


**Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Mitra and Associates
and Saferworld**

Safety and security in the South-East border area of Bangladesh

A public perceptions survey



February 2013



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Acknowledgements

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Acronyms

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	NIPORT	National Institute for Population Research and Training
ADR	Alternative dispute resolution	PoA	Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
BDT	Bangladesh taka	PRP	Police Reform Programme
BEI	Bangladesh Enterprise Institute	RAB	Rapid Action Battalion
BGB	Border Guard Bangladesh	ReCAAP	Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation	RSO	Rohingya Solidarity Organisation
DNC	Department of Narcotics Control	SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
FGD	Focus group discussion	SALW	Small arms and light weapons
GoB	Government of Bangladesh	SE	South-East
HHS	Household survey	TCO	Transnational criminal organisations
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus	TDR	Traditional dispute resolution
HuJI-B	Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh	TI	Transparency International
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce	TIP	Trafficking in persons
ICT	Information and communication technologies	UN	United Nations
IMB	International Maritime Bureau	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
INGO	International non-governmental organisation	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
JMB	Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh	UN TIP Protocol	UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons
KII	Key informant interview	UP	Union <i>Parishad</i>
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba	VDP	Village Defence Party
MLPA	Money Laundering Prevention Act		
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs		
NGO	Non-governmental organisation		

Glossary

Char A tract of land surrounded by water

Children Those aged between 0 and 14

Citizen's Charter An initiative to improve public sector institutions, Citizen's Charters were introduced by several public agencies, including some law enforcement agencies, to set out the standard of service that public institutions should provide to the people and offer an interactive platform for civil servants and citizens to discuss their concerns and challenges and plan solutions together¹

Context sensitivity Awareness of actors and possible sources of tension, and avoiding negative impacts and maximising positive effects in practice

Domestic violence Pattern of abusive and threatening behaviour that may include physical, emotional, economic or sexual violence

Dowry The passing of money, goods and/or property to any person, directly or indirectly, to ensure marriage and a secured married life

Eve teasing Euphemism for sexual harassment and abuse of girls and women in public places, also known as *jouno hoirani* in Bangla

Human trafficking Forced, fraudulent or involuntary movement or migration of people across borders for sexual, labour or other forms of exploitation

Hundi An informal, and illegal, money transfer network

Khas land Common land

Law enforcement Process of ensuring observance of the law, and thereby preserving peace and stability

Madrasa Religious school or college that specialises in Islam

Mastans Criminal thugs with political or influential patrons

Old aged Those aged over 65

Qaumi madrasa Unregulated *madrasa*

Recruitment fraud False offers of employment that cause people to unwittingly become trafficked

Rohingya refugees Can represent registered refugees and/or 'self-settled'/unregistered refugees

Rural Non-urban and largely agricultural areas

Security sector An umbrella term for the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the provision of security

Self-settled Unregistered cross-border settlement

Sexual harassment Unwelcome and inappropriate sexual advances

Shalish An informal mediation process usually chaired by local leaders

Strangers An unfamiliar person or an outsider to a particular group

Students Those that attend college/university or *madrassas*

Thana Police station; 'model *thanas*' are modern, upgraded police stations which have been established in selected metropolitan and rural locations as part of the Bangladesh Police Reform Programme

Upazila Sub-district

Urban Densely populated and largely non-agricultural areas

Violent extremism Violence carried out by militant groups to assert an extreme ideology

Youth Those aged between 15 and 25

¹ Ministry of Establishment, *Citizen's Charter: a Manual* (Civil Service Change Management Programme, 2010).

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Cox's Bazar District



This map is intended for illustrative purposes only. Saferworld takes no position on whether this representation is legally or politically valid.

Foreword

REVIEWING THE LEVEL OF SECURITY in areas that lie close to international borders should be an important aspect of national as well as regional security assessments. In South Asia, where international boundaries are often artificial, poorly demarcated and heavily populated, there is a growing need for the evaluation of safety and security issues, particularly the effectiveness of law and order mechanisms, in these areas.

The Chittagong Division of Bangladesh, located in the South-East of the country bordering Myanmar, has been reported in recent times as being particularly vulnerable due to the existence of internal threats arising from socio-economic issues and criminal activities. The threat perception in the region is further heightened by a range of external threats such as arms, narcotics and human trafficking, armed robbery against ships, the influx of refugees from Myanmar, money laundering and transnational crime. A combination of these threats is thought to have created a volatile atmosphere in an area that is of great national significance due to the existence of an international port in the city of Chittagong and a booming tourist industry in Cox's Bazar.

Regionally, the Chittagong Division is also important as it is part of the Kunming Initiative which has the objective of connecting Bangladesh to China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries through road and rail links. Despite its national and regional significance, a comprehensive study on the perception of people in this sensitive part of the country about the safety and security situation has not been previously undertaken.

This report by the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and Saferworld aims to address this gap by presenting and analysing research into the perception of safety and security in Bangladesh's South-East border area. This research, we hope, will help in finding ways and means of addressing the security concerns identified in the report. It is our hope that this report and its recommendations will not only facilitate the recognition and mitigation of some crucial safety and security issues but also lead to further studies on this significant but under-researched region of Bangladesh.

I would like to thank the British High Commission in Bangladesh for their generous financial support towards this study. At Saferworld, thanks goes to Chamila Hemmathagama, Neila Husain, Evelyn Vancollie, Touhidul Islam and G. M. Shueb Ahmed. The efforts of Nic Benton, the author of this report, deserve particular mention. A note of thanks must also be made to S. N. Mitra and Fuad Pasha for their assistance in undertaking the field research. Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues at BEI, Mohammad Humayun Kabir, Faiz Sobhan, Mirza Sadaqat Huda, Ashish Banik and Sumaiya Nour, who have made this report possible through their hard work and commitment.

Farooq Sobhan, *President, BEI*

Executive summary

BESIDES INDIA, Myanmar is the only neighbour with which Bangladesh shares a border. The border between Chittagong Division in Bangladesh and Myanmar offers an alternative land route to China and South East Asia. Chittagong Division also contains Bangladesh's primary seaport and a thriving tourist industry in Cox's Bazar. However, there are widespread concerns about various forms of trafficking as well as tensions between Rohingya refugees and host communities in this area of Bangladesh, known as the South-East (SE) border area. The region has also become vulnerable to organised crime and extremist groups. Despite this, very little information is available about the effects of these challenges on the safety and security situation in this area.

The SE border area, like the majority of Bangladesh, remains deeply impoverished, resulting in significant socio-economic insecurity. The research conducted for this report highlighted an important link between socio-economic vulnerability and illegal activities, as socio-economic and cultural threats (including unemployment, marginalisation, etc.) influence and are influenced by violence and criminality. Poverty and unemployment, for example, were identified as the main drivers of crime, but crime in turn can deprive people of their livelihood and push them into poverty, such as when fishermen's boats or catch are stolen, or if a family's breadwinner is injured or killed.

On top of these internal threats, the SE border area faces external threats due to its location on the country's international border with Myanmar. Such external threats include trafficking in narcotics and small arms and light weapons (SALW) as well as human trafficking and armed robbery against ships. This combination of internal and external threats has increased the perception of insecurity in an area of national and international significance. In spite of this, no comprehensive study has been made of public perceptions on safety and security in this part of the country.

Building on past surveys of public perceptions in Bangladesh, this report aims to address the research gap by collecting and analysing people's perceptions of safety and security in the SE border area. This research will help to identify key safety and security concerns, priorities and challenges in the SE border area and make evidence-based recommendations to address them. It will also provide baseline data to inform and influence key stakeholders and national processes such as the Bangladesh Police Reform Programme (PRP) and the proposed Bangladesh National Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

The information presented in this report was collected in May and June 2012 using a variety of research methods designed to supplement quantitative with qualitative data. The research comprised a household survey (HHS) of members of 2,500 households from Cox's Bazar District, 16 focus group discussions (FGDs) with participants from a variety of backgrounds, and 28 key informant interviews (KIIs) with a range of

stakeholders, as well as desk research to analyse government statistics and secondary sources. However, despite the best efforts of the survey team, challenges on the ground created some limitations, including fewer Rohingya respondents and urban households in the HHS than originally planned, under-representation of female participants in the FGDs due to cultural and security concerns, and a lack of credible data on financial crime. Further information on the methodology is included in annex A.

Findings

Highlights of the key findings in each chapter of this report are given below.

Looking at the **general perceptions of safety and security** in the SE border area, data for this report indicated that:

- As previous national surveys have shown, poverty is the leading security concern of Bangladeshis; accordingly, this research shows that the people of the SE border area are most concerned with issues linked to freedom from socio-economic and cultural threats.
- Eighty-five percent of HHS respondents identified ‘poverty’ and 70 percent ‘unemployment’ as drivers of crime, demonstrating that socio-economic and cultural threats can increase the threat of violence and crime. The reverse, where violence and crime increase socio-economic and cultural insecurity, was also found to be a concern. Fifty-nine percent of respondents were either worried or very worried that they or a member of their family would become a victim of crime.
- Public perceptions of security have improved in the past two years. However, while a greater number of people reported that they feel safer in their locality, the percentage of respondents reporting that they have been a victim of crime over the past 12 months has increased.
- The human security of both registered and unregistered Rohingya refugees is further undermined by poor relations with the Bangladeshi host community. On average over a third of respondents described relations between the Bangladeshi host community and the Rohingya as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’.
- Both the Rohingya and Bangladeshi host communities share many socio-economic and security vulnerabilities, but the absence of concern for shared safety and security interests and values in order to create common ground and improved dialogue has continued to alienate all communities.
- Almost the same number of men (38 percent) as women (40 percent) in the SE border area thought it would be unsafe for a woman or girl to go out alone at night, whereas previous national surveys showed less concern among men than women about gender-based violence.
- Men and women were also almost equally fearful (59 percent and 58 percent respectively) that they or a member of their family would become a victim of crime.

Trafficking is a serious concern in the SE border area, with evidence of a flourishing illicit trade in drugs, SALW and human trafficking.

- Drug trafficking in particular was identified by over 60 percent of HHS respondents as being a significant cross-border activity. Transnational criminal organisations (TCOs) reportedly draw largely from the most economically insecure and marginalised people to smuggle drugs across the border, as these people are willing to take greater risks for much-needed income.
- The availability and abuse of drugs is also widespread in the area, causing further problems. Two-thirds of survey respondents thought that drugs had adversely affected security in the SE border area.
- Due to its geography, location and porous borders, Bangladesh is also a valuable transit route in the trafficking of SALW destined for regional and local violent extremist

groups and TCOs. It was also noted in one FGD that some people buy SALW for protection as they do not have faith in the law enforcement agencies.

- Human trafficking, also identified as a major problem in the SE border area, was seen as driven by poverty and social exclusion, with traffickers tricking their victims with promises of employment or better living conditions. Children and women were identified by survey respondents as being the most vulnerable to human trafficking.

Armed violence in the SE border area can significantly affect perceptions of safety and security.

- Violent extremism was identified as a leading cause of armed violence. It was reported that extremist groups have formed local and international links for financial co-operation.
- The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) leads the government's response to violent extremism, but the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) also has a key role to play, as border management is an important part of countering extremist violence. The vast majority of HHS respondents (97.5 percent) were not aware of any militant training camps in their locality, and several FGD participants attributed a decrease of militant activity to government measures to counter extremism. However, positive developments should not be taken for granted as some sources indicated a growing concern that violent extremists were returning to the SE border area.
- Of the 2.5 percent of HHS respondents who were aware of militant training camps in their locality, nearly half thought these were used for religious indoctrination.
- Between 2010 and 2011 there was a significant reduction in officially recorded attacks and attempted attacks on ships as a result of initiatives by the Bangladesh authorities to counter incidents of armed robbery against ships. The Bangladesh Coast Guard has also recently introduced a Citizen's Charter which allows citizens to seek help from the Coast Guard on any issue relating to safety and security.
- However, armed robbery against ships remains a significant threat. There are also indications that such attacks may be under-reported, as some FGD participants alleged that Coast Guard officials threaten or harass victims for logging complaints.
- Bangladesh has recently adopted national and international measures to curb money laundering, but the informal, and illegal, *hundi* system has complicated such efforts. The *hundi* system is popular as it is a faster and cheaper way to transfer money than the formal banking system. While most transactions are innocent, such as sending remittances, the system is open to abuse by criminals.

This study also looked at **public perceptions of law enforcement agencies**.

- A little over two-thirds of respondents who had been victim of a crime in the year prior to the research said that the police had not been informed about it. While the primary reasons given for this were that the respondents dealt with the matter themselves or considered it a private/family matter, concerns about police dishonesty also prevented some victims from reporting crimes.
- Despite the under-reporting of crime and concerns about dishonesty, 70 percent of HHS respondents identified the police as responsible for reducing crime, demonstrating that the police is seen as the primary law enforcement agency responsible for reducing crime.
- Border control is a significant safety and security concern in the SE border region. 'Protecting the maritime border' and 'border security' were both identified by approximately half of HHS respondents as being a primary responsibility of law enforcement agencies.
- When asked about their level of confidence in different law enforcement agencies, respondents showed high levels of confidence in RAB and the Army (over 90 percent

each), and the Coast Guard and BGB both did very well (over 70 percent each). The Bangladesh Police, however, ranked low, with under 20 percent of respondents having confidence in them. A similar ranking was recorded for perceived levels of honesty in each institution.

- However, despite negative perceptions of honesty and low levels of confidence in the police, 81 percent of HHS respondents said they would approach the police if they or a member of their family was threatened or became the victim of a crime. This may reflect the desire among participants for improved community–police relations, which can be aided through ongoing efforts such as the PRP, community policing and gender-responsive policing initiatives.
- For the reputation of law enforcement agencies to improve, concerns about alleged corruption and external interference need to be addressed. Sixty-eight percent of respondents alleged that there was ‘greed-based’ corruption (to become rich) and 60 percent thought there was ‘need-based’ corruption (to supplement low wages). In addition, 59 percent thought there was external interference (for example, by politicians or influential people) in the work of law enforcement agencies.
- Similarly, concerns about human rights need to be addressed as well. Fifty-one percent of survey respondents believed that law enforcement agencies did not respect human rights, with ‘unlawful arrests’ perceived as the most prevalent violation.
- Three-quarters of respondents thought that law enforcement agencies did not treat all groups equally, with the ‘rural poor’ widely considered to be the most marginalised by security providers.
- When asked how the services of law enforcement agencies could be improved, respondents said agencies should receive more training (48 percent) and resources (33 percent). Other suggestions included more patrols and more accountability (24 percent each) and improving community relations (21 percent).
- While the majority of respondents said they had faith in the formal courts for settling disputes, only a small minority had sought assistance from the courts in the year prior to the survey. There was, however, wide public knowledge of other dispute resolution mechanisms, such as local government authorities and the informal *shalish*. While these mechanisms were deemed helpful in achieving justice, there were concerns that they represent local power structures and thus perpetuate marginalisation.

Conclusion

This research has shown that residents in the SE border area share many of the security concerns that have been highlighted in previous national surveys. Socio-economic and cultural threats remain the primary concern for the majority of people, although there is considerable anxiety about violence and criminal threats. However, clear links between the two mean that their respective importance can never be considered in isolation.

Being located near the international border with Myanmar brings additional security concerns. The illicit trade in drugs was identified as a particular threat, both as a crime and due to the effects of drugs on society. SALW and human trafficking, as well as armed robbery against ships, were also concerns associated with the location and geography of the SE border area.

While confidence in other law enforcement agencies was high, the research found that confidence in the police was low, as was their perceived level of honesty. Despite this, survey respondents did identify the police as the primary law enforcement agency responsible for reducing crime. There was also a desire for better community–police relations, something which may be aided by current initiatives undertaken by the Government of Bangladesh such as the PRP and community policing initiatives.

Recommendations

The report offers specific recommendations for the Government of Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Police, the BGB and the Coast Guard as well as civil society and donors. Highlights of the recommendations are provided below.

- Relations between communities and law enforcement agencies should be improved through dialogue, the implementation of a Citizen's Charter for each law enforcement agency and the creation of an independent complaints commission to review allegations of wrongdoing.
- Key law enforcement and civil society stakeholders should work together to identify and address the safety and security priorities of communities.
- Sustainable information exchange mechanisms need to be developed between domestic law enforcement agencies to improve co-ordination and effectiveness.
- Stakeholders must ensure that initiatives to address law and order concerns are supported by initiatives addressing socio-economic and cultural insecurities.

Further research is recommended to collect baseline information and understand the perceptions, needs and insecurities faced by communities in the SE border area.

Introduction

THIS REPORT BUILDS ON THE FINDINGS from past surveys of public perceptions conducted in Bangladesh and commissioned by Saferworld in 2007 and 2010, and by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2011,² by looking specifically at safety and security in the South-East (SE) border area of the Chittagong Division, where Bangladesh meets Myanmar. Data collected will provide a baseline contribution on the SE border area that can inform and influence key stakeholders, including the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), the Bangladesh Police, the international community, civil society, and in particular national processes such as the Bangladesh Police Reform Programme (PRP) and the development of the proposed Bangladesh National Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Rationale for the survey

Police records indicate that the incidence of crime has risen by approximately 50,000 incidents over the last decade, from 114,191 in 2001 to 162,898 in 2010.³ Nonetheless, a high proportion of crimes remain unreported, with research suggesting that many victims do not report crimes to the police (see table 14). This report builds on research documenting individuals' safety and security concerns and their trust and confidence in local and national security providers in order to identify challenges, build on successes and offer recommendations for improved service delivery by security providers. It is also hoped that this report can contribute to the efforts of the ongoing PRP supported by UNDP. The overarching objective of the PRP is long-term and comprehensive capacity building to improve human security in Bangladesh, promoting a democratic policing approach through progressive strengthening of law and order, respect for human rights, and equitable access to justice.⁴

The purpose of this report is not to critique the PRP or evaluate its implementation, but instead to contribute a new baseline of data on the previously under-reported SE border area that can inform and influence key stakeholders. The overall methodological approach is therefore aimed at producing recommendations in order to:

- Contribute to improvements in police performance in the target areas as part of the PRP.
- Establish baseline information for evidence-based planning by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) to implement the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

² See Saferworld, *Human security in Bangladesh* (Saferworld, 2008), and *Security provision in Bangladesh: A public perceptions survey* (Saferworld, 2010); Police Reform Programme (PRP), *Baseline survey on personal security and police performance in Bangladesh* (UNDP, 2011).

³ 'Crime Statistics: Number of registered cases from 2001 to 2010', Bangladesh Police, www.police.gov.bd/index5.php?category=48, accessed 14 November 2012.

⁴ PRP, *op cit*.

- Inform legal frameworks on law and order by providing data that can be used to evaluate the continued relevance of enacted legislation (for example the Bangladesh Arms Act of 1878, the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009 and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009, as well as the proposed Witness and Evidence Protection Act).
- Create an evidence base for the planning activities of donors, the GoB and the Bangladesh Police, and inform discussions on strategic planning and improvements to safety and security in Bangladesh's SE border area.

Methodology

The information presented in this report was collected in May and June 2012 using a variety of quantitative and qualitative survey tools:

- **Household survey:** Using a stratified cluster sampling design, a series of questions was asked to members of 2,500 households in Cox's Bazar District (Chittagong Division). This household survey (HHS) was designed to provide a representative and sensitive analysis of perceptions on the safety and security situation in the SE border area. Overall, interviews were held with a total of 1,250 men and 1,250 women (with approximately 80 percent of respondents coming from rural areas, and the remainder from urban communities – for further details on the methodology see annex A).

