

Global Review

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Winter 2012

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The Sudan - South Sudan Reconciliation: More Patience and Efforts Needed

ZHONG Jianhua *

The Sudan - South Sudan issue is one of Africa's longest, toughest problems with profound and lasting significance. Due to the multiple factors such as complicated history, mixed races, and religious conflicts, two civil wars broke out between the Northern and the Southern Sudan in the last century, lasting almost 40 years. In 2005, under the mediation of the international community, the two parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending the longest civil war in the history of the African continent. A referendum was held in early 2011 in accordance with the CPA to determine if the Southern Sudan should declare its independence from Sudan, with 98.83% of the population voting for separation. On July 9th of the same year, the Government of Southern Sudan declared its independence as the Republic of South Sudan. The now two countries have paid a tremendous cost for this hard-won peaceful separation. However, the shadow of conflicts resulting from the decades-long civil wars is still hanging over the two countries. The road towards enduring peace is still full of twists and turns. Because of the boundary demarcation disputes and differences over oil revenues sharing and the status of the Abyei region, frictions have never stopped between the two countries and sometimes erupted into fierce border conflicts.

In order to ease the tension, the international community made a collective response and concerted efforts at a critical moment. This April, the African Union, as the major mediator, initiated a "Road Map" solution and afterwards convened a number of negotiations between the two sides. In support of the African Union's "Road Map", the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 2046 and 2047 in this May and held consultations and reviews on the Sudan – South Sudan issue on a regular basis. On September 27th, coordinated under the African Union and witnessed by the international community, the two countries, after a number of intensive meetings, signed in Addis Ababa the Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of South Sudan and Republic of Sudan, including a string of agreements concerning oil revenues sharing, fiscal arrangements, and status of nationals of

* H.E. Amb. ZHONG Jianhua is Chinese Government's Special Representative on African Affairs.

other state, etc. These agreements will definitely play a positive role in easing the two sides' relations, stabilizing their domestic situations, and maintaining regional stability at large.

At present, the Sudan - South Sudan reconciliation issue is moving in the direction of peaceful solution and the two sides are given a favorable opportunity for a 'real' start of peace and a new era of cooperation and mutual benefit. How to enlarge consensus, promote negotiations, maintain and solidify the current proactive momentum, and speed up the appropriate settlement of the remaining issues between the two sides have become the international community's common challenge and mission. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and true friend of both Sudan and South Sudan, China has consistently supported and contributed to the peace process between the two countries. Both in bilateral relations with the two countries and on multilateral occasions such as in Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, Chinese leaders always tried to persuade the two sides to settle relevant issues through peaceful negotiations. Since appointed as the Chinese Government's Special Representative on African Affairs, I have visited the two countries for several times and kept regular contacts with relevant sides. The diplomatic efforts made by China in solving the Sudan – South Sudan issue have been productive, not only easing the regional tension and promoting the two sides' reaching an agreement on oil revenues sharing, but also consolidating China's relations with both countries.

As an African saying goes, to be without a friend is to be poor indeed. China always thinks that as neighboring countries indispensable to each other, Sudan and South Sudan should be friends living in harmony and partners that develop themselves hand in hand. This is also a wish shared by the international community. In the next stage, the two countries will have negotiations on the implementation of the agreements and other unsettled issues. The international community is supposed to keep its patience and take good care of the seed of peace that has been planted between the two sides, cultivating it into a luxuriant tree of happiness that shelters the two countries' people and the people in surrounding areas.

China's Relations with Two Sudans: From 'One Country, Two Systems' to 'Two Countries, One System'

ZHANG Chun*

Either before or after the peaceful separation, the relationship between former northern and southern part of Sudan, now Sudan and South Sudan, is full of disputes and even conflicts and wars, which imposes great pressures on China's foreign policy. However, China tried hard to play a constructive role in both promoting the realization of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) concluded in 2005 and mediating the contradictions between the two parties after the separation in 2011, while the policies in different periods are a bit different.

The difference is: it's a policy of 'one country two systems' in the first period and of 'two countries one system' in the second. Since the signing of CPA in 2005, China has closely engaged into its implementation. To better deal with the SPLM-led Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), China introduced the policy of 'one country, two systems'.^① Since 2005, China and GoSS have established formal relations, with President Hu Jintao and President Salva Kiir met twice in 2007 and later China opened a new consulate in Juba in 2008, an example followed by many Chinese companies. Most significantly, the Chinese Government's Special Representative for African Affairs, with special interests in Sudan and Darfur issues, always attaches great importance to the implementation of CPA. While there are skepticism from the international community, China confirmed the international community that it supported the full implementation of CPA and would collaborated with the USA to promote it. Former Envoy Ambassador LIU Guijin met with America's special envoy to Sudan Princeton Layman at least 5 times in the half year

* Dr. ZHANG Chun is Deputy Director, Center for West Asian and African Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS).

^① Daniel Large, "China's Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories in Peace and War," *The China Quarterly*, 199, September 2009, pp. 610–626.

before the referendum, the latter expressed that he believed China had delivered the right message to both parties of Sudan.^①

Though the two countries are separated peacefully, the story is not over with a lot of unsettled disputes, which requires policy adjustment for not only China, but also other external partners including USA, EU, and many others. The reason lies in the changing fact that there are two countries now. In this context, China's policy after the separation is a policy of 'two countries, one system'. The term 'one system' means that China has not changed its goal of helping both parties to find a way for development through resolving their disputes. Here we need to reaffirm that the goal of the first stage's 'one country, two systems' policy always puts the economic development at the center stage while disputes resolving simply is one of the preconditions.

In the Chinese eyes, whether the Southern part gains independence or not, economic development is fundamental to the dispute solution. With the independence of the South, now it's time to shift focus from reconciliation to development by joining hands together. To meet this goal, both sides need to abandon the mindset of zero-sum game through weakening the other party for more reasonable bargaining chips during the negotiations.

