ Between 2005 and 2009 Haiti received approximately \$3.1 million in development aid per year from Brazil, rising to \$14 million in 2011 (Hirst 2012).

The role of the Brazilian battalion in MINUSTAH demonstrates the joined-up security and development approach, which is supported by Brazil’s technical cooperation agency (ABC).¹¹ The Brazilian battalion takes part in well-building, road construction, and housing infrastructure along with conducting more assertive military operations.¹² Although Brazilian peacekeepers are well trained in community relations and pursue a wide array of relief and community-outreach interventions, they are disconnected from Brazil’s wider development engagement in Haiti.¹³ And Brazilian diplomats are sensitive to the fact that these two approaches are still not adequately ‘integrated’ (Hamann 2013).

Likewise, Brazilian cooperation with Guinea Bissau reveals an attempt to link security and development investments. Owing to its close historical and cultural affinities, Brazil has provided extensive assistance for health, agriculture, vocational training, security sector reform, public administration, and electoral assistance. Moreover, since 2007 Brazil has served as the coordinator of Guinea Bissau’s activities as part of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as well as regularly providing police officers to the UN Mission in Guinea Bissau. It has also contributed to the country through the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries and through the IBSA Fund – an Indian, Brazilian, and South African mechanism to support South–South projects.¹⁴

⁹ According to one source, however, the Ministry of External Relations’ (MRE) General Coordinator for Sustainable Development in Brasilia appeared less convinced that the linkages between peace, security, and development should be emphasised in the post-2015 development framework. She was, however, aware that such connections should be made in the course of practical programmes in post-conflict settings.

¹⁰ For a list and brief information on the projects developed under bilateral cooperation, see www.abc.gov.br/abc_por/webforms/Projeto.aspx?secao_id=132&Tipo_Projeto=Cooperacao%20Sul-Sul&Pais_Projeto=Haiti&Situacao_projeto=&Regiao=

¹¹ Although this is not an obvious task for the military, the work has been fully endorsed by the Brazilian MRE, both institutionally and financially.

¹² Muggah (2010b: 3) notes how “The latest mission was intended to merge peacekeeping activities more clearly with civilian activities associated with the delivery of core services so as to facilitate, among other things, a smooth transition and ultimately the exit of peacekeepers from the country ...”

¹³ For more information, see the statement by Sérgio Rodrigues dos Santos, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations, at the Discussion of Agenda Item 153: Financing of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) – New York, 13 May 2011 (www.un.int/brazil/speech/12d-srs-Financing-of-the-United-Nations-Stabilization-Haiti.html).

¹⁴ For details on the IBSA Fund and its project in Guinea Bissau, see www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais-informacoes/saiba-mais-ibas/fotos/paineis-sobre-o-fundo-ibas/Painel%20Fundacao%20IBAS%208%20-%20Guine%20Bissau.jpg?searchterm=fundo%20ibas. For information on the CPLP internal cooperation, see www.cplp.org/id-934.aspx

Brazilian expenditures in Guinea Bissau between 2005 and 2009 amounted to \$3.3 million, with the budget for 2012 projected to increase to \$5 million (Hirst 2012).¹⁵

Conflict prevention

Brazil has a long history of conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, and mediation. This is particularly the case in South and Central America where, in spite of considerable tension, it has not engaged in an inter-state conflict for more than 150 years (Hamann 2012). These traditions are backed by official doctrine. Brazil's former foreign minister, Celso Lafer (2001–2002), introduced the concept of “constructive moderation” to guide foreign policy engagements on issues of peace and security. This was intended to “reduce the impulsive expressions of power politics in favor of peace and development” (Amorim 2003).