Limitations: While the survey endeavoured to be as representative as possible, the number of respondents from the Rohingya community was limited. This was because the survey team could not get access to the Rohingya camps, as well as concerns among Rohingya that the real intention of the interviews was to repatriate them, and fears for personal safety, particularly on the part of women. Furthermore, because of difficulties in identifying households recorded as 'other urban' in the 2001 census, it was not possible to interview the desired number of urban households. The survey team has attempted to fill this gap in the survey by using a wide range of research methods to collect data.

- **Focus group discussions:** Sixteen focus group discussions (FGDs) were held with representatives from across Cox's Bazar District, comprising a total of 113 respondents. Participants were drawn from a variety of backgrounds, including community leaders, drivers, farmers, fishermen and fish traders, small traders, students and minority Rohingya.

Limitations: The survey team sought to include as many female participants as possible, but it should be acknowledged that they were numerically under-represented because of difficulties in securing willing participation, with many apparently fearing for their safety if they participated in public discussions. In total, women made up approximately 10 percent of focus group participants.

- **Key informant interviews:** Twenty-eight key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with a broad cross-section of stakeholders from law enforcement agencies, government, local communities and civil society organisations located in Dhaka and the Chittagong Division between 7 May 2012 and 11 June 2012. The majority of key informants were representatives from communities in Cox's Bazar District and local law enforcement officials, but additional opinions were sought from interested stakeholders in the capital Dhaka.
- **Desk research:** In addition to the primary research, government statistics and a variety of secondary sources were also analysed to provide context for the data gathered. Sources consulted included official government statistics, newspaper articles, previous Saferworld research and relevant research reports and articles from respected sources.


Limitations: Information on financial crime, including the *hundi* system, is limited, and the desk research could not find significant information or data on the impact of financial crime on safety and security. The primary research methodologies adopted for this report were unable to fill this gap as HHS and FGD respondents were not able to provide additional information. It is, therefore, evident that there is a need for further research into the effects of financial crime and money laundering on safety and security in Bangladesh.

Key dimensions of safety and security

The border shared by the Chittagong Division and the north-west of Myanmar (the SE border area) stretches for approximately 193 kilometres, creating an increased susceptibility to safety and security issues as criminal or violent extremist groups exploit gaps in border controls to traffic arms, drugs and people. These practices have inevitably had a severe and detrimental impact on safety and security in the region. Participants for this survey were drawn from the particularly vulnerable Cox's Bazar District.⁵ In addition to sharing a common frontier with Myanmar, the district has a coastline containing one of the world's longest natural beaches (120 kilometres) facing the Bay of Bengal, which increases its vulnerability to trafficking and armed robbery against ships.

The SE border area enjoys great economic potential through its close proximity to Chittagong, the primary seaport of Bangladesh (which according to the Chittagong Port Authority produced a surplus of 5.3 billion Bangladesh taka (BDT) in 2009–2010).⁶ However, like the rest of Bangladesh it remains deeply impoverished, resulting in significant socio-economic insecurity. According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), children in Chittagong Division are vulnerable to severe deprivations, with over half of children in 2006 suffering from at least one severe deficiency (in terms of shelter, sanitation, safe drinking water, information, food, education or health) – figure 1.

Figure 1: Incidence of severe child deprivations per division (2006, %)



UNICEF, *Global Study on Child Poverty and Disparities: National Report Bangladesh* (2009), www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Child_Poverty_and_Disparities_in_Bangladesh.pdf

The consequences of poverty on safety and security were continually mentioned in the findings of both the quantitative and qualitative research undertaken. Particularly evident were the links between economic vulnerability and illegal activities in the SE border area.

⁵ Cox's Bazar is one of eleven districts in Chittagong Division, and according to the provisional 2011 census has approximately eight percent of the division's population. The district contains eight *upazilas* (or sub-districts): Chakaria, Cox's Bazar Sadar, Kutubdia, Maheshkhali, Pekua, Ramu, Teknaf and Ukhia.

⁶ Chittagong Port Authority, *Overview 2012* (2012), cpa.gov.bd/portal/.

For the purpose of this survey, safety and security is comprised of two distinct features:

Freedom from socio-economic and cultural threats

- Socio-economic threats refer to those insecurities or disadvantages that result from the gap between individuals' potential ability and actual capacity to meet basic needs.
 - Threats therefore include those deprivations that arise from:
 - inadequate access to employment, food, housing, education or healthcare
 - underdeveloped infrastructure (e.g. housing, healthcare, schools and roads)
 - political underrepresentation
- Cultural threats refer to those insecurities that arise from any aspect of culture that legitimises deprivations.
 - Threats include:
 - Endemic corruption
 - Social acceptance of gender disparities
 - The marginalisation of minority communities from all aspects of society

Protection from violence and criminal threats

- Violence in this context refers to the use of force to threaten or perpetrate actual harm to persons or property.
 - Threats therefore include:
 - physical and/or sexual assault
 - verbal or psychological abuse
 - destruction of personal property
 - political intimidation
- Criminal threats refer to those insecurities that arise from individual and societal fear of crime.

This report is structured in several main chapters. Following this introduction (chapter 1), the general safety and security perceptions of respondents from the SE border area are introduced (chapter 2). This is followed by a more detailed analysis of perceptions related to trafficking (chapter 3) and armed violence (chapter 4). Before concluding, the report takes a closer look at public perceptions of law enforcement agencies in the SE border area (chapter 5). The report concludes with a summary of the key findings of the survey and recommendations that can feed into the PRP, the development of the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and other GoB strategic planning on security and justice provision in the SE border area (chapter 6).

2

General perceptions of safety and security

2.1 Socio-economic drivers of crime


DATA FROM THE SE BORDER AREA appears to show that the greatest concerns, both for the respondents of the HHS and participants in the FGDs, were linked to freedom from socio-economic and cultural threats; that is, under-development of infrastructure and insecurity in the fulfilment of basic human needs (such as access to water, food and shelter). This finding supports previous research that has shown that poverty is the leading security concern for the majority of Bangladeshis.⁷ The findings of this survey show that the primary source of anxiety was ‘access to water and/or electricity’, which was highlighted by 43 percent of respondents as their most pressing concern (rising to 73 percent if second and third priorities are added).⁸ This was followed by ‘inadequate roads’ (18 percent, rising to 52 percent if second and third priorities are added), and ‘unemployment’ (9 percent, rising to 37 percent if second and third priorities are added). Other notable cumulative concerns were ‘education’ (21 percent) and ‘food security’ (11 percent).

Concerns about unemployment, access to education and food security appeared to be directly relevant to wider safety and security concerns in the SE border area as they were perceived to be key drivers of crime. Unemployment rates were, for example, seen as directly linked to the numbers of women and children in poverty involved in drug trafficking or at risk of human trafficking, in an effort to find money to meet their basic needs.

When the data from the SE border area is disaggregated by sex, some interesting differences emerge. These include the finding that greater numbers of men were concerned, to varying degrees, with ‘access to water and/or electricity’ (78 percent compared to 68 percent of women), ‘inadequate roads’ (58 percent compared to 44 percent) and ‘unemployment’ (41 percent compared to 34 percent). In contrast, female respondents showed greater concern with ‘health infrastructure’ (18 percent compared to 15 percent), ‘food security’ (15 percent compared to 7 percent) and ‘corruption’ (9 percent compared to 4 percent). Overall, it is apparent that despite many equitable attitudes, men are arguably more concerned with public issues and women with private or domestic insecurity (table 1).

⁷ See Saferworld (2008), *op cit.*, Saferworld (2010), *op cit.*, and PRP (2011) *op cit.*

⁸ The survey asked respondents to list their three greatest concerns in their locality, prioritising them in order of importance.

Figure 2: Percentage of respondents listing concerns related to freedom from socio-economic and cultural threats in their top three security concerns (2012, %)

Differences were also apparent between rural and urban settings, including some that were particularly striking. Significantly greater numbers of rural respondents identified ‘inadequate roads’, ‘education’ and ‘health infrastructure’ as security concerns, while more urban respondents expressed concern about issues related to ‘sanitation’ and ‘corruption’. It must be noted that the HHS was not able to cover the target number of urban households specified in the original design of the survey (see annex A – methodology). Accordingly, collated responses may not be as representative as initially anticipated. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that socio-economic and cultural threats remain of particular concern for the majority of people, with the fulfilment of basic needs being a prerequisite of living safe, secure and fulfilling lives.

Table 1: Disaggregation of data on concerns related to freedom from socio-economic and cultural threats (2012, %)

		Unemployment	Access to water/ electricity	Food security	Price rises	Health infrastructure	Education	Land grabbing	Corruption	Natural disasters	Inadequate roads	Sanitation
Sex	Male	40.5	78.0	7.4	6.9	14.5	20.9	7.2	4.3	10.5	57.9	6.8
	Female	33.7	67.6	15.2	8.6	17.6	21.4	8.3	9.2	14.6	44.0	10.8
Area	Rural	36.8	73.4	12.5	8.0	18.8	23.9	8.1	5.6	11.8	53.8	6.7
	Urban	38.4	73.0	6.7	6.8	4.8	10.1	6.0	11.7	16.2	39.0	17.5

“Healthcare is one of our major concerns. Many pregnant women have died in the area due to the lack of adequate healthcare. This issue needs to be addressed by the authorities.”

Focus group participant, ‘fishermen’, Teknaf

The significance of the socio-economic and cultural threats identified in the HHS is further supported by the findings of the FGDs. For instance, poverty was a consistent source of insecurity for FGD participants from across Cox’s Bazar District. Associated anxieties included dissatisfaction in accessing education because of an inability to pay school fees or inadequate schooling infrastructure;⁹ underdevelopment of healthcare services;¹⁰ lack of employment opportunities, especially for women;¹¹ and food and

⁹ FGDs in Cox’s Bazar Sadar (‘students’, ‘community people’); Teknaf (‘fishermen’) and Ukhia (‘community people’, ‘farmers’).


¹⁰ FGDs in Cox’s Bazar Sadar (‘small traders’), Teknaf (‘fishermen’, ‘small traders’) and Ukhia (‘community people’, ‘drivers’, ‘farmers’, ‘fishermen’).

¹¹ FGDs in Cox’s Bazar Sadar (‘community people’, ‘mixed group’, ‘male Rohingya’, ‘small traders’, ‘students’), Teknaf (‘fishermen’, ‘female Rohingya’, ‘male Rohingya’) and Ukhia (‘community people’, ‘drivers’, ‘fishermen’, ‘male Rohingya’).

economic insecurity as a result of environmental strains, for example pests destroying crops (identified by ‘farmers’ in Ukhia) or monsoons breaking fishing equipment (‘fishermen’, Ukhia). The potential impact of the latter concern on law and order was highlighted by several key informants, who noted that fishermen were becoming increasingly drawn into drug smuggling because of financial insecurity.¹²


The link between socio-economic and cultural threats and threats of violence and crime – and vice versa – can be further illustrated by a hypothetical example based on discussions with focus group participants: if a struggling farmer, vulnerable to economic and food insecurity, experiences personal property crime (loss of equipment) through theft or banditry then he may suffer further insecurity by losing the capacity to feed his family or earn enough money for the fulfilment of basic needs. This individual as a result may turn to crime to survive (figure 3).

Figure 3: Example from focus group participants of the intertwined nature of socio-economic and cultural threats and insecurity



Consequently, despite not being specifically identified by significant numbers of people among their top three security concerns, law and order remains highly significant. The linkages between poverty and crime are more starkly drawn in figure 4, which shows widespread agreement that ‘poverty’ (85 percent) and ‘unemployment’ (70 percent) were drivers of crime; therefore, safety and security requires significant attention in the SE border area.

Figure 4: Why do people commit crime? (2012, %)



¹² Anonymous male (BGB), Teknaf, May/June 2012; anonymous male (police), Teknaf, May/June 2012.


2.2 Law and order situation

The HHS recorded that approximately 13 percent of respondents rated the ‘law and order situation’ in the SE border area as one of their three leading security concerns (figure 5). While the perceived perpetrators of crime cover a wide range of demographic groups (table 6, section 2.3), many people agree that the causes of crime include ‘poverty’, ‘unemployment’, ‘lack of opportunities’ and ‘drug addiction’ (figure 4). This finding does not appear to be unique to the SE border area: the *Baseline survey on personal security and police performance in Bangladesh* reported that 81.2 percent of people from across the country considered unemployment to be the primary reason why people commit crime.¹³

“Robberies, crime and theft are major issues of concern in this area.”


Focus group participant, ‘fishermen’, Ukhia

Figure 5: Percentage of respondents listing issues related to violence and criminal threats in their top three security concerns (2012, %)



Nearly half of the respondents said that the current crime situation was ‘better’ than the year before. This sentiment was particularly strong in Teknaf (with 54 percent stating this opinion). A further 30 percent of all respondents considered that criminal activity had neither improved nor worsened during this same period. This appears to be positive, particularly given that most people did not prioritise concern with violence and criminal threats. Nonetheless, a quarter of interviewees did say that law and order had worsened (29 percent in Ukhia, 24 percent in Cox’s Bazar Sadar and 18 percent in Teknaf).


Figure 6: Perceptions of respondents on the crime situation compared to one year ago (2012, %)



¹³ PRP (2011), *op cit*.

Cumulatively, 44 percent of respondents considered there to be at least ‘a little less’ crime (with 33 percent believing there to be ‘a little’ less and 11 percent ‘a lot’ less crime). In contrast, 30 percent of respondents considered there to be at least ‘a little more’ crime (figure 7).

Figure 7: How would you say the number of crimes in the South-East border area has changed compared to one year ago? (2012, %)



Given that the recent crime rate in Chittagong Range, at least in terms of crimes reported to the police, has slightly increased,¹⁴ the fact that most people consider the crime rate to have decreased or remained about the same could be an indication that people have more confidence in law enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, while most people appear to believe that law and order has not worsened, there is still cause for concern given that, for instance, 70 percent of respondents said that crime had at least a ‘little effect’ on their lives. However, almost 60 percent of respondents said that crime had either no or little effect on their lives (table 2). While this is encouraging, a large number of people do appear to be affected by crime, some to a great extent, particularly, it is assumed, some of the more vulnerable members of society.

Table 2: What effect does crime have on your life? (2012, %)

		No effect	Little effect	Some effect	Big effect	Complete effect
Sex	Male	28.4	27.4	34.2	8.8	1.2
	Female	28.5	31.6	22.6	11.1	6.2
Area	Rural	29.8	27.9	28.7	10.0	3.8
	Urban	16.9	43.8	25.8	10.0	3.5
Upazila	Cox's Bazar Sadar	27.9	31.9	28.5	7.9	3.9
	Ukhia	20.7	19.6	36.3	16.5	6.9
	Teknaf	35.4	32.9	22.0	8.7	1.0
All		28.4	29.5	24.4	10.0	3.7

As illustrated in figure 8, the most common crime is perceived to be ‘personal property crime’ (83 percent of respondents said that it was the most frequent crime in their locality). This is in line with previous research: for instance, *Security provision in Bangladesh* reported that 89 percent of public survey respondents nationwide shared this view.¹⁵

The perceived prevalence of other crimes also appears to have changed little between the national survey conducted in 2009 (*Security provision in Bangladesh*) and the present survey in 2012. ‘Sexual violence’ (including rape and sexual harassment – also known as ‘eve teasing’ or *jouno hoirani*) was reported as prevalent by 22 percent of respondents in the SE border area in this survey and 25 percent of respondents in the national public survey conducted in 2009; ‘drug abuse’ by 20 percent and 18 percent respectively; and ‘domestic violence’ by 13 percent in both surveys.¹⁶

¹⁴ Crime statistics for Chittagong Range for the five-month period January–May 2012 (see annex B).


¹⁵ Saferworld (2010), *op cit*.

¹⁶ *Ibid*.

Interestingly, dowry-related violence was considered a greater concern in the SE border area in 2012 (by 50 percent of respondents) than in Bangladesh in 2009 (when 40 percent of respondents said it was a common crime).¹⁷ Other notable differences between the results of these two surveys included the number of respondents who reported that the following crimes were prevalent in their locality: 'murder' (3 percent in the SE border area in 2012 compared with 38 percent in Bangladesh in 2009); 'extortion' (3 percent compared with 15 percent); 'land disputes' (24 percent compared with 29 percent); and 'political violence' (13 percent compared with 24 percent).¹⁸ It should, however, be remembered that the survey conducted in 2009 was a national survey across all of Bangladesh, while the present survey was specific to the SE border area. Additional concerns highlighted by the current survey include the perceived prevalence of human trafficking and drug trafficking. The latter in particular was noted by 53 percent of respondents from Teknaf and 35 percent from Ukhia as being among the most frequent crimes in their locality.

While there is some uniformity in the crimes that people across the SE border area perceive to be the most prevalent, there are some striking differences that should be noted. For example, 'personal property crime', while remaining a particularly strong concern, was reported as less common in Ukhia (79 percent) than in Teknaf (86 percent). Also, 'sexual violence' was reported as prevalent by only 15 percent of respondents from Cox's Bazar Sadar, in contrast with 32 percent from Ukhia.

Figure 8: Which do you perceive to be the most frequent crimes and unlawful acts in your locality? (2012, %)



It is notable that 'illegal business' was considered a common crime by approximately 20 percent of respondents from Cox's Bazar Sadar and Ukhia, rising to 40 percent in Teknaf. While this category can account for a multitude of crimes, this is partly a reflection of the commonly held belief that Rohingya are working illegally, the result of many not possessing the right to work as they do not have any residential status.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

However, as highlighted in KIIs and FGDs, ‘illegal business’ can also include illegal activities that are criminal in nature.

“The biggest security issue here is the activities of the Rohingya. They are involved in all sorts of criminal and [disreputable] activities.”

Focus group participant, ‘small trader’, Teknaf

In the HHS, respondents were asked what types of crimes they or a member of their family had suffered in the previous 12 months. Close to 1,750 crimes were reported to have occurred to 989 HHS respondents (or members of their families) in this period. Given that respondents were not asked how many times they were the victim of a particular crime, it can be assumed that these figures underestimate the level of crime, as victims may have experienced the same crime multiple times (such as theft or violence).