However, the reality is that both parties practiced such a wrong win set supported either by furious or victorious passions. On the Sudanese side, accepting the separation of South Sudan is the biggest concession, thus it seems reasonable to hope for greater rewards from the international community and South Sudan in particular. However, supported by victorious passion, South Sudan chose not to reward Sudan and even provoked Sudan with assumption that its support will keep support for it as usual. Thus, a kind of security dilemma is rising. Entering 2012, since the unilateral decision of South Sudan to stop its oil production and not to use oil infrastructure in Sudan and the decision of Sudan to close its border with a 'shoot-to-kill' policy for any smugglers of goods to the South, the bilateral relations

^① "UN Disappointed China not Arrest Sudanese President, US Content with China," *Ifeng.com*, 2 July 2011, http://news.ifeng.com/world/detail_2011_07/02/7394697_0.shtml, 21-11-2012.

deteriorated and reached the breaking point when South Sudan invaded Heglig and destroyed the oil infrastructure there, which in return agitated the racist attitude of President Bashir and provoked the strong condemnations from the American side who is a longstanding friend of the South. There are lots of stories of this kind in the recent development of this relationship.

China tries hard to persuade the two parties to return to the right track and gain a real success. Through his shuttle diplomacy, China's new Special Envoy Ambassador ZHONG Jianhua convinced both sides that they should be sensitive to the expectations of their people and the international community and to take the talks seriously so as to find win-win solutions that would improve their strained relations. China warns both sides that economic costs for lasting conflicts can't be afforded by two peoples. Generally, the economies of the two countries have been badly affected by their strained relations. While the South has temporarily lost oil revenue that constituted 98% of its budget, Sudan has lost more than 30% of its revenue from oil-related fees from the South, and almost more than 80% of its foreign exchange earnings. Besides, there're more serious and long-term economic impacts. For example, the monthly inflation rate, which used to be one digit, has reached more than 30% in Sudan and around 25% in the South in the first half of 2012. The exchange rate, which was less than 3 Sudanese Pounds and 3 South Sudanese Pounds per dollar, has reached almost 6 Sudanese Pounds and 5 South Sudanese Pounds in the parallel market during the same period.^①

China used wisely its leverages to push Sudan and South Sudan to shift their eyes to rebuild their economy by joining hands together. While Sudan has a better understanding about this, South Sudan needs time to realize it. For example, in the first half of 2012, South Sudan strongly held that the mega project of Lamu-Juba corridor could be the substitute for the pipeline through Sudan port. This policy stance means that South Sudan takes a zero-sum game theory and tries to cut clear with Sudan economically, which is a lose-lose scenario that China does not agree with. That's why China did not provide supports for this mega project until the two

^① Luka Biong Deng, "Strained Sudan-South Sudan Relations: Who Pays the Price?" *Sudan Tribune*, 24 June 2012, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Strained-Sudan-South-Sudan,43030>.

parties almost reached oil revenue share agreement in August 2012.^①

Either ‘one country, two systems’ or ‘two countries, one system’, China’s real policy goal hasn’t changed a bit, with respecting formal state sovereignty and promoting economic development of Sudan and South Sudan as the core. That is the secret of the success of China’s African policy in general and two Sudans policy in particular.

^① “China Welcomes Oil Deal between Sudan, South Sudan,” *Xinhua News*, 6 August 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-08/06/c_131765167.htm; Jane Perlez, “South Sudan to Get Aid from China; No Oil Deal,” *New York Times*, 25 April 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/asia/china-to-aid-south-sudan-but-pipeline-efforts-stalled.html?_r=0.

China in the International Conflict-management: Darfur as a Case

*JIAN Junbo**

Due to Chinese typical economic and strategic interests, diplomatic philosophy, cultural and psychological tradition, China's positions, principles and approaches on the Darfur issue-resolution was somehow different from those of Western countries, which also characterized the conflict-management of China in this issue. This article will review the China's policy on Darfur issue and analyze the role that China played in it, then generalize this state's conflict-management approach on international hot issues.

I. Chinese Policy over Darfur: from Neutrality to Engagement

Generally, Chinese policy on Darfur issue experienced three stages: indifference, persuasion and actively involvement. This policy change reflected the China's adherence to its national interests, its care for the international responsibility and the change of international politics.

1. Stage one: indifferent to Sudan's affair

When military conflicts happened in the Western part of Sudan, China didn't pay much attention to them and even two people were kidnapped in March 2004 in that region. Chinese leaders were successfully persuaded by Sudan government that made Chinese leaders believe what happened in Western Sudan was just local violence that could be controlled by government.

In addition, China refused to sanction Sudan when the UN planed to adopt one US-supported resolution imposing sanction on Sudan. China explained that what was happened in Darfur was not a "racial genocide" but an internal conflict between different tribes who competed for resources.

* Dr. JIAN Junbo is Assistant Professor of Fudan University.

2. Stage two: persuading Sudanese central government to accept the UN's suggestions

However, China's policy toward Darfur issue had a subtle change from the indifference or neutrality to actively persuading Omar Hassan al-Bashir authority to accept UN's resolutions.

In August 2004, Lv Guozeng, the Chinese special representative to Darfur, visited Sudan where he confirmed the roles of AU and the League of Arab States (LAS) in dealing with Darfur crisis, and stated China hoped Khartoum could comply with the UN's resolutions^①. He also argued China would provide 5 million Chinese Yuan-valued materials as humanitarian assistance for Darfur crisis.

In November 2006, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao talk to Bashir in Beijing that China supported the UN's 1706 resolution, hoped Sudanese government could comprehensively cooperate with international society and implement the UN's resolution and Darfur Peace Agreement.^② Chinese President Hun Jintao, also extended the same message to Bashir, and especially hoped Sudanese government could accept the AU-UN joint peacekeeping force.

3. Stage three: cooperation with international society

Since 2006, China took more active action to deal with the Darfur issue through three ways- pressing Sudanese government to accept international resolutions; promoting to build a joint peacekeeping troop; and coordinating with related actors in international society.

-- Pressing Sudanese government

In March 2008, Liu Guijin, the Chinese special representative to Darfur, stated that Sudan's government must do much more, stopping competing for lands with rebel groups. Meanwhile, China didn't veto the UN's 1769 resolution which decided to appoint an UN-led peacekeeping troop to Sudan, working with the AU's army, yet a joint-troop was opposed by Khartoum.

