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Identifying approaches and measuring impacts of programmes focused on Transnational Organised Crime

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Tim Midgley, Ivan Briscoe and Daniel Bertoli

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Practice Products for the CCVRI

Improving Measurement in DFID Crime, Conflict & Violence Programming

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Document Summary

Title: Identifying approaches and measuring impacts of programmes focused on Transnational Organised Crime

Purpose and intended use of this document: This paper identifies and analyses a broad range of approaches and intervention strategies that have been applied to tackle Transnational Organised Crime (TOC). It focuses on the impact and effectiveness of these approaches in breaking the links between TOC and violence, conflict and insecurity. It identifies challenges associated with measuring the impact of these approaches, and includes possible indicators (with relevant datasets) that could be used to capture impacts. It is intended to act as a useful resource for development practitioners responsible for the management of existing, or development of new, programmes aimed at tackling the destabilising impacts of TOC on development objectives, including security and justice objectives. It also aims to be a useful resource to inform policy makers working on broader organisational approaches to addressing TOC as a driver of conflict, including cross-government approaches and inter-governmental development, security and rule of law strategies and initiatives. It is hoped that by identifying key indicators relating to a wide range of approaches to addressing TOC, a set of common indicators can be developed that may be used to assess progress against anti-TOC efforts at both the national and global levels.

The paper identifies six, inter-related and overlapping theories of change that guide the majority of programmes focused on TOC. A series of core assumptions under each are identified, and assumptions underpinning them are discussed. Challenges and dilemmas associated with measuring progress against each are outlined, and examples of possible indicators that could be used to assess progress are presented. The theories of change identified are:

1. Deterrence
2. Severing the links between politics, the state and crime
3. Managed adaptation of crime to minimise negative impacts on violence, security and conflict
4. Cultural change
5. Economic transformation
6. Global regulation

Key questions this document addresses:

- Why is addressing TOC important for development?
- What approaches have been applied to address TOC that donors could support?
- What evidence is there for their effectiveness?
- What challenges do programmes face in measuring the impact of interventions on TOC? How have these been overcome?

Key messages/essential 'take-aways':

- TOC is an important development issue; it can undermine governance systems, increase levels of violence and insecurity and trap communities in cycles of poverty. However the relationship between TOC and poverty is complex and multi-faceted, and simplistic assumptions about this relationship should be avoided.
- TOC networks operate as part of a complex social, political and economic system that functions at different levels (from the local to the global). Ultimately effective efforts to disrupt TOC networks and their impact on conflict and violence will require co-ordinated and sustained action at each level in this system.
- TOC is largely driven by the demand for illicit goods in rich, developed nations. However, the impacts are felt most keenly by communities in poorer countries with weak institutions. Furthermore, action taken to disrupt TOC in one location can divert activities to new and often more vulnerable areas, whilst doing little to stem to overall scale of TOC. Efforts to disrupt TOC (and their measurement) must therefore take a global perspective.
- The evidence base around effective TOC programming remains under-developed. Many of the assumptions that underpin these programmes are not robustly tested. More research and better data is needed.
- Whilst the challenges associated with measuring impact of programmes focussed on TOC are formidable, they should not be overstated. Much data is already available, and more research is being developed as international attention becomes more focused on TOC as it comes to be seen as a key development issue.

Intended audience of this document (including assumed skill level): Advisors and programme staff working in contexts in which TOC has been identified as a driver of instability. No prior knowledge of TOC is assumed.

Key topics/tags: Transnational organised crime; external stress factors; drugs; illicit financial flows; corruption; wildlife trafficking; human trafficking; natural resources; crime indicators.

Authors and their organisations: Tim Midgley (Saferworld), Ivan Briscoe (Clingendael, contracted by Saferworld), Daniel Bertoli (Saferworld), Claudia Seymour (Small Arms Survey), Matthias Nowak (Small Arms Survey) and Larry Attree (Saferworld)

Cross-references to other documents in the series:

- Defining and measuring external stress factors that lead to conflict in the context of the post-2015 agenda

- Practical approaches to theories of change in conflict, security & justice programmes (parts I and II)
- Tools for measurement, monitoring and evaluation. Sources of data on conflict, crime and violence
- Supporting evidence-based crime prevention policymaking: Promising practices and opportunities
- Security and justice indicators for inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impact
- Measurement challenges - overcoming key challenges in DM&E for conflict, security and justice programmes

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Introduction

Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) is very big business. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), for example, estimates that TOC generates roughly $870 billion per year, or close to 1.5% of global GDP.[1] The nature of TOC has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War; globalisation has facilitated the massive expansion and diversification of opportunities for organised crime. As a result, every country is affected one way or another: for example, as a producer of illicit goods, as a transhipment zone, as a major market place for their distribution and consumption, or several of these together. Violence is closely associated with each stage in this value chain, and consequently TOC poses a significant threat to security, especially in conflict affected states and those lacking the institutional strength to counter the influence of TOC networks effectively.

Approaches to TOC have traditionally been driven by the law enforcement field; but recently a number of important actors, including DFID and the World Bank, have also begun to see addressing TOC as a critical development issue. For example, the World Development Report 2011 has substantive focus on éexternal stress factorsôthat can contribute to conflict, such as the drugs trade, illicit financial flows and the illicit trade in arms, people and commodities. This paper seeks to contribute to this emerging body of research by identifying commonly applied theories that underpin how change happens within programmes focusing on TOC, and discusses how to measure the impacts of these approaches.

Objective, audiences and structure of this paper

This paper identifies and analyses a broad range of approaches and intervention strategies that have been applied to tackle TOC, with a particular focus on the impact and effectiveness of these approaches in breaking the links between TOC and violence, conflict and insecurity. It focuses on identifying challenges associated with measuring the impact of these approaches, and includes possible indicators (with relevant datasets) that could be used to capture impacts. It is intended to act as a practical resource for development practitioners responsible for the management of existing, or development of new, programmes and approaches aimed at tackling the destabilising impacts of TOC on development objectives, including security and justice objectives. It also aims to be a useful resource to inform policy makers working on broader organisational approaches to addressing TOC as a driver of conflict, including cross-government approaches and inter-governmental development, security and rule of law strategies and initiatives. It is hoped that by identifying key indicators relating to a wide range of approaches to addressing TOC, a set of common indicators can be developed that may be used to assess progress against anti-TOC efforts at both the national and global levels.

The first section of this paper briefly describes the links between TOC, development and conflict. It includes a simple framework for understanding how TOC fits within a broader social, political and economic system. It briefly introduces six theories of change that underpin approaches that have sought to undermine the corrosive impacts of TOC on development, peace and security, and how these approaches relate to the proposed system. The following six sections are organised around these theories of change. The logic underpinning each of these theories of change is briefly described. Some examples of common programmatic approaches and strategies emanating from this logic are identified. A number of common assumptions relating to the theory of change are then laid out, and the available evidence supporting (or contradicting) these assumptions is then assessed. For each section, we then discuss common challenges and dilemmas associated with measuring progress under the theory of change, whilst examples of indicators that could be used to assess progress are then identified. Section 8 presents some consolidated analysis and conclusions drawn from the preceding sections. This includes a consolidated table of possible indicators that could be used to assess progress across multiple theories of change. Links to specific datasets that can be used to access data for monitoring and evaluation purposes are then presented in Annex A.

Box 1: Key terminology used in this report

A number of key terms are used in this report, some of which require some elaboration.

- **Transnational Organised Crime (TOC)**:[2] TOC is widely understood to refer to a structured and durable association of people who commit serious crimes involving activities in more than one country. The aim of a group involved in TOC is primarily to make a financial profit, or generate other material benefits, and those involved are ready to use at least the threat of violence to achieve their goals. TOC encompasses a very broad range of activities. These include but are not limited to: the production, trafficking and selling of illicit drugs, cross-border illicit financial flows, international arms smuggling, the illegal trade in people, natural resources, animal products, waste products (rubbish, toxic waste, etc.), counterfeit goods (from DVDs, handbags and cigarettes, to medicines,

[1] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). *The Globalisation of Crime: A Transnational Organised Crime Threat Assessment*. UNODC, Vienna.
[2] Despite the considerable attention given to the issue, there is no commonly agreed definition of what constitutes TOC. This report does not however seek to delve into competing definitions or shed new light on these discussions. Rather, we take a broad conception of TOC that draws upon commonly accepted characteristics of TOC.

computers, cars, and almost everything in between), prostitution, illicit gambling, child pornography and cyber-crime. Whilst each of these products and markets has its own characteristics, they are all deeply inter-related with each other. Often the same or similar illicit networks engage in many different aspects of these illicit markets, adapting and responding to the market conditions and opportunities for economic gain or expansion.

- **Illicit networks**: Most actors engaged in TOC do so as part of informal, flexible and adaptive networks (in contrast to the traditional conception of TOC as hierarchical and formalised mafia-type organisations). Individuals typically come together for particular activities, such as smuggling products across borders, may disband and then reform with others according to current opportunities. Many activities are therefore sub-contracted out to other groups or gangs, whilst contacts between TOC and a broad group of facilitators in positions of political, economic and social power are often sporadic and ad hoc. [3]

- **Theories of Change**: Theories of change seek to identify and make explicit the beliefs, assumptions and hypotheses about how change happens. In a programming context, they are typically used to apply critical thinking to the design, implementation and evaluation of initiatives.[4] They can for example be used to inform the identification of indicators that reflect the assumptions underpinning how change is thought to happen in a particular context. The theories of change identified in this paper can best be considered ógloba theories of changeô, that is, they are intended to reflect how change occurs at a global level, rather than in any one, specific context.

Scope of this paper

This paper seeks to identify approaches and strategies that have been employed to address the many different aspects of TOC, and especially those that are most closely associated with high levels of violence, conflict and insecurity at a global level. It is not therefore focused on any one illicit market, but seeks to draw upon available evidence and research from this wide field of study. The reader may however notice more references to the illicit drugs trade than other illicit markets; this is for three principal reasons. The first is that the drugs trade is relatively better studied than other manifestations of TOC, meaning that more and better evidence is available relating to drugs than to other types of TOC. Second, most estimates suggest that drugs account for between 50-85% of the proceeds of TOC globally.[5] Whilst not synonymous with TOC therefore, it is clearly the single most financially important strand of criminal activity that TOC is engaged with. Finally, the links between drugs and violence and insecurity in fragile contexts are clearer than other types of TOC. However, it is important to avoid drawing too many conclusions about the nature of TOC, and wider impacts on conflict and insecurity, on any one strand of criminal activity. We have therefore taken care to present evidence from across a range of criminal sectors to try to present as broad a picture as possible.

Identifying appropriate indicators and datasets[6]

One objective of this paper is to identify the sorts of indicators and associated datasets that could be used to inform approaches to measuring impact in programmes focusing on TOC. For each theory of change we include a short list outlining areas that programmes might seek to measure, with examples of possible indicators that could be used. In all programmes it is important that the right combination of indicators is employed to present a balanced picture of progress. For each theory of change, we therefore suggest a basket of issues (with example indicators) that, taken together may offer a holistic picture of how programmes are contributing to conflict prevention. Each basket combines 3 types of indicators:

- **Capacity Indicators**: is capacity developing to address the key issue?
- **'Objective' Situation Indicators**: do statistical measures of actual societal situations show that improvements are being achieved?
- **Public Perceptions Indicators**: does the public feel that an improvement is occurring?

This is important to provide a balanced picture of progress. For example, to measure progress in addressing illicit financial flows, capacity indicators to show the strength of legislation or institutions to address money laundering could be important. Such capacity indicators give credit to governments that are taking long term measures that can take many years to yield objective results. However, the ultimate success of such laws and institutions cannot be understood without reference to an óobjectiveôsituation indicator: for example, the volume of illicit financial flows

[3] E.g. see UNODC, (2010), Naim, Moses (2005) *Illicit: How smugglers, traffickers and copycats are hijacking the global economy*, Anchor Books: New York, and Glenny, Misha (2008*) McMafia: Seriously Organised Crime*. Vintage Books: London.
[4] Vogel, Isabel (2012) *Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in international development*, DFID, London.
[5] UNODC (2010). *Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes*, Research report, UNODC, Vienna.
[6] The approach outlined in this section is informed by Saferworld's work on suggested indicators for the Post 2015 development framework. See Saferworld (2013) Ad*dressing Conflict and Violence from 2015: A vision of goals, targets and indicators*, Saferworld: London. See also Saferworld (2014) *Defining and Measuring External Stress Factors that Lead to Conflict in the Context of Post 2015 Agenda*, Saferworld: London.

from the country in question. However, such statistics are not always accurate, and public/investor confidence is also crucial to the overall success of the exercise of addressing illicit financial flows: therefore perception-based indicators tracking public/investor perceptions of bribery or anti-corruption efforts would provide an essential complement to the two other types of indicator.[7]

Methodology

Drawing upon a review of key literature and in consultation with DFID, the authors identified six high-level theories of change that taken together were considered to account for the majority of approaches and strategies employed to address TOC. Key literature relating to each of these theories, and the programmatic approaches that flow from these theories, was then reviewed. Annex B includes a list of key documents reviewed.

Limitations and caveats

It is important to note that the theories of change in this report have been inferred from a review of literature and the authorsô knowledge of anti-TOC initiatives and programmes. Only rarely do anti-TOC initiatives clearly and explicitly lay out a theory of change, and even when they do, these relate to the project or programme level rather than being applicable at the global level. To the best of the authorsôknowledge, this is the first time that anyone has attempted to map out the dominant theories of change that underpin anti-TOC efforts in this way. Given the size of this undertaking, the depth of literature and experience in this field, and the limited time and resources available to complete this task, we acknowledge that there will inevitably be gaps and omissions.

A further issue of note is that we do not present these theories of change as a template for development of future programmes. All interventions should be guided first and foremost by the context within which it will operate, and specific theories of change developed to guide them. The specific component parts of any two programmes, even if guided by a similar theory of change, may therefore differ quite substantially from context to context. Furthermore, in some contexts programmes may be guided by a mix of approaches and strategies from multiple theories of change.

1: Links between Transnational Organised Crime and Violence

There is a strong evidence base and wide consensus that conflict and insecurity can act as major barriers to development. For example, all seven of the countries which are unlikely to meet a single Millennium Development Goal by 2015 are countries that have been affected by high levels of violence.[8] Meanwhile countries that experienced high levels of violence in the period between 1981 and 2005 have an average poverty rate 21 percentage points higher than countries with relatively low levels of violence.[9]

The relationship between TOC and conflict and security is relatively less well studied, but evidence from a number of cases nonetheless confirms that the presence of organised crime can do significant harm to civilian populations. Criminalised territories and political systems in various regions, including Central America and the Andes, Central Asia and West Africa, have given rise to extreme levels of armed violence, destabilised states, and fuelled the armed activities of insurgent and radical groups. The spike in homicide rates in the border regions of Honduras and Guatemala, or the links between narco-traffickers and Islamist radicals in northern Mali, are two amongst various recent instances of the connections between TOC and conditions of extreme insecurity.

Links between TOC and poverty are somewhat less linear, but can still be discerned. TOC tends to segment the various parts of its activities between different states according to their differential climates for illicit business, meaning that there is no clear correlation between wealth or income levels and the presence of TOC. However, it is clear that poor countries (or poor and peripheral regions in middle-income countries) can offer a number of significant attractions to international crime. So long as these least developed countries and regions are not too remote from trading links to richer markets, transport hubs or telecommunications networks, then their populations may become component parts of the TOC supply chain. Opium farming in Afghanistan, human trafficking in southern Libya, piracy in Somalia or illegal gold mining in Peru are all part of lucrative transnational criminal chains that hinge around wealthy and well-connected intermediaries. But in each case, the illicit business also depends upon the recruitment of poor and marginalised communities, which may receive financial compensation and other short-term palliatives as a result. The effects of criminal activity in Afghanistan, Mali and Somalia nevertheless

[7] Saferworld (2014) p.13.
[8] OECD (2014) *Fragile States 2014: Domestic Revenue Mobilisation in Fragile States* OECD: Paris p 17.
[9] World Bank (2011), *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*, The World Bank, Washington DC. P.5

show how in such cases TOC tends to exacerbate the predatory governance and social fragmentation that perpetuate poverty and under-development.[10]

It should be noted, however, that organised crime adapts to the social and political opportunities it is presented with, and can take on very different configurations and working methods as a result. This complexity arises from its multiple linkages to society, politics and business. There is no proof of a stable correlation between levels of violent crime, such as murder, and the presence of organised crime.[11] Criminal links to political life can generate a stable set of illicit transactions over long periods: the classic example is Mexico until the 1990s.[12] Furthermore, the ties between armed insurgents and criminals in conflict environments are volatile and fractious, and both groups may depend on support from local communities as well as politicians and state officials. It is in these sorts of factionalised environments that ñindiscriminate law enforcement can have undesirable outcomesò.[13]

TOC within broader social, political and economic systems

TOC networks operate as part of a complex social, political and economic system that functions at different levels (from the local to the global). Efforts to disrupt TOC networks, and their impact on conflict and violence, can be implemented at different levels and entry points within this system. Indeed, ultimately effective efforts will require co-ordinated and sustained action at each level in this system.

Diagram 1 outlines one stylised way in which TOC systems can be understood. At the centre of the diagram sits **the 'Business'** of transnational organised crime. This refers to the actual money making activities and ópprofessionalôcriminals at the heart of TOC networks. Criminal activities include the control of illicit drug trafficking networks, large-scale arms and natural resource smuggling or professionalised money laundering exercises, and associated actors include ófull-timeôcriminals (such as professional cocaine smugglers, or other actors often associated with TOC within the popular imagination). Only a relatively small number of individuals associated with TOC sit within this category, although the profits generated are extremely large.

The óBusinessôof TOC is only possible because it is facilitated by a broader network of systems and actors. This **facilitation network** provides active support to the óprofessional criminalsôby leveraging power and influence to allow for the profitable undertaking of these criminal activities. This category might include those ópart-time criminalsô, such as the corrupt politicians, civil servants, bankers, judges or policemen who willingly collude with TOC networks, often for personal or professional gain.[14] The majority of law enforcement approaches typically employed to address TOC have been focused at actors and activities within these two circles.

These facilitation networks are often able to operate with relative impunity because they are embedded within an effective **support network**. TOC networks frequently depend on strong linkages to at least part of the communities within which they operate. This relationship generates important benefits for criminal organisations for example, through the provision of safe-houses, shell companies for money laundering and a flow of human resources. A general tolerance of criminal activities within communities can also undermine efforts to counter TOC networks, since they are unlikely to co-operate with law enforcement agencies or provide vital intelligence about illicit activities. In a number of contexts, criminal groups have also provided substantial economic and social benefits for communities, often more so than the state. For example, in the ógarrison communitiesôof Jamaica or certain areas of Central America, such as the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, these groups are the conduits for basic public services and hand-outs.[15] Criminal revenues in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, meanwhile, are believed to range between 20 and 30 per cent of Gross Domestic Product ï the highest rates in the world.[16] In addition, criminal networks often enjoy strong social, ethnic or familial bonds with the communities in which they operate.