Brazil's approach to conflict prevention is consistent with the concept of constructive moderation. As a set of discourses and practices, conflict prevention is positioned between ‘intervention’, which is at odds with Brazil's fundamental principles, and ‘doing nothing’, which is not consistent with the country's commitment to peaceful solutions. Brazil has recorded several successes in negotiation and mediation over the past century, dating back to the peaceful negotiation of its borders with almost every country in South America in the early years of the twentieth century.¹⁶ More recently, in 1998 Brazil helped resolve territorial disputes between Ecuador and Peru, and in 2008 it calmed tensions between Bolivia's ruling party and opposition. Brazil was less effective in Colombia, where former president Álvaro Uribe rejected offers of assistance to mediate the long-running conflict with the FARC guerrillas.¹⁷

While it has been largely successful within Latin America, Brazil's record outside of the region is more open to question. Indeed, Brazil is regarded in some quarters as prone to error in contexts such as the Middle East and Central Asia. For example, its joint efforts with Turkey in 2010 to negotiate an Iranian nuclear fuel swap arrangement were a failure, publicly criticised by the EU and the US and undermined by Russia and China's decision to vote for more sanctions at the UN. Likewise, Brazil's foray to support mediation between Israel and Palestine is also regarded with some scepticism.

Brazil's apparent readiness to engage in conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy is a logical extension of its growing international status and attendant responsibilities; however, as made clear above, these have also been central tenets of the country's foreign policy for the last century. Brazil's approach is also shaped by its enduring preoccupation with asserting its autonomy from dominant powers such as the US, which stretches back to the nineteenth century. This is evidenced more recently by Brazilian support for negotiated solutions and non-punitive actions in the cases of Iran and Syria, its positioning as a mediator in Honduras, and its advocacy in the Doha negotiations for fairer and rebalanced trading regimes to correct economic asymmetries.

Peacekeeping

Brazil has an extensive peacekeeping record dating back to the middle of the twentieth century. This includes engagement from 1947–1948 in the Middle East and in 1956 during the Suez crisis. Altogether, Brazil has taken part in 42 of 65 UN peace support missions (Rezende 2010). Yet despite the regularity of its contributions, especially of military contingents, the number of troops involved used to be relatively low. Prior to 2004 the number of Brazilian troops in UN missions tended to be limited to less than 100 military personnel. This all changed, however, in mid-2004, when Brazil assumed


¹⁵ Due to the coup d'état carried out by Guinea Bissau's military in April 2012, aid was suspended until a provisional government and stability was restored. See ICG (2012).

¹⁶ These include Bolivia (1902), Ecuador (1904), Dutch Guiana (1906), Colombia (1907), Peru (1904 and 1909), and Argentina (1910).

¹⁷ A similar situation occurred again in 2012 when President Juan Manuel Santos accepted mediation assistance from Venezuela, Chile, Cuba, and Norway, but not from Brazil.

the leadership of the peacekeeping component of MINUSTAH and deployed a battalion to the country. Following the devastating earthquake of January 2010, a second battalion was sent, doubling the number of Brazilian troops in Haiti (see figure 1).¹⁸ By the end of 2012 Brazil reported 2,200 personnel deployed, including 2,174 troops and 26 police.¹⁹

Figure 1. Number of Brazilian troops deployed to UN peacekeeping missions (2000–2012)



Source: UN DPKO (as of 30 April 2012), available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml

Brazilian expenditures on peace support operations are more difficult to trace, though they suggest a considerable investment. Between 2005 and 2009 the Brazilian budget listed the equivalent of \$307 million devoted to peacekeeping operations, including costs of material and equipment, administration, and logistics. During this period the UN reimbursed the equivalent of \$127 million (IPEA-ABC 2010:46–47), suggesting a Brazilian expenditure of upwards \$180 million. Meanwhile, Brazilian financial contributions to the UN also demonstrate a willingness to participate, albeit on a more modest scale. In 2012 Brazil contributed \$38 million to the UN regular budget (about 1.6 per cent of the total), placing the country in 14th position. Yet Brazil's contribution to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is limited for a country claiming a permanent seat at the UNSC. It currently contributes just 0.32 per cent of the DPKO budget and sits in 28th position (UNGA 2009).