^① In this 1556 resolution, the UN asked Sudan's government to relieve weapons of Arabian militias in Darfur.

^② Wen Jiabao: China-Sudan Relations Are Equal and without any Private Interests, see China's News website, 3 November 2006, <http://www.sina.com.cn> <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-11-03/202211419625.shtml>.

The pressure to Khartoum also accompanied with Beijing's balance policy in North Sudan and South Sudan. For instance, it set up a consulate in Juba. Furthermore, China contacted with South Sudan's leaders of the rebelling groups, e.g., having invited Salva Kiir, the Chairman of Sudan Liberation Movement to visit Beijing two times.

-- Pushing to build joint peacekeeping force in Darfur

In July 2007, Security Council approved the UN's resolution which decided to send an UN-led peacekeeping troop to Darfur based on "Annan Plan". Although China abstained from the resolution, this made the resolution effective, and then the joint peacekeeping force quickly became possible. Helped by China, Sudan had to agree to allow a joint peacekeeping to enter Darfur.^①

-- Coordinating with international actors

In May 2007, the Chinese special representative to Darfur Liu Guijin visited Africa two times after he was appointed less than two months. He talked with Sudan, the AU, the LAS and some Western powers, coordinating with them to reach some shared positions and resolve the Darfur issue with political dialogues.^②

In Beijing's opinion, not only Khartoum but also those rebelling groups should be imposed pressures. Mr. Liu once said China was pressing Sudan to do more to end the violence, but added that rebel groups also shared responsibility.

He also argued that the UN and AU should together handle those technological issues regarding the deploy of peacekeeping troops; all concerned countries in this region should take cooperative action; and the international society, including Security Council members should work together, without sending wrong messages to Sudan and the rebelling groups.^③ He had also complained those rebelling groups were not active to participate in the peace negotiation "is a primary shortage".^④

^① Jim Yardley, China Defends Sudan Policy and Criticizes Olympics Tie-In, *The New York Times*, March 8, 2008.

^② Gu Guoping, Dong Jirong, *The Positions and Policies of China and the US on Darfur Issue: Based on Each Official States and Speeches*, International Forum, Vol. 1, 2010.

^③ Chinese Special Representative to Darfur Hold a Press Conference, see Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry website: <http://www1fmprc1.gov>.

^④ How Far Is Darfur from the Peace? *International Herald*, 2 November, 2007.see

For realizing stability and peace, Chinese representative to Darfur had also visited London and Paris, to coordinate with European counterparts. Meanwhile, Chinese representative in the UN also coordinate with other Security Council members in order to put forward a commonly agreed UN resolution.

II. China in the Conflict-management on Darfur Issue: Dynamics, Principles and Approaches

In Darfur issue-resolution process, China played special roles based on special interests and principles through typical approaches as a different player from other powers, especially the US and the European Union (EU).

1. Dynamics: interests and image

Without question, Beijing's policy toward Darfur and its change is embedded in its typical preference on national interests. Because the deep economic ties with Sudan, China didn't have the will to destroy the bilateral relationship, joining the international society to against Khartoum when Darfur crisis was happened in the early time.

However, when early crisis swiftly changed into a humanitarian crisis, China was imposed more international pressure and quietly changed its policy. Clearly this change was also resulted from the worry about the lasting violence in Darfur which would harm Chinese enterprises' interests.

On the other hand, Beijing's policy alteration is also due to one consideration-image, although this can also considered as a quite typical interests. As a rising power, one of China's ambitions is to be accepted as one responsible actor in international society. When Darfur crisis escalated, China was challenged by more international criticism, and then had to care about its international image. According to this, China began to cooperate with international society.^①

2. Principles: sovereign independence, multilateralism, and development

Generally speaking, the principles China used in Darfur issue can classified into three dimensions: sovereign independence, multilateralism and aiming to

<http://news.sohu.com/20071102/n253021675.shtml>.

^① Josh Kurlantzick, China, Myanmar and Sudan: Perusable Idea, New Republic, 4 September, 2010.

development.

The Chinese special representative Liu Guijin had argued that China didn't agree to deal with regional conflict by force and coerce; and the principle Chinese government adhered was respecting Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. After China decided to join in the international action for resolving Darfur issue, it adhered to the multilateralism as an important principle. It strengthened all actions aiming at Darfur issue-resolution should be under the UN's leadership and through multilateral negotiations, dialogues and cooperation, not only among international actors like China, the US, the AU and so on, but also among different political groups in Sudan.^①

At the same time, Chinese considered that promoting Sudan's development was the fundamental and essential principle to reduce the conflict in Darfur, since the poverty and backwardness was the root of the conflict. Zhai Jun, one Chinese special representative to Darfur claimed the essential road to resolution of Darfur issue was to realize the region's economic reconstruction and development.

3. Approaches: persuasion, cooperation, coordination and political dialogue

The approaches that China used in the Darfur issue-resolution are political dialogues or diplomatic means. Liu Guijin had said "there is only one way to solve the problem in Darfur only through dialogue and consultation."^② According to this, sanction was not preferred by China, diplomatic approach- persuasion, cooperation, coordination, negotiation and so like these, rather than sanction and unilateral action was the unique way that China choose to use in Darfur issue. Liu Guijin had concluded one of the principles used in Darfur issue was adherence to political approach.^③

^① Chinese Representative Explained Chinese Government's Position over Darfur, see China website, 22 February 2008: www.china.com.cn.

^② Gwen Thompkins, Chinese Influence In Sudan Is Subtle, NPR, July 29, 2008: <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92282540>.

^③ Wang Yaping, China and Darfur Issue, cited from Carnegie's Perspective on China, 8 September 2007.

