
Criterion 3:

Internal situation

Colombia

IISS ARMED CONFLICT DATABASE

Internal Armed Conflict (Active)

Colombia (FARC, ELN and AUC 1963–): State Parties: Colombia Government;

Non State Parties: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)

Fatalities 2003: <3,000

According to PIOOM, Columbia suffers from one high intensity conflict (more than 1,000 deaths per year) between the Government and various left-wing guerrilla groups.

On 30 June 2003, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe announced his latest strategy to defeat all rebel groups by aggressively striking against them on the military, economic and judicial fronts.¹ A year later, a comparison study was published between the security situation in the first quarter of 2004 and that of the same period in 2003.² The number of Public Force operations against outlawed armed groups was reported as having increased by 10 percent with 542 attacks launched between January and April 2004. Operations against paramilitary groups had more than tripled.

Although there have been benefits to Uribe's hard-hitting stance – such as the creation, for the first time, of law-enforcement agencies in 150 municipalities – the biggest effect without doubt has been on the civilian population who continue to bear the brunt of the armed conflict.³ The UN has described the country as by far the biggest humanitarian catastrophe of the Western hemisphere with the largest number of killings, humanitarian problems and the biggest conflict.⁴ Also, according to the FCO, Colombia is one of the most dangerous countries in the world. In 2003, there were 2,200 kidnappings and 20,000 murders. Of the latter, 10–15 percent were considered to be politically motivated.⁵

Before Uribe announced his new policy, approximately 100,000 civilians had been displaced in the first half of 2003. In the last 15 years, over 2 million people, including 800,000 children, have been displaced⁶ and 1 million of those can be attributed to the

¹ Armed Conflict Database (IISS), http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictSummary.asp?ConflictID=169.

² Ibid.

³ FCO Annual Report on Human Rights 2004 (FCO), <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FINALversion2edited%20Complete.pdf>.

⁴ Press Briefing on Colombia by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, 10 May 2004, <http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2004/OCHABrf.doc.htm>.

⁵ Op cit, FCO Annual Report on Human Rights 2004.

⁶ US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 2003: Colombia.

last 3 or 4 years alone.⁷ Columbia currently has the third-highest number of internally displaced people in the world.⁸

There have been attempts to find peaceful solutions to the conflicts. For example, on 16 July 2003 the Government and the United Self Defence Group of Columbia (AUC) announced that all of the group's fighters would begin disarming at the end of the year.⁹ The Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) expressed willingness from July to September 2003 to meet with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in order to demonstrate commitment for a negotiated solution.¹⁰ However, reports persist of demobilised AUC fighters operating in certain regions,¹¹ while FARC and the Colombian government remain locked in conflict, despite FARC's ostensible commitment to work for a peaceful solution. In early 2003, the Colombian security forces increased the number of attacks against FARC. In response, FARC launched a series of operations against government officials, civilians and security forces. Between August and late October 2003, at least 40 people were killed and 70 others injured following the detonation of improvised explosive devices in the towns of Bogotá, Chita, Florencia, Medellín, Puerto Rico, San Martín and Saravena.¹² According to the US State Department, FARC were responsible for 427 unlawful killings during the first 9 months of 2003, 203 of them in massacres.¹³

| Arms export licences to Colombia | 2003 | Jan–Mar 2004 | Apr–Jun 2004 |
|---|-------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Value of SIELs granted (£m) | 0.5 | <0.1 | <0.1 |
| Number of SIELs granted (refused/revoked) | 7 (1) | 2 (0) | 2 (0) |
| Number of OIELs granted (refused/revoked) with regard to Colombia | 12 (0) | 2 (0) | 6 (0) |
| Number of incorporation SIELs granted (refused/revoked) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) |
| Number of SITCLs granted (with Colombia as destination) | n/a | n/a | 0 |
| Number of OITCLs granted (with Colombia as destination) | n/a | n/a | 0 |

The systematic use of explosives by FARC at the end of 2003, killing approx 40 people, reflects the devastating consequences of the high intensity conflict in Colombia. Moreover, the nature of the conflict is such that Government responses to guerrilla attacks have serious and adverse impacts on the civilian population. Saferworld is concerned that the UK government is licensing equipment such as **components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters** and **explosives** which might prolong armed conflict in Colombia. As a result of the internal situation, under criterion 3, Saferworld would expect there to be a selective embargo on the export of all police and military equipment with an obvious application for use in internal repression, together with a presumption of denial against the export of all other categories of equipment which could be used to facilitate internal repression.