Table 3: Number of respondents who (themselves or a family member) experienced different types of crime in the previous 12 months (2012)

	Male	Female	Rural	Urban
Personal property crime	433 (34.6%)	435 (34.8%)	693 (34.3%)	175 (36.5%)
Loss of property (including land grabbing)	119 (9.5%)	148 (11.8%)	232 (11.5%)	35 (7.1%)
Sexual violence	5 (0.4%)	16 (1.3%)	11 (0.5%)	10 (1.9%)
Dowry-related violence	15 (1.2%)	63 (5.0%)	65 (3.2%)	13 (2.7%)
Physical violence by strangers	35 (2.8%)	51 (4.1%)	70 (3.5%)	16 (3.3%)
Domestic violence	34 (2.7%)	78 (6.2%)	84 (4.2%)	28 (5.8%)
Use of a firearm	2 (0.2%)	6 (0.4%)	6 (0.3%)	2 (0.2%)
Use of any other weapon	6 (0.5%)	15 (1.2%)	16 (0.8%)	5 (0.8%)
Political violence	23 (1.8%)	18 (1.4%)	34 (1.7%)	7 (1.5%)
Arms trafficking	0 (–)	1 (0.1%)	1 (0.05%)	0 (–)
Human trafficking	2 (0.2%)	3 (0.2%)	3 (0.1%)	2 (0.6%)
Drug trafficking	6 (0.5%)	4 (0.3%)	7 (0.3%)	3 (0.6%)
Threat/violence: criminal gangs/extremist groups	53 (4.2%)	59 (4.7%)	100 (4.9%)	12 (2.5%)
Threat/violence: drug gangs	11 (0.9%)	10 (0.8%)	17 (0.8%)	4 (0.8%)
Ethnic violence	5 (0.4%)	29 (2.3%)	26 (1.3%)	8 (1.5%)
Other	26 (2.0%)	29 (2.3%)	43 (2.0%)	12 (2.5%)
Total	775 (62.0%)	965 (77.2%)	1,408 (69.7%)	332 (69.2%)

‘Personal property crime’ (including theft, mugging, trespass and causing damage to property) was reported by the largest number of respondents to have been experienced by themselves or a family member in the year leading up to the 2012 survey (table 3),

with 868 crimes recorded in the HHS. This was followed by 'loss of property' (through land grabbing or theft of *khas* land) with 267 reported incidents. Acts of violence also appeared to be prevalent, with 450 incidents reported. This number included 112 relating to 'domestic violence', 86 for 'physical violence by strangers', 78 for 'dowry-related violence', 41 for 'political violence', 34 for 'ethnic violence', 21 for 'sexual violence' and 112 for combined forms of gang or extremist-related violence. It was not specified whether weapons (such as firearms, knives or clubs) were used during these attacks.

The numbers of crimes relating to arms trafficking (one incident) and human trafficking (five incidents) reported by respondents are low, perhaps unsurprisingly, given that only a small minority viewed these crimes as a common occurrence in the SE border area (figure 8). However, these low figures could also reflect a lack of awareness of such crimes, which may be deliberate given the insecurities that could arise from being aware of these issues. It is also possible that respondents who had been victims of these crimes were not willing to share this information due to potential risks arising from making incidents known, or in order to dissociate themselves from the social stigma attached to such crimes. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) trafficking, for example, is likely to be very secretive, with firearms smuggled to violent groups or overseas through ports; in contrast, human trafficking is often an abuse of trust where workers are forced into bonded labour after they have travelled away from their homes, which means the crime is not noticed in their areas of origin. The low number of drug trafficking incidents reported is surprising given the significant number of respondents who thought it to be a prevalent crime (figure 8). However, given the large amount of evidence indicating significant trade in narcotics, the data recorded may also indicate the unwillingness of some respondents to admit to having links to or knowledge of this illicit trade. This could similarly be due to respondents' desire to dissociate themselves because of the social stigma or insecurities attached to drug trafficking.

It is also important to mention that some crimes are perceived to be more prevalent in different geographic areas. For example, personal property crimes (such as theft, burglary, robbery and mugging) appear to be a greater threat in urban areas, whereas dowry-related crimes are perceived to be more prevalent in rural areas.

Table 4: Are you worried that you or a member of your family may become a victim of a crime? (2012, %)

		Very worried	Worried	Not very worried	Not at all worried
Sex	Male	12.7	46.4	23.3	17.6
	Female	17.4	40.5	22.3	19.8
Area	Rural	14.9	41.7	23.5	20.0
	Urban	16.9	58.8	16.9	7.3
All		15.1	43.4	22.8	18.7

Overall, while some of the data has been encouraging, particularly perceptions of the crime rate, it is clearly evident that fear of violence and crime remain a concern. This is illustrated by the fact that 59 percent of male and 58 percent of female respondents were worried or very worried that they or a member of their family may be a victim of crime. In Ukhia, 70 percent of respondents were worried or very worried about this.

2.3 Rohingya in the South-East border area


The Rohingya people comprise the largest part of the Muslim population of north Rakhine State in Myanmar. Historically, the Rohingya have endured much persecution, including losing their citizenship in Myanmar (following the adoption of the Citizenship Act 1982), compelling many to seek refuge in neighbouring countries.

Today, persecution and violent confrontation continue to significantly undermine the human security of the Rohingya. Nevertheless, their migration is perceived as a considerable threat to the socio-economic security of Bangladeshis in the SE border area, and structurally for Bangladesh as a whole. In total, 60 percent of HHS respondents were of the opinion that refugees were creating problems with regard to their life and livelihoods. There are estimated to be 28,000 registered Rohingya refugees living in Nayapara (Teknaf *Upazila*) and Kutupalong (Ukhia *Upazila*), with at least a further 200,000¹⁹ 'self-settled' (but perhaps more accurately defined as 'unregistered' refugees) in the surrounding areas.²⁰ As mentioned earlier, Chittagong Division is subject to significant socio-economic pressures resulting in host communities struggling to effectively meet their own needs as well as those of the Rohingya.

Bangladesh is not party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, meaning that no legal framework exists for the protection of refugees. Instead, the 1946 Foreigners Act permits the GoB to require foreigners to reside in particular places and to impose 'any restrictions' on their movements.²¹ As a consequence, integration has not been encouraged and officially registered Rohingya are restricted to living in poorly equipped camps, separate from the local community. 'Self-settled' or 'unregistered' Rohingya residing outside of the camps are further isolated as they are prevented from accessing basic services (such as health and education) as well as lawful employment because they lack the documentation which legal residents possess. Unregistered Rohingya are widely perceived as illegal economic migrants rather than refugees: they are alleged to have entered Bangladesh to access employment opportunities or healthcare rather than to flee persecution.²²

Intolerance of Rohingya continues to persist in Myanmar and incidents of inter-communal violence have led to increased migration. This is exemplified by the 28 May 2012 rape of a Rakhine (Buddhist) woman that resulted in the retaliatory murder of 10 Muslims on 3 June 2012.²³ These atrocities led to a series of revenge attacks resulting in dozens of deaths and widespread arson attacks. The violence resulted in the declaration of a 'state of emergency' in Rakhine State and the increased policing of the border by the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB). The Minister for Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives indicated that while Bangladesh was sympathetic towards all humanitarian issues it could not "be friends of terrorists or rapists. So those who raped an innocent woman in Myanmar cannot be friends of Bangladesh."²⁴ While this statement appears to unfairly indict all migrants for the crime of one, it is illustrative of the alleged links between Rohingya and crime (figure 9).

Figure 9: What kind of problems are Rohingya creating in your locality? (2012, % of the 1,456 non-Rohingya respondents who thought that Rohingya refugees were creating problems)



¹⁹ *The Daily Star*, for example, reports that there may be as many as 500,000 unregistered Rohingya living in the SE border area. See 'Govt bans operation of 3 int'l NGOs', *The Daily Star*, 2 August 2012, www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/latest_news.php?nid=39631, accessed 9 August 2012.

²⁰ Refugees International, *Bangladesh: The silent crisis*, 19 April 2011, www.refintl.org/policy/field-report/bangladesh-silent-crisis, accessed 6 August 2012.

²¹ U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 'World Refugee Survey 2009: Bangladesh' (2011), www.refugees.org/resources/refugee-warehousing/archived-world-refugee-surveys/2009-wrs-country-updates/bangladesh.html, accessed 3 August 2012.

²² Information obtained from the Office of the Refugee, Relief and Repatriation Commission, Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

²³ International Crisis Group, *Myanmar: Storm clouds on the horizon*, Asia Report No 238, 12 November 2012.

²⁴ Syed Ashraful Islam, quoted in 'Religious extremists can't be sheltered as refugees, Says Syed Ashraf', *Daily Star*, 21 June 2012, www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=239167, accessed 3 August 2012.


The negative impact of the ‘push’ factors (the conditions in Myanmar which have compelled the Rohingya to leave) on local communities in the SE border area has compelled the GoB to undertake protectionist measures that have public support, but are internationally questionable, to stop any ‘pull’ factors that might encourage Rohingya migration to Bangladesh. This resulted in the international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) Médecins Sans Frontières, Action Contre la Faim and Muslim Aid UK having their operating programmes curtailed in August 2012.²⁵ In part, this may also be a result of the perception by many Bangladeshis that international humanitarian aid agencies are insensitive. While delivering important humanitarian aid (including food, shelter, and primary and *madrassa* education) aid agencies are seen as providing services to registered Rohingya that are unavailable to host communities. This has further exacerbated communal tensions between Rohingya and host communities.

Nevertheless, this protectionist policy is a progression of past strategies that have included segregation and promotion of repatriation rather than integration²⁶ – policies that appear to be endorsed by a significant proportion of society in the SE border area, including 80 percent of HHS respondents and many FGD participants.²⁷ Only two percent of HHS respondents and one key informant²⁸ supported the formal integration of the Rohingya minority in Bangladesh. The widespread desire to restrict migration from Myanmar is likely to be linked to concern over competition for scarce employment and resources as well as concerns about the potential impact on the law and order situation. However, with growing numbers of Rohingya born outside Myanmar, often with a Bangladeshi parent, there is likely to be a continued entrenchment of the community in the SE border area. This is a reality that needs to be recognised, and steps should be taken to address long-term safety and security issues for both the Rohingya and the SE border area in general, particularly as inter-communal marriage poses a potentially very divisive familial and intra-communal problem.²⁹

“Our homes and family are in Bangladesh. We will not go back to Myanmar even if the political situation improves.”

Focus group participant, ‘male Rohingya’, Ukhia

Figure 10: Percentage of respondents who considered border infringements and host community–Rohingya related problems to be one of their top three security concerns (2012, %)



Antagonism between Rohingya and Bangladeshi host communities appears to be particularly prominent in the *upazilas* of Teknaf and Ukhia. These two *upazilas* share the responsibility of housing the majority of the registered and ‘self-settled’ (unregistered) Rohingya community in Bangladesh and are, therefore, more vulnerable to socio-economic and cultural tensions and increased likelihood of communal conflict. In Ukhia, for example, 12 percent of those interviewed considered host community–Rohingya problems to be one of their three main security concerns, a sentiment echoed

²⁵ Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, ‘Persecuted Burmese tribe finds no welcome in Bangladesh’, *The Guardian*, 7 August 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/07/bangladesh-persecuted-burmese-tribe-muslim, accessed 7 August 2012.

²⁶ Information obtained from the Office of the Refugee, Relief and Repatriation Commission, Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

²⁷ ‘Return’ was a recommendation offered by FGDs in Cox's Bazar Sadar (‘students’, ‘transport drivers’); Teknaf (‘small traders’) and Ukhia (‘drivers’, ‘farmers’, ‘fishermen’).

²⁸ Anonymous male (religious teacher), Ukhia, May/June 2012.

²⁹ Anonymous male (police), Teknaf, May/June 2012; anonymous male (student), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

by 7 percent in Teknaf (figure 10). Insecurity concerning ‘border infringements’ (for example trafficking, smuggling and/or perceived illegal economic migration) also appeared greater in areas closer to the border with Myanmar (i.e. the *upazilas* of Teknaf and Ukhia). This concern was likely due to the apparent ease with which people can cross the border. A male Rohingya who participated in the FGD in Teknaf acknowledged that his family in Myanmar often crosses the border to visit him. Another male Rohingya who participated in the FGD in Ukhia said this practice could involve inducements to BGB officials to enable safe crossing.

The extent of the poor relations between Bangladeshis and Rohingya is effectively exemplified by their contrasting attitudes towards who is vulnerable and the underlying causes of that vulnerability. Key informants alleged that isolation had left the Rohingya feeling trapped because they were unable to access enough food, shelter and clothing, insecurities that motivated many to get involved in drug smuggling and robbery.³⁰ This perception was reinforced by findings from the FGDs where it was noted that Rohingya were subject to intense poverty, often struggling with insufficient access to water, food and accommodation, leading to crime, smuggling and prostitution.³¹ This applied to both registered and unregistered Rohingya. Bangladeshis in the SE border area, however, appeared to be far from sympathetic, with only 2 percent of HHS respondents acknowledging Rohingya as being vulnerable (figure 11). Instead, 59 percent of Bangladeshi respondents perceived that the widespread presence of refugees was creating problems in their lives and livelihoods, a proportion which rose to 72 percent in Ukhia and 64 percent in Teknaf (the *upazilas* which host the majority of the Rohingya). This, in part, is likely linked to scapegoating (where one person or group bears the blame for others,³² a phenomenon that is not unique to Chittagong in particular or Bangladesh in general) but it also represents legitimate concerns about overcrowding and effects on national development.³³

Table 5: Summary of the socio-economic and security concerns identified by communities in the South-East border area (2012)

Bangladeshi host communities	Rohingya community
Crime and fear of violence	Fear of violence
Cross-border trafficking	Human trafficking
Economic insecurity	Economic insecurity and resource competition
Insensitivity to host community needs (e.g. housing, education and healthcare) by international humanitarian agencies	Inadequate provision for basic needs (e.g. housing, education and healthcare)
Inter-communal tensions	Intra- and inter-communal tensions
Overpopulation	Statelessness and ongoing violence in Myanmar preventing safe return
Unemployment	Unemployment
Concerns about infrastructure	Problems with local authorities

While migration is perceived to have negative consequences for socio-economic and personal security by the host communities, it is important to note that Rohingya refugees (both registered and unregistered) have sought sanctuary because they are often in fear for their security (or their very lives) in Myanmar. Among the security concerns in Myanmar listed by Rohingya focus group participants were: fear of torture by the military and/or police; forced labour; lack of recognised national identity; and forceful theft of personal property, livestock and land. It is, therefore, clear that socio-economic threats and threats to personal security are felt by both Rohingya and

³⁰ Anonymous male (Rohingya), Teknaf, May/June 2012; anonymous male (religious leader), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.


³¹ FGDs in Cox's Bazar Sadar ('male Rohingya'); Teknaf ('female Rohingya', 'male Rohingya') and Ukhia ('male Rohingya').

³² "scapegoat." Merriam-Webster.com. 2012. www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scapegoat, accessed 16 October 2012.

³³ Anonymous male (police), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (NGO), Cox's Bazar Sadar, May/June 2012.

Bangladeshi host communities in the SE border area, with shared vulnerabilities including high levels of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. However, the absence of concern for shared safety and security interests and values in order to create common ground and improved dialogue has continued to alienate both communities.

Figure 11: Which groups do you perceive to be most vulnerable to insecurity? (2012, %)



Many Bangladeshis in the SE border area share the perception that Rohingya create problems in the lives and livelihoods of Bangladeshis (figure 9). As shown in table 6, 18 percent of respondents, including approximately a quarter of respondents from Ukhia and Teknaf, alleged that the perpetrators of crime come from the Rohingya community. The high level of mistrust in these two *upazilas* is again probably due to their proximity to Myanmar and the large number of Rohingya residing in these *upazilas*. Several key informants also alleged that both registered and unregistered refugees were involved in drug smuggling, illegal logging and prostitution.³⁴ This perception seems to be shared by Rohingya focus group participants, who acknowledged that members of the host communities were willing to hire them for criminal activities. These activities appeared to be appealing for financial gain because of a lack of legal or secure employment opportunities that would enable them to support themselves and their families.³⁵

“[Local criminal gangs] are exploiting Rohingya just to make a profit.”

Focus group participant, ‘female Rohingya’, Teknaf

Table 6: Perceived perpetrators of crime/unlawful acts (2012, %)

		Family	Strangers	Mastans	Organised criminals	Cross-border smugglers	Extremist groups	Student political wings	Local elites	Drug addicts	Unemployed youth	Rohingya refugees	Ethnic groups	Other minorities	Foreigners	Do not know
Sex	Male	11.4	61.4	29.2	17.5	4.6	0.2	10.4	31.2	22.3	26.6	22.1	0.4	0.5	0.2	2.3
	Female	16.6	64.0	43.9	8.2	3.4	0.3	8.5	20.3	29.8	30.2	14.4	0.5	0.2	0.6	4.9
Upazila	Cox’s Bazar Sadar	17.4	57.5	28.3	7.9	1.0	0.2	6.9	22.3	24.4	25.6	12.2	0.7	0.4	0.2	3.9
	Ukhia	13.0	70.0	47.0	19.3	7.0	0.0	17.0	38.3	35.2	36.7	23.7	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.4
	Teknaf	8.7	66.6	43.4	16.9	7.0	0.7	8.1	22.3	22.1	27.0	24.9	0.1	0.4	0.7	5.6
All		14.0	62.7	36.6	12.9	4.0	0.3	9.4	25.8	26.1	28.4	18.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	3.6

One-and-a-half times as many men as women alleged that Rohingya and other minority groups were involved in criminal activities (23 percent in comparison to 15 percent).

³⁴ Anonymous male (teacher), Teknaf, May/June 2012; anonymous male (law enforcement agency), Dhaka, May/June 2012; anonymous female (female leader), Cox’s Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (police), Teknaf, May/June 2012.

³⁵ FGDs in Cox’s Bazar Sadar (‘male Rohingya’); Teknaf (‘female Rohingya’, ‘male Rohingya’) and Ukhia (‘male Rohingya’).

While this figure may be considered low in light of attitudes regarding problems allegedly created by Rohingya in local communities (figure 9), it is not entirely evident how HHS respondents defined ‘strangers’ or ‘foreigners’ for example. Therefore, it should not be discounted that these categories may have been considered to include Rohingya or other minority groups.

To further illustrate tensions between Rohingya and Bangladeshis in the SE border area, on average over a third of respondents (rising to over 50 percent and 40 percent in Ukhia and Teknaf respectively) described relations between the Bangladeshi communities of the SE border area and Rohingya as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ (table 7). These respondents noted that inter-communal conflict manifested itself in incidents including verbal insults (45 percent), threats with a knife/blade (28 percent) and/or threats with firearms (10 percent). This legacy of mistrust needs to be addressed before either community can hope to be free from socio-economic and cultural threats as well as violence and criminal threats. Improved co-operation between Bangladesh, Myanmar and international humanitarian agencies would help reduce friction by enabling longer-term planning for durable solutions.

“Either we should be repatriated or ... given refugee status. We cannot live here without a legal status forever. Urgent action by the international community is required.”

Focus group participant, ‘male Rohingya’, Teknaf

Table 7: How would you classify relations between Bangladeshis and Rohingya in your locality? (2012, %)

		Good or very good	Normal	Bad or very bad	Do not know
Upazila	Cox’s Bazar Sadar	22.5	33.7	25.5	18.2
	Ukhia	17.5	25.9	53.9	2.8
	Teknaf	30.2	21.6	43.6	4.7

Table 7, however, demonstrates that there are some positives as well. Significant percentages of respondents classified relations between the Bangladeshis and Rohingya as being either ‘good or very good’ or ‘normal’ – over 50 percent in both Cox’s Bazar Sadar and Teknaf. Further research is needed to identify specific locations in these *upazilas* where relations are considered ‘good’ or ‘very good’ so that lessons can be learnt and best practices documented in order to encourage and assist both communities in other areas to reduce tensions and build positive relations.


2.4 Women and children

In South Asian countries women and children are often vulnerable to personal safety and security threats from criminal and cultural violence and socio-economic marginalisation. Women and children in the SE border area appear to be similarly vulnerable, because ‘cruelty to women’ and ‘child abuse’ collectively comprised 16 percent of crimes recorded by the Bangladesh Police in the Chittagong Division in the first five months of 2012 (January–May).³⁶ Similarly, many respondents said that crimes related to ‘cruelty to women’ and ‘child abuse’ (such as dowry-related crimes, sexual harassment and domestic violence) were the most frequent crimes and unlawful acts in their locality (figure 8). It may, therefore, be surprising that, when respondents were listing their three leading security concerns in this survey, ‘violence against women and children’ did not feature very prominently (figure 5). One possible reason for this could be that certain types of violence, such as dowry-related violence or domestic violence, may still be socially accepted even if they are against the law.