China's Role in Sudan and South Sudan Peacekeeping Operations

XUE Lei*

I. Overview of the Peace Operations and China's Contribution

Currently, there are three ongoing UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations in the two Sudans. The first is the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) established under UN Security Council Resolution 1769 as of 2007, which provided the mandate for a combination of previous African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and UN support. The second is the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) established under UNSC Resolution 1990 as of 27 June 2011. Its aim is to monitor and verify the redeployment of Sudan governmental armed forces and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from the Abyei Area. The third one is the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) established under UNSC Resolution 1996. These three missions manifest different features of UN peace operations. The UNISFA carries on with it the traditional simplistic characteristics of peacekeeping operations, i.e. monitoring relevant parties' compliance with and implementation of ceasefire agreement. The UNAMID include the hybrid operation of AU and UN to address conflict prevention and peace maintenance work in the Darfur region of Sudan. And the UNMISS is actually a comprehensive peacebuilding and nation-building mission after the independence of South Sudan, which covers a wide range of issues and activities such as security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR), as well as economic development and social reconstruction. The co-existence of three types of peacekeeping operations has again demonstrated the complicatedness of the challenges faced by both Sudan and South Sudan.

As a responsible major power and a country with friendly relations with both of the two countries, China actively participated in the peacekeeping operations in this region. Generally speaking, China's contribution to peacekeeping operations is manifested in three aspects. First, on the conceptual level, China always sticks to the development-oriented or "development first" policy, which means that the

* Xue Lei is research fellow at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS).

peacekeeping operations should be conducted in the way conducive to dealing with the root causes of conflicts and forging solid base for subsequent large-scale rebuilding work. Second, up to now China has only dispatched non-combatant troops to join peacekeeping forces, with engineering corps and medical teams constituting the major components of Chinese peacekeepers. This reflects to some extent China's worry about the situation of peacekeeping troops being endowed with too much power of using force. Yet in practice the non-combatant feature of Chinese peacekeepers has become a unique advantage and contribution to peacekeeping operations. Chinese peacekeepers have completed large-scale economic and social reconstruction work for the local community, including the building of basic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, water supply facilities, etc.. The hospital established by Chinese medical team also contributed a lot to the health of local people. Such work has actually made a great contribution to the early recovery of conflict-affected local community and laid a solid foundation for the subsequent comprehensive rebuilding process. Third, aside from its role of a troop contributing country (TCC), China also works as a police contributing country (PCC) in this region. The riot police or civilian police dispatched constitutes an indispensable part of the process of restoration of justice and order in the local community. The engagement of Chinese police staff with local police staff is also much helpful to capacity building in local police institution and personnel. In a word, China is fulfilling its promise of being a genuine and responsible partner of the two countries through its active role in the relevant peacekeeping operations.

II. China's Policy Considerations in Participating in Peace Operations

China's deeper involvement into UN peacekeeping operations will inevitably lead to a comprehensive change in the UN conflict management system. First, the power configuration in the decision-making and implementation process of UN peacekeeping operations may experience great transformation. With the western security apparatus dominated by the US tilting more towards the war on terror and the subsequent campaigns to suppressing the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan since the 9/11 terrorist attack, the involvement of western countries in UN-led peacekeeping operations has been sharply weakened, especially in the African continent which has long been one of the focal areas of UN peacekeeping operations. The immediate consequence of this strategic shift of western countries' policies is the aggravated problems of shortage of military personnel, resources, and equipments, in particular the shortage of some critical equipments such as the

transport helicopters, which has become a significant bottleneck constraining the implementation of peacekeeping operations. Against this backdrop, the growing involvement of emerging countries including China, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, etc. will be conducive to the mitigation of constraints the UN now faces. And such a kind of gradually growing contribution to UN peacekeeping operations by emerging countries will definitely be followed with the change of power configuration in international conflict management system. Second, with the rising complexity of both the international and domestic environment for peacekeeping operations, the differences surrounding the guiding peacekeeping principles also loom large. The so-called PKO Three Principles include the following points: (1) impartiality (neutrality); (2) consent of relevant governments or parties; and (3) use of force limited to circumstances of self-defense. These principles have been the guiding principles and remain the cornerstone of UN PKOs. However, the western countries have endeavored to expand the scope of conflict situations applicable to peacekeeping operations, with the intention of including confrontational conflict situation into the scope of peacekeeping operations so as to expand the power of peacekeeping forces in terms of using force. And the emerging powers insist that peacekeeping operations should remain in the field of neutral stance to prevent escalation of inter-state or intra-state conflicts. The peacekeeping forces should not have too large scope of power in terms of using force and interfering into internal affairs of host states. With the growing influence of China and other emerging powers on coordinative work and decision-making process of peacekeeping operations, it's hoped that the confused or even inappropriate situation in relation to norms and principles of peacekeeping may be clarified or corrected. Third, the UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations also provided China with the means and channels to exert influence. As an emerging power in current times, the path for China's rise is definitely completely different from the rising paths of the old powers. In terms of management and resolution of international conflicts, China's role is manifested more in the use of UN-led multilateral platforms, the focus on political and diplomatic measures, and the stress on involvement and consent of all relevant parties. The UN-sponsored peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes are the most appropriate for the above-mentioned China's policy considerations. Therefore, in the future we may see more of this mutually-enhancing relation from the interaction between China and UN peace operations.

The EU and the Sudans

*Dame Rosalind Marsden**

As EU Special Representative, I have a wide ranging mandate from EU Foreign Ministers covering all aspects of EU policy towards Sudan and South Sudan. At the core of this mandate is the promotion of peace and stability in Sudan and South Sudan. This is one of the European Union's top priorities in Africa.

Both Sudan and South Sudan face considerable challenges. These continue to cause human suffering as well as instability and insecurity in the wider region. The conflict in Darfur continues, with 1.7 million Darfuris still living in IDP camps and 300,000 in refugee camps in Chad. The fighting that erupted in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states in 2011 has caused large-scale civilian casualties, displacement and an exodus of over 240,000 refugees into South Sudan and Ethiopia. More than 100,000 people have been displaced from Abyei. Inter-communal clashes in South Sudan, particularly in Jonglei state, have also resulted in displacement and loss of civilian life.

In order to address these challenges, EU Foreign Ministers decided last year to pursue a Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan. This is designed to promote the emergence of two viable, stable and prosperous states. The EU is using a wide range of instruments - political, diplomatic, development assistance, security and stabilisation, and human rights, as well as humanitarian assistance - in a more coherent and joined-up fashion.

