
Criterion 7: End-use and diversion

Indonesia

For some years, the end-use of UK arms exported to Indonesia has given serious cause for concern amongst human rights groups. For example, in April 1996 UK-built Scorpion tanks were used to assault a university in what was then the city of Ujung Pandang; in May 1998 UK-built Tactica water cannons were regularly used on demonstrators; in November of the same year, Scorpion tanks were again used to suppress student protests; in 1999 UK-built Hawk jets were used over East Timor for the purpose of intimidating the local population.¹ These abuses took place despite the claim by the UK Government that assurances had been received from the Indonesian Government that UK-built equipment would not be used to commit acts of internal repression.² In 2003 it was alleged that UK-built equipment was once again being deployed with Saracen armoured vehicles, Hawk jets and Scorpion tanks reportedly being used in Aceh.³

The recent use of UK-sourced arms in Aceh occurred despite statements by the UK Government that they were satisfied with assurances from the Indonesian Government that equipment of UK origin would not be used to violate human rights. This despite the fact that in June 2003 the senior Indonesian military spokesman in Aceh, Colonel Ditya Sudarsono said of the Scorpion deployment to Aceh, that “They will become a key part of our campaign to finish off the separatists”. When asked whether the UK might be unhappy at this deployment, Colonel Sudarsono replied “Maybe later the British foreign minister will have a fit”.⁴ In its May 2004 report, the QSC’s concluded that it had seen “no evidence that the Government has taken any action (other than talking to the Indonesian authorities) to investigate claims that British-built military equipment has been used in violation of human rights or offensively in Aceh. This calls into question the importance of such assurances in the eyes of the Government”.⁵

In response to the QSC report the UK Government stated that it had tried to find footage of UK-built military equipment being used in Aceh, that officials from the British Embassy in Jakarta had “immediately enquired about the reports”, and that the issue had been raised with senior Indonesian Government officials. Following these enquiries the UK Government concluded that, “to date we have no reason to believe

¹ ‘Scorpions move in on rebels as Indonesia reneges on weapons pledge to Britain’, John Aglionby & Richard Norton-Taylor, *The Guardian*, 24 June 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4697448-103547,00.html>.

² *Ibid.*

³ ‘Ministers flout arms sales code’, Richard Norton-Taylor, *The Guardian*, 6 December 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4813557-103685,00.html> 19 October 2004.

⁴ *Op cit.*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4697448-103547,00.html>.

⁵ QSC Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmdfence/390/39007.htm> HC390.

that British-built military equipment has been used in violation of the [Indonesian Government's] assurances".⁶

Arms export licences to Indonesia	2003	Jan–Mar 2004	Apr–Jun 2004
Value of SIELs granted (£m)	12.5	5.5	3.5
Number of SIELs granted (refused/revoked)	110 (5)	41 (0)	48 (2)
Number of OIELs granted (refused/revoked) with regard to Indonesia	13 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)
Number of incorporation SIELs granted (refused/revoked)	4 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)
Number of SITCLs granted with Indonesia as destination	n/a	n/a	0
Number of OITCLs granted with Indonesia as destination	n/a	n/a	1

Over the past decade, the track record of the Indonesian government as regards its use of equipment of UK origin in the abuse of human rights, on occasion in direct contradiction of assurances given, is a matter of considerable disappointment. Taken together with the apparent lack of concern in senior military circles within Indonesia regarding end-use assurances given to the UK Government it cannot be expected that existing or further assurances given by the Indonesian Government would be honoured. Accordingly, under criterion 7, Saferworld would expect a prohibition with regard to the export to Indonesia of any police and military goods – including parts, components and ammunition therefor – which have obvious application in internal repression; a similar prohibition should operate with regard to major conventional weaponry which could be used to facilitate breaches of human rights.