Underpinning these support networks lie a wide range of **social, political and economic vulnerabilities**. These are factors that make individuals and communities susceptible to becoming strong support networks for TOC. For example, analysis of patterns of narcotic production and trafficking suggest that these activities (especially production) are clustered in areas where communities have traditionally been estranged from formal state authority and rule of law. According to the Colombian expert in drug trafficking, Francisco Thoumi, ñthe existence of social groups whose socially accepted behavioural norms conflict with those of the state is a necessary conditionò[17] for

[10] UNODC (2010). *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, UN, Vienna, especially ch. 11; USAID (2013). *The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in West Africa*, USAID, Washington DC; and on Mali, Briscoe, Ivan (2014). *Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali*, Clingendael Institute, The Hague

[11] Van Dijk, Jan, 2007. "Mafia markers: assessing organised crime and its impact upon societies." *Trends in Organized Crime*, 10: 39-56.

[12] Astorga, Luis. 2001. "*Drug Trafficking in Mexico: A first general assessment.*" MOST Discussion paper 36,

[13] Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2013. "Crime-War Battlefields." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 55:3, p. 160.

[14] It is nevertheless important to recognise that the motivations behind such collusion are probably as many as there are people in this category

[15] Miraglia, Paul, Ochoa, Roland and Briscoe, Ivan. 2012. *Transnational Organised Crime and Fragile States*. Paris: OECD-INCAF working paper.

[16] Reuter, Peter and Trautmann, Frans (ed). 2009. *A Report on Global Illicit Drug Markets 1998-2007*. Brussels: European Commission, p. 33.

[17] Thoumi, Francisco. 2012. "Vulnerable Societies: Why Antidrug Policies Fail, Why There is a Need for Reforms and Why They are unlikely to be Implemented." *Substance Use & Misuse* 47: 1628-1632

the rise of the illicit drug business in a given territory or nation. Whilst there do not appear to be any universal rules, there is evidence to suggest that in addition to the absence of an effective state presence, a number of significant risk factors spur criminal activity as part of a wider illicit business. These factors include high levels of social marginalisation (for instance, in Central America),[18] horizontal inequalities and group rivalries (notably in northern Mali and southern Libya),[19] rapid and disorganised urbanisation[20], and the resilience of strong patronage networks, above all in sub-Saharan Africa, that are able to claw a larger flow of resources from criminal revenues.[21]

Diagram 1: TOC within broader social, political and economic system



Finally, the prevalence and power of TOC is only made possible because it is has become so well suited to the prevailing **global financial, economic and political system**. According to the UNODC, ñthe process of globalisation has outpaced the growth of mechanisms for global governance, and this deficiency has produced just the sort of regulation vacuum in which TOC can thriveò[22] The opening of markets and rapid expansion of global trade has allowed for TOC networks to transport contraband goods (including people, drugs, arms, counterfeit goods, etc.) more easily and cheaply than ever before. Only a tiny proportion of this international cargo can be inspected by customs authorities, making the risks of interdiction low. Meanwhile, people and goods can only be interdicted by national governments. This allows TOC networks to take advantage of lack of co-ordination and co-operation between different countriesôlegal and judicial systems. Essentially, these ñsilos of sovereignty provide sanctuary to those who, no matter how harmful their activities, are of use to the authorities in one country or anotherò[23] The growth of global communications and the internet has allowed for new forms of crime, such as cybercrime and identity theft, and the rapid evolution of other forms of crime, such as child pornography. Many countries have simply been unable to develop and enact suitable legislation fast enough to keep up.[24] Deregulation of the banking sector likewise has facilitated the growth of illicit financial flows out of developing countries, which in turn have been used to fund competition for power and control by rebel groups, terrorists, organised criminals and governments in a very diverse range of violent contexts.[25]

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[18] UNODC. 2007. *Crime and Development in Central America*. Vienna: UN
[19] Sidibé, Kalilou. 2011. *Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms*. Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex; Lacher, Wolfram. 2014. *Libya's Fractious South and Regional Instability*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
[20] United Nations Development Programme. 2013. *Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America*. New York: UN
[21] Bayart, Jean-François, Ellis, Stephen and Hibou, Beatrice. 1999. *Criminalization of the State in Africa*. Indiana University Press; De Waal, Alex. 2013. "Somalia: The Logic of a Rentier Political Marketplace." World Peace Foundation: http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/10/24/somalia-the-logic-of-a-rentier-political-marketplace/
[22] UNODC. (2010). *The globalization of crime: A transnational organized crime assessment*. Vienna: UN, p. 29
[23] UNODC, (2010) p. 29
[24] In a study of 187 countries, it was discovered that 93 have no legislation relating to child pornography. Globalisation means that such images can now be produced and disseminated from anywhere in the world, but perpetrators are protected by the lack of legislation in these countries.
[25] Saferworld, (2014), Defining and measuring external stress factors that lead to conflict in the context of the Post 2015 development framework. Saferworld, London.

Theories of change underpinning responses to TOC

Efforts to address TOC, and crucially to break the links between TOC and violence, can be directed at each of these levels of influence. However, these efforts have not been evenly distributed, with the majority of efforts to date being focused on directly tackling ôthe businessôand facilitation networks. The remaining sections of this paper focus on theories of change that underpin efforts to break the links between TOC and violence at each of these levels.

Diagram 2: Theories of change within TOC system



Interventions guided by the **deterrence** theory of change consist primarily of law enforcement initiatives, and are primarily targeted at actors operating within the inner two circles, the ôBusinessôand Facilitation Networks. Interventions that seek to sever the **links between politics, the state and crime** are primarily targeted at the facilitation networks that support TOC. **Cultural change** interventions seek primarily to undermine the Support Networks, but are also relevant for Social, Political and Economic Vulnerabilities. Interventions guided by the **managed adaptation of crime** theory of change adapt a more cross-cutting approach, and may seek to reduce the harm to individual communities and state systems by seeking to contain or cap criminal activity. Generally this policy of containment is aimed at the ôbusinessôcircle (which may be tolerated as a result), at communities (through a non-repressive, health-focused approach to drug use), or through changing the global dynamic of illicit business (notably through drug decriminalization). Interventions guided by e**conomic transformation**, are focused on the Social, Political and Economic Vulnerabilities, whilst **global regulation** seeks to put in place mechanisms that address the global political and economic system that facilitates TOC.

Theory of change 1: Deterrence

The theoretical logic underpinning deterrence emerges from classical theory, in which crime is considered a rational choice influenced by costs and benefits: as the costs of crime increase, crime will be deterred, particularly when its costs are certain and immediate and are experienced either directly or indirectly.[26] Deterrence strategies, especially when employed in conjunction with other approaches,[27] can be effective in limiting the prevalence of TOC. However, they can also have significant unintended consequences on levels of violence. This remains the most dominant approach to addressing TOC, although that dominance is diminishing as the weight of evidence supporting newer approaches becomes stronger.

[26] Much of the logic underpinning this theory of change can be traced back to the work of Gary Becker. E.g. see Becker, Gary (1968), "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." *Journal of Political Economy 76* March/ April: 169-217.
[27] Many of the theories of change in this paper contain aspects of deterrence within them.

In general, approaches informed by the deterrence theory of change are reliant on access to intelligence, an ability to use sufficient force and counter-trafficking measures, as well as a strong policy framework and the public availability of knowledge relating to the risks and costs of illegal activities.

What is the theory of change underpinning deterrence?

This theory of change can be articulated as follows:

> *If* we focus anti-TOC efforts on identifying actors engaged in criminal activities and aggressively pursue and punish them, *then* the numbers of people engaged in and the overall volume of TOC activity will be reduced, with subsequent reductions in conflict and instability associated with TOC. This will happen *because* the costs associated with criminality will increase whilst its benefits will be reduced, making crime a less reliable or attractive livelihood strategy.

The logic behind this theory of change is further elaborated in the diagram below.



Programmatic approaches and strategies employed under this theory of change might include:

- *Law enforcement approaches*: These approaches seek to apprehend and punish law breakers,[28] usually through the deployment of police or military units. At the extreme end, this might include ózero-toleranceô approaches to crime, whereby even minor offences are actively pursued through the criminal justice system. They may also include a focus on strengthening border, customs and immigration agencies so as to maximise interdiction efforts of illicit goods in transit between areas of production and consumption.
- *Selective targeting approaches*: This refers to the intentional focusing of law enforcement efforts on specific criminal actors or activities, such as gang leaders, drugs kingpins or the trade in specific illicit goods, such as rhino horn or counterfeit medicines. A wide range of tactics can be employed under this approach, including intelligence-led raids on specific actors, capacity building of special task forces and police units, ósurgicalô drone strikes, etc. They also include ódecapitation strategiesô whereby perceived leaders are targeted, thereby weakening the whole organisation.[29] Arguably, by prioritising action against certain types of TOC, these approaches can imply a degree of tolerance of other criminal activities, whilst seeking to deter other TOC actors from engaging in those activities being targeted.[30]
- *Criminal justice and security sector reform*: These approaches seek to strengthen criminal justice systems, allowing them to more effectively and efficiently prosecute and condemn TOC group members, thereby raising the opportunity costs of crime. They might include reform of legal, penal or judicial frameworks, capacity building programmes for lawyers, judges, police or military actors, reform of intelligence gathering institutions and procedures, etc.
- *Crop eradication*: This is an approach that has been specifically targeted at the illicit drugs trade, by destroying illicit crops, thereby eliminating the supply of drugs into the market. Eradication approaches employ a range of techniques, including aerial spraying or the destruction of crops by special police or military units.

What evidence is there that this theory of change is valid?

A number of assumptions underlie this theory of change. For each, the available evidence is briefly discussed:

[28] Isaac Ehrlich (1972) "The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement". *The Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 June, pp. 259-276.
[29] Many of these approaches are also known as 'network analysis and degradation'.
[30] This strategy is also employed as part of a managed adaptation of crime strategy.

1) The threat of punishment will deter individuals from engaging in criminal activities: The threat of punishment is central to rule of law approaches in almost all contexts, and clearly has explanatory value in influencing behaviour of individuals. However, a growing body of evidence shows that in many contexts the threat of punishment is relatively weakly correlated with willingness of individuals to engage in criminal activities.[31] Zero-tolerance deterrence approaches have been shown to be, in most contexts at least, not only ineffective in deterring criminality but may also contribute to increased illicit production, higher rates of violence and greater frequency of abuse of civilian populations. For example, a review of 90 law enforcement approaches to tackling the illicit drugs trade concluded that ñincreased law enforcement actually increased drug market violence in 91per cent of cases.ó[32]

In recent years the concept of selective targeting has become more prevalent as a strategy for focused deterrence. These approaches seek to deter criminal groups from engaging in certain types of criminal activity, whilst undermining the effectiveness of TOC groups by targeting key leaders. In a number of cases, selective targeting has been used to target the most harmful or violent types of criminal activities, such as association with terrorist groups.[33] This approach developed out of law enforcement experiences, with impressive results in Bostonôs fight against violent gangs in the 1990s. Felbab-Brown notes that violence in areas where the gangs operated was dramatically reduced, with youth homicide rates falling by 66 per cent following the implementation of the strategy.[34] However, success has been difficult to replicate elsewhere. In Mexico, for example, efforts to target law enforcement efforts against two of the most violent drug cartels during the 2000s (La Familia Michoacana and the Zetas) failed to have any deterrence impact on the use of violence by other cartels, and may have resulted in an increase in violence. By weakening La Familia the strategy encouraged competition within and between cartels, contributing to the emergence of new groups such Los Templarios and the current drug wars raging across Mexico.[35] In other contexts, selective targeting can result in the emergence of a single group with an effective monopoly on criminal activity over a certain area. Whilst this may result in reduced violence, it can also act to entrench the power of those groups, with impacts on state legitimacy in the longer term.

Critical factors that might impact on the effectiveness of selective targeting strategies include the pre-existing capacity of the police forces and their ability to target resources effectively, as well as the structure of the TOC networks. Deterrence strategies are unlikely to be effective in highly fragmented and decentralised organisations.[36]

2) By controlling the supply of illicit goods into the market, TOC can eventually be eradicated or greatly reduced: The second fundamental assumption of deterrence strategies is that if supply of illicit goods can be eradicated, or radically suppressed (through targeting production or the interdiction of goods whilst in transit from production to consumption sites), then eventually the demand for such goods will diminish. This is based on an assumption that by limiting the supply of illicit goods, consumer prices will be raised to a prohibitively high level. This (coupled with the threat of punishment if caught in possession of such goods) will act as a powerful deterrent to consumers, ultimately limiting demand and leading to the eradication of the flow of illicit goods between nations. The majority of available evidence does not appear to support this assumption.

There is evidence to indicate that the introduction of supply side policies can result in increased costs for consumers.[37] However, the street price of most drugs have fallen significantly in both US and European markets since 1990, whilst purity has increased, indicating that supply has remained at least steady and probably increased during this time.[38] It is however difficult to draw conclusions about the impact that this has had on demand, which has proven very difficult to measure with any accuracy.

Most commentators agree that deterrence driven initiatives have resulted in the displacements of TOC related violence to weaker and more fragile contexts whilst doing little to actually reduce demand; the so-called ôballoon effect.ó[39] For example, crop eradication efforts in one place, or a crack-down on trafficking routes simply displaces production and transport to other places, often those that lack the capacities to prevent or manage the impacts. This pattern has clearly been seen in the displacement of drug trafficking routes through Mexico and West Africa following crack-down on transhipment routes through the Caribbean for drugs travelling from South America to

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[31] Stevens, Alex (2011*) Drugs, Crime and Public Health: The Political Economy of Drug Policy*, Routledge-Cavendish, Oxford.

[32] Werb, D., Rowell, G., Guyatt, G., Kerr, T., Montaner, J. and Wood, E. (2011) "Effect of drug law enforcement on drug market violence: A systematic review" *International Journal of Drug Policy vol. 22 pp. 87–94*, quoted from Global Commission on Drug Policy, (2011), *War on drugs: report from the Global Commission on Drug Policy*. P.15

[33] As such, it is closely aligned with Theory of Change 3: Managed Adaptation of Crime.

[34] Felbab-Brown, (2013) *Focused deterrence, selective targeting, drug trafficking and organised crime: Concepts and practicalities. Modernising Drug Law Enforcement Report 2,* International Drug Policy Consortium; London.

[35] Vulliamy, Ed (2010), *Amexica: War Along the Borderline*. Vintage books, London.

[36] Felbab-Brown (2013).

[37] See Caulkins, Jonathan (2014) *Effects of Prohibition, Enforcement and Interdiction on Drug Use, in Ending the Drug Wars: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy*, LSE, London.

[38] Werb, D et al (2013) The temporal relationship between drug supply indicators: an audit of international government surveillance systems, *BMJ Open 2013;*3:e003077 doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2013-003077

[39] Whereby crack down on illicit activity in one place leads to the emergence of those same activities in another place, in much the same way as when you squeeze a balloon in one place the balloon will simply expand somewhere else where there is less resistance.

Europe and US in the 1990s, as well as the emergence of new human trafficking and migration routes from Africa into Europe.

Efforts to deter actors from engaging in criminal activities can also have significantly detrimental impacts on wider peace and conflict dynamics in those regions. This is mostly clearly seen in Western led crop eradication programmes in Afghanistan and Colombia. In each case, the destruction of livelihoods of local opium and coca producers simply fed into anti-US and anti-state narratives, whilst providing incentives for local people to turn to Taliban or FARC militias as a means of protecting their livelihoods.[40]

Whilst accepting the above critiques, a number of commentators have argued that these do not in themselves indicate a failure of these policies. They argue that the prices of illicit goods (specifically drugs) are still significantly higher than if they were part of a legalised market. Meanwhile, the fact that demand for illicit drugs has remained steady (at roughly 5 per cent of the global population having used illicit drugs in the last year), whilst demand for other harmful but legal substances is much higher (around 42 per cent for alcohol and 25 per cent for tobacco),[41] indicates that such deterrence based approaches are having an impact. Ultimately they argue that whilst expensive, prohibitionist polices and law enforcement efforts actually represent a cost effective means of tackling TOC. Caulkin argues that ñeven granting that prohibitionôs costs are enormous, it does not follow that those costs outweigh potential benefits from reduced dependence, because benefits may also be very large.ó[42] Nonetheless, there is now an emerging consensus that supply-side, deterrence based policies alone are largely ineffective at achieving the highly ambitious goals laid out by national and global targets.

3) Rule of law and criminal justice institutions pose a credible threat to TOC: Many deterrence based approaches are based on an assumption that state security or rule of law institutions are able to pose a credible threat to the activities of TOC networks. For example, criminals must genuinely believe that there is a high likelihood that they will receive punishment if they fail to abide by the laws of the state. In many contexts it would appear that this is not the case. Criminal gangs have been able to consistently out-gun state security forces across much of Latin America, the Caribbean, West Africa and many other contexts for several years, either as a result of the sheer scale of resources available to such groups or due to institutional and operational weaknesses of state institutions.[43] Wide-spread infiltration of state security services by TOC networks can also undermine deterrence based approaches, since criminal gangs are often pre-warned of impending actions and easily able to avoid or counter-act efforts to disrupt their networks.[44]

Deterrence strategies also rely on the assumption that the punishment received for breaking the law outweighs the benefit accrued by continuing to engage in illicit activities. This implies a sufficiently strong and appropriate policy and legal framework, but in many cases this is clearly not the case. For example, whilst it is forbidden in most countries for political parties to receive funding from óundesirable sourcesô including criminal groups, very few include sanctions that require them to forfeit such funds (if they are ever discovered). The implication is that parties are incentivised to accept large fines for misconduct, so long as donations from óundesirable sourcesô(with resultant impacts on political influence) are even larger.[45]

The legal and institutional changes required to implement a deterrence based strategy effectively may also have further unintended impacts. Madrazo argues that many of the legal changes required by states aiming to enforce strict prohibitionist policies consist of major alterations to national constitutional systems. These include the creation of óexceptionalôlegal regimes, such as increases in periods of detention without trial for certain ócategories of criminalsô These often tend to broaden out and serve other purposes once established. Once in place however, they can be very difficult to reverse.[46]
Insufficient resources and capacities within the criminal justice and rule of law institutions can also result in perverse impacts on peace dynamics if employed in conjunction with deterrence based approaches. One likely implication of deterrence based approaches is an increase in prison populations and criminal justice case loads. There is ample evidence to suggest that poorly managed and over-crowded prisons can be powerful bases for facilitating and expanding criminal networks, recruiting new gang members and forging new alliances between

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[40] Mansfield, D. (2013). *All Bets are Off! Prospects for (B)reaching Agreements and Drug Control in Helmand and Nangarhar in the run up to Transition.* European Commission-Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit. Accessed online: https://www.alcis.org/media/72656/1302_opium_23_jan-final.pdf
[41] UNODC private correspondence.
[42] This is based on analysis of drug markets. Caulkins, Jonathan (2014).
[43] E.g. see Shaw, Mark and Reinato, Tuesday (2013) *The evolution of organised crime in Africa: Towards a new response*, ISS Paper 244, or work of John Sullivan, Robert Bunker or Douglas Farrah.
[44] E.g. see well documented examples from Guatemala, ICG (2011), *Guatemala: Drug Trafficking and Violence*, International Crisis Group, Brussels, or El Faro (2012). *"Así es la policia del país mas violento del mundo."* http://www.salanegra.elfaro.net/es/201203/cronicas/7982/
[45] Ohman, M (2012*), Political Finance Regulations Around the World: An Overview of the International IDEA Database*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, Sweden
[46] Madrazo, Alejandro (2014) *The Constitutional Costs of the 'War on Drugs'*, in *Ending the Drug Wars: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy*. LSE: London

criminal groups.[47] Such unintended consequences need to be considered and factored into any deterrence based approach to tackling TOC.

