

International Development Committee inquiry:

UK progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals

Saferworld submission, January 2019

Introduction

1. Saferworld welcomes the International Development Committee (IDC)'s inquiry into UK progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In the years leading up to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the 17 SDGs, the UK was a global leader in support of a comprehensive agenda that addressed the shortcomings of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This leadership role was crucial in securing agreement on some of the more progressive aspects of the 2030 Agenda, particularly the commitment to building peaceful, just and inclusive societies enshrined in SDG16. But since then, the UK's role as a champion of this progressive development agenda has waned, falling short of the international leadership promised by then-Prime Minister David Cameron.ⁱ On SDG16 specifically, the UK has been overtaken by other countries that are supporting innovative approaches and prioritising SDG16 in their national development and overseas programming.
2. Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. Saferworld played a key role – working in partnership with the UK Government - in advocating for the inclusion of a peace-related goal in the SDGs, and since then it has pioneered an approach to localise and implement SDG16 in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This submission addresses the questions most relevant to our expertise from a peace perspective, which predominantly concern 'SDG16+' – the term used to refer to the inter-linked commitments to building peaceful, just and inclusive societies across the 2030 Agenda, and not just those under SDG16.ⁱⁱ This submission is based on the information available to us and should not be considered exhaustive.

Key points

- **UK leadership has declined from being a champion for the inclusion of peace-related issues in the SDGs, and has been overtaken by other governments that are incorporating SDG16 into their development strategies and helping to translate the SDG commitments to peace, justice and inclusion into practice.**
- **A review of multiple documents and anecdotal evidence from Saferworld programmes suggests that the UK Government has not approached the SDGs as a comprehensive framework for international development. Notably, just 3 of 35 available DFID country and regional profiles and only 3 of 76 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund programme summaries publicly reference the 2030 Agenda and SDGs as guidance for context analysis or programme direction. Available evidence gives the impression that the SDGs are used as an occasional reference point and benchmark rather than as a guiding framework.**
- **Led by DFID, the UK Government should undertake a fundamental review of its development strategy and programmes in relation to SDG16. It should adopt a more proactive approach to addressing SDG16 targets rather than retrospectively checking if programmes are aligned.**

- **The SDG16 targets for peaceful, just and inclusive societies will ultimately be achieved through investment in national actors and initiatives, especially in conflict-affected contexts. Therefore the UK Government should support programmes framed around SDG16+, back relevant international coalitions, and invest in national civil society initiatives that address peace, justice and inclusion.**
- **The UK Government should take advantage of the upcoming High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) at the United Nations (UN) in July 2019 to set a positive example of how a Voluntary National Review can be an inclusive process and can provide an objective critique of challenges and gaps in achieving the SDGs, as well as of successes.**

The UK's Voluntary National Review (VNR)

1. The presentation of the UK's VNR to the UN High-level Political Forum in July 2019 is a chance for the Government to articulate SDG progress and share best practices, as well as to identify gaps and shortcomings in the implementation of the SDGs by the UK. So far, the HLPF has not inspired very objective or accountable reporting by most governments, nor has it been a conducive environment for the participation of non-state actors.ⁱⁱⁱ By presenting a more balanced and objective account of SDG progress, the UK Government can raise the standard for other governments whose VNRs have typically failed to acknowledge any failures. If the UK produces a report that does not accurately reflect the reality of Britain in 2019, it is harder to expect countries with less open and less democratic tendencies to do likewise – which then undermines the whole SDG accountability process.
2. The VNR should encompass UK progress towards achieving all 17 SDGs, rather than cherry-picking specific SDGs on which the government believes it has made most progress. Best practices are emerging for VNRs which can guide the approach of the UK Government and build on existing outreach.^{iv} Engagement with UK civil society is ongoing, and the Office for National Statistics encourages people to submit data on all of the SDGs via its website. This has not been our experience in other contexts, and it would be beneficial for the UK to demonstrate to other governments its acceptance of third party (civil society) monitoring as credible, expert and non-threatening. At the HLPF, any oral, in-person presentation of the VNR should be inclusive and representative of UK society, and include civil society and academic representatives as far as possible. The presenting group should be gender-balanced, and include youth and minority voices to emphasise visibly the UK's commitment to 'leaving no one behind'.^v