Licences of greatest concern under criterion 7

SIELs 2003: ballistic shields, components for aircraft machine guns, components for combat aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanks, general military aircraft components, gun silencers, military image intensifier equipment, missile launching equipment, technology for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the production of military aero-engines, technology for the use of aircraft cannons, technology for the use of combat aircraft, weapon sights

OIELs 2003: components for combat aircraft, technology for the use of combat aircraft

SIELs January–March 2004: components for aircraft cannons, components for combat aircraft (2 licences), components for military aero-engines, components for munitions launching equipment, general military aircraft components (2 licences), general military vehicle components, technology for the use of combat aircraft (2 licences), technology for the use of general military aircraft components, technology for the use of military aero-engines, technology for the use of munitions launching equipment

SIELs April–June 2004: components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters (3 licences), components for military aero-engines (2 licences), munitions launching equipment, technology for the use of aircraft cannons, technology for the use of combat aircraft (5 licences), technology for the use of military aero-engines (3 licences), technology for the use of munitions launching equipment

SIELs-Incorporation, April–June 2004: components for combat helicopters

⁶ *Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, Response from the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry, October 2004, para. 19, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/CM6357.pdf>.*

Iraq

The establishment of new security forces in Iraq has involved the acquisition by the Iraqi Interim Authority of significant amounts of new weaponry. Figures released by the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq state that for the month of October 2004 Iraqi security forces received, for example, 12,000 AK-47 rifles, 29,163 variants of 9mm pistols, 4 million 9mm pistol rounds, 12 million AK-47 rounds, 60 Soviet-made PKM machine guns, 594 RPK Soviet light machine guns, 322,000 shotgun shells and 5,248 grenades.⁷ However questions remain as to the training, organisation and reliability of the Iraqi security forces.

In September 2004 it was reported that while there were 82,051 Iraqi police officers on the payroll, only 32,880 had received training under US guidance, and, of that figure, only 8,200 had received the full eight-week training course.⁸ Furthermore given the speed at which recruitment is taking place and the growing array of Iraqi security forces including the Iraqi Army, the National Guard, the Iraqi Prevention Force and the Special Operation Forces, together with the Department of Border Enforcement and the Facilities Protection Service,⁹ it has been claimed that the exact number of Iraqi security officers is not known, with officials claiming that record-keeping is primitive and chaotic.¹⁰

In addition there have been more specific problems with Iraqi police or security forces turning their weapons on coalition forces and supporting the uprising by Moqtada al-Sadr¹¹ or joining the insurgents in Fallujah.¹²

New recruits to Iraq's security forces have also engaged in criminal activities. For example, in March 2004 two American contractors and their Iraqi translator were shot dead at a police checkpoint by Iraqi police, who then took the car in which they had been travelling.¹³ During the clashes around Najaf in August between US-led forces and forces loyal to al-Sadr, Iraqi police were reported to have threatened, and even shot at, journalists before raiding the hotel where they were staying and arresting several.¹⁴ In addition, accusations of police corruption are widespread along with civilian complaints that the police establish checkpoints in order to extract bribes.¹⁵

Along with the problems of the accountability and training of Iraq's own security forces, the presence in Iraq of 25 private security firms (PSC)¹⁶ has created a further problem of their accountability and regulation. In all there are estimated to be about 15,000 PSC employees in Iraq, of which about 6,000 are armed, making them the second largest contributor to coalition forces after the US military.¹⁷

There remains however a 'grey zone' between the roles of PSC employees as bodyguards and their role in combat situations.¹⁸ For example it is reported that PSC employees have been used to snatch suspected Saddam Hussein loyalists and have

7 'Multinational Command Supplies Iraqi Security Forces', *US Department of Defence*, 1 November 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2004/n11012004_2004110103.html.

8 Walter Pincus, 'US Says More Iraqi Police Are Needed as Attacks Continue', *Washington Post*, 28 September 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A55070-2004Sep27?language=printer>.

9 *Ibid.*

10 *Ibid.*

11 'Iraqi police defect to Sadr', *News.com.au*, 13 April 2004, http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,9265904^1702,00.html.