What challenges/ dilemmas do programmes face in attempting to measure progress under this theory of change?

Approaches to measuring the impact of initiatives under this theory of change typically fall under two broad categories. The first focuses on assessing the overall scale of TOC. Estimates of the overall scale of TOC are however notoriously difficult to measure, as illustrated by the wildly different estimates of the value of global crime often quoted by different sources.[48] Many estimates are informed by metrics such as volume of illicit goods seized, estimates of illicit crop acreages, homicide rates, etc., but such metrics, taken in isolation, risk presenting a false or incomplete picture. For example, the 2012 World Drugs Report speculated that the West African drugs route was decreasing in importance, since there were no major drugs seizures in the region since 2008.[49] However, a more likely explanation is that TOC and government systems have become so intertwined that interdiction efforts have been largely ineffectual. In some contexts therefore, a decline in seizure rates may tell us more about government capacity and corruption than about the success of deterrence.

A related challenge for measurements is that the relationship between the scale of TOC and its impacts on violence and insecurity is not a simple one; it cannot be assumed that less crime will result in less violence. For example, a decrease in the volume of cocaine being smuggled through Jamaica has been accompanied by greater competition between criminal actors and higher levels of homicides and violence.[50]

The second broad category of indicators typically employed under this theory of change seek to assess the effectiveness of rule of law and criminal justice institutions to deter criminal activity. These approaches have usually focused on quantitative indicators such as numbers of active police officers or size of prison population. However, these indicators also suffer from potential short comings. The number of police officers does not tell us anything about the quality of police officers. Likewise, such indicators may present counter-intuitive results. As noted above, a large prison population is more likely to indicate an increased risk of TOC related violence than tell us about the effectiveness of deterrence strategies. It might be more productive to focus on an assessment of who is in prison (leaders vs peddlers, specific gangs, etc.) and what impact removing these individuals from TOC networks may be having.

What sorts of indicators might be applied to measure progress against this theory of change?

It is important to note that despite the critiques above and clear evidence that deterrence-only approaches are unlikely to be successful, deterrence can still play an important part in anti-TOC initiatives when employed as part of a mixed approach. Furthermore, the indicator types commonly employed under deterrence strategies are not without value; each of those laid out above can provide important information about the effectiveness of programmes. However, it is essential that basket of indicators are employed based on an understanding of the specific context. Failure to do so risks drawing incomplete, misleading or contradictory conclusions from the data generated. Perception based indicators might be particularly important when seeking to assess the impact of deterrence based programmes, since at their heart these approaches are about changing perceptions of risk.

Some examples of indicators that might be employed to assess the impact of deterrence based approaches include:

[47] Cases of prison as criminal nerve centres are numerous: Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and Guatemala are outstanding examples. For example, see The Guardian recently reported on the use of prisons in Venezuela as nerve centres for TOC.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/05/prisoners-make-mockery-venezuela-jails
[48] Saferworld (2014)
[49] The Global Initiative against organised crime (unpublished), *Organised Crime Composite Index*
[50] Leslie, Glaister (2010) *Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica*. Small Arms Survey, Geneva.



* According to Van Dijk (2007), homicide data can roughly be divided into two categories; emotional attacks on friends, family or acquaintances (unorganised crime) and cool-blooded killings perpetrated by organised criminal gangs (organised crime). The first type are typically arrested, whilst the second type of homicides typically go unsolved. Hence, unsolved homicide can be considered a better metric of organised crime than overall homicide rates. Van Dijk (2007).

Theory of change 2: Severing the links between politics, the state and crime

Politics, state institutions and crime have been closely associated with each other for many years,[51] and the last 30 years have seen a significant increase in the scope and scale of criminal integration and capture of political processes and actors across many contexts.[52] Globalisation has raised the stakes in terms of potential benefits associated with criminal control over state resources, whilst concurrently providing new means of ensuring impunity for corrupt political actors and officials (e.g. through the rapid transfer of money across multiple jurisdictions, making tracing almost impossible). Meanwhile, the increasing role and power of money within democratic political processes, such as elections, has increased the vulnerability of some political processes to criminal influence.

It has been argued that today, in some contexts, these links are so deeply intertwined that it is almost impossible to distinguish between the state and TOC. In Guinea-Bissau, state resources and institutions (including the navy and police) have become an essential part of the drug trafficking industry.[53] This relationship can be of mutual benefit to TOC and political actors: politicians can use organised crime networks to intimidate or manipulate opponents or the public, distort judicial or administrative processes, gain access to illicit revenue flows or buy votes and support across large parts of a country. TOC networks conversely can make use of political influence to protect or further

[51] For example, see the classic work of Charles Tilly, notably Tilly, Charles (1985), *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime*, in *Bringing the State Back In* edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[52] UNODC (2010)
[53] ICG (2014) *Guinea-Bissau: Elections, But Then What?* Africa Report. 98. ICG: Brussels

their interests, for example, by using state resources, including the security services, to pursue and destroy competitors (as has been seen in both Mexico and Colombia's drug wars) or improve logistical services. In some contexts TOC networks have even influenced the nature and shape of legislation to favour their illicit interests, as has been seen in Colombia from 2006 to 2010 under the influence of parapolitics.[54]

These links can have very significant impacts on conflict, especially where state institutions are already under strain. Criminal capture of state resources and influence can undermine political processes by making politicians and state institutions accountable primarily to TOC actors rather than the broader population. The enormous profits generated by criminal gangs, and laundered through the international financial system, are often used to fund further violent activities, both locally and internationally, such as insurgency, elimination of competitors or further expansion into new markets. Yet it is important to note that the nexus between politics and crime can also result in reductions in overall levels of violence. Arguably it is the competition between the state and TOC, as well as between TOC gangs, that is the greatest source of violence in many contexts. The aligning of interests between the state and specific gangs can remove this competition, whilst giving one group a significant advantage over others, essentially making competition futile. The case of highly criminalised, but relatively peaceful Kosovo may be instructive.[55] However, ultimately such reductions in violence are likely to be temporary, whilst the erosion of state institutions and democratic accountability are likely to be significant conflict risk factors in the medium to long term.[56]

What is the theory of change that underpins efforts to sever the link between politics, the state and crime?

The theory of change can be articulated as:

> *If* we increase accountability and transparency in how political and official decisions are taken, then the level of interaction between TOC networks and the state will reduce, *because* local people will be empowered to demand that politicians and officials respond to their needs (rather than to the needs of criminal groups), state actors will feel compelled to resist co-option by criminal groups because of the risk of being exposed by oversight mechanisms, and their incentives to develop links with TOC will be reduced.

The logic behind this theory of change is further elaborated in the diagram below.



Programmatic approaches employed under this theory of change might include:

- *Initiatives to promote transparency and community 'empowerment', including*:
  - Promotion of social accountability mechanisms, e.g. citizen score cards, social audits, participatory budgeting, etc.

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[54] One study, for instance, found that deputies associated with the paramilitary in Colombia devoted particular attention to laws relating to an amnesty for the "self-defence" forces, and to various bills on agrarian and land reform.
López, Claudia (ed), (2010) *Y refundaron la patria... De cómo mafiosos y políticos reconfiguraron el Estadp colombiano*, Bogotá: Randhom House Mondadori.

[55] EU (2013) Kosovo Progress Report. Accessed on line
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/brochures/kosovo_2013.pdf

[56] Cockanye, J., (2011). *State fragility, organised crime and peacebuilding: towards a more strategic approach*. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. NOREF report

    - Civil society strengthening initiatives (and the creation of space for these initiatives)
- *Development or strengthening of anti-corruption oversight mechanisms*:
    - Establishment of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACA)
    - Judicial reform
    - Legislative oversight committees, including ombudsmen
- *Specific components of public sector reform, including*:
    - Reform of political party and campaign financing systems and procedures
    - Public service pay and recruitment processes

What evidence is there that this theory of change is valid?

This section identifies a number of assumptions that underlie this theory of change, and briefly discusses the available evidence to assess the validity of these assumptions.

1) *Increased transparency leads to an increase in public demand for accountability in politics*: There is a strong body of evidence to suggest that increasing access to information plays an extremely important role in stimulating public action to hold politicians and officials to account. However, it is not in itself sufficient as there can be many intervening incentives and constraints that can prevent (or facilitate) collective action to use the information that is made accessible.[57] These will be highly context specific and necessitate a nuanced understanding of the local incentive structures and political economy.

2) *The establishment of oversight mechanisms increase the costs associated with co-option by criminal groups*: The evidence that oversight mechanisms are particularly effective in breaking links between politics and crime is mixed. The impact of anti-corruption agencies is particularly weak, especially in the more fragile states.[58] The OECD have reported that ñWhile the number of anti-corruption institutions worldwide is growing, a review of these institutions indicates more failures than successes.ó[59] Often such institutions lack the genuine political commitment, resources and legislative frameworks necessary to allow for maximum impact on corruption. They have also often become the targets for co-option by political and criminal enterprises as means of discrediting opponents. For example, up until 2007 in Nigeria, efforts at investigating and prosecuting corrupt politicians allegedly focused exclusively on the political opponents of the administration, undermining if not destroying the credibility of those efforts altogether.[60]

Certain countries, particularly in Latin America, have sought to reinforce their systems of oversight through innovative measures seeking to encourage greater activism against public sector crime and corruption. These include laws to protect criminal informers and whistle-blowers, such as the bill passed by Peru in 2010 to safeguard those who report acts of public sector fraud, as well as strict rules in Argentina on the filing of detailed public statements of assets by all politicians and public employees. However, in these and other cases in the region, public sector corruption has proved resilient, while effort to prosecute suspected criminal accomplices in the state often flounder once they are brought to trial.[61]

3) *Increased public demands for accountability coupled with the presence of oversight mechanisms will lead to more accountable politics, (which will in turn lead to a reduction in corruption)*: The evidence linking improved transparency and accountability at the local level to reduced corruption is mixed. A review of theories of change by the anti-corruption body U4 notes that ñMany civil society programmes make a leap of faith when they assume that, for example, raising peopleôs awareness of their rights, or building capacity of duty bearers to be responsive will automatically lead to a change in behaviour and power structuresò.[62] Instead, McGee and Gaventa find that such initiatives can contribute to decreased corruption, but that the impacts are highly context specific. They point to a number of emerging intermediary factors that could be important, including the level of existing democratisation within the political system, legal frameworks and the existing capacities of states and societies to take up the opportunities afforded by transparency initiatives. Ultimately however, they argue that the mediating mechanisms between transparency and accountability initiatives and reduced levels of corruption are not well understood.[63]

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[57] McGee and Gaventa, (2011), S*ynthesis Report: review of impact and effectiveness of transparency initiatives*. Transparency and Accountability Initiative, London, p.6.
[58] For a review of the effectiveness of Theories of change underpinning anti-corruption authorities, see Johnson, (2011), *Theories of change in anti-corruption work: a tool for programme design and evaluation work,* U4, Oslo
[59] OECD, (2008), *Specialised anti-corruption institutions: A review of models*. OECD, Paris.
[60] Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 2007 - Nigeria* , 11 January 2007, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45aca2a316.htmlp4..
[61] See forthcoming book (2014) by IDEA International on Illicit Networks in Latin America
[62] Johnson, (2011)
[63] McGee and Gaventa, (2011),

4) *Reform of political and electoral finance systems can decrease the incentives for politicians to become co-opted by criminal groups*: There is some evidence that in some contexts this can be an effective strategy. It has been reported that providing public funding or free broadcast media time to candidates, political parties and other electoral participants during election campaigns, as well as limiting permissible expenditures, coupled with audits and strict penalties for offenses, for example, by denying eligibility to run in future elections (as was done in the Balkans), can lessen the reliance on or dominance of óundesirable sources of political fundingô[64]

However this is reliant on not only sufficient political will but also capable police and judicial systems and the ability to effectively monitor electoral spending. A review of political finance regulations in over 100 countries shows that in most places, this is lacking. Whilst the majority of countries have some form of political finance regulation in place that seeks to ban or limit political funding from óundesirableôsources, few are able to effectively enforce it. Either loopholes exist (such as different rules for candidate and political parties), they lack oversight and enforcement bodies or regulation includes inadequate penalties associated with non-compliance. Most countries do not require parties to forfeit funds received against the rules, meaning that they are likely to accept large fines for misconduct, so long as the donations received are even larger. One quarter of countries also lacked any requirement to make sources of political finance public.[65]

5) *Targeted reform of public sector administration structures can decrease the incentives for officials to become co-opted by criminal groups, thereby reducing corruption*: The evidence that reform of public sector administration decreases corruption is so far mixed. Some studies have found that when income per capita is relatively low, higher government wages can reduce corruption, while other studies have concluded salary top-up programmes can increase corruption by creating perceptions of favouritism and un-balance within government pay structures. This could increase the incentives for civil servants and political actors to collude with criminal networks.[66]

What challenges/ dilemmas do programmes face in attempting to measure progress under this theory of change?

Measuring the degree to which politics, the state and crime are inter-related is extremely challenging on many levels. The closest measures probably relate to levels of corruption within the political system. However, corruption levels are themselves notoriously difficult to measure and assess. A number of important and useful cross-country indices have been developed, such as Transparency Internationalôs Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the World Bankôs Control of Corruption Index. Most of these are based on perception surveys which register public impressions of corruption levels. As such they draw on the direct experiences of local people, and can provide important insights that it may not be possible to glean from official statistics and other sources of quantitative data (e.g. related to confidence in and legitimacy of state institutions).

However, such data should be treated with a degree of caution. Perceptions of corruption can take a long time to change, resulting in significant time lags between changes in the situation and corresponding perceptions. Furthermore, perceptions are not only informed by direct experience but also by factors such as media coverage and wider public awareness of corruption issues. These are likely to be higher in the midst of anti-corruption campaigns or as a result of prosecution of officials on corruption charges, etc. Perversely therefore, an increase in perceived levels of corruption might actually be indicative of effective action to tackle corruption, at least in the short to medium term.[67]

A further challenge with these global indices is that they tend to aggregate a wide range of corrupt behaviours into a single score. More recent indices have sought to develop a more nuanced conception of corruption by focusing on more measurable components of corruption. However these have tended to focus on factors such as willingness to take bribes rather than ódeeperôforms of corruption that tend to characterise the inter-relationship of crime and politics, such as the systematic facilitation of criminal activity through legislation in return for on-going political support.

A complementary approach to measuring progress against efforts to sever (or weaken) the relationship between politics, the state and crime may be through the development of proxy indicators. Efforts to measure transparency

[64] A review of 8 case studies into post-conflict elections concluded that 'funding from and to undesirable sources seems to be a major and common problem in post-conflict elections', but that 'none (of the case studies) has been able to find effective solutions to the problem', Boneo & Dahl, 2006 *Lessons Learned about Political Finance in post-Conflict Societies*, in Fischer, Walecki and Carlson, *Political Finance in Post-Conflict Societies*. USAID and IFES p16-17,

[65] Ohman, M. (2012),

[66] U4 Expert Answer: Salary Top-ups and their impact on corruption, CMI: Bergen.

[67] U4 (2013) *The Proxy Challenge: Why bespoke proxy indicators can help solve the anti-corruption measurement problem* Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, U4 Brief 2013:2

and accountability in political decision making processes may give a more accurate picture of the relationship between politics and crime than corruption-perception scores. But care must be taken here to assess whether proxy indicators necessarily demonstrate the progress that they are assumed to demonstrate. For example, does increase in transparency indicate that criminal influence over politics is diminishing, or is it that only countries with relatively little criminal influence over politics are willing to introduce greater transparency?

It is essential that such proxies should be tailored to the specific context, since the relationship between any step in the theory of change is highly dependent on the local dynamics of the programme context. As USAID reports, in some cases the promotion of transparent political decision making can have perverse impacts on efforts to tackle crime, for example, by discouraging political actors from opposing TOC ôbehind the scenesô for fear of exposure and becoming a target of retribution.[68] The introduction of proxy indicators can therefore also introduce new dilemmas and challenges.

What sorts of indicators might be applied to measure progress against this theory of change?
A number of example indicators and suggested data sources are listed below.



[68] USAID, 2013, Developmental response to drug trafficking, USAID, Washington DC

Theory of change 3: Managed adaptation of crime to minimise negative impacts on violence, security and conflict

The primary aim of strategies employed under this theory of change are not to directly prevent TOC from operating; rather, they focus on mitigating some of the most significant harms that affect society. They seek to push the nature of criminal enterprise away from these most harmful impacts, including on conflict and violence, towards less harmful activities. In doing so, they seek to impact on the õBusinessôof TOC directly, by altering the activities it focuses on. They may also contribute to undermining the support networks that allow for TOC to thrive at the local and national levels, for example, by removing barriers to cooperation between law enforcement institutions and local people, or minimising the vulnerability factors that contribute towards recruitment into criminal gangs. They may also have an impact on the global dynamics of TOC, by bringing a range of illicit activities (such as the possession of drugs) under greater public control in major consumer countries.

Many of the approaches and strategies employed under this theory of change focus on the prevention of harm rather than the prevention of the illicit activities themselves. As such they often imply active engagement with criminal groups through negotiated settlements or decriminalisation of certain illicit activities. As a result, these approaches can be very controversial and discussion of them highly politically charged.

What is the Theory of Change that underpins the managed adaptation of crime to minimise negative impacts on violence, security and conflict?

This theory of change can be articulated as follows:

> *If* we encourage people engaged in illicit activities to access social welfare services, selectively target specific criminal actors or activities and seek negotiated settlements with some criminal actors, *then* the negative impacts of transnational organised criminal networks on violence, conflict and insecurity will be minimised. This will happen *because* people will be more willing to engage with state service providers (including health, education and security and justice providers), resources will be freed up to target the most violent criminal actors whilst illicit activities will be confined to specific areas, thereby insulating the wider population from the negative impacts of the criminal networks on conflict.