³⁶ Full details available in annex B.

Historically, women have been more worried about forms of gender-based insecurity.³⁷ However, in response to specific questions on the security of women, it was found that an increasing number of men share these concerns. In total, 38 percent of male HHS respondents perceived that women and girls would not be safe if they went out alone at night. This is comparable to the number of female respondents who had such concerns (slightly more than 40 percent, figure 12). This suggests that men in the SE border area are becoming equally concerned for the safety of women and girls. Overall, this changing attitude is in line with general perceptions on safety and security, as 59 percent of men said that they were fearful that they or a family member would become a victim of a crime – a figure that was marginally greater than that expressed by women (58 percent). This finding is in keeping with national data documented in the 2011 survey, which recorded that approximately 60 percent of men and women were worried about becoming victims of crime.³⁸ The increased concern of men that they or a member of their family could become a victim of crime is highly significant as it is more than one-and-a-half times what was recorded in 2009,³⁹ when only 36 percent of men were at least ‘somewhat worried’ about the safety and security of their family. This increase indicates a growing pessimism.

Figure 12: In your view, how safe is it for women and adolescent girls to go out *alone* at night? (2012, %)



However, if perceptions of common crimes are disaggregated according to sex, certain types of crime generated different levels of fear in men and women. For instance, female respondents were more concerned about personal crimes (theft, harassment, rape, dowry abuses, murder and human trafficking) than men, who expressed greater concern about what could be referred to as crimes more prevalent in the public sphere (political violence, abuses of *khas* land, police harassment and illegal business), as shown in greater detail in table 8. The extent and nature of the threat of personal crimes was expressed by a key informant from the Rohingya community: “Due to lack of employment opportunities, many Rohingya women are also involved in prostitution and drug trafficking. They are sometimes abducted by the local criminal gangs and are repeatedly raped.”⁴⁰

In more specific questions about threats to women and adolescent girls, it appears that there is much greater fear of various forms of insecurity associated with such threats than may otherwise have been indicated. Survey data showed that both female and male respondents considered the greatest threats to women and girls to be dowry-related violence (67 percent of female and 62 percent of male respondents), domestic violence (52 percent of female and 59 percent of male respondents) and sexual harassment

³⁷ Saferworld (2008), *op cit.*

³⁸ PRP (2011), *op cit.*

³⁹ Saferworld (2010), *op cit.*

⁴⁰ Anonymous male (Rohingya leader), Teknaf, May/June 2012.

outside of the home (39 percent of female and 34 percent of male respondents) – figure 13. Dowry-related violence is a considerable threat to personal and familial security because, despite its illegality since the Dowry Prohibition Act 1980, it can place a significant economic and emotional strain on families. Sexual abuse, ranging from sexual harassment to sexual violence, can be very frightening and damaging both in terms of physical and emotional harm as well as potentially damaging to a girl/woman's reputation. As such, it can increase the risks of other forms of insecurity. For instance, the threat of being socially ostracised as a result of sexual abuse can compel families to try and protect daughters' honour by forcing them into an early marriage. While this may mitigate one security concern, it creates another, with some 24 percent of female and 27 percent of male respondents noting 'forced child marriage' as a particular concern for women and adolescent girls.

Table 8: Which do you perceive to be the most common crimes in your locality? (2012, %)

	Male	Female
Personal property crimes	80.2	85.7
Sexual harassment	15.9	20.6
Rape	1.5	5.2
Dowry-related violence	38.2	60.3
Political violence	14.9	10.3
<i>Khas</i> land being enjoyed by the powerful	8.6	4.7
Murder	0.9	4.3
Police harassment	14.5	1.5
Human trafficking	2.1	6.2
Illegal business	27.0	22.6

Domestic violence is a particularly complicated issue in Bangladesh because (despite over half of female respondents recognising it as a leading security concern for women and girls) large percentages of both men and women appear to accept wife-beating. The 2007 Demographic and Health Survey conducted on behalf of the National Institute for Population Research and Training (NIPORT) of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare documented that 36 percent of female participants (rising to over 40 percent in the Chittagong Division) said wife-beating was justified in at least one of the following instances: failure to obey elders, arguing with their husband, going out without permission, neglecting children or refusal of sexual intercourse with their husband.⁴¹ Similar attitudes were expressed by male participants to the survey, particularly regarding arguing with husbands (25 percent) or disobeying elders (23 percent).⁴²


This data may, in part, be explained by the enduring cultural belief that domestic violence is a family problem; therefore, while frightening and a cause of personal insecurity, it is not considered a criminal act. Over 30 percent of female respondents in the HHS in the SE border area failed to report crimes to the police because they considered them to be a personal or family matter, which may have included incidents of domestic violence. The GoB has sought to change this perception through the recent adoption of the Domestic Violence Act 2010, building on the Prevention of Cruelty against Women and Children Act 2000 and the Dowry Prohibition Act 1980. It is yet to be seen what impact this new legislation will have on levels of violence against women and children, but without changes in attitudes towards domestic violence, such incidents will likely remain unreported and perpetrators will not be charged. However, as seen in figure 13, male respondents shared many of the concerns of female respondents

⁴¹ National Institute for Population Research and Training (NIPORT), *Bangladesh: Demographic and Health Survey 2007*, (NIPORT: BGD 2009), [www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR207/FR207\[April-10-2009\].pdf](http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR207/FR207[April-10-2009].pdf), accessed 3 August 2012.

⁴² *Ibid.*

about the threats to women and adolescent girls. This is encouraging for the purposes of involving both women and men to help prevent violence against women and children.

Figure 13: What are the key threats to women and adolescent girls in your locality? (2012, %)



It was also noted by a female key informant that women are likely to face further prejudice in areas where extremist ideologies are prevalent, because those ideologies can impose significant restrictions on the liberties of women, particularly freedom of movement and freedom of expression. Women can also suffer severe punishment if they are subjectively considered to have violated 'religious doctrine'. The activities of extremists were described by a female key informant as "denigrating the honour and status of women in society."⁴³

⁴³ Anonymous female (female leader), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

Trafficking

TRAFFICKING IS KNOWN TO BE A SERIOUS SOURCE OF CONCERN in the SE border area, with government and civil society sources referring to a flourishing trade in illicit drugs, SALW and human trafficking.⁴⁴ Drug trafficking, for example, was identified by nearly a third of HHS respondents as a common crime in their locality.

Figure 14: Which do you perceive to be the most common crimes in your locality?
(Answers involving trafficking, 2012, %)





Figure 15: What are the key threats to women and adolescent girls in your locality?
(Answers involving trafficking, 2012, %)



However, despite being identified as a common crime, when respondents were asked to list their three greatest security concerns, only a small number considered trafficking to be a significant threat. Only drug trafficking was perceived by a sizeable number (although still only 15 percent) to be a key security concern; other forms of trafficking were each mentioned by only one percent of the respondents. This is probably because survey respondents tend to prioritise more personal forms of insecurity (i.e. those most likely to have a direct impact on them) rather than those crimes that are known but have less of an impact on their lives. Therefore, the extent of trafficking could be higher than these statistics suggest. This is supported by the responses of several key informants who strongly indicated that trafficking is of serious concern. One, for example, expressed the belief that trafficking was affecting the social harmony of the SE border area⁴⁵ and particularly the security of women (especially those from the Rohingya community), youth, students and fishermen. This is because their socio-economic vulnerability appeared to be increasingly drawing them into criminal activities associated with trafficking and smuggling.

⁴⁴ For example, see Taleb, Md. Abu, *Annual Drug Report of Bangladesh, 2010* (Department of Narcotics Control (DNC), 2011) www.dnc.gov.bd/Press/DNC%20Annual%20Report%202010.pdf; van Schendel, Willem, 'Guns and Gas in Southeast Asia: Transnational Flows in the Burma-Bangladesh Borderland', *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*, August 2006; U.S. Department of State, 'Trafficking in Persons Report 2012', www.state.gov/j/tip/ris/tiprpt/2012/.

⁴⁵ Anonymous male (*madrassa*), Ukhia, May/June 2012; anonymous male (local government), Ukhia, May/June 2012.

The extent of the threat from trafficking is also supported by the number of respondents (66 percent, or two-thirds) who agreed that their locality had become a safe haven for traffickers (only 20 percent of respondents disagreed – see figure 16). Of those who agreed, the majority considered the sea and waterways to be the most often used transit routes, exploited by different types of boats, ships and trawlers. A notable minority of respondents, particularly from the landlocked location of Ukhia, noted that trucks and other forms of transport were also used (figure 17). It should be mentioned that the respondents were almost universally local to Cox's Bazar District and therefore the views are likely to relate to the long stretch of coastal waters that border much of the Chittagong Division, rather than other vulnerable areas of the 'Indo-Bangla-Myanmar Triangle' such as the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Figure 16: Is your locality a safe haven for drug/arms/human traffickers? (2012, %)





Figure 17: To those who thought their locality was a safe haven: What are the main modes of transport used by traffickers? (2012, %)



Only 3 percent (or 92 interviewees) responded that they were aware of others being asked to participate in trafficking. This figure should be taken with some caution, however, because the sensitive and illegal nature of trafficking may have resulted in other respondents concealing their knowledge; similarly family members that have been approached may have concealed their experiences from other relatives. It should also be noted that the HHS was only able to interview some 230 Rohingya, meaning that a community that may be more vulnerable to transnational criminal organisations (TCOs) involved in trafficking was under-represented in this survey. The inability to interview as many urban residents as desired also meant that there may be insufficient data from urban locations which are vulnerable to trafficking.

According to the survey findings, the apparent prevalence of trafficking in the SE border area seems to have emerged because of gaps in border controls. For example, 67 percent of HHS respondents alleged that corrupt members of border law enforcement agencies were working in co-operation with traffickers. Only a quarter of respondents disagreed with this opinion. Of these, 14 percent believed border law enforcement agencies did not co-operate with traffickers and just 10 percent believed these agencies penalised them. Of those who alleged that co-operation between border law enforcement officials and traffickers existed, most thought it took the form of corruption (55 percent) or alleged that inducements were involved (94 percent), while some thought it involved sharing profits (24 percent). A more thorough analysis of perceptions relating to law enforcement agencies is contained in chapter 5.

Figure 18: In your opinion, how do border law enforcement agencies treat traffickers? (2012, %)



3.1 Drug trafficking and abuse

TCOs are able to successfully traffic illegal drugs by exploiting Bangladesh's vulnerable coastline, busy seaports and its extensive borders with India and Myanmar. As a result Bangladesh has emerged as a leading global conduit for the transit of narcotics, including heroin, hashish, opium, phensidyl (a codeine-based cough syrup) and psychotropic substances, as will be discussed in greater detail below. The potential reach of narcotics trafficked through Bangladesh is illustrated in the *World Drug Book 2011*, which refers to a 2009 seizure of 409,000 pseudoephedrine tablets shipped from Bangladesh and en route to Guatemala.⁴⁶

Table 9: Total seizures of drugs in Bangladesh (2008–2011)

	2008	2009	2010	2011
Poppy plants	–	1,450,210	–	–
Opium (kg)	–	–	12	8
Heroin (kg)	147	160	188	104
Cannabis (kg)	24,282	32,956	48,749	52,961
Cannabis plants	2,834	791	1,760	742
Codeine (preparation, bottle)	904,384	1,117,354	961,260	925,766
Codeine (loose, litre)	2,620	2,955	4,119	3,228
Ampoules (for hypodermic drugs)	45,921	89,469	69,158	117,042
Yaba (methamphetamine and caffeine tablets)	36,543	129,644	812,716	1,360,186

Data taken from 'Statistics', *Department of Narcotics Control*, www.dnc.gov.bd/statistics.html

Article 18 of the Bangladesh Constitution declares that it is the responsibility of the GoB to adopt measures to prevent the consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs that are 'injurious to health'.⁴⁷ The GoB reported in its *Annual Drug Report of Bangladesh 2010* that the demographics of arrested drug dealers were largely drawn 'from a very low income group'.⁴⁸ These offenders are mostly listed in the annual drug report as 'Rohingya', 'unemployed', 'divorced women' or 'the drug-dependent'. They are alleged to deal in drugs as a means of maintaining economic security (and other related human security issues such as access to food or healthcare) or because of their drug dependency. It was also noted that students were being drawn into smuggling because drugs have come to be seen as a very profitable business in Cox's Bazar.⁴⁹ Very few cases are recorded by the Bangladesh Department of Narcotics Control (DNC) as involving money laundering to hide profits from drug dealing, which could indicate that most drug trafficking is on a small scale. However, it should not be assumed that TCOs are not highly motivated to traffic drugs. Narcotics can provide quick finance and they may use the *hundi* system (an informal, and illegal, money transfer network) to transfer profits outside Bangladesh undetected (see section 4.3 on financial crime). Participants in the FGDs alleged that unemployed women and marginalised Rohingya are used by TCOs to carry drugs across from Myanmar as they are willing to take greater risks to secure a much-needed wage.⁵⁰

The DNC in Bangladesh records that fishing trawlers from Myanmar exploit the Bay of Bengal to smuggle drugs into the country. In 2007, it was reported that 1.2 million *yaba* tablets (a mixture of methamphetamine and caffeine) were seized by security providers in Bangladesh, the origin of which could be traced back to Myanmar.⁵¹ The price of

⁴⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Book 2011* (UNODC, 2011).

⁴⁷ *Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh*, available from the Legislative and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs website at bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367.

⁴⁸ Taleb (2011), *op cit*.

⁴⁹ Anonymous male, Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (NGO), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.


⁵⁰ Anonymous male, Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (DNC), Dhaka, May/June 2012; anonymous male (religious leader), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

⁵¹ ANM Muniruzzaman, 'Transnational Security Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh', *Peace and Security Review*, vol. 4, no. 7, First Quarter (BIPSS, 2011), www.bipss.org.bd/pdf/bipss%20journal-2011.pdf, accessed 9 August 2012.

yaba tablets varies from BDT 200 for the ‘R-7’ brand and BDT 150 for the ‘WY’ brand.⁵² The proximity of the Chittagong international seaport to Myanmar (the world’s second largest producer of opium in 2010)⁵³ has unsurprisingly resulted in the SE border area becoming one of the primary exit points for narcotics in the region. Bangladesh is also host to the trafficking of narcotics, particularly codeine and codeine-based cough syrup, from India. It is also contended by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) that Bangladesh is an exit point for cannabis cultivated in Nepal and trafficked via India.⁵⁴

As a direct consequence of drug availability, substance abuse has spread widely, affecting both urban and rural areas in Bangladesh. According to the DNC, the most frequently used drug in Bangladesh in 2011 was heroin, followed by phensidyl and cannabis.⁵⁵ As shown by figure 19, the number of crimes involving narcotics recorded by the police has almost doubled in the five years spanning 2006–2010. However, it is not clear whether this increase reflects greater drug abuse or better reporting and policing of an already significant problem.

Figure 19: Crime statistics for narcotics (2006–2010)



Data taken from 'Crime Statistics: Number of registered cases from 2001 to 2010', Bangladesh Police, www.police.gov.bd/index5.php?category=48

It is evident that the availability of drugs is a major concern in the SE border area and is recognised as a threat to security on many levels (figure 20). As already seen in figure 4, almost 40 percent of respondents perceive much of the crime in the SE border area to be driven by drug addiction. A quarter of all respondents also thought crimes were directly perpetrated by drug addicts (table 6). As figure 20 demonstrates, close to two-thirds of respondents said that drugs have affected safety and security in the SE border area. A greater number of men (74 percent) than women (53 percent) perceived there to have been an impact on crime. This could be explained by men’s disproportionately high presence in the public sphere (as compared with women, who more frequently occupy private spaces, such as the home) and at their possible higher level of exposure to media sources which report an increase in drug-related crime. Of those who considered that drugs had a negative impact on security, most people (84 percent) thought that they would lead to increased drug addiction, particularly among the youth. Many people also believed that the prevalence of drugs in society leads to increases in violent crime (40 percent) and theft/robbery (42 percent). Many also thought drugs create an unsafe environment for women and children (12 percent) and for the wider general public (22 percent). While fewer women than men considered that drugs undermined security, a greater proportion of those women thought that drugs have a negative impact on a wide variety of security and socio-economic factors in the SE border area (figure 21).

⁵² ‘Yaba worth hundred crore taka comes each month from Myanmar’, *Samakal*, 23 April 2012, www.samakal.com.bd/details.php?news=17&view=archiev&y=2012&m=04&d=23&action=main&menu_type=&option=single&news_id=253889&pub_no=1031&type=, accessed 10 December 2012.

⁵³ International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), ‘Asia’, *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board: 2011* (INCB, 2011), www.incb.org/pdf/annual-report/2011/English/AR_2011_E_Chapter_III_Asia.pdf, accessed 3 August 2012.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Department of Narcotics Control, ‘Drug Smuggling Route’, www.dnc.gov.bd/route.html, accessed 3 August 2012.

Figure 20: Do drugs have an effect on the law and order situation in the South-East border area? (2012, %)





Figure 21: If yes, what effects do they have? (2012, %)



In terms of how the prevalence of drugs can affect freedom from socio-economic and cultural threats, a third of those who thought that drugs have an effect on the law and order situation in the SE border area said that drug abuse creates family tensions. Some also thought that it increases school drop-out rates (7 percent) and health insecurity (3 percent). The low figure for health insecurity may suggest that survey participants' concern for drug-related health hazards (e.g. the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and Hepatitis B) was of secondary importance compared to their own security. It should also be noted that appropriate measures for long-term rehabilitation of drug addicts are important, as one key informant stated that half of addicts trying to rehabilitate relapse after about six months.⁵⁶

There did not appear to be much fear among HHS respondents that drug availability is fuelling greater misuse of firearms. However, some key informants said that drug traffickers carried firearms as they smuggled drugs across the border.⁵⁷ It appears that a significant amount of drugs are trafficked into Bangladesh from abroad. Respondents were asked to detail what drugs they knew or thought to be available in their communities. Besides hashish/marijuana, which is perceived to be either home-grown or smuggled from Myanmar or India, other drugs commonly considered to originate from abroad are also perceived to be widely available. *Yaba*, which is known to be manufactured in Myanmar,⁵⁸ was said to be available by over 50 percent of HHS respondents (figure 22). This figure rises significantly in Teknaf, where 87 percent of those who participated in the HHS said they were aware of the drug being available in their locality.


⁵⁶ Anonymous male (NGO), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

⁵⁷ Anonymous male (NGO), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male, Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

⁵⁸ *Samakal*, 23 April 2012, *op cit*.

Yaba appears to be more prevalent in urban areas, with some 69 percent of respondents declaring that it was available, compared to a little over 50 percent in rural areas (figure 22). Similarly, urban areas appear to suffer to a greater extent from heroin, which is trafficked in from India and Myanmar.⁵⁹ Heroin was known to be available by 50 percent of urban respondents, while only a little over a quarter of rural respondents were aware of imported heroin. Moreover, it is evident that ‘phensidyl’, which is alleged to come from India, is also a particular problem (30 percent of urban and 38 percent of rural respondents said it was available in their localities). Alcohol appeared widely accessible with both rural and urban areas recording awareness of ‘imported alcohol’ (totalling 19 percent), ‘Burmese spirits’ (32 percent) and/or ‘local alcohol’ (36 percent).