12 Damien McElroy, 'New Iraqi police fight US troops who trained them', *The Daily Telegraph*, 27 June 2004, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/06/27/wirq127.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/06/27/ixnewstop.html>.

13 'US fears Iraqi police were behind the deaths of 2 civilians', *International Herald Tribune*, 12 March 2004, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/509983.html>.

14 Adrian Blomfield, 'Police fire at reporters as US tanks roll up to shrine', *telegraph.co.uk*, 16 August 2004, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/08/16/wirq216.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/08/16/ixnewstop.html>.

15 David Enders, 'Iraqi police a law unto themselves', *Asia Times Online*, 3 February 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FB03Ak01.html.

16 Tom Squitieri, 'Role of security companies likely to become more visible', *Usatoday.com*, 1 April 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-04-01-security-usat_x.htm.

17 Jamie Wilson, 'Private security firms call for more firepower in combat zone', *The Guardian*, 17 April 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1193871,00.html>.

18 *Ibid.*

been involved in operating checkpoints usually operated by US soldiers.¹⁹ Furthermore there are reports of fire-fights between Iraqi insurgents and PSC employees; in April 2004 it was reported that there were clashes between PSC employees working for the Blackwater Security Consulting and insurgents in Najaf in which an unknown number of Iraqis were killed.²⁰ Some PSC employees have reportedly claimed to be “accountable to nobody”.²¹ This raises serious questions about the role and accountability of PSC employees in Iraq, and, consequently, whether UK arms exports to Iraq could or should be destined for PSC end-use.

Arms export licences to Iraq	2003	Jan–Mar 2004	Apr–Jun 2004
Value of SIELs granted (£m)	2.0	7.0	25.0
Number of SIELs granted (refused/revoked)	24 (0)	11 (1)	26 (0)
Number of OIELs granted (refused/revoked) with regard to Iraq	1 (0)	0 (0)	3 (0)
Number of incorporation SIELs granted (refused/revoked)	1 (0)	0 (0)	4 (0)
Number of SITCLs granted with Iraq as destination	n/a	n/a	2
Number of OITCLs granted with Iraq as destination	n/a	n/a	0

Military equipment gifted by the Government during financial year 2003/04

3,200 hand held and 300 vehicle radios	£1m
13 GAZ trucks	£159,000

The significant problems that are occurring in terms of the discipline, organisation and accountability of the new Iraqi security services must call into question the UK Government’s decision to authorise the supply of such large quantities of small arms to the new Iraqi security forces, for example the licensing for export of 21,428 semi-automatic pistols in the period April–June 2004. While the need for internal security in Iraq is not in question, the supply of increasing amounts of arms should only be undertaken to official forces which have been properly trained and where clear accountability mechanisms are in place. Without a statement by the Government to this effect, which also clarifies whether there have been any exports of controlled goods to PSC in Iraq, such exports raise concerns under criterion 7.

Licences of greatest concern under criterion 7

SIELs 2003: anti-riot shields, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, equipment for the use of semi-automatic pistols, equipment for the use of submachine guns, semi-automatic pistol maintenance equipment, semi-automatic pistols (235), small arms ammunition, smoke hand grenades, submachine gun maintenance equipment, submachine guns (135), technology for the use of semi-automatic pistols

SIELs January–March 2004: assault rifles (100), components for semi-automatic pistols (2 licences), general purpose machine guns (100), semi-automatic pistols (550), small arms ammunition (2 licences), armoured all wheel drive vehicles

SIELs April–June 2004: armoured all wheel drive vehicles (3 licences), assault rifles (500), components for assault rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols (2 licences), military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, semi-automatic pistols (21428), small arms ammunition (2 licences), submachine guns (100), technology for the use of semi-automatic pistols

¹⁹ Borzou Daragahi, ‘Use of private security firms in Iraq draws concerns’, *The Washington Times*, 6 October 2003, <http://washingtontimes.com/world/20031006-122420-5426r.htm>.

²⁰ Op cit, Jamie Wilson.

²¹ Op cit, Borzou Daragahi.