There are limits to the extent to which Brazil is prepared to expand its international peacekeeping role. Fundamentally, the Ministry of Defense pursues a cautious approach owing to logistical, material, and budgetary constraints – a factor that has intensified since President Dilma Rousseff's administration began in 2011 with a mandate to promote more fiscal austerity. Likewise, peacekeeping is also considered in Brasilia, as in other capitals, as a 'subsidiary mission' of the armed forces: their primary mission focused on territorial protection. Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity is explicit in the Brazilian constitution and associated legislation. But there are also pragmatic considerations that influence Brazil's preparedness to deploy abroad. Preoccupations with military expansion in certain neighbouring countries (e.g. Colombia and Venezuela) and the perception of more intrusive involvement in the region by outside powers such as the US, Russia, and China compel a careful calculation in Brasilia.

Furthermore, Brazil is traditionally wary of violating the national sovereignty of other countries unless there is an incontestable mandate from the UNSC. This is an historical impulse with few exceptions.²⁰ Brazil's engagement in Haiti implicitly entails inter-

¹⁸ Its commitment to peacekeeping is consistent with its multilateral instincts and is also a means of enhancing Brazil's influence and opportunities to become a permanent member of the UNSC. Peacekeeping also reinforces domestic priorities, including training and equipping the armed forces.

¹⁹ See www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/Nov12_1.pdf

²⁰ One exception occurred during the military dictatorship (1964–1985) which involved the deployment of troops to join an OAS-mandated mission endorsed by the US to dispatch the democratically elected Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic.

vention, a fact conceded by the Brazilian authorities and criticised domestically. Although Brazil's support for Haiti is a source of pride, there are clear domestic concerns and cautions about assuming such a major operation given Brazil's internal needs. Moreover, it is against the principle of non-intervention inscribed in the Brazilian Constitution (article 4), and it was regarded by some as aiding and abetting the US and France in their plan to remove President Aristide.²¹ However, notwithstanding support for security training and development – and more recently open support for the Haitian armed forces – Brasilia emphasises that the mission was endorsed by the UN and is consistent with the interests and directives of Haiti's authorities.

Responsibility to protect

Given Brazil's position on non-intervention and respect for sovereignty, it is unsurprising that Brazil questioned the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a doctrine endorsed by the UN in 2005. Together with other developing countries, Brazil resists the idea of R2P as a licence for military intervention, particularly when undertaken unilaterally or outside the framework of the UN.²² However, while the country has stressed its unwillingness to support military intervention, other recommendations set out in the R2P formulation are well received. It is worth noting that Brazil's strong resistance to Chapter VII missions may also stem from its reluctance to assume a leading role without having a corresponding capacity to influence what it perceives to be a Northern-dominated UN agenda.

The Brazilian position on R2P is largely influenced by a tradition of multilateralism and legalism that stretches back a century or more. As noted above, the principle of non-intervention and emphasis on the peaceful settlement of disputes has shaped much of the country's engagement beyond its borders. It has also heavily influenced the Brazilian position on the debate over the preservation of sovereignty on one side against the protection of human rights on the other. Indeed, over the past two decades Brazil has positioned itself *against* military intervention even in the face of gross violations of human rights, whether in Kosovo (1998–1999) or Darfur/Sudan (2004–2006). The only case in which Brazil positioned itself in favour of military intervention was in Rwanda (1994) – which represents an exception and not necessarily a precedent. More recently, Brazil has also firmly rejected the use of force in Libya (2011) and Syria (2012), much to the consternation and frustration of its Western allies (Hamann 2012).