Licences of greatest concern under criterion 3

OIELs 2003: components for combat aircraft and military training aircraft, mortar training equipment, explosives

SIELs January–March 2004: sporting rifles (1)

SIELs April–June 2004: sporting gun ammunition

⁷ Op cit, Press Briefing on Colombia by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Op cit, Armed Conflict Database.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ For example, on 15 December 2003, the national police confirmed that a town councillor in Las Balsas, Medellín, had been killed by members, supposed to have been demobilised, of the Bloque Nutibara. *Human Rights Watch World Report 2003: Colombia* (Human Rights Watch), <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/21/colomb6978.htm>.

¹² Op cit, Armed Conflict Database.

¹³ Op cit, *US Department of State*.

OIEs April–June 2004: test equipment for large and small calibre artillery, components for combat helicopters, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, test equipment aircraft cannons

Indonesia

IISS ARMED CONFLICT DATABASE

Internal Armed Conflict (Peace Accord)

East Timor (1975–(2000))¹⁴: State Parties: Indonesia Government, East Timor Government;
Non-State Parties: Forcas Armadad de Liberatacao Nacional de Timor Leste (FALANTIL)
Fatalities 2003: <10

Internal Armed Conflict (Active)

Aceh (1999–): State Parties: Indonesian Government;
Non-State Parties: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)/Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (AGAM)
Fatalities 2003: <2,000

Internal Armed Conflict (Dormant)

Kalimantan (1997–(dormant)): State Parties: Indonesia Government;
Non-State Parties: Dayak Tribesmen, Madurese
Fatalities 2003: <10

Internal Armed Conflict (Active)

Maluku (1999–): State Parties: Indonesia Government;
Non-State Parties: Christian Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM), Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahideen
Fatalities 2003: <60

Internal Armed Conflict (Active)

Papua (1965–): State Parties: Indonesia Government;
Non-State Parties: Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)
Fatalities 2003: <10

The most serious of the conflicts within Indonesia remains in Aceh.¹⁵ The conflict is now over 30 years old with the insurgents led by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) fighting for autonomy. Indonesian military forces have been deployed in the area since the early 1990s.¹⁶

An agreement reached in December 2002 to end the hostilities between the Indonesian Government and the GAM collapsed in May 2003; this was followed by a land, sea and air invasion of Aceh by the Indonesian military. A year long military state-of-emergency was declared on 19 May.¹⁷ By August 2003 there were up to 45,000 Indonesian military and paramilitary police in Aceh conducting operations against the GAM.¹⁸

On 19 May 2004, the military state-of-emergency expired and was replaced by a civil state-of-emergency. The military can continue to impose curfews on civilians, set up blockades, and detain suspects indefinitely. Although, the civil-emergency status was expected to expire on 19 November 2004, the Indonesian government announced that it would be extended for another 6 months.¹⁹

¹⁴ On 26 October 1999, Indonesia officially handed authority over East Timor to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) with transition to independence effectively beginning the following year. Armed Conflict Database (IISS), http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_SelectConflict.asp?CountryID=89&RegionName=East%20Asia%20and%20Australasia&RegionID=7.

¹⁵ BBC News, 'Indonesia flashpoints: Aceh,' 27 July 2004 (BBC), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/tr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3809079.stm>.

¹⁶ Op cit, Armed Conflict Database.

¹⁷ *Human Rights Watch World Report 2003: Indonesia* (Human Rights Watch), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/indone7005_txt.htm.

¹⁸ J Aglionby & M Peusangan, 'Battered people of Aceh take time out to party as Jakarta's crackdown drags on', *The Guardian*, 27 July 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4736676-103681,00.html>.

¹⁹ 'Indonesia decides to maintain civil emergency in Aceh,' *China View*, 19 September 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-11/19/content_2236995.htm.