Supporting the achievement of the SDGs overseas

3. The UK's ability to make progress towards the SDGs depends on a coordinated, cross-government approach involving the Cabinet Office, DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Stabilisation Unit, National Crime Agency, the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office. When it comes to supporting the SDGs overseas, DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) and the cross-government Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) have particularly important roles to play in initiatives relating to SDG16.
4. In all departmental plans, the SDGs are referenced where particular activities are deemed to contribute towards an SDG. For example, DFID's plan states: 'Promote effective, accountable and inclusive institutions and champion British values around the globe: freedom, democracy, tolerance and the rule of law (contributes to SDG16).'^{vi} DFID's annual review also mentions the SDGs to which specific strategic objectives will contribute if achieved. Many of the areas of work and examples of achievement will contribute to meeting SDG targets.^{vii} However, beyond these references, it is difficult to tell whether the SDGs are used as monitoring criteria against which government activities are retrospectively plotted, or as a transformative framework used to design

objectives, strategies and programming. The 2030 Agenda was intended to signify a break from business as usual as regards international development, and one that required, according to David Cameron, “actions, not words”.^{viii} However, there is no readily available evidence that any institution charged with implementing SDG16 has radically changed its approach since the implementation stage of the SDGs began in January 2016.

5. Anecdotal evidence from Saferworld programmes suggests a mixed picture when it comes to mainstreaming SDGs in HMG programmes in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. Most programmes funded by FCO, CSSF and DFID did not stipulate any reference to the SDGs either in programme proposals or in reporting on progress and impact. In contrast, an Irish Aid programme included evidence of the project’s contribution to SDG16 as part of its assessment criteria. One UK government-funded programme did have a requirement to assess the level of implementation of the SDGs in the target country, but this was the exception rather than the norm.
6. A review of the 35 available DFID country and regional profiles indicates that each has a section on progress towards the SDGs, but a survey of these documents reveals only three mentions of the SDGs in the contextual description of the programmes.^{ix} Only 3 of 76 CSSF programme summaries reference the SDGs at all.^x Anecdotally it appears that UK country offices’ strategies relating to peace, justice and inclusion are developed with little or no reference to SDG16, but are rather focused on mitigating risks to security and stability, for instance around elections or the threat of terrorism, or with promoting strategic interests. That country offices are primarily concerned with these sorts of risks is not surprising, but the SDG framework offers a way of strengthening security and stability through an integrated developmental approach. It underscores the need to build more awareness and understanding of the transformative potential of the SDGs among UK officials overseas.
7. Key reviews and guidance for the UK’s approach to conflict make scant reference to the SDGs. Recently-released guidance titled ‘the UK Government’s approach to stabilisation: a guide for policy makers and practitioners’,^{xi} does not mention the SDGs whatsoever. The Building Stability Framework^{xii} makes a passing reference to them, despite these being two of the most important contemporary documents in setting out the UK’s approach to conflict and governance or – expressed another way – to peaceful, just and strong institutions.
8. **The Committee should seek clarification from the government on how it uses the SDG framework in overall strategy as well as programme design, and urge the government to review how it uses the SDG framework to support peace, justice and inclusion in particular.**

Proactively using the SDGs: approaches by other countries

9. Several European countries are using the SDG framework in a proactive and transformative way. For example, in 2016 the German Government ‘radically revised its national development strategy to align it with the 17 sustainable development goals laid out in the 2030 Agenda’.^{xiii} In contrast, the UK Government states that the ‘most effective way of (delivering the SDGs) is by ensuring that the Goals are fully embedded in planned activity of each government department’.^{xiv} The contrast between the strategy-level approach to SDG delivery of the German Government and the activity-level approach of the UK Government is stark. The government has been questioned by Members of Parliament on the extent to which the SDGs are ‘driving policy’, but its answers seemed to miss the point.^{xv}
10. Meanwhile, other countries such as Switzerland, Sierra Leone^{xvi}, Sweden and the Republic of Korea^{xvii} have taken a lead in supporting international coalitions to build strategies for achieving

SDG16. There are indications that the UK Government may join in supporting one such coalition, and this would be a welcome development. However, the UK Government should ensure that any investment in international processes and multilateral initiatives is matched by investments in action on SDG16+ at national and sub-national levels.