Given this enduring tradition, it is in some ways predictable that Brazil has adopted a more visible stand in relation to the R2P doctrine. In September 2011, President Dilma introduced the 'Responsibility while Protecting' (RwP) concept during her speech at the opening session of the 66th UN General Assembly. During a follow-up 'protection of civilians' session at the UNSC, the Brazilian delegation distributed a concept note highlighting elements of the 'new' RwP proposal. This document reinforced key aspects of R2P, but also drew attention to a number of related parameters, principles, and rules inspired by international humanitarian law and 'just war' theory. These include: a "focus on prevention", "the use of force as the last resort", the role of "proportionate engagement", the importance of "not causing more harm or instability than it was trying to prevent or resolve (do no harm)", the role of "collective action authorized by the UNSC", and the critical importance of "monitoring and accountability".²³

The introduction of RwP was not intended, as some suspect, to throw sand in the works of R2P. According to Brazil, while it is acceptable to use force to protect populations from the four crimes set out by the R2P doctrine (i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing), it comes with attendant responsibilities. Several

²¹ The new position began with the mission in Timor-Leste, which included one operational paragraph under Chapter VII. The Haiti mission was fully based on Chapter VII.

²² Indeed, all Brazilian officials consulted as part of this paper reject the idea of Brazil engaging in missions deployed by regional organisations, whether the African Union or the OAS.

²³ The convergences and dissonances of R2P and RwP were the subject of an Igarapé Institute and CEBRI workshop in Brasilia in November 2012. See www.igarape.org.br

countries enthusiastically embraced Brazil's complementary proposal, including India and South Africa.²⁴ Indeed, some 'fragile' countries may increasingly look to Brazil as a kind of champion of their position. Other states have been less supportive: during a BRICS Summit in early 2012, the formal insertion of RWP in the outcome document was rejected by China and Russia. Likewise, a number of Western countries involved in ongoing military operations – including Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the US – received the Brazilian proposal coolly. They interpreted RWP as an attempt not just to regulate but to impede military operations outright.

²⁴ Although China and Russia are opposed to allowing military intervention for geopolitical reasons and, as such, hold a similar position to Brazil, their motivations are rather different.

6

Promoting peace in the post-2015 development framework

THE EXTENT AND DIRECTION OF BRAZIL'S INVOLVEMENT in the post-2015 development agenda is difficult to determine. At the outset, it is worth recalling that Brazil does not use the terminology of fragile states, peacebuilding, or statebuilding in the ways advocated by many Western countries. While Brazil features the ability and willingness to provide technical assistance, it has not been visibly involved in wider multilateral debates on aid effectiveness or the future development agenda. That said, there is little doubt that Brazil will increasingly be required to step-up its involvement given the country's engagement on issues of international intervention and its ever-expanding development portfolio. Moreover, given challenges in transitioning its security presence out of Haiti, the Brazilian MRE is already initiating a debate on ways to enhance its development profile there.

There are, moreover, a number of important lessons that Brazil can offer for the wider post-2015 development agenda. For instance, it has a growing array of experiences in reinforcing South–South and triangular aid modalities; it has launched a wide range of South–South programmes focused on agriculture and tropical medicine in West and Southern Africa and as far away as Timor-Leste that hold promise for future cooperation (Muggah and Carvalho 2010, 2009). Brazil has also invested in innovative data collection modalities on the domestic front with lessons for others. For example, at the state and city level, Brazilian authorities have actively monitored progress in achieving the millennium development goals and critical human development targets (see Muggah and Wenmann 2010). These and other innovations could be of some use in shaping debate and action in relation to future peacebuilding and development agendas.

In terms of conflict prevention, Brazil's explicit focus on this issue, and its track record of proactive preventive diplomacy and mediation initiatives, suggests a receptivity to its incorporation in the post-2015 development framework. Brazil clearly gives a prominence to conflict prevention that is consistent with norms advocated by international organisations working on peacebuilding. It has a long tradition of supporting conflict prevention and mediation, both in its own neighbourhood and abroad. While its role within the Latin America region has mostly been welcomed, its initiatives in the Middle East and Africa have been less well received. Nevertheless, Brazil has

reinforced its commitment through the concept of RwP, which emphasises the use of non-military means to resolve conflicts and to ensure the protection of all civilians when intervention is pursued. This view is not only consistent with a large proportion of the humanitarian and development sectors but also with many developing countries.