The logic behind this theory of change is further elaborated in the diagram below.



Programmatic approaches and strategies employed under this theory of change might include:

- *Harm reduction approaches*: This refers to a set of policies, programmes and practices that seek to minimise the adverse social, health and economic effects of illegal activities on individuals, communities and wider society.[69] They do not necessarily seek to reduce the prevalence of the illegal activity directly. So far, harm reduction approaches have been largely confined to drug programmes, focussing on activities

[69] UK Harm Reduction Alliance- http://www.ukhra.org/harm_reduction_definition.html.

such as needle exchange programmes, drug substitution therapy and education programmes. However, the concept is gaining increasing resonance within non-drug policy related debates.

- *Decriminalisation*: This is an important component of some harm reduction approaches. It refers to the removal of sanctions under criminal law for specific illicit activities. It is not the same as legalisation (considered in Box 2), since the specified activities remain illegal and punishable by non-criminal sanction such as fines, confiscation or court-ordered therapy. Decriminalisation takes many forms, including *de jure* criminalisation in which legal frameworks are explicitly reformed, and *de facto* decriminalisation, in which a decision is taken to not enforce criminal laws, although these laws remain in place. The possession and use of small quantities of some or all illicit drugs has been decriminalised in between 25-30 countries,[70] whilst a number of states have also decriminalised aspects of the sex trade.
- *Selective targeting of law enforcement*: This refers to the intentional focusing of law enforcement activities on the most violent types of criminal activity or criminal actors. Arguably, it implies a degree of tolerance toward some other types of criminal activity, and seeks to act as a deterrent to other criminal gangs to employ violence. These approaches are discussed under Theory of change 1: Deterrence.
- *Negotiated settlements with criminal groups*: In some contexts the state has entered into or facilitated explicit agreement with and between criminal groups allowing for them to undertake illicit activities, often within specific areas, in return for decreased levels of violence. In other cases, the state and criminal groups may have come to an implicit settlement, in which they seek to avoid confrontation by operating in discrete areas or in extreme cases, co-operating for mutual gain.

What evidence is there that this theory of change is valid?

A number of assumptions underlie this theory of change. For each, the available evidence is briefly discussed.

1) Reducing the negative impacts of crime on society, through harm reduction approaches, will undermine support for TOC and shrink the pool of people likely to become engaged in TOC networks: This remains a largely untested assumption. Whilst there is ample evidence to suggest harm reduction approaches can be effective in reducing health harms associated with the drug trade, there is little available evidence to suggest the existence of a direct or clear causal link between these benefits (primarily HIV and hepatitis C infection rates) and violence associated with TOC.[71] There is a clear pattern of falls in drug related deaths associated with drug harm reduction programmes, but again it is not clear whether or how this is related to TOC (e.g. drug related homicides).

However, there is some evidence that harm reduction approaches can have an impact on helping to establish bonds of trust between local people engaged in low-level illicit activities and state institutions. A review of New Zealandôs Prostitution Reform Act, which decriminalised many aspects of the sex trade, argues that the reforms have removed many of the barriers between sex workers and the police, making sex workers more willing to engage with the police to identify and tackle human trafficking networks.[72] Police officers in Portugal have reported similar impacts following decriminalisation of drugs, making it easier for them to gather intelligence and to target large scale drug dealers.[73]

There is evidence to suggest that in some contexts users of illicit drugs from marginalised groups may be prone to deeper engagement in violent crime.[74] Furthermore, the criminalisation of people involved in illicit activities can have adverse impacts on future life prospects, potentially making them more vulnerable to further involvement with TOC networks. For example, a study in Australia found that people who receive criminal sanction for minor drug offences were more likely to suffer negative employment, relationship and accommodation consequences, and come into further contact with the criminal justice system than those who received non-criminalised sanctions.[75] Whilst the findings of such studies should be treated with caution (there is nothing to suggest that the findings are applicable in other contexts), they do pose important questions related to risk factors that make people vulnerable to increased engagement with criminal networks.

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[70] Rolles, S and Eastwood, N (2012), Drug Decriminalisation Policies in Practise: A global summary, in the *War onb Drugs and HIV/AIDS: How criminalisation of drug use fuels the global pandemic.* Global Commission on Drugs.

[71] Some studies have identified a possible relationship, arguing that 'HIV/AIDS can create conditions conducive to conflict.' However, this is not yet a robustly established relationship. (Conflict and HIV: A framework for risk assessment to prevent HIV in conflict-affected settings in AfricaNancy B Mock12*, Sambe Duale2, Lisanne F Brown2, Ellen Mathys2, Heather C O'Maonaigh2, Nina KL Abul-Husn2 and Sterling Elliott2*Emerging Themes in Epidemiology* 2004, **1**:6 doi:10.1186/1742-7622-1-6)

[72] New Zealand Government (2008) Report of the prostitution law review committee on the operation of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003. New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Wellington.

[73] The House of Lords European Union Committee (2012) The EU Drugs Strategy, 26th report of session 2010-2012. UK Parliament, London

[74] Paco Under Scrutiny: The cocaine base paste market in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil- http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/200702282203568348.pdf

[75] McLaren and Mattick, (2007). *Cannabis in Australia: Use, supply, harms and responses.* Monograph no. 57. Sydney: National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre.

2) Harm reduction strategies will free up resources to help improve effectiveness of selected targeting of law enforcement on the most harmful impacts of TOC: There is a significant body of evidence to indicate that harm reduction approaches can be a cost effective means of reducing the negative impacts of TOC activities on communities. For example, needle exchange and substitution therapy programmes can be amongst the most efficient strategies for HIV prevention.[76] There is also evidence that decriminalisation can free up resources from the criminal justice system, which in some cases have been used to tackle the more harmful impacts of TOC on communities. A review of the impacts of decriminalisation of cannabis in various US states concluded that ñThe beneficial consequences of decriminalisation consist mainly of savings to law enforcement and the criminal justice systemò In California the total cost of cannabis focused law enforcement dropped from $17 million in the first half of 1975 to $4.4 million in the first half of 1976 following decriminalisation.[77] There is evidence that law enforcement in those states redirected efforts toward the detection and arrest of more serious offences and other illicit drugs, such as increased drug seizures.

3) Decriminalisation of illicit activities will not encourage more people to engage in that illicit activity: This is a contentious assumption, and one that has sparked intense debate from all sides. Most evidence, analysis and discussion has focused on the drug trade (although there have also been experiments with prostitution). Many commentators argue that decriminalisation removes a key deterrent to engaging in illicit activities, making them more socially acceptable and leading to an increase in the prevalence of such activities. They argue that this will ultimately strengthen the power of TOC networks, ultimately leading to an increase in violence and insecurity.[78] Others argue that decriminalisation has little impact on the prevalence of illicit activity, but is a critical part of a wider harm reduction strategy (for reasons outlined above).

The evidence to support these positions is not totally clear cut. First of all, decriminalisation can mean very different things in different contexts, making comparisons across contexts difficult.[79] This may help to explain the relatively small number of available comparative studies. A relatively large number of country case studies are however available, mostly focused on the impact of decriminalisation of drugs (often only cannabis). These are often used to support contradictory positions. Greenwald argues that decriminalisation of drugs in Portugal has resulted in decreased drug use and reduction in drug related deaths,[80] whilst Coelho has used the same or similar data to make the opposite argument.[81] Similarly, several studies have found that decriminalisation of prostitution in New Zealand has had little impact on overall levels of prostitution, whilst the country has not reported any increase in human trafficking associated with the sex trade.[82] Conversely however, the removal of criminal penalties associated with sex work in Rhode Island and Germany have been correlated with significant increases in the scale of the sex trade, and crucially in the estimated numbers of women trafficked to feed this demand.[83]

On balance the available evidence does not support a view that decriminalisation will automatically lead to significant increase in prevalence,[84] and consequently further entrenching of the power of TOC. But neither is it a ómagic bulletô It can be an effective strategy for limiting the wider harms of illicit activities (driven by TOC) when employed as part of a broader strategy of harm reduction, including social and economic reforms to strengthen a social welfare system.

4) Selective targeting of law enforcement against the most violent criminal groups will act as a disincentive to other criminal groups to engage in violence: This is also an important assumption under-pinning deterrence theories of change. The relevant evidence is therefore discussed under the section dealing with deterrence theories of chance.

5) Explicit or implicit negotiated settlements with criminal groups are sustainable: In a number of contexts, state forces have reached explicit agreements with criminal actors to limit levels of violence.[85] Their long-term impacts have been very difficult to assess however. In El Salvador the Government had a key role to play in

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[76] de Wit, A, & Bos, J. (2004). *Cost-Effectiveness of Needle and Syringe Programmes: A Review of the Literature*. In J. Jager, W. Limburg, M. Kretzschmar, M. Postma & L. Wiessing (Eds.), *Hepatitis C and Injecting Drug Use: Impact, Costs and Policy Options* (EMCDDA Monographs 7) (329-343). Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction

[77] Single and Christie, (2000) The impact of cannabis decriminalisation in Australia and the United States*, Journal of Public Health Policy*, 21,2 (Summer, 2000): 157-186.

[78] Hitchins, P (2013) *What 'decriminalise' really means Is; 'we're giving junkies a drug den next door to you'* The Daily Mail Online, posted 21 Apriul 2013. Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2312345/What-decriminalise-really-means-giving-junkies-drug-den-door-you.html#ixzz32RA5kuue

[79] see 2012 annual report of the EMCDDA for a comprehensive description of the different harm reduction strategies across EU member states- http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_190854_EN_TDAC12001ENC .pdf

[80] Greenwald, Glenn (2009) *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Successful Drug Policies*- Cato Institute, Washington DC.

[81] Coelho, M (2010) *The 'resounding success' of Portuguese Drug Policy*, National Drug Prevention Alliance, available at http://drugprevent.org.uk/ppp/2011/01/the-%E2%80%9Cresounding-success%E2%80%9D-of-portuguese-drug-policy/

[82] New Zealand Parliament (2012) *Prostitution law reform in New Zealand: Research report*. Government of New Zealand, Wellington.

[83] Cho, S, Dreher, A and Neumayer, E (2013) Does Legalised Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking? *World Development Vol. 41*. Pp.67-82, 2013

[84] E.g. see Eric Single, Paul Christie and Robert Ali, (2000)

[85] For a useful overview of these issues, see Whitfeild, Teresa (2013), *Mediating criminal violence: Lessons from the gang truce in El Salvador*, Oslo Forum Papers, 001 June 2013, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva.

facilitating a truce between two of the countriesô largest gangs (MS-13 and Barrio 18). This has had a dramatic impact on the homicide rates in the country (which have dropped from 14 to 6 per day), whilst opening up space for government to implement social, educational and job training programmes. However, many of these gains seem to be diminishing as the truce comes under increasing strain. Furthermore, it has been largely unpopular with the wider population and many people have argued that the truce has simply provided criminal gangs with more space to consolidate and expand their activities, including increasing their previously marginal role in international drug smuggling networks.[86] Similarly, as part of the peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and the FARC in the late 1990s, the government withdrew from a huge area of land in order to facilitate negotiations. This allowed FARC to hold kidnapping victims and deepen their involvement in international drug trafficking operations, whilst negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful.

In other contexts, the state and TOC networks have reached implicit settlements, including instances where the state has effectively ceded control of certain areas to criminal networks, as has historically been seen in some of Brazilôs favelas and (arguably) throughout many parts of Afghanistan today. In other contexts, such as Guinea Bissau or Serbia in the 1990s and early 2000s, the state and TOC networks have become so intertwined that it is very difficult to tell them apart. In these contexts, levels of violence might be relatively low since both the state and TOC can benefit from such agreements in the short to medium term. Cockayne argues that this is how the Burmese state was able to make peace with opium traffickers in the Northeast of the country during the 1980s and 90s.[87] The degree to which such accommodation strategies can help or hinder statebuilding processes in the longer terms is debatable.[88] However, it is clear that reduced violence and crime may indicate that crime has become symbiotic with government rather than a reduction in the power and influence of TOC.[89]

What challenges/ dilemmas do programmes face in attempting to measure progress under this theory of change?

Measuring the effectiveness of interventions guided by this theory of change faces a range of significant challenges. Harm reduction approaches, including decriminalisation of some illicit activities, are receiving increasing support and have now been piloted (in one form or another) in a large number of countries, allowing for the establishment of a reasonably strong evidence base of aspects of their effectiveness. However, the majority of evidence has been generated from a relatively small number of high income western nations, such as USA, Holland, New Zealand, Portugal or Australia. Given that the effectiveness of such interventions are, at least in part, defined by the capacities of local service provision institutions (including rule of law and justice providers), it cannot be assumed that the results could be replicated in more fragile contexts.[90] Furthermore, the focus of such initiatives on drugs, and to a lesser extent, prostitution also makes it difficult to assess their relevance to other types of illicit activities.

A further challenge relates to the politically charged nature of debating, and consequently measuring the effectiveness of approaches employed under this theory of change. Approaches that imply the acceptance of certain types of criminal activity are likely to generate significant opposition at both the national as well as the international levels. The Calderon administration in Mexico for example felt compelled to deny that it was employing a selective targeting approach against specific cartels. They consequently undertook actions against the Sinaloa cartel to demonstrate that they were being even handed in their approach, even though such even handedness was likely to result in increased violence.[91] Much of this opposition has been led by leading donor nations, whilst arguably such approaches are inconsistent with much global regulation, such as the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychoactive Substances (which, it has been argued, ties signatories into the criminalisation of personal consumption).[92]

To date most harm reduction programmes have been focused on health orientated programmes for users of illicit drugs, and have therefore measured their effectiveness in terms of reductions in social harms associated with drug

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[86] See Peeters, Timo, Schulting, Gerard and Briscoe, Ivan (2013) *Truce on a tightrope: risks and lessons from El Salvador's bid to end gang warfare.* CRU Policy Brief, Clingandel Institute and Dudley, Steven (2014) *2 Divergent Views on El Salvador Gang Truce, 1 Sad Conclusion*, Insight crime: organised crime in the Americas blog, posted 16 April 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/2-divergent-views-on-el-salvador-gang-truce-1-sad-conclusion

[87] Cockanye, James (2013) *Chasing Shadows: Strategic Responses to Organised Crime in Conflict-Affected Situations*, RUSI Journal, Apr 2013, Vol. 158, No. 2.

[88] For example see James Cockayne and Patrick Meehan's competing arguments about the role of the Burmese state's accommodation with drug trafficking networks in the statebuilding process there. Cockanye, James (2013) and Meehan, Patrick (2011), *Drugs, insurgency and state-building in Burma: Why the drugs trade is central to Burma's changing political order*, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies / Volume 42 / Issue 03 / October 2011, pp 376-404

[89] Cockanye, James (2011) *State fragility, organised crime and peacebuilding: towards a more strategic approach*. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. NOREF report.

[90] A similar pattern has been observed in relation to selective law enforcement approaches. Falbeb-Brown for example argues that the success of selective targeting in US was in large part due to the pre-existing capacity of law enforcement in the country. Falbeb-Brown, (2013).

[91] Felbab-Brown, Vanda (2013)

[92] Rolles and Eastwood, (2012)

use at the individual level. For example, robust evidence is available to suggest that harm reduction can have a significant impact on rates of communicable disease transmission amongst intravenous drug users, or numbers of addicts seeking treatment. There is little evidence that these changes can have an impact on changes in levels of conflict and insecurity or the influence of TOC at the national and international levels. New indicators may need to be developed to test this relationship, for example focusing on issues such as levels of trust between security providers and communities in which TOC are embedded.

Indicators that focus on levels of violence under this theory of change could also be misleading. For example, a settlement between the state and TOC may result in decreased levels of violence. However, this may indicate the development of a symbiotic relationship between TOC and state or the diversification of TOC into behaviours that could be more damaging to security in the longer term. Equally, such settlements can simply displace violence to more vulnerable locations, either within a country or internationally. A long-term and holistic conception of risk must therefore be employed in the development of indicators.

Examples of indicators that might be applied to measure progress against this theory of change



Box 2: Legalisation vs. Decriminalisation: Realistic policy options?

Discussions around legalisation and decriminalisation are often conflated. Both involve the removal of criminal sanction for engagement in proscribed activities and seek to minimise the most harmful impacts of illicit activities on society by promoting greater state oversight and control over those activities. However, there are significant differences between these approaches with implications on their ability to impact on violence and conflict.

Decriminalisation does not allow for the full government regulation or taxation of illicit behaviours; decriminalised activities remain illegal, and people engaged in those activities remain open to sanction by the state (just not criminal sanction). Furthermore, decriminalisation does not appear to have a significant impact on the demand for illicit goods (as discussed above), whilst the production and transhipment of decriminalised goods typically remains in the hands of criminal groups (with the notable exception of cannabis, which can typically be home-grown and does not require complex processing). As such, decriminalisation of illicit goods in major markets arguably does little to minimise down-stream violence prevention; heroin and cocaine are still being produced and transported to feed demand, women are still being trafficked into prostitution and conflict diamonds are still being mined, with all of the subsequent impacts on conflict.

Legalisation of illicit goods and activities on the other hand implies the removal of legal proscription and the introduction of regulation to govern the operation of these industries. This gives states a much greater degree of power over how industries are managed, including who is engaged, who they sell to, how they treat their workers, the quality of products, the marketing strategies they employ etc. It also allows states to benefit through taxation, bringing in revenue that can be re-invested in mitigating against the negative impacts of prohibited goods on communities (e.g. in the health system). Taxation can also provide an additional lever for dissuading people to engage in legal activities, as can be seen by government strategies on tobacco and alcohol.

Crucially legalisation also implies that certain groups would be permitted to produce these newly permitted goods, possibly under licence from the state. In doing so, TOC groups could (in theory) be excluded from the production and trafficking of such goods, thereby depriving them of a huge proportion of their current revenue streams (estimates vary from 50-85% of the revenues of TOC accrued from drug smuggling alone)[93]. The lifting of Prohibition in the USA for example was widely credited with undermining the power of organised criminal groups.

However, neither the potential benefits nor the possible draw-backs of legalisation should be over-stated. The impacts of legalisation on demand in major consumer nations are difficult to predict. However, it is clear that demand for licit drugs (in most countries) such as tobacco and alcohol far outstrips demand for illicit ones,[94] despite compelling evidence that they are significantly more harmful to both individuals and society than many illegal substances.[95] Furthermore, TOC groups have proven themselves to be supremely adaptable to changes in legal and economic conditions. For example, as governments have raised the prices of cigarettes (and alcohol), as a means of seeking to control demand whilst recouping some of the costs associated with these industries, TOC networks have also been able capitalise. Smuggled cigarettes are, for example estimated to account for roughly 1 in 10 cigarettes smoked in UK (and almost half of hand-rolled tobacco).[96]

Furthermore, many substances that drive conflict at their source of origin and provide TOC with much of their influence, such as natural resources extraction, may be illicit at their point of extraction (e.g. illegally exported coltan from DRC), but perfectly legal at their point of consumption (your mobile phone). In other cases, companies engaged in the licit extraction of natural resources are required to obtain a licence to operate, effectively by paying a tax to TOC groups. For example, the taxing of legal iron ore production now provides more revenue to some Mexican drug cartels than drug smuggling[97]. The point being that the legal status of highly sought after products is unlikely to prevent TOC groups from being able to gain control over these industries.