Israel

According to the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israeli defence exports account for 10–12 percent of the global total, and were worth around US \$3bn in 2003. They are expected to be of the same approximate value for 2004, while in terms of production, only 20–30 percent is destined for the Israeli Defence Force, leaving 70–80 percent for export.²² Israel's main export markets include China, India, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Turkey and the US.²³ In 2002, 75 percent of the state-owned Israel Aircraft Industries sales were to overseas clients, with 50 percent of those sales going to India.²⁴ The types of arms which Israel exports are predominantly advanced electronic systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and exports for the upgrading of subsystems.²⁵

Israel is currently the second largest exporter of arms to China.²⁶ In June 2004 a report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, created in 2000 by the US Congress, labelled Israel's defence relationship with China as increasingly worrisome.²⁷ The Commission's Vice Chairman, Dick D'Amato, said that despite "strenuous" efforts by Washington to restrain sales of Israeli arms to China, "there's still not the level of co-operation and assurance that has relieved our concerns. We're very worried about this relationship".²⁸ Under US pressure, in January 2003 Israel agreed to suspend arms and security equipment sales to China that could harm US security interests in relation to Taiwan. However Israeli officials remained committed to selling arms to China that were available on the world arms market.²⁹ Key to China's military modernisation has been its "extensive" acquisition of military technologies from overseas, with Israel as its second largest supplier.³⁰ The types of equipment believed to have been exported by Israel to China include unmanned aerial vehicles, radar systems, optical and telecommunications equipment, drones and flight simulators³¹.

Concerns arising from UK exports to Israel not only include fears of re-export under undesirable conditions, but also in respect of the end use of arms exports to Israel. In 2002 this issue was highlighted by the use of converted UK-built centurion tanks for operations in the Occupied Territories, despite Israeli pledges that they would not be used in the Territories, and also the export of parts for F-16 fighter jets, at the same time that F-16s were being used to attack targets within both Gaza and the West Bank³².

Arms export licences to Israel

	2003	Jan–Mar 2004	Apr–Jun 2004
Value of SIELs granted (£m)	9.0	2.0	1.0
Number of SIELs granted (refused/revoked)	136 (25)	25 (7)	21 (3)
Number of OIELs granted (refused/revoked) with regard to Israel	12 (0)	5 (0)	11 (0)
Number of incorporation SIELs granted (refused/revoked)	44 (1)	4 (0)	13 (0)
Number of SITCLs granted with Israel as destination	n/a	n/a	0
Number of OITCLs granted with Israel as destination	n/a	n/a	0

Given the concerns of diversion, both in terms of end-use and end-user, of arms exports to Israel, and given the failure of Israel to honour its explicit end-use commitments in the past, Saferworld would expect maximum restraint to be exercised for

22 Zvi Lavi, 'Defence Ministry: Israeli defence exports 10–12% of global total', *Globes*, 6 July 2004, <http://www.globes.co.il/DocsEn/did=811925.htm>.

23 Peter Enav, 'AP Breaking News – Israel's weapons exports skyrocket, making it friends and money' ... *SFGate.com*, 18 November 2003, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/11/18/international0156EST0428.DTL>.

24 Ibid.

25 Philipp Nielsen, 'Israeli arms exports: still a means of quiet diplomacy?', *Weltpolitik.net*, 11 August 2004, <http://www.weltpolitik.net/Regionen/Naher%20u.%20Mittlerer%20Osten/Israel/Analysen/Israeli%20arms%20exports:%20still%20a%20means%20of%20quiet%20diplomacy%3F.html>.

26 'Israel, Russia arms sales to China concern US', 15 June 2004, <http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=44212>.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Wade Boese, 'Israeli Arms Exports to China of Growing Concern to US', *Arms Control Association*, March 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/isralexport_mar03.asp?print.