Figure 22: Which drugs are available in your locality? (2012, %)



It is somewhat surprising, given the proximity of the world’s second-largest producer of opium, that the SE border area is not perceived to be more greatly affected by opium abuse. This is not to say that opium is not widely trafficked, but instead shows an apparent lack of demand for this product in the SE border area. Overall, ‘opium’ was recognised by one-and-a-half times as many rural respondents as those from urban areas. This likely indicates that the porous border has allowed opium to be more widely trafficked by smugglers from Myanmar crossing into rural areas rather than urban ports. On average, 10 percent of interviewees from Ukhia and Teknaf recognised the presence of opium compared to just 2 percent in Cox’s Bazar Sadar. However, the potential for increased availability of this or any other drug cannot be ignored, because closure of access to other substances may result in it becoming a more desirable substance for addicts to turn to.

Further evidence that drugs are being trafficked through Bangladesh is highlighted by respondents’ perceptions of the origin of the drugs that are available in the SE border area. Less than half of respondents thought that the available drugs originated from Bangladesh: most (74 percent) alleged that they came from Myanmar and a small percentage (11 percent) thought they originated in India. While there appears to be some knowledge as to the origin of many drugs in the SE border area, key informants noted that traffickers were continually changing their methods of transportation

⁵⁹ van Schendel (2006), *op cit.*

(including smuggling using fishing boats or concealed internally within carriers) and points of crossing through many parts of Ukhia, Chakdala and Gundung and along the Naf River, making detection difficult.⁶⁰

Table 10: Where do the drugs come from? (2012, %)

		Bangladesh	Myanmar	India	Thailand	China	Other	Do not know
Sex	Male	39.9	81.0	17.6	2.1	1.4	0.1	7.3
	Female	36.3	67.4	4.6	0.2	0.2	0.7	21.8
All		38.1	74.2	11.1	1.2	0.8	0.4	14.6

The GoB has endeavoured to reverse the impact of narcotics on communities – within the limits of its capacity – by supporting initiatives to raise awareness and entering into a bilateral agreement with India to encourage co-operation to better combat TCOs.⁶¹ This activity could likely be strengthened through extending its dialogue to include Myanmar. In spite of these efforts to control the proliferation of drugs in Bangladesh, the DNC remains confronted by fundamental challenges. For example, in its annual drug report for 2010 the DNC acknowledged that assistance was a fundamental necessity; it was documented that the international community needed to engage with staff to develop drug enforcement best practices and modernise investigative techniques and data management systems.⁶² It was also noted that support is required for the development of infrastructure and purchase of equipment (particularly modern equipment required for the interception of illicit drug transfers at possible points of entry). Support was also seen as required to facilitate information exchange between different security providers in the region.

3.2 Small arms and light weapons trafficking and misuse

SALW trafficking is a concern in Bangladesh. This is particularly due to its emergence as a valuable transit point because of its geography and the activities of multiple regional and domestic violent extremist groups and TCOs. It is thought that the smuggling of SALW takes place through entry and exit points in the porous borders to the north, south and south-east of Bangladesh – particularly Chittagong, Khagrachhari, Bandarban, Sandwip, Haluaghat and *chars*.⁶³ The transit of weapons through Bangladesh was also supported by the results of the HHS, which showed that over 20 percent of respondents considered arms trafficking to be one of the main cross-border activities in their locality. This perception was endorsed by participants from several FGDs.⁶⁴

Desk research for this survey has indicated that a variety of SALW transit through Bangladesh, including both sophisticated weapons and home-made weapons (such as pipe/shutter guns).⁶⁵ It has been alleged that there are 400,000 illicit small arms in Bangladesh, and that a single weapon can be purchased for between BDT 25,000 and BDT 100,000.⁶⁶ It is not evident what proportion of the total number of SALW in

⁶⁰ Anonymous male (police), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (media), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (police), Ukhia, May/June 2012; anonymous male (police), Teknaf, May/June 2012.

⁶¹ High Commission of India, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 'India-Bangladesh relations' (September 2010), www.hcidhaka.org/pdf/Political%20and%20Economic%20relations.pdf, accessed 8 December 2012.

⁶² Taleb (2011), *op cit*.

⁶³ Muniruzzaman (2011), *op cit*.

⁶⁴ FGDs in Cox's Bazar Sadar ('mixed group', 'students', 'transport drivers'); Teknaf ('male Rohingya') and Ukhia ('community people', 'drivers', 'farmers').

⁶⁵ Muniruzzaman (2011), *op cit*.


⁶⁶ See Muniruzzaman (2011), *op cit*; Bangladesh Development Partnership Centre, quoted in 'Bangladesh – Gun Facts, Figures and the Law', *Gun Policy*, June 2012, www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/bangladesh, accessed 3 August 2012; and 'Cadres buying smuggled small arms: Intel report', *The Financial Express*, 19 February 2012, www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/more.php?news_id=120706&date=2012-02-19, accessed 3 August 2012.

Bangladesh consists of industrially-manufactured SALW and how much is locally produced. It is worth mentioning, however, information suggesting that local blacksmiths in the Chittagong Division are able to produce small arms for between BDT 1,500 and BDT 5,000.⁶⁷ Many of the weapons in Bangladesh, if not trafficked out of the country, are used by criminal organisations and violent extremist groups for criminal motives and to destabilise and intimidate communities.

However, the demand for small arms may also indicate that the trafficking of SALW is not always negatively perceived. For example, students in Cox's Bazar Sadar alleged that some people willingly bought SALW to better ensure protection from abuses because of a lack of faith in law enforcement agencies. This information was reinforced in the KIIs, as respondents acknowledged that many SALW were being produced or purchased locally for safety and security reasons.⁶⁸ The following areas were noted by some key informants as potential locations where local manufacturing of SALW may be taking place: Chakarai *Upazila*, Maheshkhali *Upazila*, Garjania and Idgor (in Ramu *Upazila*) and Gundum (in Ukhia *Upazila*).⁶⁹ In addition, it was alleged that criminals were able to purchase SALW from the *upazilas* of Kutubdia, Lama and Naikhanchhari in Bandarban District.⁷⁰

The majority of crimes in Bangladesh are committed without the use of SALW.⁷¹ Nevertheless, it is clear that problems relating to SALW proliferation are particularly damaging to security and stability. SALW availability can encourage criminal factions, political agitators or violent extremists to adopt violent strategies, and cause widespread insecurity. Between the years 2006 and 2010, police records documented that an average of 1,625 cases were registered annually under the Arms Act and approximately 250 under the Explosives Act. It is not clear from the available data what percentage of these cases referred to either misuse or illegal possession (or whether the incidents involved trafficking). It should be noted that these figures, however, are likely to present an unrealistic picture of the extent of the presence and misuse of SALW in Bangladesh. This is because, as shown in chapter 5 (table 14), a significant proportion of potential crimes and acts of violence that could fall under this category probably go unreported. This is corroborated by the recent PRP *Baseline survey on personal security and police performance in Bangladesh*, which found that only a little over 20 percent of survey participants who had been a victim of crime in the previous two years reported the incident to the police.⁷²

Figure 23: Crime statistics of registered cases under the Arms Act and Explosives Act (2006–2010)



Data taken from 'Crime Statistics: Number of registered cases from 2001 to 2010', Bangladesh Police, www.police.gov.bd/index5.php?category=48

It is also important not to disregard the strong linkages between armed violence and socio-economic and cultural threats. The presence and misuse of SALW can, for

⁶⁷ Shamsi, A. Nayyer, 'Arms Trade in Bangladesh', *NewsDawn*, 27 May 2011, newsdawn.blogspot.com/2011/05/arms-trade-in-bangladesh.html, accessed 3 August 2012.

⁶⁸ Anonymous male (police), Ukhia, May/June 2012; anonymous male (local government), Ukhia, May/June 2012.

⁶⁹ Anonymous male (police), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (local government), Ukhia, May/June 2012.

⁷⁰ Anonymous male (police), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (police), Ukhia, May/June 2012.

⁷¹ Saferworld (2008), *op cit*.


⁷² PRP (2011), *op cit*.

example, threaten health and economic security by depriving households of primary income earners as a result of injury or death. These results inevitably feed into other interlinked insecurities such as the ability to purchase food or protect property from land-grabbers. Bangladesh has endeavoured to combat SALW availability and trafficking through active policing initiatives that have resulted in substantial seizures of firearms and ammunition. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), for example, recorded that during the years 2009 and 2010, 2,821 SALW were recovered (1,338 and 1,483 respectively).⁷³ In spite of this, Bangladesh remains vulnerable and smuggling continues to be pervasive because of the need to further strengthen border controls. In Chittagong this vulnerability is particularly relevant, with RAB-7 (responsible for Chittagong) consistently recording greater numbers of SALW-related crimes than other battalions across Bangladesh (figure 24).⁷⁴

“Drug traffickers usually carry heavy arms [noted to include AK-47s] when trafficking drugs through Naf River.”

Focus group participant, ‘farmer’, Teknaf

Figure 24: Comparison of monthly arms-related crimes recorded by RAB-7 (Chittagong) for November 2010–October 2011 with the overall average for all 12 battalions



Data taken from ‘Crime & Criminals: Crime Statistics’, Rapid Action Battalion, www.rab.gov.bd/crime.php

While HHS respondents did not say that arms trafficking was one of the more prevalent crimes in their locality (figure 8), there is evidence of small arms misuse in the SE border area and, as mentioned before, evidence that the trafficking of weapons is perceived to be a problem. Awareness of the extent of the problem may be diminished because of the prevalence of locally-made weapons as well as the discreet way that arms are trafficked (gradually, rather than in bulk, and with weapons dismantled for ease of transport and concealment before they are reassembled in Bangladesh⁷⁵). The practice of dismantling and avoiding bulk transfers, however, is not universal: in the early hours of 2 April 2004, 10 truckloads of SALW and explosives were discovered in the port city of Chittagong. The cache of weapons consisted of 1,790 SALW (including 1,290 sub-machine guns), 2,000 grenade launchers and 150 rocket launchers, as well as hand grenades, rockets and over a million rounds of ammunition.⁷⁶ It is thought that the weapons were destined for the Indian insurgent group United Liberation Front of Assam.⁷⁷

Even though it appears that respondents possess considerable knowledge of arms trafficking in the SE border area, they did not appear to have been asked by the security sector to contribute to law enforcement activities related to arms trafficking. Only a

⁷³ ‘RAB Achievements: Statistics of Remarkable Success of RAB in 2009 & 2010’, Rapid Action Battalion, www.rab.gov.bd/achievement.php?cid=10, accessed 26 October 2012.

⁷⁴ ‘Crime & Criminals: Crime Statistics’, Rapid Action Battalion, www.rab.gov.bd/crime.php, accessed 10 December 2012.

⁷⁵ Muniruzzaman (2011), *op cit*.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*.

⁷⁷ ‘10-truck arms haul trial starts’, *bdnews24*, 29 November 2011, www.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=212482&cid=2, accessed 10 December 2012.

quarter of HHS participants said that they had been approached by government agencies to co-operate in protecting their community against illicit smuggling of SALW. Based on the GoB's reports on progress towards implementation of its commitments to the United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), assistance is considered necessary to improve SALW controls. Assistance has been requested for public awareness raising; technical assistance for capacity building at checkpoints; weapon collection and destruction; marking and tracing; and information sharing.⁷⁸ In part, the latter requirement may be addressed at the regional level through the strengthening of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) mechanisms for co-operation on regional policing and countering violent extremism. Relying on this structure alone is, however, inevitably limited as it excludes Myanmar. Further development of the alternative framework provided by the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC)⁷⁹ may make up for this shortfall through its Convention on Co-operation in Combating International Terrorism, Trans-National Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking.

3.3 Human trafficking

Trafficking in persons (TIP) is a multi-dimensional problem, with a wide variety of abuses falling under the definition. According to the 2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (UN TIP Protocol):

'Trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Article 3, UN TIP Protocol⁸⁰

Bangladesh, however, is not a signatory or party of the TIP Protocol so this description and the relevant prevention articles are not binding. Instead, Bangladesh has committed itself to a more limited legal framework by ratifying the SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution.

Box 1: SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution⁸¹

'Trafficking' means the moving, selling or buying of women and children for prostitution within and outside a country for monetary or other considerations with or without the consent of the person subjected to trafficking.

And

'Persons subjected to trafficking' means women and children victimised or forced into prostitution by the traffickers by deception, threat, coercion, kidnapping, sale, fraudulent marriage, child marriage, or any other unlawful means.

⁷⁸ Government of Bangladesh, *Bangladesh National Report (2008) on Implementation of the PoA* (2010), in Sarah Parker 'National Implementation of the United Nations Small Arms Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument: An Analysis of Reporting in 2009–10', Working Paper of the Small Arms Survey, Interim Version, June 2010, www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP9-National-Implementation.pdf, accessed 3 August 2012.

⁷⁹ BIMSTEC comprises the seven countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

⁸⁰ Article 3, *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons*, General Assembly Resolution 55/25 (November 2000), www2.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoltraffic.htm.

⁸¹ SAARC, *Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution*, (2002), www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/conv-trafficking.pdf.

The SAARC definition inevitably marginalises many victims of trafficking transiting through or taken from Bangladesh because it does not protect the rights of men, or the rights of women and children to be free from forced/bonded labour. It is recorded by the US Department of State, for example, that a significant proportion of trafficked persons are men who have been fraudulently recruited for work overseas.⁸² It is also recorded that women and children have been trafficked to India and Pakistan for sexual exploitation or forced labour; particularly vulnerable are unregistered Rohingya refugees.⁸³ Vulnerability to forced labour is, in part, due to the willingness of many Bangladeshi men and women to migrate to the Middle East, South-East Asia, North Africa, Europe and elsewhere for work. In 2012, MoHA officials estimated that 100,000 to 200,500 women may be victims of trafficking every year,⁸⁴ though it is unclear if this figure referred only to women trafficked into prostitution or if it included women trafficked for other reasons such as forced labour.

Box 2: Data on TIP from Bangladesh⁸⁵

- Every day, an average of at least 70–80 women and children are trafficked from Bangladesh to other countries.
- Every month, some 200–400 young women and children are smuggled and trafficked from Bangladesh to Pakistan and Arab Gulf countries.
- Every year, an estimated 10,000–15,000 women and children are trafficked from Bangladesh to India.

FGD participants said that human trafficking was a significant problem in the SE border area, like other forms of trafficking.⁸⁶ Desk research and some statements from key informants indicated that many victims were from Myanmar and trafficked to Malaysia or Thailand.⁸⁷ It is important that efforts are made to better identify perpetrators of human trafficking, not least to enhance law enforcement efforts as well as to avoid the spread of misinformation and practice of scapegoating. One newspaper article quoted a victim as having paid as much as BDT 30,000 in advance, with a further BDT 70,000 expected on arrival, to a trafficking syndicate in order to facilitate transport and access to employment.⁸⁸ These figures are the equivalent of approximately \$365 and over \$1,220 (\$1 was equal to BDT 81.69 on 30 July 2012). The UNDP *Human Development Report 2011* records that half the population of Bangladesh earn less than \$1.25 per day, showing that the fee demanded could equate to up to three years wages for the most impoverished in Bangladesh, who are the most vulnerable to human trafficking.⁸⁹

Trafficked persons are often victims of abuses of trust. Traffickers trick vulnerable persons into giving up their liberty by promising employment and/or improved living conditions. Instead victims become bonded into slave labour or forced to submit to continual sexual abuse (including, but not limited to, prostitution). Trafficking is a great threat to victims, not just because they face abuses at their destination, but for many because they have to endure dangerous transit, particularly when forced to sail from the Bay of Bengal.⁹⁰

⁸² US Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 'Bangladesh', *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011*, (Department of State, 2011), www.state.gov/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164231.htm, accessed 4 August 2012.

⁸³ US Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (2011), *op cit*.

⁸⁴ 'BD girls trafficked under honeymoon cover: BGB chief', *Banglanews24.com*, 20 May 2012, www.banglanews24.com/English/detailsnews.php?nssl=9447b7e2c724174c9af773d5f1b64263&nttl=2012052142300, accessed 3 August 2012.

⁸⁵ As revealed in studies conducted by the Co-ordinating Council of Human Rights in Bangladesh, Ain-o-Shalish Kendro and Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association quoted in Jamila Ahmed Chowdhury, 'Human Trafficking – A New Form of Slave Trade in Bangladesh', *FOCUS*, vol. 37, September 2004, www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/2004/09/human-trafficking---a-new-form-of-slave-trade-in-bangladesh.html, accessed 3 August 2012.

⁸⁶ FGDs in Cox's Bazar Sadar ('community people', 'students', 'transport drivers'), Teknaf ('small traders') and Ukhiya ('community people').

⁸⁷ Anonymous female (female leader), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (police), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

⁸⁸ 'More sea voyagers arrested in Cox's Bazar District', *Burma News International*, 27 December 2011, bnionline.net/index.php/news/kaladan/12369-more-sea-voyagers-arrested-in-coxs-bazar-district.html, accessed 3 August 2012.

⁸⁹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2011* (UNDP, 2011), hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Tables.pdf.

⁹⁰ Anonymous male (media), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (NGO), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

Box 3: Case study of human trafficking⁹¹

BartaBangla, an online Bangladeshi newspaper, records the experience of a female victim of trafficking. Taslima Khatun (32 years old) had been deserted by her husband and was forced out of her home with her two children. Taslima endeavoured to provide for her family by taking up employment as a day labourer, but then she was offered the opportunity by a friend of her brother to earn more money as a housemaid in India. The promise proved tempting and she, along with her brother, youngest son and some other women agreed to be trafficked. After crossing the border she, along with the other women, was handed over to a third party who was supposed to take them to their new place of work. Instead, Taslima was taken to Mumbai, where she was confined to a room and forced to become a prostitute. Fortunately, she was able to escape and return to Bangladesh with the help of a sympathetic shopkeeper in India. Upon her return, she found that her brother and son had also returned.

Among the main motivations for succumbing to trafficking is poverty. Other reasons include social exclusion, gender-based discrimination, lack of awareness and weak enforcement of relevant laws and border security. Consequently, those at greater risk from socio-economic and cultural threats are also at greater risk of fraud by traffickers and the violence and abuse that often follows. The HHS appears to indicate that attempted deception is not as rare as may be expected. Overall, 5 percent of respondents had personal experience or knowledge of attempted trafficking (equating to some 120 attempts at trafficking), as shown in table 11. Given that respondents were not asked how many instances of attempted trafficking they were aware of, and that many respondents may not have been inclined to share this information, it is likely that the prevalence of trafficking is far wider than suggested by the HHS. However, if five percent is an accurate representation for the three *upazilas* under investigation, over 5,500 (based on the 2001 census) attempts will have been made in Cox's Bazar Sadar, Teknaf and Ukhia alone. This number, however, likely excludes attempts where traffickers have been successful and incidents where victims have taken members of their family with them (increasing the numbers of those that have been tricked).