Human rights organisations believe that over a thousand civilians were killed in the latter half of 2003, mainly by Indonesian security forces.²⁰ It is estimated that the violence has driven more than 40,000 people from their homes, forcing most to seek shelter in overcrowded refugee centres.²¹ In addition, officers admitted that the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces) had committed 511 crimes during the period of martial law from May 2003 to May 2004, and 57 soldiers had been sentenced for serious offences including rape, theft, illegal logging, drug offences and desertion.²² Meanwhile, by the end of 2003, more than 250 people were being held hostage by the GAM.²³

In 2003 and the first half of 2004 the Indonesian Government also faced increasing levels of militancy from separatist elements based in Papua. Human Rights Watch reported that ‘low level attacks’ by the Free Papua Movement (OPM) were met by Indonesian military reprisals disproportionately targeted against civilians and suspected separatists.²⁴ The decision by the Indonesian government to divide Papua into provinces in 2003 met with local anger, already on the increase because of an influx of economic migrants and civilians escaping conflicts from other parts of Indonesia.²⁵ It was reported that “arbitrary detention, torture, disappearances, and arson are now widespread”²⁶ and that peaceful expressions of support for Papua independence are banned.²⁷

| Arms export licences to Indonesia | 2003 | Jan–Mar 2004 | Apr–Jun 2004 |
|--|---------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Value of SIELs granted (£m) | 12.5 | 5.5 | 3.5 |
| Number of SIELs granted (refused/revoked) | 110 (5) | 41 (0) | 48 (2) |
| Number of OIELs granted (refused/revoked) with regard to Indonesia | 13 (0) | 1 (0) | 3 (0) |
| Number of incorporation SIELs granted (refused/revoked) | 4 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (0) |
| Number of SITCLs granted (with Indonesia as destination) | n/a | n/a | 0 |
| Number of OITCLs granted (with Indonesia as destination) | n/a | n/a | 1 |

In June 2003, following a statement by a senior Indonesian military spokesman that “Scorpion vehicles will become a key part of our campaign to finish off the separatists,”²⁸ 36 UK-made Scorpion armoured vehicles were reportedly used to suppress pro-independence rebels in Aceh.²⁹ This followed previous instances of UK-made equipment being deployed in contentious circumstances within Indonesia (see the Indonesia entry under criterion 7). In addition in January 2004, *The Guardian* reported that local Indonesian television had “on several occasions” shown heavy machine guns mounted on Scorpion vehicles firing at “alleged separatist positions.”³⁰ However the UK Government has since stated that it investigated this claim but was unable to find evidence of this footage.³¹

It is of serious concern that, at a time of heavy armed conflict and continuing reports that UK equipment is being used in dubious circumstances, the UK government has granted SIELs for **body armour, components for combat aircraft and components for combat helicopters** as well as OIELs for **components for combat aircraft** to Indonesia.

20 Op cit, J Aglionby & M Peusangan.

21 Op cit, Armed Conflict Database.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Op cit, *Human Rights Watch World Report 2003: Indonesia*.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 *Amnesty International Report 2004: Indonesia* (Amnesty International), <http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/2004-idn-summary-eng>.

28 QSC, *Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny*, May 2004, HC 390, para. 89, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmdfence/390/39002.htm>.

29 Ibid., para. 88.

30 Ibid., para. 95.

31 QSC, *Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, Response from the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry*, October 2004, para. 19, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/CM6357.pdf>.

In light of the high levels of instability and violence occurring across several Indonesian provinces, under criterion 3, Saferworld believes that there should be a selective embargo on the export of all military and police equipment with an obvious application for use in internal repression, and a presumption of denial of all other categories of equipment that could be used to facilitate human rights violations.

Licences of greatest concern under criterion 3

SIELs 2003: body armour, general military aircraft components, gun silencers, technology for the production of combat aircraft

OIELs 2003: components for combat aircraft, components for military training aircraft

SIELs January–March 2004: components for body armour, general military aircraft components, components for combat aircraft

SIELs April–June 2004: components for combat aircraft, body armour, technology for the use of aircraft cannons, components for combat helicopters

SIELs for Incorporation April–June 2004: components for combat helicopters, components for military aircraft communications equipment

Morocco

IISS ARMED CONFLICT DATABASE

Internal Armed Conflict (Ceasefire)

Morocco (Polisario) 1975–): State Parties: Morocco Government;

Non State Parties: Popular Front For The Liberation Of Saguia El Hamra And Rio De Oro (POLISARIO)

Fatalities 2003: 0

According to PIOOM, Morocco suffers from violent political conflict centring upon the region of Western Sahara.³² Since the 1991 ceasefire between the Moroccan government and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El Hamra and Rio De Oro (POLISARIO), a UN monitoring force has been deployed in the area. There were few instances of violence during 2003 and the first half of 2004.