A cornerstone of the Comprehensive Approach has been to support the African Union's mediation efforts between Sudan and South Sudan. The EU has lent political, financial and technical support to the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), led by former President Thabo Mbeki. The EU also welcomed the clear leadership demonstrated by the AU Peace and Security Council, in particular when it adopted the AU Roadmap on 24 April, subsequently endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2046. My team and I have been present in Addis Ababa during the negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan in order to support the AUHIP.

* H.E. Dame Rosalind Marsden is EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan.

I also coordinate closely with key regional players and Special Envoys from the UN, US, and Norway, and, of course, my Chinese counterpart. This coordination, together with the strong lead given by the AU, has ensured an unprecedented degree of international consensus that has been indispensable to making progress in resolving the outstanding issues.

The Addis talks culminated in the signing of nine agreements by Sudan and South in Addis Ababa on 27 September. These agreements represent a major step towards normalising relations between the two countries. The implementation of the agreements will benefit the people of both countries. The EU stands ready to support the implementation process.

While the agreements are a great achievement, the critical issues of the final status of Abyei, the disputed and claimed border areas and the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states remain unresolved. Resolving these issues is essential for full normalisation of relations between Sudan and South Sudan and for full implementation of the AU Roadmap and UN Security Council Resolution 2046. The EU supports the clear lead given by the African Union.

The EU remains gravely concerned about the fighting in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states and the serious humanitarian situation this has caused. The EU has repeatedly insisted on immediate access for international humanitarian agencies to all civilians affected by the conflict. It is also imperative that the Government of Sudan and SPLM/North engage immediately in direct talks in order to reach a cessation of hostilities and a political settlement on the basis of the 28 June 2011 Framework Agreement and with a view to an inclusive national dialogue that meets the needs and aspirations of all Sudanese citizens within an open and democratic framework. There can be no military solution to this conflict.

Darfur is also an issue of major concern for the EU. The security situation in Darfur is serious with an increased threat of physical violence to civilians from armed groups, inter-communal tensions, aerial bombing and fighting between forces of the Government and the armed movements, particularly in North Darfur. The EU is concerned about continuing restrictions on humanitarian access in some parts of Darfur, including the eastern Jebel Marra, and on UNAMID's freedom of movement, particularly to areas of recent conflict. Forty seven UNAMID peacekeepers have been killed in Darfur but none of the perpetrators has yet been brought to justice.

Also in the case of Darfur, dialogue and negotiations are necessary to resolve the conflict. That is why the EU welcomed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) signed in May 2011 as the basis for reaching a comprehensive and inclusive peace. The EU has urged the signatory Parties to redouble their efforts to achieve rapid and tangible progress in implementing the DDPD.

The EU remains strongly committed to helping the people of Darfur. We will continue to demonstrate that commitment through our support for the peace process; and political and financial support for UNAMID to fulfil its protection of civilians mandate (EU Member States fund 45% of UNAMID's budget through their assessed contributions to the UN). The EU is also funding a large humanitarian assistance programme, including support for some early recovery activities. The EU would like to do more to help but our ability to do so depends on progress in three areas: access for international humanitarian and development workers, security and implementation of the DDPD.

The EU is committed to promoting democratisation, good governance and human rights. The EU supports the promotion by the African Union of a holistic approach to the quest for peace, justice and reconciliation and the need to prioritise democratisation in both Sudan and South Sudan as a sine qua non for stability and equitable governance. Local civil society groups in both Sudan and South Sudan have an essential role to play in this endeavour. The EU is a strong supporter of civil society organisations in both countries.

Besides our political engagement, humanitarian and development assistance is a core part of our engagement in both Sudans. Since 2005, the EU has committed development assistance of over 650 million euros to South Sudan. Since 2010, the EU has committed 285 million euros to developing the following sectors: education, health, agriculture, food security and democratic governance. The EU has also deployed a Common Security and Defence Policy mission in order to strengthen security at Juba Airport.

Development assistance to Sudan is more limited given the Government of Sudan's decision not to ratify the revised Cotonou Agreement. Even so, in 2011 the EU provided around 47 million euros to vulnerable populations in conflict-affected areas in the agriculture, health, and education sectors. In 2012, the EU provided 10 million euros for agriculture and basic services in North and South Darfur.

Humanitarian assistance continues to be another core strand of the EU's policy towards Sudan and South Sudan. There are still considerable humanitarian needs in both countries. The EU's humanitarian programme for the two Sudans is one of the largest EU humanitarian programmes in the world. The European Commission's budget for Sudan and South Sudan towards the end of 2012 was 127 million euros.

The EU will remain closely engaged in Sudan and South Sudan and will continue to work with our international partners to promote two stable, democratic and prosperous states.

Development through Peace: Could China's Economic Cooperation with South Sudan be More Conflict-sensitive?

Thomas Wheeler*

While China has already provided some development aid, it is likely that in the future it will be a source of considerably more financial assistance to the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), especially for the construction of infrastructure.^① This holds substantial promise for post-conflict reconstruction and economic development in the world's newest nation. However, on-going insecurity remains a significant obstacle. For many of South Sudan's people, the absence of a peace dividend is perhaps one of the biggest post-independence disappointments. Alongside the continued tensions with its northern neighbour, inter-community conflicts have escalated to alarming levels, taking lives, displacing families and wreaking humanitarian havoc. This insecurity prevents the delivery of important development projects and deters commercial investment. It is widely accepted that development cannot occur in conditions of heightened conflict and insecurity. The World Bank notes that no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet to achieve a single Millennium Development Goal.^②

While insecurity might restrict economic growth, the reverse is also true: economic engagement, no matter how well-intentioned, can inadvertently fuel conflict. Explaining China's economic co-operation with a pre-secession Sudan that was 'mired with conflict', some Chinese officials espoused the theory of 'peace through development'. However, as is acknowledged in China, the reality of economic co-operation presents a far more complex picture.^③ For example, while Sudan saw GDP growth figures above 10 percent in 2006 and 2007, the country was far from peaceful in that period.