Table 11: Have human traffickers attempted to trick you or someone you know? (2012, %)


		Yes	No	Do not know
Sex	Male	4.1	93.6	2.3
	Female	5.4	91.9	2.7
Area	Rural	4.8	92.5	2.7
	Urban	4.4	94.0	1.7
Upazila	Cox's Bazar Sadar	4.5	91.4	4.0
	Ukhia	5.9	93.7	0.4
	Teknaf	4.1	94.4	1.4
All		4.7	92.8	2.5

Moreover, while trafficking may often be the result of abuses of trust, it can also be the result of kidnapping. The forceful removal of victims can also be the result of a sale: a person, typically a child, is sold to the traffickers by someone having control of him or her, such as a family member, friend or neighbour.⁹² Irrespective of the means of recruitment, those most vulnerable to human trafficking were perceived by the HHS respondents to be 'children' (65 percent) and 'women' (45 percent). 'Poor people' (33 percent), 'female youth' (25 percent) and 'girls' (29 percent) were also considered to be in danger by the HHS respondents. Men and the 'old aged' were considered less at risk of trafficking (figure 25).

⁹¹ Touhidur Rahman, 'When will be end of Trafficking from Bangladesh', *BartaBangla.com*, 24 May 2012, bartabangla.com/details.php?reqDate=2012-06-25%2013:10:21&catId=1&subCatId=24&conId=938, accessed 3 August 2012.

⁹² See BIPSS, 'Human Trafficking: A Security Concern for Bangladesh', *Issue Brief*, Issue 9, August 2011, www.bipss.org.bd/pdf/Issue%209%20Quark%20Link%20Off.pdf, accessed 9 August 2012; and USAID Bangladesh, 'Current Conditions: Trafficking in Persons' (USAID, September 2011), transition.usaid.gov/bd/programs/trafficking.html, accessed 3 August 2012.

Figure 25: In your opinion, which groups are vulnerable to human trafficking? (2012, %)



As has been indicated, there are various factors that have increased the incidence of human trafficking, including poverty, abuse and marginalisation. These factors may, for example, push victims to seek opportunities elsewhere or make them vulnerable to promises of a better life (e.g. recruitment fraud or false promises of marriage). Trafficking is considered to be a multiplier of crime, with victims being incorporated into criminal gangs; this process may result in the victims contributing to further trafficking by smuggling drugs/SALW or by tricking family/neighbours into becoming involved in human trafficking. Many respondents also said that they were aware of what happens to victims of human trafficking. Seventy-nine percent of respondents said victims have been ‘killed for organs’, and 39 percent said ‘tortured and killed’. Thirty-five percent of HHS respondents believed that victims ended up in ‘prostitution/sexual slavery’. Child labour was also recognised, with five percent acknowledging the demand for ‘camel jockeys’ in the Middle East. These perceptions were supported by key informants who noted that recruitment fraud was resulting in Rohingya women being sold to brothels in South-East Asia and women and children were ending up in forced labour and prostitution.

Figure 26: Do you know what happens to victims of trafficking? (2012, %)





Figure 27: If yes, what happens to them? (2012, %)



Records from BGB show that only very limited success has been achieved in rescuing trafficked persons. For the period 2006–2010, 1,374 women or children were rescued and 64 traffickers arrested (table 12). Considering the conservative estimate that approximately 100,000 women are trafficked every year, BGB operational activity has only been able to have an impact on roughly 0.275 percent of the problem. But this statistic may be unfair as not all trafficked persons are sent overseas. There is evidence that both adults and children, as a result of coercion, fraud or sale into bondage, have been trafficked internally for commercial sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, or forced/bonded labour. Victims are often transferred to more affluent areas, including the cities of Dhaka and Chittagong, from poorer rural areas.

Table 12: Border Guard Bangladesh operational activity relating to trafficking in persons (2006–2010)

	Recovered		Number of apprehended traffickers
	Women	Children	
2006	27	22	11
2007	19	6	14
2008	264	204	12
2009	210	137	18
2010	339	146	9
Totals	859	515	64
	1,374		

Data taken from 'Human Trafficking', Border Guard Bangladesh, www.bgb.gov.bd/index.php/bgb/bgb_human_trafficking

While prevention and prosecution of crimes relating to TIP has been limited, new legislation adopted by the GoB in 2012 has created a legislative framework complementing the UN TIP Protocol. The Human Trafficking Deterrence and Suppression Act 2012 establishes a comprehensive anti-trafficking legal framework that criminalises all forms of TIP, both internal and transnational, irrespective of the sex of the victim.⁹³ Punishment for those convicted of trafficking under the new act is severe, with the possibility of the death penalty as punishment for those linked to TCOs. It is yet to be seen what impact this new legislation – and its strengthening of punitive powers – will have on effectively prosecuting traffickers, supporting victims and deterring TCOs.

⁹³ Ministry of Home Affairs, *National Plan of Action for Combating Human Trafficking 2012–2014* (Ministry of Home Affairs: Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 2012), sgdatabase.unwomen.org/uploads/NAP%20Trafficking%20-%202012%20to%202014.pdf.

4

Armed violence in the South-East border area

ARMED VIOLENCE CAN SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS of safety and security. While Bangladesh is largely free from violent conflict, it is nevertheless vulnerable to criminal acts involving SALW or other conventional weapons. The leading causes of armed violence identified were violent extremism and armed robbery against ships.

4.1 Violent extremism

Violent extremism can be understood as the sustained threat or use of violence against people, institutions or infrastructure to create 'terror' in order to achieve extremist ideological goals. Violent extremism affects political stability and security through direct acts of violence. It also indirectly affects socio-economic and cultural security through its influence on governance, particularly the curtailing of freedoms (of expression, association, thought, conscience and religion) that can accompany the threat of violent extremism.

Box 4: Crime of violent extremism

In Bangladesh, the Anti-Terrorism Ordinance 2008 (Chapter 2: Section 6)⁹⁴ provides the following definition of terrorist acts (referred to in this report as acts of violent extremism):

- 1) Terrorist acts mean striking terror in the people or any section of the people in order to compel the Government of Bangladesh or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act with intent to threaten the unity, solidarity, security or sovereignty of Bangladesh through:
 - a) Killing, injuring grievously, abducting a person or causing damage to the property of a person; or
 - b) Possessing or using explosives, inflammable substance, firearms, or any other chemical to achieve the purpose of sub section (a)
- 2) Whoever commits terrorist act shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life or to a maximum 20 years and not less than 3 years rigorous imprisonment, to which fine may be added.

Bangladesh has long witnessed violence from extreme political ideological groups, but more recently it has been confronted with violent religious extremism. The composition and agendas of some of these groups can be seen to be fluid as, sometimes unlikely,

⁹⁴ Government of Bangladesh, *Anti-terrorism Ordinance, 2008*, (GoB, 2008), www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Bangladesh/Bangladesh_Anti_Terrorism_Ordinance_2008.pdf, accessed 3 August 2012.

partnerships are formed over time. Rohingya nationalist insurgents (demanding a recognised national identity for the Rohingya in Myanmar) have, for instance, formed partnerships with other extremist groups operating in the SE border area. The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), for example, is reported to have formed partnerships with the radical Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and the international Saudi Arabian charity Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami.⁹⁵ These links have resulted in examples of Rohingya joining hardline Muslim organisations in the region. Strong transnational linkages appear to be a feature across the contemporary fundamentalist/violent extremist spectrum in Bangladesh, with identifiable alliances between local organisations and international and regional extremist networks. It is alleged, for example, that HuJI-B was formed using Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban as a template and that it continues to cultivate links with these networks,⁹⁶ while Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) is thought to be expanding its influence into India.⁹⁷ Some evidence also suggests that the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is establishing a network in Bangladesh and have been actively trying to recruit Rohingya refugees (both registered and unregistered) residing in Chittagong.⁹⁸

These linkages allow for financial co-operation between internal and external groups that may share extremist ideologies or criminal motives. The 10-truck arms haul in Chittagong in 2004 discussed in the SALW section of this report is an example of the level of financing and resourcing that such groups have.⁹⁹ To overcome the challenges of transferring illegal funds, widely available money laundering methods such as *hundi* provide a simple and untraceable means of sending or receiving money outside of the traditional banking system. Conventional smuggling is also evident. While not referring to the funding of extremist groups, a large number of focus group participants said that Rohingya carry money across the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar.¹⁰⁰ This perception may be informed by the high levels of hostility towards Rohingya among members of the host community: some Rohingya FGD participants said that they did not even secure enough money to sustain themselves, let alone to send home to their families in Myanmar.

As established by the Anti-Terrorism Act 2009, RAB leads anti-terrorist activities (as well as investigations into organised crime) in Bangladesh. RAB enjoys very strong public support because of many notable arrests and public seizures of extensive amounts of illegal SALW.¹⁰¹ In 2009, it was documented that approximately 90 percent of people were of the opinion that RAB was doing a 'good job', 98 percent believed that RAB had helped to 'tackle crime and violence' and 96 percent considered that RAB had produced some improvements in combating terror.¹⁰² RAB is not without controversy, however. Human Rights Watch has noted that RAB has received criticism from domestic and international sources concerning a number of fatalities resulting from RAB operations (commonly known as 'crossfire') and for a sharp increase in enforced disappearances.¹⁰³ Participants in FGDs for this research also expressed concerns about so-called 'crossfire' incidents.¹⁰⁴

The BGB also has an important role in countering the threat of extremist violence, as border management is a crucial part of any effective security response to this threat. However, capacity constraints, including insufficient training and limited cross-border

⁹⁵ Andrew Selth, 'Burma's Muslims and the War on Terror', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 27, no. 2, March–April 2004.

⁹⁶ 'Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) Terrorist Group, Bangladesh', *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm, accessed 3 August 2012.

⁹⁷ Muniruzzaman (2011), *op cit*.

⁹⁸ Mukhlesur Rahman, 'Cops on trail of 20 more Lashkar men', *The Daily Star*, 15 November 2009, www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=114100, accessed 3 August 2012.

⁹⁹ Rajeev Sharma, 'ISI Network in Bangladesh', *South Asia Analysis Group*, 13 February 2012, www.eurasiareview.com/13022012-isi-network-in-bangladesh-analysis/, accessed 12 December 2012.

¹⁰⁰ FGDs in Cox's Bazar Sadar ('community people', 'male Rohingya', 'students', 'transport drivers'); Teknaf ('farmers', 'female Rohingya', 'male Rohingya', 'small traders') and Ukhia ('community people', 'drivers', 'fishermen', 'male Rohingya').

¹⁰¹ For additional information see 'RAB Achievements', Rapid Action Battalion, *op cit*.

¹⁰² Saferworld (2010), *op cit*.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch, *Bangladesh: Alarming Rise in 'Disappearances'*, 27 April 2012, www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/26/bangladesh-alarming-rise-disappearances.

¹⁰⁴ FGDs in Cox's Bazar Sadar, Ukhia and Teknaf.


co-operation, have limited BGB's impact (for further details on border assistance see chapter 5). Combined with increased BGB capacity, border security may improve following recent democratic reforms in Myanmar, potentially allowing greater co-operation between the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar on migration and trafficking.

Despite desk research suggesting that violent extremism remains a challenge in Bangladesh, according to the survey almost all respondents were unaware of any violent extremist activity where they live, with only 2.5 percent saying that they were aware of a militant training camp in their locality, for instance (figure 28). While articles collated between January and June 2012 suggest that violent extremists have been returning to the SE border area, particularly in the previously perceived safe areas of Rohingya refugee camps, limited public awareness of such activity could be attributed to the robust commitment by law enforcement agencies to counter extremist threats; police representatives, for instance, stated that violent extremism has decreased because of “coercive measures”, “close surveillance” and “quick action”.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, several interviewees did express some concern about the vulnerability of certain areas to violent extremists:

“The refugee camps are sensitive areas ... the extremists might take advantage of the sensitivity as police can't raid there without specific information or just on the basis of suspicion.”¹⁰⁶

A key informant also noted that “common people suspect that many violent extremist groups might have training camps in remote places at Gorjonia in Cox's Bazar”,¹⁰⁷ which have continued to develop because of the social problems of poverty, illiteracy and the misrepresentation of religious scriptures. Another key informant noted that violent extremists were also resident in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, as the geography allows them to effectively hide from law enforcement agencies. This has resulted in the development of “dangerous paths” (routes where passers-by get looted, kidnapped and even murdered by those who make a living through these means) that local people “never think [of] taking”.¹⁰⁸

Figure 28: Are you aware of any militant training camps in your locality? (2012, %)



Only 25 male and 38 female respondents (a total of 2.5 percent of the HHS) were aware of any militant training camp in their locality. Of this 2.5 percent, the majority considered camps to be centres for extremist religious indoctrination (46 percent); some key informants, including religious leaders and other well-informed sources, agreed. In addition, camps were also believed to be used by violent extremists to liaise with foreign militant groups (14 percent of those HHS respondents who were aware of a militant training camp in their locality). Of this small percentage of respondents,

¹⁰⁵ Anonymous male (police), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (police), Ukhia, May/June 2012.

¹⁰⁶ 'Concerns over militancy grip Bangladesh afresh', *The Independent*, 17 June 2012, www.theindependentbd.com/national/115910-concerns-over-militancy-grip-bangladesh-afresh.html, accessed 3 August 2012.

¹⁰⁷ Anonymous female (female leader), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

¹⁰⁸ Anonymous male (NGO), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

a few also referred to training in conducting terrorist attacks (14 percent), and the use of SALW (11 percent) and explosives (11 percent) taking place in these camps. Unsurprisingly, very few people had knowledge about specific activities in camps or sources of funding for extremist activities. Five percent of HHS respondents thought that extremist activities were funded from abroad, but 92 percent said that they did not know how such activities were funded.

In spite of limited knowledge of violent extremism in the SE border area, approximately 60 percent of HHS respondents had an opinion on government counter-extremist activities, a finding that could reflect the high levels of public concern about this issue (table 13). Twenty-three percent of HHS respondents believed that state agencies are very successful or successful in tackling extremist activities in their locality (falling to 9 percent in Cox's Bazar Sadar and rising to 40 and 36 percent in Ukhia and Teknaf respectively). However, 38 percent of respondents thought that state agencies were not successful or not successful at all.

Table 13: How successful are government agencies at tackling extremist activities in your locality? (2012, %)

		Successful/ very successful	Not successful/ not successful at all	Do not know
Sex	Male	23	43	34
	Female	23	33	44
All		23	38	39

To improve effectiveness, the GoB needs to better understand the origins of violent extremist recruits. This may prove difficult, as three-quarters of respondents (73 percent) could not give an opinion on this subject. For those that did offer an opinion, the greatest number thought that violent extremist recruits were largely drawn from the 'youth' (15 percent). This may be because of a lack of opportunities for economic and social advancement – a possibility supported by the fact that nine percent of respondents also considered the 'impoverished' to be particularly vulnerable to recruitment. A minority of respondents thought that youth may also be susceptible due to indoctrination through *madrassas* or other educational facilities. This data complements recent findings from *Safety and security in North Bengal, Bangladesh: A youth perception survey*, conducted in the North Bengal region of Bangladesh, in which it was reported that respondents considered religious indoctrination (65 percent) and economic benefits (48 percent) as the main drivers of recruitment.¹⁰⁹

FGD participants ('students' in Cox's Bazar Sadar) said that pupils of *Qaumi madrassas* (unregulated *madrassas*) are specifically targeted for recruitment. These FGD participants also perceived that violent extremists ran training camps in Gorjonia, Kuniapalong and Kochhopia in Ramu *Thana*; this allegation was not corroborated by other focus groups, who largely denied that violent extremism occurred in the SE border area, except for 'small traders' from Cox's Bazar Sadar who noted that while violent extremist activities were not prevalent they continued 'underground' (the survey team was unable to verify any of these claims).

HHS respondents were asked to provide recommendations as to how violent extremism can best be combated (figure 30). Most people (70 percent of males and 55 percent of females) said that there should be an increase in the presence of law enforcement agencies in their locality. Many also said that greater training should be provided to special forces. Respondents also supported the recommendations to sensitise media to conduct investigative reporting on security concerns in their locality (15 percent), to conduct awareness-raising programmes at the school and family level (14 percent) and to ensure mainstream education opportunities for young people (14 percent).

¹⁰⁹ Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and Saferworld, *Safety and security in North Bengal, Bangladesh: A youth perception survey* (BEI and Saferworld, 2012), www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/North%20Bengal%20report.pdf.

Figure 29: Which members of your community are most vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist organisations? (2012, %)





Figure 30: Recommended measures to counter violent extremism in the South-East border area (2012, %)




With regard to media reportage, 50 percent of respondents considered the media to be covering safety and security sufficiently. However, a fifth of the HHS respondents considered the news to be subject to bias and/or subject to external pressures. The greatest sources of such pressures were considered to be ‘political’ (76 percent of those who thought the media was subject to external pressures), ‘criminal gangs’ (33 percent) and ‘local elites’ (23 percent). The exertion of pressures could also extend to violence, given that almost 20 percent of these respondents were of the opinion that editors, reporters and their families are subject to ‘anonymous death threats’.

The extent to which improved media reporting could help counter extremism depends upon the level of access people have to various types of media. From the data it appears that a little under two-thirds of urban respondents own a television, although radio ownership is likely to be much higher. This potential barrier to information is further compounded by the finding that 38 percent of respondents, 42 percent in rural areas, have had no form of education and are likely to be illiterate and therefore unable to read print media reports. The GoB also needs to be aware of limitations such as literacy and access to types of media when planning awareness-raising initiatives. Community radio initiatives in rural Bangladesh, supported by the GoB as well as a number of donors and implemented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), hold promise in overcoming some of these barriers. Radio also provides opportunities for inter-

active dialogue between relevant stakeholders (e.g. government and law enforcement agencies) and communities via mobile and SMS messaging.

Figure 31: Level of education of household survey respondents (2012, %)



4.2 Armed robbery against ships

In the past, the waters around Bangladesh, particularly Chittagong, have been seen as at high risk of piracy. However, in recent years the Piracy Reporting Centre of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has reported that attacks have ‘fallen significantly’ due to the efforts of the Bangladesh authorities.¹¹⁰ The Bangladesh authorities have also attempted to clarify that most attacks are in fact armed robbery against ships rather than piracy, given that they occur in territorial waters. Similarly, the Bangladesh Coast Guard records the numbers of dacoits detained and not pirates.¹¹¹ Being known as a piracy hotspot can have a severe economic impact on the region in terms of deterring trade and raising insurance costs for the shipping industry. For the purpose of this report, considering the GoB’s preferred terminology, ‘armed robbery against ships’ is used as a generic term (even though it is recognised that attacks that occur outside territorial waters are acts of piracy). This report also considers the term ‘ships’ to be representative of all sea-going vessels including small boats or trawlers.

Box 5: Definitions of ‘piracy’ and ‘armed robbery against ships’

Definitions demonstrating the difference between ‘piracy’ and ‘armed robbery against ships’ are given below (emphasis added).

The UN definition of ‘piracy’ according to Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea¹¹² is:

- a. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
 - i. **On the high seas**,¹¹³ against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
 - ii. Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place **outside the jurisdiction of any State**;
- b. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

¹¹⁰ International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) – Commercial Crime Service website, www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/prone-areas-and-warnings, accessed 21 September 2012.

¹¹¹ See ‘Achievement’, Bangladesh Coast Guard website, www.coastguard.gov.bd/main/.

¹¹² ‘Article 101: Definition of piracy’, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

¹¹³ Article 1 of the UN Convention on the High Seas (1958) defines the term “high seas” as meaning “all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State.” See untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf.


c. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

And ‘armed robbery against ships’ is defined in Resolution A.1025 (26) adopted by the International Maritime Organization¹¹⁴ as:

1. Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, **within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea**;
2. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.