Barring the compelling arguments for and against legalisation of certain illicit activities and goods, debate on these issues remains deeply polarised. Most public discussion is based on ideological rather than evidence based arguments. There are signs that this is changing, as is demonstrated by recent reports and positions by groups of eminent experts, such as the Global Commission on Drugs Policy and the recent LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy. Furthermore, an increasing number of Latin American states have come out in opposition to the heavily criminalised approach to international drugs policy promoted by most global institutions (although only Uruguay and some US states so far has gone as far as legalisation of some drugs). However, until more balanced debate on the issue of legalisation is possible, an important potential avenue for tackling TOC remains off the table for many countries.

Theory of change 4: Cultural change

Although it is occasionally depicted as an invasive force operating primarily across borders in search of profit, TOC frequently depends upon strong linkages to at least part of the communities in which it is based. This relationship with a community generates important benefits for criminal organisations, whether through the establishment of a diffuse facilitation network enabling products to be stored or money to be laundered, general tolerance of criminal activities, and in certain cases overt social consent for and defence of illegal activity. The recent protests in Sinaloa that followed the arrest of cartel leader Joaquín ñEl Chapoò Guzmán are indicative of this kind of community mobilization, although in many cases the supportive relationship between criminal groups and the local population tends to be more tacit and indirect. According to one Ecuadorean politician, the relationship between illicit forces and his local coastal community is one of ñlucrative permissiveness.ò[98]

[93] Saferworld (2014)
[94] UNODC private correspondence
[95] Nutt, D., King, L. A., Saulsbury, W., & Blakemore, C. (2007). "Development of a rational scale to assess the harm of drugs of potential misuse". *The Lancet 369* (9566): 1047–1053
[96] ASH (2012) Tobacco Smuggling Fact Sheet, Action on Smoking and Health, available at http://ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_122.pdf
[97] Castillo, Eduardo (2014*) Mexico drug cartel makes more dealing iron ore than drugs*, The Big Story Blog, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/mexico-drug-cartel-makes-more-dealing-iron-ore
[98] Cited in forthcoming books from IDEA International on illicit networks in Latin America.

Just as the Sicilian mafia thrived in conditions of weak state presence, drug cultivation and centres for smuggling and trafficking tend to be based in towns and regions that have long been estranged from formal state authority. As a result, these areas have often established the sort of specialized knowledge and interpersonal networks that enable them to retain a competitive advantage in illicit trade. Examples include, in the case of narcotic production, the ethnic tribal areas of Myanmar or the rural periphery of Colombia, and for contraband and illicit trafficking, towns such as Ciudad del Este in Paraguay and Timbuktu in northern Mali.

More generally, the entrenchment of crime, as well as its capacity for reproduction and adaptation to prevailing security conditions, would appear to reflect a continuing social disposition towards illicit activity, particularly in cases where there are few other means of subsistence. Such adaptive continuities in organized criminal activity, which have been most evident in parts of Latin America (Colombia and Mexico), West Africa (Nigeria), the Sahara-Sahel (Libya, Mali) and southern Europe (Italy and the Balkans), depend upon a shallow social acceptance of formal legal norms. Furthermore, the willingness to regard violence as a permissible solution to social or interpersonal disputes would also appear to depend on an assimilation of coercive and intimidating practices within community life.[99] It is this ñcontinuum of violenceò[100] often noted in the transition from conflict to post-conflict periods, which seems to act as an important source of local power and influence for criminal organisations.

What is the theory of change behind efforts to undermine support networks within communities and broader society?

The theory of change can be articulated as follows:

> *If* we improve trust between security providers and local people, and convince local people of the positive benefits of withdrawing community support to TOC, *then* communities will reduce their support to TOC and governments will gain tactical advantages in their efforts to enforce the rule of law, *because* communities will see the benefits of providing better intelligence and greater bonds of trust will be developed between communities and governments.

The logic behind this theory of change is further elaborated in the diagram below.



Programmatic approaches employed under this theory of change might include:

- *Civic engagement*: mobilization of local civil society in order to bring criminal organisations and their social networks into disrepute, e.g. Victimsô Movements (Mexico, Colombia), Anti-protection racket movements (ñAddiopizzoòin Italy, or the civic campaign against the ôNdrangheta in Calabria[101]).
- *Media mobilization*: stronger flows of public information on criminal activities, including their links to politicians and business, and their implications for community welfare, e.g. funds and foreign support for investigative journalists, seed funding for websites, local radios.
- *Community change*: creation of a ñculture of lawfulnessòin which citizens are motivated to engage with the formal legal and security order, and lawless behaviour is marginalised, e.g. community policing reforms, National Strategy Information Centerôs initiatives in Colombia, Mexico and the Middle East (centred on youth education),[102] ñbroken windowsòtheory of crime control.[103]

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[99] Adams, Tani. 2011. *Chronic Violence and its Reproduction: Perverse Trends in Social Relations, Citizenship and Democracy in Latin America*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center

[100] Bourgois, Philippe. 2001. "The power of violence in war and peace. Post-Cold War lessons from El Salvador." *Ethnography* 2 (1): 5-34. This concept has since proved pivotal in the analysis of conflict and insecurity provided in the World Bank's World Development Report 2011.

[101] Heinrich Böll Stiftung. 2013. *Transnational Organized Crime. Analysis of a Global Challenge to Democracy*. Berlin: Transcript, chapter 10.1

[102] See Developing Support for the Rule of Law: A Culture of Lawfulness, available at http://www.strategycenter.org/programs/education-for-the-rule-of-law/

[103] Wilson, James and Kelling, George. (1982). "Broken Windows." *The Atlantic*.

What evidence is there that this theory of change is valid?

A number of assumptions underlie this theory of change. For each of them, the available evidence is briefly discussed:

1) *The popular legitimacy of criminal organisations is dubious*: The most fundamental assumption guiding the theory of change is that the legitimacy which supposedly underlies criminal influence over communities is in fact the result of coercive and one-sided relationships of power.[104] There is no doubt that significant harm to the public interest is caused by extensive criminal influence over community life. Examples include the predation of revenues from local public services,[105] suppression of free speech,[106] outbreaks of violence due to criminal score-settling and summary justice,[107] and distortion of economic development[108], although it should be added that the precise distribution of embezzlement, oppression, violence and distorted economic incentives varies according to the context. The cumulative evidence of these harmful effects as well as the results of opinion polls suggests that if citizens were given a robust and safe alternative to criminal influence, a majority would see good reason to support it. Vibrant citizen initiatives against criminal organisations in numerous contexts, most recently by civic leaders and victimsô movements in Mexico, also suggest that most people in affected communities do indeed support lawfulness against coercion by illicit powers.[109] At the same time, ethnographic studies point to the deep social entrenchment of illicit networks, for example in north Mali, where traffickers have provided essential means of subsistence since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, and are now widely admired and even envied by local citizens.[110] In parts of the Sahel meanwhile, a review of community perceptions of TOC found that many local people did not recognise economically motivated trafficking to be criminal acts, although they did acknowledged the negative impact of their growing reliance on criminal economies.[111] In Mexico meanwhile, a ñculture of illegalityò, whether in music, television, fashion or popular culture in general (including social media), remains a challenge that efforts to promote lawfulness will have to tackle.[112]

2) *The benefits of the rule of law outweigh the material patronage and "security" offered by criminal organisations*: A practical assumption deriving from the point above is that the removal of the clientilistic networks sustained by criminal actors will not result in further material hardship, or loss of life for citizens. Whereas the first assumption maintains that local people do not regard criminal influence as legitimate, the second asserts that they do not see it as a regrettable necessity resulting from their strained material conditions.

Here the evidence as to the strength of the assumption is mixed. On one side, it is to be expected that the eradication of criminalised ghettos will benefit residents by giving access to jobs, and better public services. However, one study of efforts to extend state influence into criminalised urban environments in Latin America and the Caribbean observed that quick-impact projects and a spate of government handouts have had limited effects on entrenched relations between local populations and criminal groups. ñIsolated projects, not integrated into a broader comprehensive development strategy, may also give the impression that in the absence of intense crime or instability, the state would not bother to deliver any service and development at all.ò[113] A lack of sustained state attention, and an over-reliance on extracting criminal intelligence, may also put communities at the risk of revenge attacks by criminal groups should these efforts lose their impetus. At particular risk of such attacks are any activists involved in broadcasting information about criminal activities: for example, four social media activists were executed by the Zetas drug cartel in the border town of Nueva Laredo in 2011.[114] Indeed, the Zetas have shown particular zeal in tracking down and killing anyone involved in publicising their activities.[115]

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[104] The nature of these degraded relations, and the social psychology that underlies them, is discussed in depth in Adams, Tani. (2014). *How Does Chronic Violence Affect Human Development, Social Relations and the Practice of Citizenship? A Framework for Public Policy, Research and Social Action*. Forthcoming publication.

[105] Romero, Mauricio (ed.). 2011. *La economía de los paramilitares*. Bogotá: Debate

[106] Sample, Kristen. 2014. "Beware of the Pax Mafioso." *Foreign Policy* April 15.

[107] Most recently, on the subject of the Colombian city of Buenaventura that has recently been subject to military occupation, see Human Rights Watch. 2014. *The Crisis in Buenaventura. Disappearances, Dismemberment and Displacement in Colombia's Main Pacific Port*. New York: HRW.

[108] This falls under the theory that "criminal finance encourages investment in non-productive sectors." United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2011. p. 109.

[109] Shirk, David A., Wood, Duncan, and Olson, Eric (eds). 2014. *Building Resilient Communities in Mexico. Civic Responses to Crime and Violence.* Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center.

[110] See Briscoe, Ivan. 2014. *Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali*. The Hague: Clingendael-CRU (forthcoming); Scheele, Judith. 2012. *Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara. Regional Connectivity in the 20th Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Grémont, Charles et al. 2004. *Les Liens Sociaux au Nord-Mali*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

[111] Shaw, M and Reitano, T (2014) *People's perspectives of organised crime in West Africa and the Sahel*, ISS Paper 254, Institute for Security Studies.

[112] De Choudhury, Munmun De, Monroy-Hernández, Andrés and Mark, Gloria. 2014. "'*Narco' Emotions: Affect and Desensitization in Social Media during the Mexican Drug War*." Microsoft Research paper presented at Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems 2014

[113] Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2011. *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America*. Washington DC: Brookings Institute, p. 31.

[114] Houston Chronicle. 2011. "*Gang sends message with blogger beheading"*

[115] Rexton Kan, Paul. 2013. "Anonymous vs Los Zetas: The Revenge of the Hacktivists*." Small Wars Journal*, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/anonymous-vs-los-zetas-the-revenge-of-the-hacktivists

3) The state and its security forces conform to the rule of law: Encouraging a culture of lawful behaviour through education, public information and other civic initiatives should in principle orient citizens towards greater trust in state authority and the rule of law. For example, in Jamaica, Mexico, Central America and various African countries (e.g. Kenya) levels of trust in police are low: in Mexico, only 10.2 per cent have a high level of confidence in the municipal police;[116] in Jamaica, only 20 to 30 per cent of crimes are reported to the local police.[117] However, sustained changes in these levels of public mistrust would require not merely a shift in community attitudes, but also major improvements in the performance and reliability of these state institutions. This raises the issue of whether community expectations can be harmonized with achievable progress in security and justice reform. One means to achieve this is through community security and community policing, which seeks to build trusting, cooperative and accountable relations between authorities, specifically police, and the communities they serve and helps ensure that communitiesô priority security needs are addressed. A number of case studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of such approaches,[118] although in many cases weaknesses remain in the monitoring and evaluation of much security and justice programming, limiting our ability to draw too many conclusions from such initiatives.[119]

One possible by-product of community mobilisation against crime that occurs without corresponding improvements in security and justice systems is the formation of self-defence or vigilante forces, whose operations may well not conform to the rule of law and whose exact motivations may be opaque. This trend has been noted in cases such as Guatemala, where over 300 community policing units are estimated to engage in kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking.[120] Similar concerns surround the recent emergence of self-defence militia in Michoacán, Mexico.

4) Improvements in social capital will result in undermining of TOC support networks: Various indicators of social capital, inclusion and inequality are strongly correlated with rates of crime and violence: in general terms, more unequal and less cohesive societies tend to be more disposed to illicit activity,[121] although the relationship is often complex and it is hard to track a linear relationship between the variables.[122] However, it would seem reasonable to expect that community support networks for crime can only be undermined over the longer term if improvements are made to levels of social capital, including equity and inter-personal trust. A number of risks should be noted in this regard. One is the danger that community mobilisation based around a prominent role for traditional social hierarchies, as proposed by some authors[123], will reinforce sources of exclusion based on gender, ethnicity and class.[124] Should any groups continue to find themselves marginalised from collective life, through for example limited access to economic opportunity or to political participation, then they may remain disposed to support illicit activity, particularly if they manage to form strong identity-based sub-cultures, as with the *maras* in Central America.[125]

Measuring progress under their theory of change: challenges and dilemmas

It is by no means simple to track the nuances in social attitudes towards illicit behaviour, and above all to distinguish between cases where organized crime is regarded as a legitimate activity from where it is seen as a regrettable necessity for survival. Moreover, a community-based approach rooted in awareness-raising, education, public information and police or judicial outreach is likely to have limited impact without corresponding changes in institutional performance and social equity, or without a broader programme of community development. Thus, short-term gains in citizensôfaith in police and justice can be rapidly reversed if evidence emerges of continuing malpractice within these services, or of weakened commitment towards community welfare. Recent moves to enforce a military presence in Rio de Janeiroôs slum areas underlines the precarious nature of gains made even after several years of deployment of Pacification Police Units across the city.[126]

Even where a majority of people oppose criminal or illicit presence, they may regard their opinions as a private matter, and doubt whether broader civic mobilization is possible. In these contexts, the viability of a community response will often depend upon the emergence of a leadership based around victimsô associations as well as

[116] Shirk et al,(2014) *Building resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence.* Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington DC, p. 9.
[117] Glaister, Leslie. 2010. *Confronting the Don: the Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, p. 7.
[118] Saferworld, (2013). *Community-based approaches to safety and security: Lessons from Kosovo, Nepal and Bangladesh*. Saferworld, London
[119] Saferworld, (2009). '*Evaluating for Security and Justice: Challenges and Opportunities for Improved Monitoring and evaluation of security system reform programmes*', Saferworld, London.
[120] Prensa Libre (Guatemala). (2013). *"Mas de 300 juntas actuan ilegalmente."* 20/06/13. http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/juntas-actuan-ilegalmente_0_941305912.html
[121] Putnam, Robert. 2001. "*Social capital: Measurement and consequences."* Presentation to OECD, p. 12. https://www1.oecd.org/edu/innovation-education/1825848.pdf; Wilkinson, Richard and Pickett, Kate. (2009). *The Spirit Level: Why more equal societies almost always do better*. London: Allen Lane, chapter 10.
[122] United Nations Development Programme. (2013). *Seguridad Ciudadana con Rostro Humano. Informe Regional de Desarollo Humano 2013-2014.* New York: UN, pp 17-22.
[123] Locke, Rachel. (2012). *Organized Crime, Conflict and Fragility: A New Approach*. New York: International Peace Institute, p. 14.
[124] Pelser, Eric. (1999). *The challenges of community policing in South Africa*. Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No 42.
[125] Ferrell, Jeff, Hayward, Keith and Young, Jock. (2008). *Cultural criminology: An invitation*. London: Sage.
[126] Watts, Jonathan. (2014). "Brazil to order army into Rio slums as violence escalates before World Cup." *The Guardian*, March 24. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/24/brazil-army-rio-slums-violence-world-cup

political support for their activities. Simply measuring public opinion without understanding the context of fear, intimidation and the role of civic tradition may not provide any clear indication as to the possibility of mobilisation. Furthermore, criminal groups might themselves back social or community groups as a means to boost their legitimacy.

What sorts of indicators might be applied to measure progress against this theory of change?



Theory of change 5: Economic transformation

Economic development is often considered a key component in donor strategies to reduce the influence of and opportunities available for TOC networks. However, many of the assumptions and consequent interventions that underpin these strategies are not supported by a clear evidence base. TOC is for example often assumed to flourish in contexts where state capacity is weak or absent, and where institutional capacities to limit and prosecute violence are ineffective. As states become more developed economically and stronger institutionally, it is assumed that their capacity to enforce laws and regulate crime within and across their borders will improve. However the

evidence would seem to suggest that the very nature of TOC is integrally related to the economic structure of a country. Therefore as economic development takes hold, so the nature of TOC also changes. In some cases this may result in a reduction in the scale and impact on TOC related violence, in others it may lead to an increase in violence, and in yet others it may lead to a displacement of violence to new and possibly far off locations.

Economic transformation is also important at the individual and household level. Improved access to licit income generating opportunities are expected to reduce dependence on illicit activities. However, a large number of variables and diverse factors, such as individual motivations, social identity and respect issues play an important role in the success or otherwise of interventions that seek to promote economic transformation at this level.

Articulation of theory of change

This theory of change can be articulated as follows:

> *If* we can promote economic development in contexts heavily impacted by TOC, e.g. by promoting economic growth and diversification, improving equal access to economic opportunities and jobs, *then* the negative impact of TOC on conflict and insecurity will be diminished. This will happen *because* poor people will have access to livelihood alternatives which will preclude their involvement in illicit income-generating activities and because the state will have a stronger economic base from which to uphold the rule of law.

The logic behind this theory of change is further elaborated below.



Programmatic approaches and strategies employed under this theory of change might seek to promote:

- *Economic Growth*, for example:
  - Improved access to markets
  - Provision of safety and security for market access
- *Equitable access to economic resources*, for example:
  - Conditional and unconditional cash transfers
  - Access to credit and savings programmes
- *Economic diversification, including employment programmes and alternative development*, for example:
  - Public works programmes
  - Vocational and skills training programmes
  - Crop substitution programmes for drug producers
- *Improved access to and quality of basic services, especially health and education*, for example:
  - Direct support to health centres and schools
  - Education policies
  - Community-level health insurance schemes

What is the evidence that this theory of change is valid?

A number of assumptions underlie this theory of change. For each, the available evidence is briefly discussed:

1) Poverty causes crime: This is a widely cited assumption. A large number of studies have identified a robust correlation between low income states and high levels of civil conflict,[127] whilst the World Development Report

[127] Fearon, James, (2010), *Governance and civil war onset.* World Development Report 2011 Background paper.