11. There is a growing body of experience on implementing SDG16+ at a national level, upon which the UK government can draw. For example, for the past three years Saferworld has been working with national government and civil society actors in the Horn of Africa to develop locally-owned processes for implementing SDG16+. This has led to a more inclusive approach, bringing together diverse stakeholders around the SDG framework, adapting the process to local needs and realities by identifying priority SDG16+ targets, and galvanising action on peace, justice and inclusion. By framing this as part of the 2030 Agenda – signed up to by all governments around the world – space has opened up to discuss issues like corruption and female genital mutilation, which were previously deemed too sensitive or divisive. This has only been possible through dedicated resourcing of a SDG16-focused project.^{xviii} Given its stated commitments to peace, justice and inclusion, DFID should likewise consider supporting national and international partners that frame their programmes around SDG16.

12. **The UK can champion and support processes of SDG localisation in countries around the world. While the SDG16+ framework may gain more traction in some contexts than others, where appropriate it should be used as a central method to support and reinforce existing efforts to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies rather than as an afterthought.**

Policy inconsistency that risks undermining SDG16

13. A potential barrier within DFID to effectively supporting SDG localisation is the tendency to spend through large consolidated projects. The IDC's previous report on private contractors acknowledges how this trend, and many of DFID's current procurement processes, are limiting opportunities for smaller, locally-based organisations to access DFID funding.^{xix} It notes that in many conflict-affected contexts, the majority of DFID programmes are delivered through a small number of predominantly UK-based private contractors. These organisations are often the only ones with administrative capabilities and financial reserves necessary to manage vast budgets and to absorb the associated risks.^{xx}

14. However, we know from decades of experience that successful programmes in conflict-affected regions must be built on a solid understanding of the context to be effective. Otherwise they risk exacerbating conflicts and can do more harm than good. This requires a nuanced understanding of political, economic and social dynamics, and an ability to pick up on and respond to these as they change. Localising the SDGs allows for the development of sustained relationships with communities that will need to take the lead in future design and implementation of efforts to deliver the 2030 Agenda.

15. **DFID should build on the recommendations of the IDC's reports into private contractors and aid allocation of resources to manage the risks of large contracts and support locally-led development.**

16. A further risk can be seen in references to SDG16 by some international actors in order to justify more 'securitised' approaches to development. For example, SDG16 has been used in justification for increasing the proportion of the UN Peace Operations (peacekeeping) that can be classified as official development assistance (ODA).^{xxi} UN Peace Operations are often crucial and warrant international investment, but they are not the same as supporting sustainable development – even if objectives are sometimes shared. It should be noted that the move to allow

financial support for UN Peace Operations to be classed as ODA contributions is taking place in a context in which the UN is being pressed to play a greater role in peace enforcement efforts in some contexts, including a role in combating terror groups.^{xxii} While this might not be the main objective, given the willingness of many governments to define their enemies as 'terrorists', it is easy to see how this risks diverting aid towards a military agenda for fighting wars rather than towards peacebuilding and development^{xxiii} - elements that are at the heart of the SDGs.^{xxiv}