As referred to above, between 2010 and 2011 there was a sharp reduction in attacks and attempted attacks on ships recorded by the IMB as a direct result of progressive initiatives by the Bangladesh authorities (figure 32).¹¹⁵ The GoB empowered the Bangladesh Navy and the Bangladesh Coast Guard to carry out operations including patrolling fishing, inland and coastal areas to counter armed robbery against ships.¹¹⁶ The Bangladesh Coast Guard also recently introduced a Citizen’s Charter which allows every citizen to seek assistance from the Coast Guard on any issue related to safety and security.¹¹⁷ At the regional and global levels, Bangladesh has ratified relevant conventions, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 2001.

Figure 32: Actual and attempted attacks on ships in the waters of Bangladesh (2007–2011)



Data taken from ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*, annual reports 2007–2011

The GoB, however, cannot take continued progress for granted, as focus group participants mentioned that armed robbery against ships is widely perceived to be a significant threat¹¹⁸ and key informants have suggested such crimes may be increasing.¹¹⁹ There are also indications that the incidence of armed robbery against ships may be under-reported, as some focus group participants alleged that the Coast Guard may threaten or harass victims of such crimes for logging complaints, thus potentially lowering the number of incidents reported.¹²⁰ Focus group participants also noted that perpetrators of such attacks originated from all over Chittagong Division, as well as the entire southern coastal belt, including the Sundarbans and Patuakhali.¹²¹ Particularly vulnerable are fishing boats, whose catch, tackle and stores are prized. Greater accuracy when counting and cataloguing such incidents is necessary

¹¹⁴ International Maritime Organization, Resolution A.1025(26) (2009), www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf.

¹¹⁵ IMB, *op cit.*; and ICC – Commercial Crime Services, ‘Piracy attacks in East and West Africa dominate world report’, 19 January 2012, www.icc-ccs.org/news/711-piracy-attacks-in-east-and-west-africa-dominate-world-report, accessed 12 November 2012.

¹¹⁶ For details see the Bangladesh Navy website: www.navy.mil.bd/aid.html.

¹¹⁷ Bangladesh Coast Guard, ‘Citizen’s Charter of the Bangladesh Coast Guard’, www.coastguard.gov.bd/charter.pdf, accessed 24 October 2012.

¹¹⁸ FGDs in Cox’s Bazar Sadar (‘community people’, ‘Rohingya’, ‘small traders’), Teknaf (‘fishermen’) and Ukhia (‘fishermen’).

¹¹⁹ Expressed by an anonymous male (NGO), Cox’s Bazar, May/June 2012; but similar sentiments were offered by anonymous male (media), Cox’s Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (religious leader), Cox’s Bazar, May/June 2012; anonymous male (Rohingya leader), Teknaf, May/June 2012; anonymous male (Coast Guard), Teknaf, May/June 2012.

¹²⁰ FGDs in Cox’s Bazar Sadar and Teknaf.

¹²¹ FGDs in Cox’s Bazar Sadar (‘male Rohingya’, ‘small traders’, ‘students’); Teknaf (‘fishermen’) and Ukhia (‘fishermen’).

to better monitor acts of armed robbery against ships and map vulnerable areas requiring greater attention from the Coast Guard to protect ships from violence and criminal threats.


“Our lives and livelihood are completely dependent on our small boats. We have no other means of survival except fishing. If these boats are damaged our livelihoods will be destroyed.”

Focus group participant, ‘fishermen’, Teknaf

Moreover, despite the success of governmental initiatives, a key informant from the Coast Guard stated that “many obstacles in the process of carrying out operations” remain, identifying insufficient manpower and equipment as particular operational limitations to tackle the problem.¹²² An example of the difficulties faced by the Coast Guard was given in which a vessel sent to police against armed robbery against ships in the Sundarbans was unable to communicate with other Coast Guard vessels because they could not get a mobile signal.

In 2009, risk management consultants Bergen Risk Solutions documented that pirate attacks in Asia followed ‘distinct patterns’. The majority of incidents occur during the hours of darkness, and pirates avoid direct confrontation, adopting methods that involve stealing products undetected.¹²³ However, armed robbery against ships is often violent. One key informant, for example, said that many perpetrators are guilty of looting and murder.¹²⁴ Research conducted by the IMB shows that in Bangladesh the most common weapons used in attacks on ships (both piracy and armed robbery against ships) have been knives (figure 33).

Figure 33: Types of arms used in attacks on ships in the waters of Bangladesh (2007–2011)



Data taken from ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*, annual reports 2007–2011

4.3 Financial crime

Effective policing of law and order requires not only positive law enforcement but also a shared commitment to enforce legislation fully. In the SE border area, countering the threat of crime, including violent extremism and trafficking, requires considerable commitment, not least for preventing the financing of these illegal activities. A key informant from the BGB alleged that violent extremist organisations are active in laundering money from the illicit drug trade and other illegal commerce, including SALW and human trafficking.¹²⁵ In an effort to counter the threat of money laundering, the Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) 2009 seeks to safeguard financial processes from abuse by criminal elements in terms of the keeping, concealment or disposal of funds derived from illegal activities. The MLPA defines money laundering as follows:

¹²² Anonymous male (Coast Guard), Teknaf, May/June 2012.

¹²³ Erik Hoffmann, *Piracy in Asia* (Bergen Risk Solutions, 2009), www.bergenrisksolutions.com/index.php?dokument=569, accessed 8 August 2012.

¹²⁴ Anonymous male (local journalist), Cox's Bazar, May/June 2012.

¹²⁵ Anonymous male (BGB), Teknaf, May/June 2012.

To transfer, convert, remit from or to Bangladesh the money or properties¹²⁶ acquired through commission of any predicate offence with an intention to conceal or disguise the illicit origin of the property or smuggle money or property earned through legal or illegal means to abroad.

Government of Bangladesh, *Money Laundering Prevention Act*¹²⁷

Bangladesh is also party to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987) and its Additional Protocol (2004). The latter criminalises ‘the provision, collection or acquisition of funds for the purpose of committing terrorist acts and [takes] further measures to prevent and suppress financing of such acts.’¹²⁸ Responsibility for policing financial integrity and seizing illegal funds lies with financial institutions, under the supervision of the Bangladesh Bank, and with the co-operation of law enforcement agencies. Fulfilment of this responsibility is complicated, however, as financial transfers are often paid through the informal, but ultimately illegal, *hundi* system.

Hundi is a popular form of money transfer because dealers generally charge smaller fees, give better exchange rates and provide faster service than regular banks. Although most transactions are from legal sources and intended for legal use in Bangladesh, the system is open to abuse by TCOs because there is little means of tracing the purpose or source of a transfer. For example, dealers often do not know either the sender or recipient of a transfer. By accruing illegal funds, extremists and TCOs are able to effectively finance their operations, for example by recruiting members, exploiting corruption or gaps in border controls for smuggling and purchasing weapons for violent extremist activities. Following the arrest of the JMB leader Maulana Saidur Rahman in May 2010, it was reported that as much as \$42 million had been illicitly transferred into Bangladesh to finance insurgent activities.¹²⁹ Thirty-seven percent of HHS respondents thought of *hundi* as the mode of money transfer used for funding extremists, while 17 percent believed these groups use the official banking system. This view was also reflected in several of the FGDs in all three survey areas. The general perception of the FGD participants was that *hundi* was a common form of money transfer in their areas. The FGDs with ‘community people’ in Cox’s Bazar Sadar and ‘farmers’ in Teknaf linked *hundi* with Rohingya and drug trafficking, while some of the Rohingya said that they used *hundi* to send money to their relatives in Myanmar. There was also a view shared by the ‘student’ group in Cox’s Bazar Sadar that *hundi* may be used by militants. One FGD in Ukhia alleged that a local syndicate is involved in illegal money transfer and although the BGB and police are aware of this, they do not take any action against the dealers.¹³⁰

The use of *hundi* for sending money can have both positive and negative effects on the economy of Bangladesh. Remittances from outside Bangladesh to families still resident in the country can enable greater economic security, an outcome that has significant implications for all aspects of human security. However, when *hundi* is used to send money out of Bangladesh, despite the likely socio-economic reasons for doing so, this can damage the Bangladesh economy.

In 2010, following the enactment of the MLPA, five money laundering prosecutions were attempted in Bangladesh, of which one resulted in a conviction.¹³¹ Weaknesses in the investigation and prosecution of money laundering are a direct result of recorded

¹²⁶ Property is understood as meaning “(i) any kind of assets, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable; or (ii) cash, documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, which indicates evidential title to, or interest in, such assets.” Government of Bangladesh, *Money Laundering Prevention Act*, section 2(o) (2009), www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Bangladesh/Bangladesh_Money_Laundering_Prevention_Act_2009.pdf.

¹²⁷ Government of Bangladesh, *Money Laundering Prevention Act*, section 2(k)(i), 2009, www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Bangladesh/Bangladesh_Money_Laundering_Prevention_Act_2009.pdf

¹²⁸ See the relevant documents accessible through ‘SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and its Additional Protocol’, SAARC, www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=21, accessed 3 August 2012.


¹²⁹ ‘Bangladesh’s terror financing problem’, *Diplomatic Courier*, 8 January 2012, www.diplomaticcourier.com/news/asia/694, accessed 3 August 2012.

¹³⁰ FGDs in Cox’s Bazar Sadar, Teknaf and Ukhia with farmers, transport drivers, students, small traders, community people and Rohingya men and women, who shared the above views on *hundi*.

¹³¹ US Department of State, ‘Bangladesh’, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Country Database*, May 2011, publicintelligence.info/MoneyLaunderingDatabase2011.pdf, accessed 3 August 2012.

incidents of corruption. The US Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs records that the GoB “acknowledges that corruption is pervasive” and that it “undermines effective implementation” of the duties of law enforcement agencies, including the police and customs.¹³² This is reinforced by Transparency International (TI), which rates Bangladesh 120th out of 183 states in its 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index with a score of 2.7/10 (with 0 being ‘highly corrupt’ and 10 being ‘very clean’).¹³³ As a result, public confidence in the authorities is likely to be low. Almost 70 percent of people interviewed by TI reported paying a bribe in 2010. Likewise, only 27 percent of those interviewed thought government efforts to fight corruption were effective (figure 34).

Figure 34: Perceptions of government efforts to fight corruption (2010, %)



Data taken from ‘Corruption by country/territory: Bangladesh’, *Transparency International*, www.transparency.org/country#BGD

Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world and is ranked 146th in the UNDP human development index, with half the population living on less than \$1.25 a day. Consequently, banking procedures are unlikely to be as developed as those in other countries. It is therefore necessary that training be offered to government and banking officials on best practices for curbing both money laundering and the financing of extremist organisations. Commentators have also recommended that the Bangladesh Bank be provided with sufficient resources to be able to fulfil its responsibilities of investigation.¹³⁴

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ Transparency International, ‘Corruption by country/territory: Bangladesh’, www.transparency.org/country#BGD, accessed 3 August 2012.

¹³⁴ Paul Cochrane, ‘The Funding Methods of Bangladeshi Terrorist Groups’, Combating Terrorism Center, 15 May 2009, www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-funding-methods-of-bangladeshi-terrorist-groups, accessed 3 August 2012.

Public perceptions of law enforcement agencies:

Police, Rapid Action Battalion, Border Guard Bangladesh and Coast Guard

5.1 Crime reporting

AS RECORDED IN SECTION 2.2 (table 3) close to 1,750 crimes were alleged to have been suffered by 989 HHS respondents or one of their family members in the last 12 months; in fact, many more crimes are likely to have occurred given that respondents were not asked about the number of times a specific crime had been experienced. In response to a follow-up question, it was discovered that a little over two-thirds did not report the crime to the police (68 percent), while a minority of 32 percent reported it. While disappointing, compared with recent national surveys the reporting rate may be cause for some optimism. *Security provision in Bangladesh* found that in 2009, for instance, 28 percent of those who experienced a crime in the previous two years had reported it to the police.¹³⁵ More recently, in 2011, the *Baseline survey on personal security and police performance in Bangladesh* reported that only 21.5 percent of the public survey respondents who said that they had been the victim of crime over the previous two years had reported it to the police.¹³⁶ Further research is needed to better understand whether reporting rates have increased or whether they are higher in the SE border area than elsewhere in Bangladesh, and what reasons are behind higher reporting rates. This could enable any positive trend to be built upon and potentially replicated across Bangladesh.

Notwithstanding this apparent progress, government records remain likely to be unreliable given that it seems a significant proportion of people do not report crimes to the police. This potential for under-reporting was anecdotally exemplified in the section on ‘armed robbery against ships’ (section 4.2) where focus group participants noted that threats from the Coast Guard had limited the extent to which fishermen reported alleged attacks. On a positive note, very few respondents thought that weak policing was to blame for criminality and under-reporting. Many chose not to report incidents of crime because they considered them to be personal or family matters.

¹³⁵ Saferworld (2010), *op cit.*

¹³⁶ PRP (2011), *op cit.*

HHS respondents also noted several social and institutional barriers to the reporting of criminal acts.

Table 14: If you or a member of your family were a victim of crime in the past year, did you report the crime to the police? (2012)

		Total number	Yes (%)	No (%)
Sex	Male	447	38	62
	Female	542	27	73
All		989	32	68

Of those respondents who did not report the crime to the police, approximately a third said this was because the crime was a 'personal/family matter' (figure 35). The national survey in 2011 (*Baseline survey on personal security and police performance in Bangladesh*) recorded that 39 percent of respondents had not reported a crime to the police because they considered it to be a personal or family matter.¹³⁷ It is not clear which crimes this rationale refers to, but they may include crimes that occur in the home or crimes that are more socially acceptable, such as sexual violence, domestic violence and dowry-related crimes. A similar number of respondents in both surveys (HHS and *Baseline survey on personal security and police performance in Bangladesh*) said that they did not report the crime to the police because they had 'personally dealt with the matter' (32 percent). A considerable 18 percent said that they reported the matter to other authorities (such as employers, village elite, Union *Parishad* (UP) chairs/members and NGOs).


Other reasons given for not reporting crime to the police, as shown in figure 35, included: respondents 'do not have enough money to pay corrupt police' (18 percent); it would be 'too much trouble' (6 percent); and the 'police would not have been interested' (5 percent). The finding that approximately one in five respondents did not approach the police because they were not able to offer an inducement is a concern as it is double the 9 percent recorded in the recent PRP *Baseline survey on personal security and police performance in Bangladesh*. This indicates that police in the SE border area potentially have much to do to improve public perceptions of their honesty. The PRP report also documented that 63 percent of respondents from Chittagong considered access to police as being at least 'somewhat difficult' and that 58 percent of respondents thought the police spent at best 'not much time' investigating crimes.¹³⁸ Dialogue between law enforcement agencies and local communities and greater support to community policing initiatives may in future help reduce possible deficiencies in trust and concerns regarding the reliability of these agencies.

The findings also indicate, in part, that law enforcement requires a holistic approach with all security providers co-operating to maintain law and order in the SE border area. This includes the Coast Guard working with police to protect fishermen from crime, or police working in partnership with RAB to combat trafficking by TCOs and extremist violence. Improving the accessibility of the police is also important because an additional 9 percent of respondents stated their reason for not reporting a crime as 'dislike/fear of police' and 5 percent as 'fear of reprisals'. These reasons may further explain why significant proportions of respondents feel more comfortable approaching others rather than the police. Consequently, it is essential that police reforms work towards improving accountability of the security sector and protection of victims.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

Figure 35: Reasons for not reporting crime to the police (2012, %)




5.2 Crime prevention and maintaining law and order

The HHS asked respondents to list which law enforcement agencies they considered responsible for reducing crime and unlawful acts in the SE border area (figure 36). The overwhelming majority (70 percent) identified the police as being responsible. This is a similar percentage to those who identified the role of the police as ‘maintaining law and order on the streets’ in the 2009 national survey (74 percent).¹³⁹ RAB and the army were also considered to be responsible by 16 percent and 11 percent of the HHS respondents respectively. This data likely indicates the continued trust placed by the public in the police to maintain law and order.

Surprisingly, only two percent thought the Coast Guard was responsible for maintaining law and order in the SE border area, despite significant evidence of waterways being used as major conduits for traffickers and the Bay of Bengal remaining vulnerable to armed robbery against ships. Nevertheless, maritime security remains significant, with over half of the respondents associating law enforcement with the protection of maritime borders (figure 37).

Figure 36: Who in your opinion is responsible for reducing crime and unlawful acts? (2012, %)



139 Saferworld (2010), *op cit.*

Building on these findings, it was evident that a significant proportion of HHS respondents (46 percent) acknowledged that the public is also responsible for maintaining law and order. This may be facilitated by the development and strengthening of community policing forums and grassroots security providers like Ansar and Village Defence Party (VDP). The importance of community policing forums cannot be overemphasised as the mechanism provides a mandate for police and communities to work together to solve problems relating to local crime, disorder and safety. Subsequent development of principles promoting policing through consent rather than by coercion will in turn encourage greater levels of trust in the security sector. The level of responsibility attributed to local government and civil society for security issues is shown by the finding that 48 percent of respondents would approach their 'Ward commissioner' or a 'UP member' and 47 percent their 'Union *Parishad*' in general, while 45 percent would contact their 'local elite' when threatened by crime or an unlawful act; these figures were only surpassed by the 80 percent that would approach the police (table 15).

The apparent vote of confidence in the police is very positive given the high proportion of respondents who did not report crimes to the police and the proportion of people who feel that the institution is dishonest (figure 43). It is likely to reflect public acceptance that the police act as the primary law enforcement provider responsible for reducing crime and unlawful acts.

Table 15: Who would you approach if you or your family were threatened by crime or unlawful acts? (2012, %)


		Male	Female	All
Security sector	Police	86.1	76.8	81.4
	RAB	12.8	12.8	12.8
	Army	2.8	5.4	4.1
	Ansar/VDP	0.4	1.0	0.7
	Coast Guard	1.0	1.0	1.0
	BGB	3.8	2.6	3.2
Civil society and local government	Relative/friend	13.6	5.5	9.6
	Neighbour	3.7	5.9	4.8
	MP	1.0	1.7	1.3
	Community (police) forum	1.7	2.3	2.0
	Local elite	43.6	45.8	44.7
	Ward commissioner/ UP member	54.7	41.5	48.1
	Union <i>Parishad</i>	41.6	53.1	47.4

Irrespective of which institution leads in maintaining law and order in Bangladesh, respondents offered opinions on what the security sector was responsible for. Approximately nine out of ten respondents believed that law enforcement involved 'maintaining law and order on the streets', followed by associated responsibilities of 'arresting petty thieves' (45 percent) and 'preventing day-to-day crime' (38 percent). Approximately half of the respondents said that the primary responsibility of law enforcement agencies was to 'protect the maritime border' and 'border security' (figure 37). This data reaffirms the inter-agency nature of law enforcement, with generally recognised police responsibilities merging with those of BGB, the Coast Guard and RAB.

These responses also arguably underscore the widespread concerns mentioned earlier regarding threats associated with the border, such as trafficking, smuggling and migration from Myanmar. The significance of policing cross-border crime in the SE border area is further emphasised by the finding that more than twice as many people,


just over 3 percent, said they would approach the BGB if they were threatened with crime or an unlawful act, compared with the 2011 national survey.¹⁴⁰

Figure 37: What are the primary responsibilities of law enforcement agencies? (2012, %)



It is clear that border control is a significant law enforcement priority in the SE border area. Cross-border activities in respondents' localities, outside legal movement and trade, can cause safety and security concerns.