2011 reports that ñlow incomes reduce the opportunity costs of engaging in violenceò[128] However, the relationship between conflict and income is not well understood, with many analysts agreeing that both conflict and income levels are likely to be the result of common underlying factors, such as weak institutional capacities or high levels of inequality and unemployment.

The relationship between income levels and crime specifically is less well researched, and studies looking explicitly at income and violence associated with TOC are extremely rare. Whilst it is clear that many low income countries suffer from high rates of violence that can be clearly linked to TOC (e.g. DRC, Mali, Afghanistan, Somalia etc.), there are also many examples of poor countries with relatively low rates of crime related violence (e.g. Laos, Zambia or Tanzania[129]). Those countries with the highest crime rates however are often middle income, as can be seen in Mexico, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador or Brazil.[130] It is equally difficult to map out any stable patterns related to economic indicators and the severity of violence associated with TOC at the sub-national level. In 2011, the city of San Pedro Sula suffered the worldôs highest homicide rate, at 159 per 100,000, yet it is also the economic centre of Honduras, generating two thirds of the countryôs GDP. Generally however, urban areas, borderlands and international ports have higher homicide rates than other areas, indicating a likely correlation between violence and major trafficking routes.[131] The relationship between income and crime related to TOC is complex, and the lines of causality are not clear. However, it does appear that simplistic assumptions that crime is the result of poverty are best avoided.

2) Economic growth will undermine TOC because the state will be more effective at pursuing criminals, and deterring others from joining or supporting TOC: There is evidence to suggest that TOC often proliferates in contexts in which the stateôs capacity to provide access to security and justice is limited. Equally, where the state is unable to secure its own borders, prevent corruption within rule of law institutions or actively pursue actors through the criminal justice or law enforcement sectors, TOC is also more likely to exert major influence. A commonly articulated assumption flowing from this is that economic growth is an essential component of allowing states to develop and strengthen these institutions and extend its influence into areas where state presence is lacking or weak.

The evidence base might indicate that growth can play an important role in ensuring institutional capacity to uphold the rule of law is developed. For example, the Rule of Law index report demonstrates a clear correlation between rule of law and economic development.[132] However economic growth, and the strategies employed to try and promote it, can also have perverse impacts on the prevalence and impact of TOC on conflict and violence. For example, economic liberalisation policies in Europe and Latin America have been linked to significant increases in GDP, but have also facilitated the smuggling of drugs, arms, people and counterfeit goods and money.[133] The fall of the Berlin Wall meanwhile has been credited with freeing up a cadre of former Eastern European and Russian state security operatives, highly trained in surveillance, smuggling and violent intimidation. The subsequent liberalisation of markets and borders provided opportunities for these actors to branch out into criminal enterprise, becoming a new criminal elite in many countries across Europe.[134]

A major side effect of many economic growth strategies meanwhile has been a significant rise in inequality within states. The evidence base linking inequality and crime is not clear-cut; Paraguay and Costa Rica for example have roughly equal levels of inequality, however Costa Ricaôs levels of reported theft are almost 30 times those of Paraguay.[135] However, other studies do claim to show a relationship between income inequality and criminal violence (as measured by homicide rates).[136] Unbalanced growth can also exacerbate horizontal inequalities (between regional, ethnic, religious or other social categories), another clear risk factor for violent conflict and crime.[137] Economic growth is also often associated with demographic shifts, such as rapid urbanisation, which is in turn associated with weakened social cohesion and greater risks of violent crime.[138]

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[128] World Bank (2011) p 78
[129] All three countries are ranked as having 'high' levels of peace on Global Peace Index.
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2013_Global_Peace_Index_Report_0.pdf
[130] Benjamin Lessing, (2012). *When Business Gets Bloody: State Policy and Drug Violence*. Small Arms Survey, Geneva.
[131] UNODC (2014) *Global Study on Homicide 2014*, UNODC, Vienna.
[132] Although lines of causality are not clearly proven. World Justice Project, 2013, *Rule of Law Index report 2013*, World Justice Project, Washington DC.
[133] Europol, (2009), *OCTA: EU Organised crime threat assessment, 2009*. Europol, The Hague.
[134] Glenny, Misha, (2009).
[135] UNDP 2013, *Human Development Report 2013-14*, UNDP, New York
[136] Gutierrez et al, (2013), *Income Inequality and Crime: A Review and Explanation of the Time–series Evidence*,
[137] Stewart, F. (2010) *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict Understanding Group Violence in Multi-ethnic Societies*, Palgrave MacMillan: London
[138] World Bank (2011)

3) People engage with TOC because they lack alternative livelihood opportunities, therefore if alternatives were available they would not engage in illicit activities: It has long been argued that unemployment is a key predictor or driver of crime.[139] The World Bankôs Voices of the Poor project for example, finds that ñthe presence of unemployed and frustrated young men in post-conflict situations is often linked to higher levels of violence, substance abuse and gang activitiesò[140] Employment generation initiatives have therefore been commonly used as a means of removing a key vulnerability factor that drives violence associated with TOC.

However, as with economic growth, the relationship between employment and crime (especially TOC) is not clear-cut. Econometric studies have consistently failed to find a statistically significant correlation between employment and crime rates[141] (although this may be due to weaknesses in available data). It would appear that the nature of available jobs, and their impacts on social identities, notions of social justice and perceptions of respect play an important role in the decisions people take in terms of whether to pursue formal employment over engagement with illicit activities. For example, the World Development Report 2011 references research by Padilla on Puerto Rican gangs in Chicago, which ñstresses the insecure and demeaning nature of legal work opportunities compared with gang membership- which offered not only income but social respect and a sense of belonging.ò Similar sentiments were expressed by gangs in Guatemala, who ñdid so because they were searching for the support, trust and cohesion ï social capital ï that they maintained their families did not provide, as well as because of the lack of opportunities in the local context.ò[142]

Alternative livelihood strategies follow a similar logic to employment generation initiatives, although they have tended to be more explicitly linked to efforts to counter TOC, e.g. by encouraging farmers to grow alternatives to illicit crops such as poppy and coca. Despite some notable, but isolated successes, e.g. in parts of Bolivia and Northern Thailand, alternative livelihood programmes have been largely ineffective in countering TOC. [143] Like many of the employment initiatives outlined above, alternative livelihood programmes have too often failed to account for the wider political economy of the conflict, including the multiple reasons why people engage in illicit activities. Opium is for example, a largely non-perishable good which can be easily stored and sold during the hard winter months. Furthermore, the harvesting of poppies is a labour intensive process which provides significant seasonal employment for migrant labour in parts of rural Afghanistan. Many of the alternative crops proposed by alternative livelihood strategies however are unable to provide the same benefits to impoverished rural communities that are the main producers of the crop.[144] Arguably, the displacement of labour from on-farm poppy harvesting caused by alternative livelihood strategies has contributed to the support for Taliban fighters in Helmand province. [145]

4) If people are better educated they will not turn to crime, because they will have access to other means of generating a livelihood: A number of studies claim to demonstrate a causal link between educational achievement and crime rates in UK and US.[146] However the relationship is surprisingly under-researched, especially in developing countries.[147] Nonetheless, a number of programmes have sought to promote peace through education and skills development. For example, efforts to reintegrate former combatants (including gang members) back into society have focused on providing vocational training programmes. However, many have been implemented without any clear links to local labour markets, severely limiting their effectiveness.[148] Such programmes must however also account for the multiple reasons why people engage in illicit activities, as outlined above.

5) TOC networks are able to generate support because they allow for the provision of better basic services than the state: It is clear that in many contexts, TOC networks facilitate access to better basic services for communities than would be available through the state alone. The related assumption being that if the state were able to provide more and better access to basic services, this would undermine community support to TOC. This assumption is discussed under Theory of change 4: Cultural change.

What challenges/dilemmas do programmes face in attempting to measure progress under this theory of change?

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[139] E.g. see World Bank, (2007), *World development report 2007: Development and the Next Generation*. World Bank, Washington DC.
[140] Quoted in World Bank, 2011
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid. p.79
[143] Mansfeild, D. (2006) *Development in a Drugs Environment: A Strategic Approach to 'Alternative Development': A Discussion Paper by the Development-oriented Drug Control Programme (DDC),* GTZ. Eschborn
[144] These issues do not even account for the coercive drivers of poppy production, such as requirements to pay land tithes or repay loans in poppy often employed by local land owners and Taliban commanders.
[145] Mansfield, D (2013)
[146] E.g. see Machin, S. Marie, O. and Vujić, S. (2011): The Crime Reducing Effect of Education, *The Economic Journal, 121 (May) 463-484.,*
[147] Dammert, L , (2010) Can Education Reduce Violent Crime? *Americas Quarterly, Issue Fall* 2010
[148] World Bank, (2011).

The evidence base underpinning many of the assumptions outlined here is surprisingly weak. Despite many years of development programming focusing on economic development, there still appears to be little consensus on the mechanisms that link issues such as income levels, economic liberalisation policies, employment and educational achievement with criminal violence. The pool of research focusing on TOC related violence specifically is even more limited. In significant part this lack of consensus reflects the complexity and context specificity of each of these relations. However it may also be indicative of the fact that TOC has only recently come to be considered a development issue, and therefore an important topic of study by development practitioners.

The quality of some of the data necessary to capture impacts can be a challenge. For example, whilst some economic data is fairly reliable and comparable across countries (such as income and growth rate data), comparability of other datasets, including unemployment is particularly poor. This is largely due to different definitions and methodologies used across contexts. Where data is available and comparable, lines of causality can be difficult to distinguish. For example, it is not straightforward to establish whether people who stay in education and get a good education also have characteristics that make them less likely to go out and commit crime. In other words, correlation does not necessarily imply causality.

Approaches to measuring progress under this theory of change must also account for the fact that the nature of crime is intimately linked to the economic structure of the countries within which it operates; as an economy evolves, so does the nature of criminal activity. Economic development is therefore likely to result in shifts in the manifestations of TOC. Low income countries for example are likely to be net producers of or key transit routes for, illicit goods such as raw natural resources (gold, diamonds, opium etc.). They are unlikely however to be major consumers of these products. As economic development takes hold, disposable incomes increase and the capacities of states to crack down on the production or transit of illicit goods increases. These countries may therefore move away from production and transit of illicit goods, but increasingly become major consumers of such goods, as has been seen in increased demand for illicit wildlife products from Africa in many Asian markets, as well as increased consumption of illicit drugs in Brazil, North Africa and China in recent years.[149] Likewise, some types of crime are better able to operate in more economically developed nations, due to the quality of infrastructure or specialist expertise available. For example some types of cyber-crime, large-scale financial fraud and money laundering or meta-amphetamine production are all linked with countries with higher GDPs.[150]

These manifestations of TOC that are more prominent in economically developed nations tend to result in significantly lower levels of violence within these countries compared to other types of TOC. However they can have very significant impacts on conflict further down the value chain. The majority of international efforts to tackle smuggling of illicit goods for example, rely on supply side interventions that seek to cut the flow of such goods into major consuming countries. In doing so, violence is shifted towards sites of production and transit.[151] Likewise, outflows of capital from fragile and conflict affected countries into Western bank accounts may have a positive impact on the economies of the recipient countries, but clearly contribute to conflict, poor governance and under-development in countries of origin.[152]

We might therefore expect to see a decrease in levels of TOC-related violence at the national level as countries become richer. However the net impact on global insecurity might be an increase, with the most vulnerable populations being the ones who face the greatest hardship. It is essential that approaches to measuring the impact of interventions focused on economic transformation should therefore focus on changes in transnational dynamics as well as national-level trends.

[149] UNODC (2013) *World Drugs Report 2013*, UNODC, Vienna
[150] UNODC (2010) and UNODC (2013)
[151] See Theory of Change 1: Deterrence.
[152] Saferworld (2014)

What sorts of indicators might be applied to measure progress against this theory of change?



Theory of change 6: Global regulation

The power, reach and influence of TOC has expanded massively in the last 30 years, largely in line with globalisation trends.[153] Indeed, many analysts have argued that the success of TOC is only made possible by a combination of the deeply integrated nature of the global political, social and economic system, whilst legal and judicial systems largely remain fragmented and inconsistent across borders. This allows for TOC to piggy back on licit transactions and infrastructure, such as using the international banking system to channel illicitly generated funds rapidly across multiple jurisdictions, thereby making the funds practically untraceable. At the same time, TOC networks are able to exploit the lack of global integration of rule of law frameworks and institutions to evade capture or sanction, for example by basing operations in a country where the threat of sanction is low due to weak or underdeveloped legal frameworks. Equally, TOC networks may choose to base themselves in, or develop within, contexts where the capacity or willingness of the state to actively pursue them is poor, as may be the case with famous 419 internet scamming cases largely emanating from Nigeria.[154] Often those pursued by rule of law institutions in one country are also able to find refuge elsewhere, for example in countries where the threat of extradition is low. Famous examples of include the case of Carlos the Jackal (arrested in Sudan), Great Train Robber Ronnie Biggs (Brazil) or Julian Assange (taking refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London).

Articulation of theory of change

The theory of change can be articulated as follows:

> *If* we are able to improve harmonisation, cooperation and coordination between states on anti-TOC initiatives, whilst agreeing shared global transparency standards, *then* we will limit the ability of TOC networks to operate across international borders. This will limit their negative impact on conflict and violence *because* key actor groups in the public and private sectors will become more transparent and accountable to citizens making illicit activity harder to conceal, whilst law enforcement will become more efficient, effective and suitably resourced, and this will increase the risks and costs of operation for TOC groups.

This diagram further elaborates the logic underpinning this theory of change.



The implications for donor policy and practice of this theory of change include:

- *Establishing and promoting global standards in key sectors at risk of capture by TOC:* such initiatives include the Kimberly Process for the certification of conflict diamonds, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
- *Ensuring compliance with relevant global regulations relating to TOC:* A number of UN conventions have been agreed that seek to harmonise legal and judicial frameworks across countries and promote co-ordinated action

[153] UNODC (2010)
[154] 419 scams are so named after the article in Nigerian Criminal Code dealing with fraud.

against TOC.[155] These include UN conventions on TOC, the illicit drugs trade, international arms transfers and corruption.

- *Promoting active and constructive engagement with relevant global bodies, whilst seeking to maximise the effectiveness of these bodies:* Such as UN agencies (especially UNODC), international organisations and international law enforcement agencies. These bodies seek to coordinate anti-TOC initiatives or provide technical or financial assistance to member states.

What evidence is there that this theory of change is valid?
A number of assumptions underlie this theory of change. For each the available evidence is briefly discussed:

1) *Global standards are an effective mechanism for improving accountability and transparency in public and private institutions:* Overall the evidence to support this assumption is mixed. There have been a number of notable examples of global standards contributing to improved transparency and accountability in relevant sectors, with subsequent impacts on the prevalence of criminal activity and violence. For example, although not without its problems (some of which are outlined below), the Kimberley Process for the certification of diamonds has clearly had a significant role in stemming the flow of conflict diamonds out of West Arica, most notably Sierra Leone and Liberia. In doing so it has had a key role to play in disrupting the transnational market chain in conflict diamonds and contributing the facilitation of peace.[156] A key strength of this initiative appears to be that it has enjoyed strong buy-in from a range of key actors engaged in the trade in uncut diamonds, including state governments and the private sector. The active involvement of civil society from the very beginning of the Kimberley Process appears to have been a key factor in its success (at least in its first 10 years).

Likewise, initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have been effective in raising awareness of issues of criminal capture of key state resources (natural resources in the case of EITI and state funds for FATF) amongst policy makers and civil society. In turn, this has prompted policy and legal reform in a number of countries. For example, Ghana has responded positively following evaluation of compliance with FATF standards, e.g. by introducing new legislation and investing in capacity building and sensitisation programmes for banking regulators and oversight committees.[157] Nigeria meanwhile has enshrined a number of EITI principles into national law and the NEITI National Stakeholders Working Group has become a statutory body.[158] However, criminal capture of natural resource rents remains endemic.[159]

However, a number of common weaknesses have inhibited the potential impact of such global standards as a means of tackling TOC. The vast majority of global standards are voluntary. Consequently take-up of many of the most relevant standards relating to TOC has been relatively limited. For example, 12 years after initiation, 44 countries have signed on to EITI, of whom only 27 are considered compliant.[160] Where uptake has been significant, the non-binding nature of most global standards means that affiliation is no guarantee of implementation. For example, recent criticism of the Kimberley Process has focused on the inability or unwillingness of certain signatory states to take effective action when examples of non-compliance have been identified.[161] Lack of implementation can be compounded by overly complex standards. For example, no state has yet been found to be fully in compliance with the entire set of regulations and guidelines laid out by FATF. Conversely, when minimum standards are not ambitious enough, compliance may have a very limited impact on TOC and wider conflict issues ï a further criticism that has recently been levelled at the Kimberley Process.

2) *Global conventions will harmonise legal frameworks and therefore limit the ability of TOC to operate with impunity:* A number of global conventions have been developed, promoted and ratified in recent years that are explicitly focussed on TOC. When ratified, it is clear that such conventions can have a significant impact on harmonising approaches to tackling TOC, with significant potential impacts on tackling TOC. For example, a review

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[155] Notable examples include: United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC aka Palermo Convention), United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Convention on Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention), Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITIES or Washington Convention), Strasbourg Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

[156] Editorial: A Kimberley Process failure - Business Day Live – South Africa - June 06 2013. www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/editorials/2013/06/06/editorial-a-kimberley-process-failure

[157] ECOWAS (2010) *First Follow-Up Report Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: Ghana 2010*. Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa Report

[158] Balleny, Luke, (2013). *What impact has the EITI transparency initiative had on Nigeria?* Blog posted on Thomson Reuters Foundation, 26/05/2013. http://www.trust.org/item/20130526235456-nderv/

[159] Shaxson, N. (2009). *Nigeria's Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Just a Glorious Audit?*. Chatham House, London

[160] http://eiti.org/

[161] According to Global Witness; the scheme has failed three tests: it failed to deal with the trade in conflict diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire, was unwilling to take serious action in the face of blatant breaches of the rules over a number of years by Venezuela and has proved unwilling to stop diamonds fuelling corruption and violence in Zimbabwe. Global Witness - Press Release, 5th December 2011. Accessed Online: http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-leaves-kimberley-process-calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable

of the first 10 years since the adoption of the UN Convention on TOC (the Palermo convention) points to a number of key impacts, such as changes and improvements of laws in states including the United Arab Emirates and the United States. There has also been success in terms of increasing the number of investigations and criminal proceedings for human trafficking for sexual exploitation.[162]

However, the effectiveness of global regulation as a tool for combatting TOC, or breaking the link between TOC and conflict is constrained by a number of key factors. The process of developing, negotiating and agreeing global conventions can be extremely time-intensive. For example, it has taken nearly 20 year of campaigning by NGOs to reach agreement on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Even once a convention is agreed, ratification can be a laborious and fraught process: 10 years after adoption, one third of signatory states have not yet ratified the Palermo Protocols for example. Furthermore, once states have ratified global conventions, there is no guarantee that they will have the capacity to enforce regulation within their borders.