Brazil views conflict prevention and engagement in conflict-affected states beyond a narrow focus on violence reduction, which may only secure a 'negative peace' at best. Brazil consistently reinforces the linkages between security and development, suggesting a more expansive and holistic vision than many other international actors advocate. It has consistently drawn attention to the importance of simultaneously reducing inequalities and poverty as a means of improving safety and security. The emphasis on alleviating inequalities because these are seen as generators of conflict and violence suggests that Brazil's approach to development cooperation in conflict-affected states is focused not just on the symptoms of conflict but also on addressing the so-called root causes.²⁵ This position is reflected in Brazil's role as a signatory of the *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*²⁶ in 2006, although its active participation has since waned. Brazil's ambition to transform wider economic relations – globally and domestically – in order to shape a more peaceful world order can be seen as a macro-level expression of the same position.

In practical terms, Brazil has taken a number of steps to support states emerging from conflict or from war that have been shaped by the linkage between development and security. This is especially the case in Haiti where Brazil has supported security and development interventions since 2004, and is now seeking an appropriate transition or 'exit strategy'. It is also evident in Guinea-Bissau where Brazil has invested in security sector transformation alongside traditional development sectors. Informed by its experiences in these and other countries, senior Brazilian diplomats are exploring possibilities of developing a more concerted peacebuilding approach – seeking to shift from a purely 'technical cooperation' role to a more integrated approach. Furthermore, while still only modestly involved in activities overseas, there is some evidence of a small number of Brazilian non-governmental organisations also engaging in such countries, though not yet with financial support from the Brazilian government.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise the real possibility that Brazil will obstruct attempts to incorporate conflict prevention in the post-2015 development agenda. As is by now clear, Brazil purposefully avoids, indeed on occasion tacitly rejects, the language and intentions of the international peacebuilding and statebuilding communities. While it has endorsed the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in official statements – particularly in relation to Guinea Bissau – it has shown a marked reluctance to engage with the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.²⁷ Nor has Brazil actively supported the g7+, weighing such support against its stated commitment to non-alignment and continued influence with the wider G77. While there are likely to be opportunities for enhancing linkages, potentially with the New Deal given some areas of convergence and common interest, these will be likely clouded by complex interests.

Furthermore, Brazil's approach departs from OECD-led approaches to conflict prevention in a number of respects. Brazil does not formally project an approach to aid that emphasises the inclusion of all stakeholders and accountability. It objects to the *Paris Declaration* on the basis that its principles for aid effectiveness reinforce, rather than reform, Northern aid modalities. Instead, and as discussed above, Brazil has long embraced the concept of South–South Cooperation which emphasises solidarity, respect for sovereignty, and non-intervention. Brazil prides itself on its ability to

²⁵ For example, then foreign minister Amorim (2003) described how "poverty and inequality create an environment propitious to the dissemination of extreme ideas and actions ... It is impossible to speak about peace and reconciliation without mentioning also economic issues."

²⁶ See www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GD-Declaration-091020-EN.pdf

²⁷ See www.oecd.org/site/dacpbsdialogue/

export 'social technologies' and innovations developed internally for its 80 development partners, and it is often more inclined to pursue these bilaterally or, in certain cases, trilaterally (see, for example, Itamaraty 2013).

The foregoing description and analysis highlight key characteristics of Brazil's foreign policy and development assistance, its approach to conflict prevention, and its engagement in conflict-affected states. The paper identifies opportunities and entry points for engaging Brazil in support of promoting peace in the post-2015 development framework. Equally, it identifies reasons for possible Brazilian resistance to this agenda. In this way, it is hoped that this paper will raise awareness and stimulate debate both within the Brazilian policy community and, more broadly, among international policy actors.

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COVER PHOTO: Brazilian peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in the capital, Port-au-Prince. © LOGAN ABASSI, UN PHOTO



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