* Thomas Wheeler is Project Coordinator, Saferworld.

① Saferworld *China and South Sudan* Saferworld Briefing (2012). Also see International Crisis Group *China's New Courtship in South Sudan* Africa Report 186 (2012).

② World Bank, *World Bank Development Report 2011*.

③ Saferworld *China and Conflict-affected States* (2012) and Large, D *Between the CPA and Southern Independence: China's Post-Conflict Engagement in Sudan* (2012) SAIIA, Occasional Paper No.115.

Chinese state banks, and Chinese companies, have long been big players in Sudanese infrastructure development, funding and building railway tracks, water pipelines, electricity grids, ports and bridges. As the largest consumer of Sudanese oil, and the biggest shareholder in its oil blocks, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) made significant investments in the infrastructure required to extract it. Much of this economic co-operation between China and pre-secession Sudan likely brought real and tangible benefits for development and, ultimately, some people's wellbeing.

Nonetheless, it could never be totally isolated from a context of conflict which was (and remains) so common to Sudan. In some cases, China's economic role may have inadvertently exacerbated the pre-existing factors that drive conflict. For example, Chinese dam construction projects were reportedly associated with displacement and violent protest in regions where political relations were already tense.^① The creation of Sudan's oil infrastructure, including roads, was associated with extremely high levels of violence between the Sudanese security services, armed groups and civilians in oil-rich areas. As argued by one South Sudanese politician, this history remains a major hurdle in China-South Sudan relations.^②

Large scale development assistance to South Sudan may come to address one major criticism that is common among officials and civil society in the country, which is that, before independence, the benefits of economic co-operation with China – including infrastructure development and jobs – overwhelmingly favoured the North. “They say they have built things – hospitals and schools – but this is in the North, not in the South,” summarises one South Sudanese observer.^③ Feelings of marginalisation from economic development underpinned armed rebellion down the path of secession for many Southerners. A substantial boost in Chinese economic engagement in South Sudan may go some way to redressing these feelings. In this way, as Chinese officials and academics have long argued, economic engagement can positively address root causes of conflict. But another fact also becomes evident: perceptions of where, and to whom, the benefits of

^① For example see: Bosshard P, “New Chinese Dam Project to Fuel Ethnic Conflict in Sudan,” *Huffington Post*, 26 January 2011, and “UN Expert Urges Sudan to Respect Human Rights of Communities Affected By hydro-electric Dam Projects,” *Sudan Tribune*, 28 August 2007.

^② Deng L, “South Sudan: China – a Strategic Partner of the New Nation,” *Sudan Tribune*, 16 April 2012.

^③ Saferworld interview, Unity State, South Sudan, August 2011.

economic co-operation are distributed matters more for stability than whether it is delivered at all.

These are obviously extremely complex issues raising difficult questions about responsibility: was it Chinese companies, or warring parties that turned oil fields into battlefields? Is it Chinese state banks who should decide whether, where and how an infrastructure project is implemented, or the national government in whose country it is being built? If people are displaced, who should ensure that they have new homes to go to? And who is it that should decide where the fruits of economic development go?

Clearly, there are no straight forward answers. Of course the GoSS holds primary responsibility in ensuring that assistance from China is shared equally between the country's people, that development is catalysed and that conflict is not exacerbated. But in order for Chinese officials and companies to support such efforts, they must acknowledge that economic co-operation will potentially have an impact on the high levels of violent conflict in South Sudan and – at the very least – take concrete measures to ensure that no harm is done.

One way in which to meet this objective is through adopting the three steps of conflict sensitivity. First, Chinese actors involved in economic co-operation should understand the conflict context through consulting with all the stakeholders – including the GoSS, state governments, politicians, civil society groups, elders and local communities. Second, based on this understanding they should identify how their engagement might impact on conflict by conducting a thorough risk analysis before starting a project. Third, they should use this information to minimise negative impacts and promote positive ones, working closely with the host government and other involved actors. However, in some cases, the risks may simply outweigh the benefits, meaning that the whole project should be reconsidered.

For Chinese companies, in both the infrastructure and extractive sectors, conflict sensitive approaches offer significant benefits for risk management in a dangerous environment. Better understanding the operating environment and seeking acceptance from local communities and conflict actors maybe less costly and more effective than relying exclusively on armed protection from state security services, who are very often targets themselves. For the Chinese government, applying conflict sensitivity to its development co-operation can be a way to co-ordinate and

achieve its FOCAC commitments for peacebuilding and contributing to post-conflict development. For both Chinese commercial actors and the government, the approach will help guard against reputational costs that will be felt far beyond South Sudan.

Future economic co-operation with China can potentially boost development in South Sudan. It is clear that this is conditional on stability. It is for South Sudan's government, politicians and civil society to achieve peace and security. Outsiders cannot do this for them; they can only support their efforts. Through reflection on China's role in the recent past, Chinese decision-makers can ensure that how they choose to help in the future is in line with peace and development.

China, Sudan and South Sudan Relations

Leben Nelson Moro *

Introduction

The arrival in the old Sudan^① of Chinese oil companies in the 1990s and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between President Omer al Bashir's government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) in 2005 greatly shaped the relations between China, Sudan and South Sudan. With expanding investments, and increasing demands to secure them, China upped its relations with the old Sudan.

Three phases of relations are discernible: the first was a period of low key ties before the arrival of Chinese oil companies; the second was characterized by substantial ties with al Bashir's government; and the third was marked by continued expansion of ties with al Bashir's government and cultivation of relations with the leaders of SPLM/A. It is argued that Chinese relations with the old Sudan as well as Sudan and South Sudan blossomed mainly due to mutual interest in development of oil resources. Given that the development of oil resources is a political matter, China's oft-stated policy of non-interference and no-strings attached has been questioned. In this article, the reasons for this will be analyzed.

Low Key Relations

The old Sudan was among the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1959. Relations increased after President Jaafar Nimeiri (1969-1985) visited China in 1970. During the visit, he asked for help in several areas but was reportedly advised to turn to the US for assistance with oil prospecting as China did not have the right technology.^②

* Dr. Leben Nelson Moro is the Director of External Relations at the University of Juba, South Sudan, and teaches at the University's Center for Peace and Development Studies.