In some contexts, the ratification of global conventions may actually inhibit states from taking effective action to break the links between TOC and conflict. The Vienna Convention (relating to illicit drugs) for example has been interpreted in many contexts as requiring that domestic legal frameworks criminalise the possession and use of even small quantities of illicit drugs.[163] As such, it may act as a barrier to allowing states to adopt new or innovative approaches to anti-drug efforts (such as decriminalisation or legalisation ï see Theory of change 3: Managed adaptation of crime). The extremely lengthy process of agreeing global conventions can also act as a disincentive to embarking on reform processes once they have been agreed, potentially ôlocking-inô counter-productive policies.

There appears to be a correlation between the success of judicial harmonisation efforts and the strength of pre-existing and commonly accepted norms around key judicial concepts, such as human rights approaches and freedom of speech. This may help to explain why efforts to promote judicial harmonisation have been more successful at the regional rather than global level. For example, EU integration has allowed for greater law enforcement and judicial cooperation. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, thus far regional norms have remained weakly developed throughout the world aside from the example of Europe,[164] although even EU states have not been able to agree on a definition of TOC.[165]

3) Global bodies are effective mechanisms for coordinating action (including law enforcement efforts) as well as providing technical and financial assistance, which will limit the ability of TOC networks to operate with impunity:[166] It is clear that many states look to global bodies such as the UN for support, guidance and leadership in crafting and implementing approaches that seek to undermine the influence of TOC at the national and sub-national levels.[167] There is also some evidence to suggest that the conditionality requirements associated with joining an international body can stimulate beneficial internal reforms.[168] Global bodies, such as UNODC have also had a critical role in building the capacity of member states to target TOC networks more effectively or undermine the facilitation and support networks that allow TOC to operate with impunity. [169] UNODC also plays a unique and critical role in gathering, collating and analysing data related to a wide range of aspects of TOC.

International organisations such as the World Bank and IMF are also important in tackling TOC. For example, in 2011 the World Bank has pledged $1.5 billion in 2011 to fight TOC.[170] The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative is an example of an innovative partnership supported by the World Bank, UNODC and a wide range of member states.[171] These bodies can also have an important role in setting norms for international action on tackling TOC. For example, in 2010 the IMF suspended its programme with Afghanistan in the wake of the huge fraud case uncovered in the Afghan Kabul Bank. This stance was backed up by a number of other donors, sending an extremely strong message to the Government of Afghanistan at the time.[172]

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[162] Brusca, C. S. (2011). "Palermo Protocol: The First Ten Years after Adoption." *Global Security Studies*, *2*(3).
[163] Rolles and Eastwood (2012)
[164] Council on Foreign Relations (2012). *The Global Regime for Transnational Crime*. Jul 2012. Accessed Online: http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/global-regime-transnational-crime/p28656?cid=rss-economics-the global regime for transnat-070212
[165] European Parliament. *(*2011). *International Organised Crime in the European Union*. EU, Brussels
[166] A large range of global bodies have an explicit, or implicit impact on tackling TOC. These include Europol, Interpol, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Labour Organisation (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC), Organisation American States (OAS), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Bank, the World Health Organisation (WHO) amongst many others.
[167] Global Commission on Drugs. (2011).
[168] David-Barrett, L., & Okamura, K. (2013). "*The Transparency Paradox: Why do Corrupt Countries Join EITI?*." European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building, University of Oxford Working Paper No. 38.
[169] UNODC (2010)
[170] Shifter, M. (2012). *Countering Criminal Violence in Central America*. Retrieved May, 2014.
[171] See http://star.worldbank.org/star/
[172] Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (2012*) Report of the public inquiry into the Kabul Bank crisis,* Kabul.

However these global bodies also face a number of significant challenges in promoting better coordinated approaches to TOC. For example, several UN agencies have been criticised for being too conservative in their policy prescriptions, and for acting as the õprotector of traditional policyö.[173] In part this may be due to the fact that many are largely reliant on funding from a small number of donor countries, making it politically difficult for them to openly oppose donor-oriented strategies.[174]

Organisations such as Interpol and Europol seek to promote better co-operation and co-ordination across law enforcement agencies. There have been suggestions that expanding Interpolõs capabilities[175] and giving it enforcement powers will help to tackle TOC. However, effectively sharing information and enforcing laws over such a wide spectrum of countries is difficult at best.[176] National policing authorities for example, are often reluctant to share intelligence with counterparts in other countries, often in order to protect sources. This is possibly best illustrated by the low levels of co-ordination and intelligence sharing across the US- Mexico border, despite this being amongst the most important bilateral relationships in global crime control.[177]

What challenges/ dilemmas do programmes face in measuring progress under this theory of change?

It is relatively easy to capture data relating to membership of international conventions, global bodies or standards. This information is usually available on websites affiliated with global initiatives or bodies, and can usually be codified into clear categories (member/non-member, compliant/partly/non-compliant etc.). This can be important for assessing the degree of international buy-in to global reform processes, and can also be important for helping to establish a picture of emerging global norms, for example related to the global arms trade or international justice. They can also indicate willingness to focus domestic energies on key issues related to TOC at the national level.

However, such measures often do not in themselves tell us a lot about the impact of membership or compliance with such international initiatives on TOC, or the links between TOC and conflict. Although bodies like the FATF have agreed to increase the focus of its assessments on the implementation of its standards in practice, in some cases national affiliation with global bodies or conventions can also be used to hide a lack of genuine political will to address key issues to which conventions are relevant. Such data may also hide perverse impacts. Global conventions on the prohibition of illicit drugs, for example have been widely adopted (an indicator of success), but arguably have done little to impact on the scale of drug related TOC.

In order to get a clearer view of the impact of such bodies, agreements and standards, it is necessary to go deeper. For example, we can investigate the degree to which international agreements have been implemented at the national and sub-national levels, whether legislative changes and implementation and oversight mechanisms have been established or an assessment of whether suitable resources have been made available to support implementation. Correlations between membership of global initiatives and corresponding impacts on levels of conflict associated with TOC may also be useful. It is important also to bear in mind that the chain of causality running from agreement of global standards to real change for communities can be extremely long and complex. Real impacts may not therefore be observable until several years after agreements have been reached, whilst success is invariably impacted by a wide range of factors, making attribution very difficult.

[173] The Global Commission on Drugs Policy (2011).
[174] E.g. see Bewley-Taylor, D., & Trace, M. (2006). *The Funding of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; An Unfinished Jigsaw*. The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme. Report 11.
[175] The Global Regime for Transnational Crime. (2012).
[176] *CRS – report for Congress - March 2006* John R. Wagley Transnational Organized Crime: Principal Threats and U.S. Responses
[177] Castillo, Eduardo & Corcoran, Kathrine. (2013). "Mexico Ends Open Access for US Security Agencies" *AP: The Big Story.* http://bigstory.ap.org/.

What sorts of indicators might be applied to measure progress against this theory of change?



Box 3: Demand reduction: an alternative global approach?

The failure of policies that aim to counter criminal activity solely from the supply side, such as by targeting the production and trafficking of drugs, or combating the activities of human trafficking, has spurred growing interest in alternative approaches anchored in reducing demand. Instead of tackling the systemic roots of illicit economies, these approaches are targeted primarily at consumers in final markets, and seek to curb their appetite for drugs, prostitutes, clandestine labour, smuggled cigarettes, blood diamonds, endangered species or stolen antiquities.

A demand reduction approach seeks to stifle the illicit business by removing their source of income, and thus the possibility of profit, while protecting vulnerable people used in the supply chain. This approach has been embraced by European states and the international community. The 2009 UN Political Declaration on Drugs, as well as the EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020, both stress the importance of a balanced and holistic approach to drugs that combines demand and supply measures.[178] Similarly, the Swedish government has embraced a demand-focused strategy towards prostitution, one of the primary drivers of human trafficking to Europe: a law in 1999 decriminalized the sale of sex while criminalizing the purchase of it. Similar policing initiatives that target the buyers of sex rather than the providers have been embraced in many local districts in the United States and Europe.

Demand reduction comes in diverse forms, and has notched up some successes. The Swedish policy on the sex trade marks a robust shift in the focus of law enforcement efforts, and is officially reported to have reduced

[178] UNODC. (2009). *Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Pro*blem. Vienna: UN, European Commission. (2013). *The EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2012*. Brussels: EU

prostitution by 50 to 70 percent.[179] A number of civil society campaigns have also sought to reduce demand for illicit goods by raising the profile of such activities. For example the recent WildAid campaign, supported by Prince William, David Beckham and Yao Ming is seeking to reduce the global demand of illegal wildlife products through the use of multimedia campaigns, a global network of media partners and celebrity ambassadors. Efforts by NGOs to promote public awareness of conflict diamonds meanwhile were effective in raising public awareness of their prevalence within the market place. Assessing the impact of such initiatives on public demand (i.e. going beyond awareness raising to altering consumption patterns) for illicit goods is however difficult.

A fundamental criticism of demand reduction approaches is that their successes are limited in number, and are largely anecdotal. Although certain drug types have fallen in popularity for periods of time (e.g. heroin, crack cocaine), campaigns aimed at deterring young people from drug use have not managed to reduce drug use rates substantially in the United States over the last 30 years, and have failed to counter sharp rises in drug use in Western Europe over the last 15 years.[180] Many of these campaigns have failed to differentiate between different sorts of drug, and have done little to undermine the cultural cachet of certain narcotics popularized by the music, TV and film businesses. Likewise, sustained demand for cheap and exploitable labour, stolen antiquities, counterfeit goods or endangered species reflect certain structural economic conditions and material aspirations that would appear extremely hard to combat without increasing the legal penalties for final use. While this repressive approach can no doubt work, it does depend on increased resources for policing and the judicial system, and may prove extremely unpopular amongst the public on the demand side.

Analysis and Conclusions

This report has laid out a range of common theories of change that guide the design of programmes focussed on TOC. Many of these theories are overlapping and share common characteristics. For example, promoting improved transparency and accountability within key institutions of state (especially rule of law, security and justice institutions as well as public financial management systems) so as to build greater public confidence in both their fairness and effectiveness appears to be a common aim of several theories of change[181]. A targeted approach, incorporating elements of deterrence (including prioritising certain types of crime and criminal actors) alongside approaches to undermine structural drivers of crime, is also employed by several theories of change.[182] However, there are also contradictions between different theories of change. For example many of the approaches employed by deterrence strategies are directly contradictory to aspects of managed adaptation of crime. Furthermore some of the policies promoted by global regulations inhibit the capacities of states to adopt alternative strategies, driven by different theories of change.

It is also clear that programmes focussed on TOC are guided by a wide range of assumptions. Assessing the robustness of these assumptions (and measuring impact of these programmes) based on available evidence is challenging. The evidence base for many of these issues remains largely under-developed. Crime statistics for example are notoriously unreliable and often open to wide interpretation, even in countries with strong data gathering capabilities.[183] These challenges are only exacerbated in low income and conflict affected countries. Furthermore, the majority of crimes go unreported, meaning that multiple metrics must be employed to develop a picture of the prevalence of crime in any context. Definitional ambiguities, for example around what constitutes TOC against simply organised crime, or indeed unorganised crime (and even what constitutes crime, for example in a context lacking a developed legal framework or constitution) further complicate data gathering and analysis.

Where data is available, it has largely been generated from the law enforcement sector (reflective of the focus on most TOC focused efforts to date). Whilst this data is critical, it does not provide a comprehensive picture of the drivers of TOC, and its links with conflict, violence and insecurity. Nor does it provide evidence of what works in addressing TOC from a non-law enforcement perspective. Whilst data on possible drivers of TOC is often available through other sources (e.g. World Bank data), there may be issues of comparability between datasets generated from very different methodologies (e.g. there may be geographical or social biases in data gathering between surveys used to assess education and crime levels). The relatively under-developed nature of this evidence base also means that many of the lines of causality between variables (such as homicide rates and employment) remain highly contested, further complicating programme approaches.

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[179] Shively, Michael et al. (2012). *A National Overview of Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Efforts*. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice, p. vi.

[180] Robelo, Daniel. (2013). "Demand Reduction or Redirection? Channelling Illicit Drug Demand towards a Regulated Supply to Diminish Violence in Latin America." *Oregon Law Review* 91: 1227, pp 1227-1252

[181] Severing the links between crime and politics, Managed adaptation of crime, cultural change, economic transformation and possibly global regulation.

[182] Deterrence, Severing the links between crime and politics, Managed adaptation of crime, cultural change and global regulation

[183] For example, the UK Statistics Authority announced in 2014 that it would no longer approve crime figures generated by police in England and Wales due to a lack of confidence in their reliability. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25831906

A specific challenge that programmes must also grapple with relates to the extremely adaptable nature of TOC and its inherently global nature. Efforts to crack down on illicit behaviours in one context have been shown to result in a displacement of those activities to new, and often more fragile contexts. Likewise as the social, political and economic nature of a particular context changes, so does the nature of TOC. This may result in less violence within a country, but potentially more violence further down the value chain.

It is however important not to overstate the challenges associated with measuring impacts of these programmes. Much data is available and accessible, for example through the UNODC and World Bank datasets and various indices developed and maintained by civil society and academia globally, many of which are outline in Annex A. In addition to these datasets, it is often possible to gather new data to develop programme specific M&E frameworks and indicators. These could be drawn from (or inspired by) a wide range of sources, such as media monitoring services, specifically commissioned perception surveys or disaggregation of existing statistics by region, gender, age or social group etc. Furthermore, the last few years have seen a large increase in focus on alternative approaches (including developmental) approaches to tackling TOC. As this trend continues, so more research is being developed, new and innovative approaches are being employed, and the evidence base is becoming ever more developed. Concurrent efforts to strengthen the data gathering capacities of rule of law institutions are also likely to improve the reliability of national statistics in the coming years.

The complex nature of the relationship between TOC and conflict, coupled with the challenges associated with data collection and analysis underline the need to ensure that a suitable basket of indicators are employed to assess impact of specific programmes. Clearly these must be based on the specific theories of change that underpin a specific intervention. This in turn must be based on a solid understanding of the programming context. Given the global nature of TOC, and the necessity to assess impact at all levels, from local to global, it may also be important to seek to identify a common set of indicators that can be used to identify collective priorities, ensure momentum for addressing them and assess global impacts (although doing so falls outside of the remit of this paper).

Table 1 draws upon this analysis to identify a range of indicator types that may be most relevant for measuring impact for programmes from across the six identified theories of change. These indicator types are laid out according to perception, capability and ǿbjectiveôindicators, (see introduction section of this report). By indicating the most relevant types of indicators for each theory of change, we do not imply that these indicator types cannot be relevant for programmes guided by other theories of change; for example there may be instances where measures of social capital are highly relevant to global regulation. Furthermore, these suggested indicators are not intended to be prescriptive or exhaustive, but rather seek to guide the design of programme specific monitoring and evaluation frameworks. Where possible hyperlinks to relevant datasets are included.

Table 1: Indicator types relevant for measuring impact in programmes focussing on TOC

Indicator Type	Theory of Change						Possible datasets and sources
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Perception Based Indicators							
Public Perceptions of corruption, crime and security	■	■	■	■	■	■	Transparency International, World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, Gallup World Poll, World Bank Enterprise Survey, International Crime Victimisation Survey[184], Economist Intelligence Unit,
Levels of confidence in rule of law institutions	■	■	■	■	■		World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable Governance Indicators, Gallup World Poll
Social attitudes towards corruption, crime and the use of violence	■	■		■			World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, Surveys of Prison Populations
Measures of social capital		■		■	■		International Institute for Social Studies, Indices for Social Development, Legatum Institute Prosperity Index (social capital), OECD Better Life Index (quality of support networks)
Social attitudes towards the consumption of illicit goods				■	■	■	None known
Capacities Based Indicators							
Capacity, accountability and independence of rule of law institutions (including police and judiciary)	■	■	■	■	■	■	CPJ Impunity Index, Global Integrity Report, World Bank Stolen Assets recovery database, World Governance Indicators, Legatum Institute Prosperity Index (separation of powers)
Transparency and accountability of public		■		■	■	■	International Budget Partnership, FATF, World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators and CPIA,

[184] Data no longer collected, although questions may form basis for developing new indicators

financial management systems							
Existence, robustness and appropriateness of anti-TOC legislation							Basel Institute on Governance Anti Money Laundering Index, Global Integrity Report, IDEA Political Finance Database,
Quality of natural resource governance							Revenue Watch Institute Resource Governance Index,
Presence and capacity of holistic drug treatment regimes							Assessments based on International Standards on Drug Use Prevention, UNODC
Access to information							Freedom House Freedom of the press index, Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index,
ôObjectiveôIndicators							
Levels of violence/ violent crime							IEP Global Peace Index (internal Peace Indicators) and Positive Peace index, Uppsala Institute Conflict Data Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database, UNODC crime and justice statistics,
Estimates of overall size and value of TOC (global and national)							UNODC statistics and analysis,[185] Economist Intelligence Unit, World Bank World Governance Indicators (political stability and absence of violence), FATF, Global Financial Integrity
Assessments of level of demand for illicit goods							UNODC drug use statistics,
Profile of prisoners, overall prison populations and conditions							International Centre for Prison Studies World Prison Brief,
Access to and quality of state provision of basic services, especially education							UNDP Human Development Index, Legatum Institute Prosperity Index (Education)
Health indicators amongst actors involved in illicit activities							WHO datasets, National Drug Use and Health surveys, UNODC drug use statistics
Macro-economic data							World Bank
Quality and nature of employment							Legatum Institute Prosperity Index (Entrepreneurship and opportunity), World Bank
Horizontal inequalities							Economist Intelligence Unit, International Institute for Social Studies, Indices for Social Development, UNDP Human Development Index (inequality),
Membership of relevant global bodies compliance with relevant international treaties, conventions and standards							UN Database on multilateral treaties, UN panel reports (where available), EITI secretariat, FATF, Kimberley Process, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, Publish What You Pay, Global Witness

Conclusion

TOC is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that is deeply intertwined with social, political and economic dynamics of societies at local, national and global levels. Developmental approaches therefore have a critical role to play in developing holistic, multi-sectorial strategies for tackling TOC, although more research is needed to better understand exactly what works in different contexts, and why. Donor agencies have an essential role to play in helping to develop this evidence base, through employing innovative approaches, applying rigorous monitoring and evaluation of programmes, investing in research and building the capacities of local data gathering capacities, such as national statistics agencies and accurate crime reporting initiatives.