30 Op cit, *The Russia Journal*.

31 Ibid.

32 Ewen MacAskill & Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Britain tightens arms exports to Israel', *The Guardian*, 23 August 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/armstrade/story/0,10674,779431,00.html>.

exports to Israel under criterion 7. This would apply to equipment destined for the use of the Israeli security forces within the Occupied Territories that would be used for internal repression and for those items that are to be incorporated by Israel for onward export. The incorporation issue is most stark when considering the possible onward export to states under embargo, such as China.

In this context it is of extreme concern that, notwithstanding the significant amount of SIELs licensed for Israeli end-use, in the 18 months to June 2004, 61 incorporation licences were awarded for exports to Israel (second only to the US, with 64 incorporation licences).

Licences of greatest concern under criterion 7

SIELs 2003: components for aiming devices, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for anti-armour missiles, components for anti-radiation missiles, components for combat aircraft, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, components for small arms ammunition, components for small calibre artillery, components for tanks, components for unmanned air vehicles, software for the use of unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of unmanned air vehicle control/handling/launching equipment, technology for the development of unmanned air vehicles, technology for the use of unmanned air vehicle control/handling/launching equipment, technology for the use of unmanned air vehicles, test equipment for unmanned air vehicle control equipment, unfinished products for air to surface missiles, unmanned air vehicle control/handling/launching equipment, unmanned air vehicles, weapon day and night sights

SIELs for Incorporation 2003: components for aiming devices, components for airborne warfare equipment, components for anti-radiation missiles, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for unmanned air vehicles, equipment for the use of unmanned air vehicles, military aero-engines, technology for the use of optical target designator equipment

SIELs January–March 2004: components for bombs, military aero-engines, production equipment for optical target tracking equipment, small arms ammunition, technology for the use of laser range finders, weapon control systems

SIELs for Incorporation, January–March 2004: components for combat aircraft, components for infrared/thermal imaging equipment

OIELs January–March 2004: components for electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for surface to surface missile launching vehicles

SIELs April–June 2004: armoured all wheel drive vehicles, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for anti-armour missiles, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for unmanned air vehicles (2 licences), components for weapon day and night sights

SIELs for Incorporation April–June 2004: components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for unmanned air vehicles (2 licences), components for weapon day and night sights

OIELs April–June 2004: armoured all wheel drive vehicles, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment

Pakistan

With the establishment of the Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO) in 2001, the Pakistani government of President Musharraf set itself the aim of capturing one percent of the global arms export market by 2007.³³ If the value of global arms deliveries remained the same as for 2003, that is \$28.748 bn,³⁴ this would give Pakistan an arms export industry worth almost \$300 m. Indeed, following its establishment as the first Muslim state to have acquired nuclear weapons, there were calls from parts of the Arab world for Pakistan to take on the role of the major Muslim defence exporting state.³⁵ Pakistan's traditional export markets have included Egypt, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and the UAE, in addition to main customers Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. However, in March 2003 it was revealed that DEPO was also planning to target states such as Algeria, the Congo, Indonesia, Libya, Sudan and Zimbabwe,³⁶ several of which are experiencing conflict and are subject to either EU or UN arms embargoes. Pakistan also maintains a long-term strategic alliance with China – also the subject of an EU arms embargo – that has included exchanges of technologies and the co-production of weapons systems, such as the JF-17 fighter jet.³⁷

Pakistan has also been at the centre of controversy surrounding the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies. In January 2004, with the removal of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan from his position as scientific advisor to the prime minister of Pakistan, it was revealed that he had established a clandestine network of black market contacts for the proliferation of nuclear technology. This network based in Dubai, also included another Pakistani scientist, Mohammed Farooq, and supplied sensitive nuclear technologies to Iran, Libya and North Korea.³⁸ Dr Khan is now subject to effective house arrest, however there remains widespread concern that Dr Khan's activities could not have occurred without at least the tacit sanction of the Pakistani government.