17. In addition, some governments and multilateral agencies have sought to connect security objectives and the SDGs through the countering and preventing violent extremism (C/PVE) agenda. It is worth recalling that some governments and NGOs expressed concerns during negotiations for the 2030 Agenda that a goal on peace and justice would lead to the securitisation of development. There are many reasons why the SDGs should not be conflated with C/PVE, and any attempt to combine development and external security agendas is likely to prove extremely damaging to peace, justice and inclusion, and to hinder the achievement of the 2030 Agenda.^{xxv}
18. While states clearly have a responsibility to protect the public from violent groups and individuals, Saferworld's research shows how the C/PVE framing can enable governments to portray certain groups and ideologies as the root causes of conflict and insecurity, thereby overshadowing and even excluding responses to address political and economic grievances. This framing can therefore be seen in tension with the principles espoused in the 2030 Agenda, and it risks undermining the targets that make up SDG16+. We caution the UK Government against blurring the line between the SDGs and C/PVE interventions.^{xxvi}
19. There are further concerns that some institutions^{xxvii} are using SDG16 (and specifically target 16.a on strengthening state capacities to combat terrorism and crime) to justify 'train and equip' assistance to security forces of repressive, undemocratic governments to 'foster peace and development.' Providing training and equipment to governments that lack the political will to undergo meaningful reforms and improve public security may directly lead to less peaceful societies.^{xxviii} An over-reliance on this approach, and the inadequacy of mechanisms to assess potential harm, were recently criticised by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) in their review of CSSF.^{xxix} One example is the EU effort to prevent migration by training and equipping states such as Ethiopia and Sudan, funded by DFID through the EU Trust Fund. This runs a high risk of reinforcing the problems that fuelled instability and displacement in the first place, and does not help achieve the overall goal of SDG16. The UK needs to recognise migration as a symptom of insecurity, violence and oppression, as well as of economic causes such as lack of employment opportunities, and adopt a strategy which puts addressing its causes at the centre of its strategy. This requires promoting democracy, human rights and political and social inclusion rather than reinforcing repressive state security apparatuses.
20. The CSSF represents a valuable cross-government tool which could, and in some cases does, support programmes that build the foundations of long-term stability and peace. The CSSF should avoid programmes which exacerbate conflict drivers or that prioritise short-term security threats over long-term peace. **The fund should continue to strengthen monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) and transparency,^{xxx} and should focus on contextual and programmatic learning rather than trying to demonstrate fund-level aggregated impact. It is welcome that the UK Government's 'Approach to Stabilisation' document spells out that peace and long-term stability are the overall goals of UK intervention and by integrating SDG16+ into its approach, the CSSF can further support these goals.**

21. It should be noted that the approach by the UK Government to arms transfer control risks undermining the delivery of the SDGs. While the government supports many important programmes that help build peaceful, just and inclusive societies, these efforts are fundamentally undermined by UK weapons sales to conflict parties. For example, the UK sells planes and bombs to Saudi Arabia,^{xxxi} where their use in Yemen is having a profoundly adverse effect on the achievement of core SDGs including health, hunger, education, and security – while simultaneously funding programmes in Yemen for demining and clearing unexploded ordnance.^{xxxii}
22. **The UK Government should ensure that peace, justice and inclusion are central objectives of national strategy overseas, as well as domestically, and should use SDG16+ as a framework. To allow greater scrutiny of the compatibility of UK strategy with the SDGs, the Cabinet Office should release public versions of national security strategies in priority countries, as it agreed to do in the Capability Review of Cross-Government Funds^{xxxiii} – or at a minimum it should publicly announce a timetable for doing so. The government should also take steps towards greater policy coherence by de-conflicting activities that jeopardise long-term peace and explaining where trade-offs are necessary.**

About Saferworld

Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. We believe that everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from insecurity and violent conflict. We are a not-for-profit organisation with programmes in nearly 20 countries and territories across Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

Contacts

Lewis Brooks, UK Policy & Advocacy Coordinator

Jordan Street, Policy and Advocacy Advisor

Tel: +44 (0) 207 324 4646 | **Email:** lbrooks@saferworld.org.uk, jstreet@saferworld.org.uk | **Saferworld** – 28 Charles Square, London N1 6HT, UK | Registered Charity no 1043843 | Company limited by guarantee no 3015948 | **Web:** www.saferworld.org.uk