^① Old Sudan refers to the united Sudan before the secession of the Southern region on 9 July 2011.

^② Ali Abdalla Ali "The Sudanese-Chinese Relations: Before and After Oil", Khartoum, Sudan, 2006, p. 47.

Trade and assistance increased. In 1973, for example, 26 percent of old Sudan's cotton exports went to China, representing 13.6 percent of total exports.^① Besides cotton, the old Sudan sold gum arabic, oil seeds and other goods. It imported textiles, building materials and light industry machinery. Moreover, China gave loans to the old Sudan on easy terms, which led to the establishment of a number of projects, such as the Friendship Palace, Hassa Heissa Friendship Textile Mill and Bridge on Blue Nile. Its ties had no-strings attached. However, they were really more "symbolic than politically consequential".^②

President Nimeiri turned to US companies for support with the search for oil. In 1978, Chevron discovered oil in the Unity State of Southern Sudan. At that time, Nimeiri was building ties with Middle Eastern countries close to the US, which was keen to contain the regime of Gaddafi of Libya and that of Mengistu of Ethiopia. Chevron rapidly built infrastructure to exploit the oil. It planned for pipelines from the oil fields to Port Sudan. By 1986 oil was supposed to reach international markets. However, this was thwarted by SPLA attacks. In 1985, Nimeiri was overthrown.

In 1992, Chevron wound down its activities under US pressure and SPLA threats. The US banned engagement by American companies with the oil sector in 1997, accusing the government of Al Bashir, which came to power in 1989, of abusing human rights and supporting terrorists, including Osama bin Laden. This was to mark a new pace of Chinese involvement in the old Sudan.

Expanding Relations

China's relations with the old Sudan grew. Like Nimeiri, al Bashir travelled to China in 1995 to request help with development of oil resources. This time around China accepted as it had the technology and interest. It needed oil from abroad to sustain economic growth. In 1993 China had gone from being a net exporter of oil to a net importer.

In 1996, despite the SPLA threat, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) acquired interests in the old Sudan. Petronas from Malaysia, where al Bashir

^① Ibid, p.14.

^② Dan Large, "China's Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories in Peace and War," *The China Quarterly*, 2009, p.613.

attended military school, also entered into the country. Indian companies later joined. Together, they took over oil operations and continued from where Chevron left off. The atmosphere of conflict, which discouraged risk-averse Western companies, worked in their favor as competition was low.^①

In 1999, the old Sudan exported oil for the first time. Six years later, production reached nearly 500,000 barrels per day. In 2007, oil revenues were estimated at 4 billion US dollars, and economic growth exceeded 10 per cent. China also reaped huge benefits. It satisfied eight percent of its oil needs with supplies originating from Sudan.^②

This achievement had to be protected from the SPLA and other threats, however. China supported Sudan to secure oil flow. It used its veto to protect al Bashir's regime in the UN Security Council from sanctions. It also supplied arms, which were used to secure oil installations.^③

Clearly, relations were characterized by mutual benefit for al Bashir's regime, China and its oil companies.^④ However, the move towards peace within the country, which was being pushed by the US and other Western countries, could destabilize them.

Balancing Relations

In 2005, the regime of al Bashir and the SPLM/A signed the CPA. Without US pressure this agreement would not have been reached. China quickly established ties with SPLM/A leaders as they were going to control most of the oil fields from which Chinese and other companies extracted oil.

Broadly, this experience raised questions about China's policy of dealing only with governments. Traditionally, the state in China is strong and the driver of social

^① International Crisis Group "God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan," *Africa Report*, No. 39, 2002.

^② Leben Nelson Moro, "Oil, Conflict and Displacement in Sudan," DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2008.

^③ S.L. Field, "The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry," IUD Occasional Paper, Braamfontein, South Africa.

^④ Daniel Large and Luke Patey, "Caught in the Middle: China and India in Sudan's Transition" DIIS Working paper, p.6.

change. The big companies are owned by the state and work closely with the government. There are no significant NGOs. Accordingly, China focuses on building relations with other states.

The case of the old Sudan, Sudan and South Sudan posed challenges for this policy. China built good relations with al Bashir's regime which was pursuing devastating wars in the south and later in Darfur. China avoided establishing relations with the rebels in the south who were to become the leaders of South Sudan. Other countries dealt with the SPLM/A before coming to power. So, China was to play catching up when the SPLM/A came to power after 2005.

China has been trying hard to build equal relations with the leaders of the South and North, which separated in 2011. It has been doing well in this respect. However, China might learn from the past and not limited its future engagement only to government leaders, particularly unpopular ones like al Bashir, but also engage with other players, such as civil society actors and opponents of those in power. Dissidents or rebels of today might become the leaders of tomorrow!

Conclusion

China's relations with the old Sudan evolved from low to high engagement since the 1950s. Crucial in this transformation was the role played by oil companies that helped President al Bashir's regime to exploit oil resources. However, this development posed a significant challenge to China's oft-stated policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In fact, development of oil resources has always been a political issue with close links to internal political developments.

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 meant that China had to deal with SPLM/A leaders who were to rule the Southern region, which broke away in 2011 to form the Republic of South Sudan. Belatedly, China forged relations with the new leaders so that oil companies could continue their operations. It is trying to balance relations with Sudanese leaders and South Sudanese leaders. However, it should consider engaging with other actors such as civil society leaders.

The History of South Sudan's Chinese Future

*Daniel Large**

The creation of ties between South Sudan and China has been one of the more striking aspects of recent Sudanese politics and international relations. China's new Juba consulate, opened in September 2008, came months before February 2009 and the start of an extended series of celebrations commemorating the Golden Jubilee fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of official diplomatic China-Sudan relations.

Now, after South Sudan's independence in July 2011, swift diplomatic recognition by China and the formal opening of Juba's embassy in Beijing in April 2012, China-South Sudan relations are topical. Taking a step back from the heat of the immediate moment, however, this article considers the question of how should we think about the history of South Sudan's Chinese future. It does so via some broad thematic points, and locates these relations in historical time, both in terms of history as it has happened to date and is in the process of unfolding today.