The similarities and overlaps between the different theories of change outlined in this paper suggest that many approaches can and should be used together. Furthermore, the existence of linkages between the various levels of the system within which TOC operates also suggests that holistic strategies which draw on different approaches are likely to have a higher impact. In practice the onus will most likely fall on the national government to establish holistic development and security strategies that are informed by an understanding of the dynamics of TOC. Donors may have a critical role to play in informing the development of these strategies, as well as supporting

[185] See UNODC (2011), for outline of possible methodologies.

particular aspects of these strategies. This will require significant co-ordination and co-operation between donors and national governments, as well as within the donor community.

It is also clear that co-ordinated, global action to tackle TOC is required. TOC is in large part, driven by the demand for illicit goods in developed nations, and made possible by the establishment of global infrastructure, rules and regulations that primarily benefit high income states. The most harmful impacts on conflict and security meanwhile, are disproportionately focused on the poorest and most vulnerable communities in low and middle income states. Donor governments can have a critical role in catalysing global approaches that seek to undermine the conditions in which TOC is able to thrive at each stage in value chain. The success of domestic policies in ódevelopedôn ations for example should be informed by global as well as national considerations, such as the potential for the displacement of violence to weaker and more vulnerable countries and communities.

Finally, approaches to tackling TOC at local, national and global levels will require significant input from different agencies within donor governments. This may include, amongst others ministries responsible for development, rule of law, foreign and home affairs. It is essential therefore that donors are able to promote joined-up, whole of government approaches in their efforts to support anti-TOC initiatives. This may require the development of a common understanding of TOC across government departments and the clear articulation of common goals, objectives and approach.

Annex A: Useful Transnational Organised Crime Related Datasets

These tables present information about relevant datasets that could be used to develop appropriate indicators relating to transnational organised crime. Much of the text included here is taken from a previous CCVRI product, Defining and Measuring External Stress Factors the Lead to Conflict in the Context of the post 2015 Development Agenda.[186] This data has been complemented with a review of additional datasets of relevance to TOC. This is not a comprehensive list of all datasets.

THE ILLICIT DRUGS TRADE	
UNODC World Drugs Report **Link:** unodc.org/wdr/	The World Drug Report, published annually since 1999, presents comprehensive information on the illicit drug situation. It provides detailed estimates and trend analysis on production, trafficking and consumption in the opium/heroin, coca/cocaine, cannabis and amphetamine-type stimulants markets.
	Example indicator: Estimated profits generated by global trade in cocaine and heroin.
UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring Surveys **Link:** unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/index.html	Annual surveys are carried out to gather data on estimated total areas under crop cultivation, eradication efforts and farm-gate prices. These typically include analysis of GIS imaging, economic modelling and village surveys. Opium surveys have been conducted in Afghanistan each year since 2000, and in Laos and Myanmar since 2003. Annual coca surveys have been carried out in Colombia and Peru since 2003, and Bolivia since 2004. Irregular cannabis surveys have been carried out in Morocco and Afghanistan since 2005. These surveys provide the most comprehensive assessments of the production of illicit drugs.
	Example indicator: Estimated volume of opium production at national and sub-national levels.
UNODC Statistics on Drugs Use **Link:** unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/drug-use.html	UNODC collects and analyses data on the extent, patterns and trends in drug use and its health consequences through Annual Reports Questionnaires (ARQ), including household and school surveys, submitted by Member States. ARQ's are submitted to all UN member states, although not all report back. For example, in 2012, 192 ARQ's were sent out, with only 94 responses. More than 80% of European states responded, compared to only 20% of African states.[187] ARQs capture national level data on: • Prevalence of drug use among the general population • Prevalence of drug use among youth • Treatment demand
	Example indicator: Heroin use amongst young people.
UNODC Statistics on Drug Trafficking and Prices **Link:** unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/drug-trafficking.html	UNODC collects and analyses data on drug trafficking trends, including arrest, seizures, price and purity of illicit drugs submitted by the Member States through the Annual Reports Questionnaires (ARQ). However, as noted above, response rates to ARQ's vary dramatically between member states. Furthermore, much of this data (especially seizure data) is open to significant interpretation (outlined in the body of the report). ARQs capture national level data on: • Drug seizures (national totals) • Significant individual drug seizure reports • Price and purity of drugs • Laboratory seizures
	Example indicator: Retail and wholesale prices of illicit drugs as an indicator of the supply of drugs reaching local market place.
UNODC Statistics on Drug-related Crime	UNODC classify Total Drug-Related Crimes as being "all intentional acts that involve the cultivation; production; manufacture; extraction; preparation; offering for sale; distribution; purchase; sale; delivery on any terms whatsoever; brokerage; dispatch; dispatch in transit; transport; importation; exportation; possession or trafficking of internationally controlled drugs."Data is collected at

[186] Saferworld, (2014)
[187] UNODC, 2012. *World Drugs Report, 2012, Statistical Annex: Methodology*. UNODC, Vienna.

Link: unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html	the national level from police statistics. As such, data sets are limited by capacity of national police data gathering systems. **Example indicator:** Total Drug-Related Crimes at the national level, number of police-recorded offences.
National Drug Use and Health Surveys **Links:** US: drugabuse.gov/national-survey-drug-use-health UK:gov.uk/government/publications/drug-misuse-declared-findings-from-the-2011-to-2012-crime-survey-for-england-and-wales-csew-second-edition EU:emcdda.europa.eu/stats12	Important sources of information for assessing scale of demand, primarily in developed nations. Questions could be applied in a range of contexts without current annual surveys to gather data on consumption patterns in producing and transit countries. These can be important for assessing demand-side indicators as well as perception-based indicators. **Example indicators:** • How easy is it to buy cocaine/ heroin in your community • Percentage of persons 12 years of age and over with any illicit drug use in the past month • Drug use in prisons • Drug-related infectious diseases

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERANCE DATASETS	
Resource Governance Index (RGI) **Link:** http://www.revenuewatch.org/rgi	The RGI scores and ranks countries based on a detailed questionnaire completed by researchers with expertise in the extractive industries. The Index assesses the quality of four key governance components: Institutional and Legal Setting; Reporting Practices; Safeguards and Quality Controls; and Enabling Environment. It also includes information on three special mechanisms used commonly to govern oil, gas and mineralsð state-owned companies, natural resource funds and subnational revenue transfers. **Example indicator:** Score on RGI
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights **Link:** voluntaryprinciples.org/	Lays out guidance and principles for companies and governments about responsible natural resource extraction practices. Information is provided on companies and governments that have signed up to the principles, although information on compliance is not readily available. **Example Indicators:** Percentage of major extractive companies operating in (country) that have signed on to the Voluntary Principles.
EITI Secretariat **Link:** http://www.eiti.org/countries	The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) encourages resource rich countries and large extractive companies to promote transparency of revenue flows. It rates countries as candidate, compliant or suspended, according to adherence to transparency benchmarks and indicators. **Example indicator:** Has (country) produced EITI report, detailing revenue received from extractive industries?
Publish What You Pay, Revenue Watch Institute and Global Witness **Links:** publishwhatyoupay.org/ globalwitness.org/ revenuewatch.org/	All three organisations gather and publicise information about degree of revenue transparency in different resource rich countries as well as major consuming countries. They can also be useful resources for identifying the capacities of local civil society to monitor natural resource governance at the local and national levels. **Example indicator:** Existence and impact of legislation on promoting transparency in natural resource revenue flows.

CORRUPTION DATASETS	
Global Integrity Report	Global Integrity Report provides analysis of, and data on, integrity and controls on corruption within public administrations and legal frameworks. Each country assessment contained in the Global Integrity Report comprises a qualitative

Link: www.globalintegrity.org/global-report/what-is-gi-report/	Reporterôs Notebook and a quantitative Integrity Indicators scorecard. The latter assesses the existence, effectiveness, and citizen access to key governance and anti-corruption mechanisms through over 300 indicators. They are scored by a lead in-country researcher and blindly reviewed by a panel of peer reviewers, a mix of other in-country experts as well as outside experts. It published annual reports from 2004-2011 (covering 31 countries in 2011) ï but is currently revising its methods. Vera institute of justice has also documented the process of piloting similar indicators (on transparent procurement decisions and bidding processes for public contracts).
	Example indicator: Score for government conflicts of interest safeguards, checks & balances
Transparency International **Link:** www.transparency.org/research/	Transparency International provides a range of data on levels of corruption. Perhaps the most useful and relevant for measuring progress on illicit financial flows from the ósupply sideôis the bribe payers index, which ranks the likelihood of companies from leading economies to win business abroad by paying bribes. The Global Corruption Barometer, published eight times since 2003, in 2013 offered data on public experiences of corruption in 107 countries. A fuller range of data on most developing countries is provided by the corruption perceptions index, which measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 177 countries and territories.
	Example indicator: 'Is the government effective in the fight against corruption?ô (global corruption barometer survey question); corruption perceptions index score
World Justice Project **Link:** http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Index_Report_2012.pdf	The World Justice Project compiles data on the rule of law and justice. Its third annual rule of law index report in 2012-13 covered 97 countries, providing data on 48 indicators on a range of relevant topics ï including absence of corruption, open government, regulatory enforcement ï presented in innovative and user-friendly ways. Its data are drawn from two surveys: one for the general public and another for óqualifiedôor expert respondents.
	Example indicator: Absence of corruption score
IDEA Political Finance **Link:** http://www.idea.int/publications/political-finance-regulations/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=52121	International IDEAôs database on Political Finance is a leading source of comparative information on political finance regulations. It includes laws and regulations from 180 individual countries.
	Example indicator: Presence of financial transparency legislation for political parties.

ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS DATASETS	
Global Financial Integrity **Link:** iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2013/2013report.html	Global Financial Integrity has produced a number of reports and accompanying data to estimate the cross-border flow of illegal money. As such it is a primary source for datasets on illicit financial flows from developing countries over multiple years.
	Example indicator: Volume of illicit financial flows
Financial Action Task Force **Link:** www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/	The most important international initiative to tackle illicit financial activity, the Financial Action Task Force, monitors both the legal framework for compliance of its 40 recommendations and their implementation in practice. Countries will receive scores on both issues. It also publishes a list of óhigh risk and non-cooperative jurisdictionsô At country level, indicators could be derived from FATF analysis of compliance.
	Example indicator: FATF compliance status (High-risk and non-cooperative, not making sufficient progress, Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance in an on-going process, no longer subject to monitoring)
Basel Institute on Governance **Link:**	The Basel AML Index is a country risk ranking to measure the risk of money laundering / terrorist financing and other relevant aspects, such as financial standards and public transparency. It aggregates third party data from sources such as the FATF, World Bank, and the World Economic Forum to assess a country's overall money laundering risk.

http://index.baselgovernance.org/	**Example indicator:** Anti-money laundering index score
International Budget Partnership **Link:** http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/	The International Budget Partnership considers the publication of and provides indicators on budgetary transparency at the national level in its Open Budget Survey and Index. The 2012 Survey measures whether governments in 100 countries produce and disseminate to the public 8 key budget documents recommended by international good practices. It also examines effective budget oversight and public participation in national budget decision making. Country rankings are built up from a set of 125 indicators.
	Example indicator: Score on the regularity and timeliness of budget and spending data (from the Open Budget Index)
World Economic Forum – Global Competitiveness Report **Link:** www.weforum.org/content/pages/competitiveness-library	The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report has been produced annually since 2009. Today it assesses the competitiveness landscape of 148 economies, providing a profile of each and an extensive section of data tables with global rankings covering over 100 indicators. The indicators are derived from data from other multilateral agencies and WEFôs own Executive Opinion Survey ï a survey of business peopleôs perceptions. The survey has been conducted annually for a growing number of countries for the last 35 years and includes a section on bribery, ethics and corruption that is a useful source for perceptions of corruption among businesses who are likely to be affected by it.
	Example indicator: ‘To what extent does organised crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses in your country?ô(Global Competitiveness Report survey question)

DATASETS RELATING TO OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF TOC	
UNODC Crime and Justice Statistics **Link:** https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html	UNODC collects data on crime and the operation of criminal justice systems in order to make policy-relevant information and analysis available in a timely manner to the international community. UNODC works on the development of standards for national crime and criminal justice information systems and for the conduct of victimization surveys. The office also aims to enhance the cross-national comparability of data through the development of key indicators and data reporting tools. The quality of data varies significantly in this context according to local data generating capacity.
	Example indicator: Homicide rates
Committee to Protect Journalists: Impunity Index **Link:** http://www.cpj.org/tags/impunity-index	CPJ's Impunity Index calculates the number of unsolved journalist murders as a percentage of each country's population. For this index, CPJ examined journalist murders that occurred between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2012, and that remain unsolved. Only those nations with five or more unsolved cases are included on this index.
	Example indicator: Impunity Index score
International Centre for Prison Studies World Prison Brief (WPB) **Link:** http://www.prisonstudies.org/world-prison-brief	The WPB is a data-base which provides information about prison systems throughout the world. It thus enables more evidence-based discussion of ways to improve prison systems in accordance with international human rights standards. In each country page information is provided on prison populations and prison population rates per 100,000 of the national population, on the use of imprisonment for women and juveniles, on the extent of pre-trial imprisonment and on prison overcrowding, as well as a record of the national ministries responsible for prisons and contact details for prison administrations. Information is updated on a monthly basis using data from reputable sources. All countries are covered however, not all data is recent.
	Example indicator: Prison population per 100,000

MEMBERSHIP OF GLOBAL CONVENTIONS	
UN Database on Multilateral Treaties **Link:** treaties.un.org	The UN Treaty collection documents which countries have signed up to multilateral treaties. This information can be helpful for assessing the commitment shown by national governments to address the illicit drug trade. However, this is no indication of implementation. Furthermore, many of these treaties have been criticised for having a disproportionate focus on supply-side dynamics.
	Example indicator: Is (country) party to international instruments related to drug control, specifically: (i) the Single Convention on Narcotic Drug Use (1961 amended); (ii) the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971); (iii) UN Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)?

CONFLICT DATASETS	
Global Peace (GPI) and Positive Peace Indices (PPI) **Link:** http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index	The GPI measures the ñabsence of violence and absence of the fear of violenceò using socio-economic and statistical indicators of interior and exterior conflict as well as the degree of social security and militarization. The PPI compliments it by attempting to broaden our understanding of international peace by monitoring ñformal and informal institutions that move a society away from violence and towards peace,ò such as the quality of business environment, the corruption level of the government, the availability of education, and the flow of information and resources.
	Example indicator: Score on GPI
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme **Link:** http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/	UCDP provides detailed data on a range of conflict issues. Conflicts are not categorised by the degree to which they are driven by natural resources. However, it would be possible to draw upon UCDP datasets, complemented with an assessment of role of natural resources as a driver of conflict to develop global or national level indicators.
	Example indicator: Deaths in conflicts fuelled by natural resource revenues

ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT DATASETS	
World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) **Link:** http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia/cluster/overall-cpia-score	The World Bank provides a range of data relevant to the quality of governance and management of revenues, in a range of different datasets. The CPIA is a diagnostic tool that is intended to capture the quality of a countryôs policies and institutional arrangements. It offers ratings on financial management, transparency, accountability and corruption.
	Example indicator: Quality of Public Administration
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators **Link:** http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home	The Worldwide Governance Indicators (which provide aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996ï 2012, for six dimensions of governance) include further scores on órregulatory qualityôand ócontrol of corruptionô
	Example indicator: Public trust in politicians
World Bank Enterprise Survey	Enterprise Surveys provide data on perceptions of businesses from over 135,000 establishments in 135 countries, including many developing countries. Data are used to create over 100 indicators that benchmark the quality of the business

Link: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/enterprise-surveys	environment, including a number of indicators on levels of corruption. Each country is surveyed every 3 to 4 years. Country level surveys sometimes include specific questions not included in international datasets. Surveys are conducted by private contractors who are independent of government.
	Example indicator: Percentage of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint.
World Bank World Development Indicators **Link:** http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators	The WDI is the primary World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially-recognized international sources. It includes a wide range of relevant composite indicators relating to energy and mining, environment, labour and social protection, economy and growth and private sector development.
	Example indicator: Strength of legal rights index (0=weak to 10=strong)
Stiftung Sustainable Governance Indicators **Link:** http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-8F4259C0-24574219/bst_engl/hs.xsl/prj_52957_53423.htm	The Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) examine governance and policymaking in the 31 OECD member states in order to evaluate each country's need for and ability to carry out reform.
	Example indicator: To what extent can citizens obtain official information?

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DATASETS	
Human Development Index **Link:** http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi	The Human Development Index (HDI)is a summary of human development around the world and implies whether a country is developed, still developing, or underdeveloped. Data sets are collected according to sub-indices such as; education, health, social integration, environment, innovation and technology, command over resources, gender inequality, international trade flows of goods and services.
	Example indicator: Functional literacy rates, disaggregated by age, sex etc.
International Institute for Social Studies, Indices for Social Development **Link:** http://www.indsocdev.org/	The Indices of Social Development (ISD) brings together 200 indicators, synthesising them into a usable set of measures to track how different societies perform along six dimensions of social development: Civic Activism, Clubs and Associations, Intergroup Cohesion, Interpersonal Safety and Trust, Gender Equality, Inclusion of Minorities.
	Example indicator: % reads newspaper
Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index **Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index** **Links:** http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2014 http://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php	The Freedom of the Press index is an annual survey of media independence in 197 countries and territories. The index assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom in every country in the world, analyzing the events of each calendar year. It provides numerical rankings and rates each country's media as "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." Country narratives examine the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, and economic factors that affect access to information. The Press Freedom Index that Reporters Without Borders publishes every year measures the level of freedom of information in 179 countries. It reflects the degree of freedom that journalists, news organisations and netizens enjoy in each country, and the efforts made by the authorities to respect and ensure respect for this freedom.
	Example indicator: Number of journalists jailed

Legatum Institute – Prosperity Index **Link:** http://www.prosperity.com/#!/	The Legatum Prosperity Index is an annual ranking of 142 countries. The ranking is based on a variety of factors including wealth, economic growth, education, health, personal well-being, and quality of life.
	Example indicator: Freedom of speech.

MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PERCEPTION SURVEYS AND OTHER RELEVANT DATASETS	
Gallup World Poll **Link:** www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/en-us/worldpoll.aspx?ref=f	Gallup conducts surveys in 160 countries, including a range of conflict-affected contexts (e.g. Somaliland, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Yemen) on at least an annual basis ï and sometimes more frequently. Its public perceptions data is available to purchase, including questions on overall levels of corruption and the sufficiency of government anti-corruption efforts.
	Example indicator: Do you think the government is doing enough to fight corruption or not?
Economist Intelligence Unit **Link:** http://www.eiu.com/home.aspx	The Economist Intelligence Unit provides forecasting and advisory services through research and analysis. For example the Business environment ranking and index 2014.
	Example indicator: Economic forecasting and credit risk

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