ⁱ David Cameron (2015), 'PM's Speech to the UN Sustainable Development Goals Summit 2015,' 28th September, (<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-to-the-un-sustainable-development-goals-summit-2015>)

ⁱⁱ Targets crucial for building peaceful, just and inclusive societies are found in SDG1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 16 and 17. More information can be found here:

https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/peaceful_just_inclusive_targets_analysis_aug2016.pdf

ⁱⁱⁱ Anna Möller-Loswick (2016), 'Crowding out accountability: The follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda,' Saferworld, July: (<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/685-crowding-out-accountability-the-follow-up-and-review-of-the-2030-agenda>) or Jordan Street (2017), 'Keeping the SDGs on track: did the 2017 UN High-Level Political Forum do its Job?,' July. (<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/726-keeping-the-sdgs-on-track-did-the-2017-un-high-level-political-forum-do-its-job>)

^{iv} See for example: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) (2018), 'Handbook for the Preparation of Voluntary National Reviews,' United Nations. (<http://www.partners-for-review.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/VNR-Handbook-2019-Edition.pdf>)

^v The UK's policy commitment can be found here: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leaving-no-one-behind-our-promise/leaving-no-one-behind-our-promise> For an example of this in practice, see the voluntary national review

from the Netherlands:

https://uk.video.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search;_ylt=AwrIRIHUvVfcmSgAOf3Bwx.;_ylu=X3oDMTB0ZTgxN3Q0BGNvbG8DaXlyBHBvcwMxBH20aWQDBHNIYwNwaXZz?p=HLPF+webcast+netherlands+2017&type=b7ds_7908_CHW_UK&hspart=iba&hsimp=yhs-1&ei=UTF-8&fr=yhs-iba-1#id=3&vid=ae1f69499673f6f6eff3cdf9282b3906&action=view

^{vi} From DFID's Single Departmental Plan under objective 1.1 'Tackle the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict'

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/department-for-international-development-single-departmental-plan/department-for-international-development-single-departmental-plan-december-2018>

^{vii} DFID (2018), 'Annual Report and Accounts 2017/8,' July. See SO1 as the most relevant to SDG16. Available at:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/750989/DFID-Annual-Report-Accounts-2017-18-amended-Oct18.pdf

^{viii} David Cameron (2015), PM's Speech to the UN Sustainable Development Goals Summit 2015, 28th September,

(<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-to-the-un-sustainable-development-goals-summit-2015>)

^{ix} See Afghanistan, Zimbabwe and Rwanda DFID Country Profiles: July 2018 available at:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/DFID-country-profiles-july-2018>

^x See Great Lakes, Pakistan Democracy Programme and Commonwealth Fairness Programme Summaries 2018-9,

available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-programme-summaries>

^{xi} UK Stabilisation Unit (2018), 'The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation, A guide for policy makers and practitioners,' December. Available at:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/767466/The_UK_Governments_Approach_to_Stabilisation_-_A_Guide_web.pdf

^{xii} DFID (2016), 'Building Stability Framework'

(<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5968990ded915d0baf00019e/UK-Aid-Connect-Stability-Framework.pdf>)

^{xiii} <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/issues/sustainability/germany-s-national-sustainable-development-strategy-354566>

^{xiv} <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/implementing-the-sustainable-development-goals/implementing-the-sustainable-development-goals>

^{xv} House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2018), Oral Evidence: Sustainable Development Goals in the UK Follow-up, HC 1491, 23 October 2018, Q 77.