A New History

China's history of its Sudan future has only very recently come to encompass the *de facto* and then the *de jure* reality of two Sudans. When relations between Sudan and China changed from 'traditional' to 'strategic' after 1989, this reinforced the dominance of a northern-centric political geography of relations. This, of course, carried an official narrative and a sanctioned history of its own, which continued its own version of a history of Sudan's future China relations that had been forged in the nineteenth century. This is when the founding mythology of the colonial bridge linking Sudan and China began.

* Dan Large is Research Director of Africa Asia Centre, SOAS, University of London.

The Historical Mythology of China-Sudan Relations: Questioning Genesis

The first area concerns the unique historic links between Sudan and China, which have provided generations with a historical narrative on which to base relations. As seen, for example, during Premier Zhou Enlai's state visit to Khartoum in 1964, these have been fashioned into a colourful narrative distilled into the form of the perfect anti-hero, Chinese Gordon, who was viewed as a bridge linking Sudan and China.^①

Gordon, who took part in the capture of Peking (Beijing) in 1860 and commanded the Chinese force that quashed the Taiping Rebellion (1863-1864), was shot to death in 1885 by 'a very tall black Sudanese'.^② The meaning of 'Sudanese' from around the mid-nineteenth century was associated with the black peoples of Southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains, who were recruited into the Egyptian army then controlling Sudan or the slave armies of northern Sudanese traders.^③

The upshot is that it is likely that the founding myth of Sudan-China relations is based upon the actions of a Southern Sudanese. For a history appropriated by successive ruling elites in Khartoum, and in view of Southern Sudan's comparative lack of a meaningful history of Chinese connections until recent years, this might provide a subversive twist and the basis of a new historical connection between South Sudan and China. In an important sense, however, the Mahdist rebellion united disparate groups of Sudan's peripheries into a common purpose. In this way, it makes little sense to reattribute a Southern identity to this founding episode. However, politics always appropriates and reinterprets history to its own ends.

Before and after the January 2011 referendum, efforts were made to strengthen the basis of China's relations with the GOSS. As well as the better covered

^① See Richard Hill, "The Gordon Literature," *The Durham University Journal*, Vol. 47, 1955, p. 97.

^② J.A.R.Reid, "The death of Gordon," *Sudan Notes and Records* Vol. XX (1937), p. 173. Available in www.sudanarchive.net.

^③ Johnson, "The Death of Gordon," op cit., footnote 51, p.309.

economic diplomacy or high-level political missions, the Chinese consulate and later its Embassy made active efforts to demonstrate a continuity of socio-cultural links between China and South Sudan. One dynamic appeared to be a desire to compensate for the recognised imbalance in China's relations with Sudan founded in Khartoum; a necessary adaptation and one that has paved the way for greater links between Juba and Beijing.

China and Southern Sudan's Economic Development

The second area concerns the current significance that China is now being accorded to independent South Sudan's development prospects, which evokes a very different form of historical interest. One history of Sudan's China future from the nineteenth century foresaw a prominent Chinese role in economic development. In the late nineteenth century, various schemes were devised – and some implemented – predicated upon the superiority of Chinese labour in opening up Central Africa to more effective European resource exploitation.^①

In certain respects, 'the Chinese' have long been associated with schemes of improvement, bound up in imaginaries of modernising projects using outside labour. Such projections were by no means confined to nineteenth century Egyptian-governed Sudan. Since 2005, and the entry of the first Chinese entrepreneurs who pioneered business ventures outside the oil sector in Southern Sudan after (and even before) the CPA, an independent Chinese role has been unfolding. Emin Pasha would be intrigued and, conceivably, feel partly vindicated, even if this is of a qualitatively different kind of engagement than he envisaged.

The Weight of the Past: a Mixed Legacy

The mutual ignorance that formerly existed in China about South Sudan and vice versa was long conspicuous. Overcoming the history of the war years and the

^① He wrote in May 1881 "that if it is possible for Central Africa to be opened up, it can only be accomplished by means of the Chinese?" Schweinfurth, G. F. Ratzel, R.W. Felkin and G. Hartlaub eds., *Emin Pasha in Central Africa: being a collection of his letters and journals* (London: George Philip and Son, 1888), pp. 417, 419.

legacy of China's role in Sudan's North-South and South-South civil wars after the 1989 NIF coup remains a challenge in relations going forward. Because of Beijing's strong and multifaceted support for Khartoum it is understandable that there were and remain strong feelings about China. However, China's adept diplomacy and the SPLM's savvy incorporation of China into its own political agenda during the CPA – using China not just in its domestic struggle with the NCP but also in its international diplomacy – demonstrated how at the elite level pragmatism founded in mutual interest trumped this history, opening a new historic phase.

South Sudan – China relations have been reset in political terms, though recent oil politics have not been easy or straightforward and the legacy of the past is mixed. The war years will continue to inform perceptions of China in South Sudan, especially for those in the oil producing areas. At the same time, China's history of support to Southern Sudan after 1972 and more recent attempts to be more cooperative with independent South Sudan through various gestures of assistance, and the processes to enhance mutual understanding point toward a better future.

Conclusion

South Sudan's relations with China were born and baptised in political fire. That looks likely to continue, despite the September 2012 agreement on oil and security related matters between Sudan and South Sudan. The history of South Sudan's China future remains bound up in Sudan's relations with China and the continuing reality, albeit a contested on subject to ongoing violence, of two importantly inter-related and inter-dependent countries.

Today's expectations that China can deliver in South Sudan where others have failed hark back to the likes of Emin Pasha and the transformative visions centred on (controlled) Chinese agency. Given the enormity of South Sudan's development needs today, a hopeful but cautious realism should thus temper any notion of China's ingrained advantage or superiority; recent years have shown that China is just as subject to the constraints of operating in South Sudan as any other investor. The history of South Sudan's China future will likely become important if current trends continue, but this scenario depends upon this future history being made.