Nevertheless, the stalemate continues between the Government and the Polisario Front, a situation described as “deeply frustrating” in June 2004, by the outgoing UN envoy to the region, James Baker.³³ Between January 2003 and June 2004, one or other party rejected a total of four peace plans put forward by the UN.³⁴ The Polisario Front continued to demand independence for Western Sahara, while the Government rejected proposals for self-determination for the people of the area. At various times, both sides have threatened a return to war reflecting the fragile state of relative peace in the country.

Displaced by the conflict, 412 Moroccans continue to remain in captivity in desert camps near Tindouf, south-western Algeria, while Morocco still holds 150 Saharawi prisoners of war.³⁵ Furthermore, 165,000 refugees from the Western Sahara are living in camps in the Algerian desert and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has warned that the refugees may face critical problems without significant donor assistance.³⁶

On 16 May 2004, 45 people were killed in 5 separate bomb attacks in Casablanca, leading to a clampdown on suspected ‘terrorist’ activities. According to official statements, judicial proceedings were brought against over 1,500 people suspected of involvement

³² *World Conflict and Human Rights Map, PIOOM: 20001/ 2002* (PIOOM), http://www.goalsforamericans.org/publications/pioom/atf_world_conf_map.pdf.

³³ Armed Conflict Database (IISS), http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictSummary.asp?ConflictID=162.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

in the May attacks or of planning or inciting other violent acts attributed to Islamists.³⁷ Dozens of those sentenced were allegedly tortured in custody to extract confessions or to force them to sign or thumbprint statements they originally rejected.³⁸

| Arms export licences to Morocco | 2003 | Jan–Mar 2004 | Apr–Jun 2004 |
|--|-------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Value of SIELs granted (£m) | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Number of SIELs granted (refused/revoked) | 6 (0) | 4 (0) | 0 (0) |
| Number of OIELs granted (refused/revoked) with regard to Morocco | 8 (0) | 1 (0) | 7 (0) |
| Number of incorporation SIELs granted (refused/revoked) | 4 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (0) |
| Number of SITCLs granted (with Morocco as destination) | n/a | n/a | 0 |
| Number of OITCLs granted (with Morocco as destination) | n/a | n/a | 0 |

In 1998, the UK Minister of State for Middle East and North Africa recommended a refusal for an ELA for the refurbishment of 30 existing guns and the supply of 6 new guns for deployment in the forward areas in Morocco.³⁹ After several appeals by the arms company concerned, the application for the refurbishment of the existing guns was eventually accepted. Significantly though, the refusal for the licence of 6 new guns was maintained based on the “clear risk” that the guns could be used to “assert by force a territorial claim.”⁴⁰

In 2003 and the first half of 2004, the continuing threats of a return to war by the Government and the Polisario Front and the introduction of large-scale terrorist bombings makes a situation of peace appear particularly deceptive. In this context, Saferworld therefore views with concern the January–March 2004 SIEL and in particular the 2003 OIEL for **components for large calibre artillery**, and would appreciate reassurance that these are not for use in the Western Sahara. In addition, as the situation in that part of the country is such that Saferworld would expect a presumption of denial to operate with regard to all categories of major conventional weapons as well as police and military equipment that could be used for repression, there are concerns about a number of SIELs and OIELs issued for the export of small arms and light weapons. Indeed, Saferworld would expect the UK Government to exercise extreme caution with all ELAs for Morocco, until a permanent solution to the Western Saharan situation is found.

Licences of greatest concern under criterion 3

SIELs 2003: components for submachine guns, submachine guns (200)

OIELs 2003: assault rifles, pistols, revolvers, semi-automatic pistols, submachine gun rifles, sniper rifles heavy machine guns, shotguns, mortars, components for large calibre artillery, shotguns (2).

SIELs January–March 2004: components for large calibre artillery, shotguns (2). Under temporary licence: assault rifles (102), semi automatic pistols (25)

OIELs April–June 2004: components for military aero-engines, components for military transport aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment

³⁷ *Amnesty International Report 2004: Morocco* (Amnesty International), <http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/mar-summary-eng>.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ QSC, *Strategic Export Controls: Annual report for 1999 and parliamentary prior scrutiny*, 14 March 2001, HC 212, Appendix 10, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmfaff/212/212apf22.htm>.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*