While Pakistan is looking to obtain self-sufficiency in its arms production, it nevertheless relies on overseas purchases to keep up-to-date with technological advances, which it then replicates and exports. Pakistan's Director of Policy was reported to have said that the country hopes to sell major weapon systems like the Agosta 90B submarine (originally acquired from France, but now manufactured within Pakistan), mine-hunters, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missile and gun boats, jet trainers and propeller driven aircraft to customers such as Algeria, Congo, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Zimbabwe.³⁹

Arms export licences to Pakistan

	2003	Jan–Mar 2004	Apr–Jun 2004
Value of SIELs granted (£m)	29.5	6.5	3.0
Number of SIELs granted (refused/revoked)	240 (14)	32 (3)	42 (3)
Number of OIELs granted (refused/revoked) with regard to Pakistan	19 (0)	2 (0)	5 (0)
Number of incorporation SIELs granted (refused/revoked)	2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Number of SITCLs granted with Pakistan as destination	n/a	n/a	0
Number of OITCLs granted with Pakistan as destination	n/a	n/a	0

Given Pakistan's intent to export military equipment to countries and regions which appear potentially problematic, along with the role played by Pakistani figures in the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies, serious questions must be raised concerning

³³ Nadeem Iqbal, 'Pakistan's arms industry aims high', *Asia Times Online*, 4 October 2002, http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DJ04Df08.html.

³⁴ Military Balance 2004–2005 (IISS), p. 359.

³⁵ 'Pakistan Targets Arab World For Its Arms Export', *South-Asian Defence News*, August 2002, <http://www.pakistanidefence.com/news/MonthlyNewsArchive/2002/August2002.htm>.

³⁶ 'Pakistan to sell weapons to boost exports', *paknews.com*, 28 March 2002, <http://www.paknews.com/top.php?id=1&date1=2002-03-28>.

³⁷ 'Air Chief in China For JF-17 Flight Ceremony', *South-Asian Defence News*, September 2003, <http://www.pakistanidefence.com/news/MonthlyNewsArchive/2003/Sep2003.htm>.

³⁸ 'A.Q. Khan', *GlobalSecurity.org*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm>.

³⁹ Op cit, *paknews.com*.

the suitability of Pakistan as a destination for UK arms exports. At a minimum, under criterion 7, Saferworld would expect there to be a prohibition on the export from the UK to Pakistan of any new, or relatively new, conventional military technologies as well as on any nuclear, chemical, biological or related dual-use technologies. While it may be the case that the UK has not exported any such items to Pakistan, the lack of detailed information provided on this issue inhibits a definitive judgement.

Licences of greatest concern under criterion 7

SIELs 2003: components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for destroyers, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for frigates, components for large calibre artillery, components for military combat aircraft, components for military combat helicopters, components for naval engines, components for naval light guns, components for submarines, components for torpedo launching equipment, components for unmanned air vehicles, components for unmanned air vehicles control/handling/launching equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of unmanned air vehicles control/handling/launching equipment, naval engines, technology for the use of electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of unmanned air vehicles control/handling/launching equipment, unmanned air vehicles control/handling/launching equipment, unmanned air vehicles

SIELs for Incorporation 2003: components for military aero-engines

OIELs 2003: components for military aero-engines, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, castings for combat helicopters, forgings for combat helicopters, unfinished products for combat helicopters, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of equipment for the use of combat helicopters, castings for military aero-engines, forgings for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines, technology for the production of military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aero-engines, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for frigates, components for naval light guns, components for torpedo control equipment, components for torpedo handling equipment, components for torpedo launching equipment, production equipment for combat helicopters, production equipment for military aero-engines

SIELs January–March 2004: components for combat aircraft (2 licences), components for combat helicopters, components for frigates (3 licences), components for military aero-engines

OIELs January–March 2004: components for frigates, components for naval engines

SIELs April–June 2004: components for armoured personnel carriers (2 licences), components for combat helicopters (2 licences), components for destroyers (2 licences), components for frigates (10 licences), components for large calibre artillery, components for military aero-engines, components for torpedo launching equipment, technology for the use of combat aircraft, torpedo launching equipment

OIELs April–June 2004: military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of components for military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aero-engines, technology for the use of components for military aero-engines