^{xvi} See Pathfinders for Peaceful Just and Inclusive Societies, accessed 21/01/2019. Available at:

<https://www.sdg16hub.org/pathfinders>

^{xvii} See World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA) Sixteen Plus Forum, accessed 21/01/2019, available at:

<https://www.wfuna.org/sixteenplusforum>

^{xviii} The Kingdom of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides support for this project

^{xix} International Development Committee (2017), '8th Report – DFID's use of private sector contractors,' April. Available at:

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmintdev/920/92002.htm>

^{xx} Tim Midgeley (2017), 'Spend better, not less: The challenge for UK aid effectiveness,' April. Available at:

<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/220-spend-better-not-less-the-challenge-for-uk-aid-effectiveness>

^{xxi} International Development Committee (2018), 'Government Response to Committee Recommendations on definition of ODA,' September, available at:

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmintdev/1556/155602.htm>

^{xxii} Larry Attree, Jordan Street and Luca Venchiarutti (2018), 'United Nations peace operations in complex environments: charting the right course,' Saferworld, September. <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1183-united-nations-peace-operations-in-complex-environments-charting-the-right-course>

^{xxiii} Anna Möller-Loswick (2017), 'Goal 16 is about peace, not hard security,' Saferworld, October.

<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/740-goal-16-is-about-peaceful-change-not-hard-security>

^{xxiv} <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/831-from-the-sustainable-development-goals-to-the-post-2015-development-agenda-building-a-consensus-for-peace>

^{xxv} Larry Attree (2017), 'Shouldn't YOU be countering violent extremism?', Saferworld. Available at: https://saferworld-indepth.squarespace.com/shouldnt-you-be-countering-violent-extremism?utm_source=smartmail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Shouldn%27t+YOU+be+CVE

^{xxvi} For example Kenya, see DFID and FCO involvement in preventing violent extremism approaches in CSSF, 2018. East Africa: preventing violent extremism Programme Summary. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-programme-summaries-for-africa-2018-to-2019> and DFID, 2018. DFID Kenya Country Profile https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/723198/Kenya-July-2018.pdf for risks of marginalisation see Christopher Wakube, Thomas Nyagah, James Mwangi and Larry Attree (2017),

'Inside Kenya's war on terror: breaking the cycle of violence in Garissa,' Saferworld, July, <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/725-inside-kenyaas-war-on-terror-breaking-the-cycle-of-violence-in-garissa> and Thomas Nyagah, James Mwangi and Larry Attree (2017), 'Inside Kenya's war on terror: the case of Lamu,' Saferworld, April, (<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/712-inside-kenyas-war-on-terror-the-case-of-lamu>)

^{xxvii} European Union Commission (2016), 'New proposals to improve the EU's support for security and development in partner countries', Press Release, July, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2405_en.htm

^{xxviii} Kloe Tricot O'Farrell (2016), 'EU foreign policy risks fuelling displacement and terror', Saferworld, August, (<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/203-eu-foreign-policy-will-fuel-displacement-and-terror-unless-it-focuses-on-what-is-driving-them>); and Kloe Tricot O'Farrell (2017), 'Charting the wrong course: EU efforts to stop migration through the Mediterranean,' Saferworld, September (<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/735-charting-the-wrong-course-eu-efforts-to-stop-migration-through-the-mediterranean>)

^{xxix} Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2018), 'The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund's aid spending: A performance review,' March. Pp. 27-9. Available at: <https://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/The-CSSFs-aid-spending-ICAI-review.pdf>

^{xxx} See Saferworld (2018), 'Submission to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy inquiry: The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund,' September, available at:

<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/national-security-strategy-committee/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-201718/written/90168.html>

^{xxxi} Peter Foster (2015), 'UK "will support Saudi-led assault on Yemeni rebels - but not engaging in combat"', *Daily Telegraph*, March, (<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/11500518/UK-will-support-Saudi-led-assault-on-Yemeni-rebels-but-not-engaging-in-combat.html>)

^{xxxii} HM Government (2018), 'Programme Summary Yemen: CSSF country programme', (<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-programme-summaries-for-middle-east-and-north-africa-2017-to-2018>)

^{xxxiii} Cabinet Office (2018), 'Capability Review of the Cross-Government Funds, March, recommendation 2,' Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695331/Capability_Review_of_the_Cross-Government_Funds_28032018.pdf