Figure 38: What are the main cross-border activities in your locality? (2012, %)




BGB and Bangladesh Coast Guard are considered as the primary law enforcement agencies responsible for boarder control in the SE border area. Despite obvious resource and capacity constraints that affect their ongoing efforts to tackle trafficking, smuggling and illegal cross-border movement, BGB and the Coast Guard are largely considered to be effective by the public.


With regard to the BGB, approximately three-quarters of the HHS respondents considered the organisation to be at least 'somewhat effective', including 10 percent who believed the BGB to be 'very effective' (figure 39). In contrast, only 22 percent considered the BGB to be 'not very effective' and a further 7 percent 'not effective at all'. This largely positive attitude towards the BGB is somewhat surprising given public concerns over the alleged complicity of some individuals within the BGB in co-operating with traffickers or sometimes being corrupt, as mentioned earlier. It may, however, be explained by the apparent strength of feeling towards the need to prevent the perceived illegal migration of Rohingya from Myanmar. In June 2012, for example, following the bloody rise in sectarian violence in Rakhine State in Myanmar, the BGB was active in preventing the entry of Rohingya,¹⁴¹ an activity that also involved the Coast Guard.

¹⁴⁰ PRP (2011), *op cit*.

¹⁴¹ Human Rights Watch, 'Bangladesh: Stop Boat Push-Backs to Burma', 20 June 2012, www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/19/bangladesh-stop-boat-push-backs-burma, accessed 3 August 2012.

Figure 39: How effective is the Border Guard Bangladesh at protecting the border? (2012, %)

The Coast Guard was similarly well supported with 75 percent of respondents considering the institution to be at least 'somewhat effective' in protecting the border (figure 40). While there is significant public support, research suggested that there is overwhelming recognition by the Coast Guard and the public that the Coast Guard requires more resources (such as better equipment to police the border, including improved information and communication technologies – ICT) and further training to ensure that all staff are able to perform their duties and that their skills continue to be upgraded. These findings indicate a perception that strengthened human resource management systems and enhanced training could produce a more competent and effective Coast Guard.


Figure 40: How effective is the Coast Guard at protecting the border? (2012, %)

5.3 Levels of public confidence and trust

To better understand public perceptions of the security sector in the SE border area, the HHS solicited responses on leading law enforcement agencies. There was an apparent vote of public confidence in the police, as 80 percent of respondents would approach the police if they or their family was threatened by crime or an illegal act, and 72 percent viewed the police as the key security provider responsible for maintaining law and order. However, in stark contrast to these positive trends, only 26 percent said that approaching the police is 'very easy' or 'easy', while others were of the view that it was 'difficult' or 'very difficult' (66 percent). Interestingly, none of the three districts that were the subject of this survey has a model *thana*. Findings from *Baseline survey on personal security and police performance in Bangladesh* showed that significant proportions of the public felt it was easier to access the police in model *thanas* compared with non-model *thanas*. Reasons for this could be that model *thanas* have a people-friendly presence and conduct a number of initiatives to promote public-police relations (such as open days for the public to visit the police and visits to communities by the police).¹⁴² The data from the SE border area suggests a need for community programmes that would increase the accessibility of the police and, as a result, build public confidence in the institution.

¹⁴² PRP (2011), *op cit*.

Figure 41: How accessible is the police? (2012, %)



While accessibility impacts public security, levels of confidence and perceptions of honesty are equally important. In the 2009 public survey, 45 percent of respondents had some confidence in the police,¹⁴³ and this rose to 63 percent in 2011.¹⁴⁴ However, in the 2012 survey of SE border area residents, only 13 percent of male and 25 percent of female respondents had a lot or a little confidence in the police. In addition, only 19 percent of men and 33 percent of women thought police were very honest, honest or somewhat honest, while the greatest percentage of interviewees (approximately 44 percent) was of the opinion that the police were ‘not at all honest’. Low levels of confidence in and perceived honesty of the police are likely to be driven by concerns with corruption and external interference – e.g. from politicians, business leaders or criminal gangs (section 5.4).

Figure 42: Level of confidence in the police (2012, %)





Figure 43: How honest is the police? (2012, %)





Perceptions of RAB are considerably more positive, with 66 percent of respondents saying that they had ‘a lot’ of confidence and 29 percent ‘a little’ confidence in the institution. A very high proportion of respondents (almost 90 percent) also said that they thought the RAB was at least ‘honest’, a figure only surpassed by that recorded for the army, which was considered to be honest by 91 percent of the respondents to this survey. While there appears to be considerable confidence in RAB, it must not be forgotten that for many they can still be a cause of fear due to concerns about their alleged excessive use of force, as noted by international commentators and participants in several FGDs.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Saferworld (2010), *op cit*.



¹⁴⁴ PRP (2011), *op cit*.

¹⁴⁵ Shay, C, ‘Has Bangladesh’s Elite Police Force Gone Too Far?’, TIME World, 19 June 2011, www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2078260,00.html, accessed 16 December 2012; and FGDs in Cox’s Bazar Sadar, Teknaf and Ukhiya.

Figure 44: Level of confidence in the Rapid Action Battalion (2012, %)**Figure 45: How honest is the Rapid Action Battalion? (2012, %)**

The respondents also had high levels of confidence in BGB, which is indicative of their perceptions on BGB's effectiveness. A large proportion (71 percent) had 'a lot' or 'a little' confidence in the institution, while a minority of 29 percent had 'not much' or 'no confidence'.

BGB was also considered to be 'very honest', 'honest' or 'somewhat honest' by the majority of HHS respondents (87 percent). This finding may be surprising considering the concerns about alleged corruption highlighted by some FGD participants¹⁴⁶ and the concerns of HHS participants regarding perceived co-operation with traffickers by border law enforcement (figure 18). However, the reason for this contradiction may be that the public in general consider BGB to be honest because they are seen to be effective.

Figure 46: Level of confidence in the Border Guard Bangladesh (2012, %)**Figure 47: How honest is the Border Guard Bangladesh? (2012, %)**

Respondents held similar views regarding the honesty of the Bangladesh Coast Guard and there was a similarly high level of confidence in this institution. The majority of respondents had some degree of confidence ('a lot' or 'a little') in the Coast Guard (75 percent). Eighty-nine percent of respondents also said that they considered the Coast Guard to be 'very honest', 'honest' or 'somewhat honest'. However, it should be noted that while the public has a high level of confidence in the Coast Guard, there is overwhelming recognition by Coast Guard officials¹⁴⁷ and HHS respondents that the Coast Guard requires additional resources (such as equipment including ICT) and a comprehensive training strategy in order to perform their duties and continually upgrade their skills.

¹⁴⁶ FGDs in Cox's Bazar Sadar and Teknaf.

¹⁴⁷ Anonymous male (Coast Guard), Teknaf, May/June 2012.

Figure 48: Level of confidence in the Coast Guard (2012, %)






Figure 49: How honest is the Coast Guard? (2012, %)



5.4 Corruption and external interference

Perceived levels of honesty and public confidence are often linked to concerns about corruption. When asked in what ways law enforcement officials may be corrupt, 60 percent of respondents believed there could be need-based corruption (to supplement low wages) and 68 percent greed-based corruption (to become rich). Twenty-five percent also thought law enforcement agencies might take money from victims who come to seek assistance from them. It is thus clear that there is a widespread concern that corruption is fairly prevalent in law enforcement agencies. This assumption is endorsed by participants in the FGDs, who alleged that some law enforcement agencies are complicit in smuggling illegal substances.¹⁴⁸ These concerns need to be addressed if the performance and reputation of the law enforcement agencies is to further improve.

Figure 50: In what ways are law enforcement agencies corrupt? (2012, %)



Similarly, survey findings suggest a widespread perception by the public (59 percent) that law enforcement officials suffer from high levels of external interference, particularly from local politicians (82 percent). This needs to be addressed in order to ensure the operational independence of law enforcement agencies and to improve public service delivery.

Figure 51: Do you think there is external interference with security providers? (2012, %)





Figure 52: If yes, where does this interference come from? (2012, %)



¹⁴⁸ FGDs in Cox's Bazar Sadar, Teknaf and Ukhia.

5.5 Respect for human rights

Concerns regarding levels of confidence in law enforcement agencies and the extent to which they are honest will be difficult to reverse, as many are evidently concerned about their human rights records. Indeed, such concerns may be partially the result of anxiety regarding alleged human rights abuses. Over half of those surveyed said that law enforcement agencies do not respect human rights. Among HHS respondents who were of this opinion, the majority considered ‘unlawful arrests’ to be the most prevalent abuse. These and other acts (table 17) undoubtedly undermine public confidence and trust in key security providers’ ability to serve communities. Overall, the findings of the survey show that survey respondents (in the HHS, FGDs and KIIs) widely recognised that security providers need to be made more accountable. Previous surveys (*Security provision in Bangladesh* and *Baseline survey on personal security and police performance Bangladesh*) had similar findings.¹⁴⁹ These concerns need to be addressed if the performance and reputation of the law enforcement agencies is to be further improved. In particular, it is important that mechanisms are established for improved accountability of the law enforcement agencies. A legislative review should also be undertaken to ensure that law enforcement agencies are not able to act with impunity. Changes to attitudes and working cultures are also required so that illegal actions are punished. Citizen’s Charters setting out citizens’ rights before law enforcement agencies and an independent complaints commission to review allegations of wrongdoing could hold promise to address these concerns.

Table 16: Do you believe law enforcement agencies respect human rights? (2012, %)

		Yes	No	Do not know
Sex	Male	26.3	64.9	8.8
	Female	44.7	37.7	17.6
Area	Rural	38.4	47.8	13.8
	Urban	10.8	81.2	8.1
Upazila	Cox’s Bazar Sadar	21.3	61.3	17.4
	Ukhia	49.1	44.1	6.9
	Teknaf	50.6	38.9	10.6
All		35.5	51.3	13.2

Table 17: If no, in what ways are human rights not respected? (2012, %)


		Unlawful killings	‘Crossfire’	Disappearances	Torture	Cruel, inhumane, degrading treatment	Unlawful arrests	Illegal searches	Involuntary statements	Ill-treatment of women/children	Ill-treatment of disabled persons
Sex	Male	35.5	37.4	25.8	36.0	42.8	47.5	13.6	6.5	1.4	2.1
	Female	19.5	11.0	16.1	31.4	50.7	54.6	13.6	15.3	9.3	5.9
Area	Rural	22.3	26.7	23.2	40.9	46.8	51.0	15.0	8.8	5.0	4.1
	Urban	49.1	30.3	19.7	16.9	42.9	47.7	9.7	12.3	2.3	2.0
Upazila	Cox’s Bazar Sadar	28.6	26.0	24.1	26.3	41.6	46.8	12.2	5.3	3.1	3.0
	Ukhia	32.4	33.2	21.0	62.2	72.3	44.5	13.4	11.3	5.9	5.9
	Teknaf	30.1	27.6	18.0	32.7	34.2	64.3	17.6	21.0	6.3	2.9
All		29.6	27.7	22.2	34.3	45.7	50.1	13.6	9.8	4.3	3.5

¹⁴⁹ Saferworld (2010), *op cit.*, and PRP (2011), *op cit.*

5.6 Equality and inclusion

If law enforcement is to become more service-oriented, it is essential that the security sector be sensitive to the specific needs of minority groups. This is even more pertinent in the SE border area, which is home to a large multi-ethnic/religious population. The SE border area population comprises a number of different ethnic and religious groups including Bengali, Rohingya, Rakhine and tribal ethnicities, and Islamic, Buddhist, Christian and Hindu religions. The HHS asked respondents whether they thought that law enforcement agencies treated all groups equally. The findings indicate that there are widespread perceptions of marginalisation within the SE border area. It was considered by three-quarters of respondents (75 percent) that law enforcement agencies did not treat all groups equally. This perception was much greater among urban respondents (95 percent) compared with rural respondents (73 percent).


Figure 53: Do security providers treat all groups equally? (2012, %)



A follow-up question was asked to identify specific groups they thought were not treated equally. The rural poor were considered to be the most marginalised group (93 percent), followed by illiterate people and the urban poor (30 percent each) and women (20 percent). It is noteworthy that despite the apparent exclusion of Rohingya from basic services (such as housing, healthcare, education and legal employment), they were considered to be marginalised only by a very small percentage of respondents (2 percent). The 2009 national survey found the rural poor (83 percent) and urban poor (46 percent) to be the groups most marginalised by security providers, followed by ethnic/religious minorities and women. Similar results were shown in the 2011 national survey, in which the majority of respondents thought the rural poor and the urban poor (94 percent and 48 percent, respectively) were the most marginalised, followed by women.¹⁵⁰ The poor are often identified as a group that is more susceptible to insecurity. People perceive that poor households are more vulnerable to violence, abuse and unlawful acts.¹⁵¹ In this and previous surveys, data indicates a widespread belief that the poor are also most likely to be marginalised by law enforcement agencies. In other words, the very people who most need the services provided by law enforcement agencies are perceived to be least likely to receive them. This suggests a need for a fundamental review of how the law enforcement agencies operate to ensure that the poor have equal access to security services and are treated fairly and equally. Further research would help to assess why the poor are marginalised and how such problems could be addressed.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*


¹⁵¹ Saferworld (2008), *op cit.*

Figure 54: Which groups do you think are not treated equally? (2012, %)

5.7 Suggestions to improve law enforcement services and community engagement on security issues

Survey respondents were asked how services provided by law enforcement agencies in the SE border area could be improved. The most popular answers were that there should be more training on combating and preventing crime (48 percent) and more resources (such as vehicles/equipment) to enable law enforcement agencies to combat and prevent crime (33 percent). These findings were supported by FGDs and KIIs in which participants said that law enforcement agencies in the SE border area require additional resources and training to help improve their professionalism and performance.

Other suggestions included increasing the visibility of the police when on patrol and making them more accountable to the public (24 percent each), improving community relations through dialogue (21 percent), providing more substantial training on human rights (19 percent) and increasing co-operation between different security providers (19 percent).

Figure 55: Suggestions to improve services provided by law enforcement agencies (2012, %)

As indicated in section 5.2, while the maintenance of law and order is widely seen as mainly the responsibility of law enforcement agencies, there is significant support for the public to contribute to these efforts. When respondents were asked how the relationship between law enforcement agencies and the public can best be improved, over half (55 percent) suggested the police should engage more with community groups, a quarter (25 percent) wanted improved community policing forums and 18 percent suggested that community engagement be made an important part of institutional mandates. These findings are supported by previous research, which indicated that 93 percent of Bangladeshis want the police to ‘ask for community support in helping to prevent crime’.¹⁵² This suggests that there is a very strong demand for local security concerns to be addressed more effectively by law enforcement agencies with public support.

While a good relationship between the public and law enforcement agencies is crucial for the maintenance of law and order, it is particularly important for those security providers that have a policing function. A good relationship could be facilitated by improving communication and dialogue between the public and security providers. Implementing the Bangladesh Police’s Community Policing Strategy¹⁵³ in the SE border area, including the development and implementation of a Community Policing Forum Action Plan,¹⁵⁴ could ensure that communities are able to actively support law enforcement agencies in maintaining law and order and promoting community security. The impact on community policing in the SE border area could be maximised by improved co-ordination between the police, BGB, RAB and the Coast Guard.

5.8 Other security and justice providers

Although law enforcement agencies in the SE border area were a key focus of this research, it also looked more broadly at other security and justice providers including formal and informal justice mechanisms, local government administration and NGOs.

A significant proportion of HHS respondents appeared to have faith in the formal courts with 60 percent saying that, given the opportunity, they would choose to seek assistance from the court to settle a dispute. However, only a small minority (15 percent) have sought assistance from the courts in the past 12 months. Compared with the 2011 national survey in which 93 percent said they would seek assistance from courts,¹⁵⁵ faith in the courts today in the SE border area appears to be significantly lower. However, compared with four years ago when only a third of the Bangladeshi public said they would seek redress from courts,¹⁵⁶ confidence in the formal court system is considerable. Despite this positive trend, survey respondents identified several gaps within the formal justice system, including dishonesty, the costs involved in taking a case to court, the time cases can take in the court system and the ease with which bail can be given to alleged perpetrators. In both the 2012 study and previous research, findings suggest that to ensure fair and equitable justice for all, reforms in the formal justice system and the wider security sector must be undertaken concurrently.

Survey findings also suggest that there is broad public knowledge (98 percent) of informal justice systems and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, including UP/Ward commissioners (local government authorities), *shalish* (an informal mediation process usually chaired by local leaders) and other traditional dispute resolution (TDR) mechanisms. Interestingly, those who have sought assistance from these have found them to be helpful, with a great number of successes in achieving justice.

¹⁵² PRP (2011), *op cit*.

¹⁵³ Bangladesh Police, *Community Policing: National Strategy for Bangladesh* (UNDP, n.d.).

¹⁵⁴ PRP (2011), *op cit*.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁵⁶ Saferworld (2008), *op cit*.

Table 18: Percentage of respondents who contacted a specific dispute resolution system, the extent to which the contact was helpful and whether they had success in achieving justice (2012, %)

	NGO (consultative legal services)	Village court	UP/Ward commissioner, <i>shalish</i>	Other TDR
Have you ever heard of these informal justice systems?				
Yes	25.3	82.5	96.5	89.5
No	74.7	17.5	3.5	10.5
If yes, have you ever contacted them to resolve a problem?				
Yes	6.8	24.0	24.6	25.1
No	93.2	76.0	75.4	74.9
If yes, how helpful was the contact?				
Very helpful	42.9	49.8	43.4	49.6
Fairly helpful	35.7	28.8	30.8	27.9
Not very helpful	16.7	13.0	13.7	13.4
Not at all helpful	4.8	8.4	12.1	9.1
Were you successful in getting justice?				
Yes	66.7	67.3	60.9	66.3
No	33.3	32.7	39.1	33.7

Additional questions were specifically asked about traditional village *shalish*, which are very widespread and popular in Bangladesh as they are seen to provide justice quickly, fairly and cheaply. Considerable public support was found for *shalish* in the SE border area, with 99 percent aware that *shalish* is practiced in their locality and 46 percent having attended one. However, it should be noted that of those who have attended a *shalish*, the majority were men (74 percent) and only 19 percent were women. This raises concerns that *shalish* may represent local power structures, making it difficult for women, especially poor women, to seek assistance and achieve justice. These concerns were supported by HHS respondents who identified the following as the main problems with local *shalish*: justice is quick but it is biased towards rich and powerful people (40 percent); justice is achieved only by rich people (40 percent); and poor people become very vulnerable and marginalised (31 percent).

With regard to the level of public satisfaction with government structures, the majority of HHS respondents said that overall service delivery was ‘sometimes good and sometimes bad’ (46 percent), while 37 percent said that it was ‘very good’ or ‘good’. Almost half of the HHS respondents said that UP/Ward commissioners were very accessible. However, there was a marked contrast between the male and female respondents, with almost half as many women (32 percent) as men (60 percent) agreeing. As mentioned above with regard to *shalish*, this raises concerns that local government structures may replicate local power structures, making it difficult for women, especially poor women, to seek assistance.

Respondents were asked about a number of recommendations to improve state services in their localities. Improving local police services had the greatest support (58 percent), closely followed by creating economic and livelihood opportunities for the poor (49 percent), improving community relations with UP representatives (28 percent) and reducing external interference (24 percent).

The HHS also asked the respondents to identify the main issues addressed by NGOs that work in their locality. Ninety-one percent said they work on micro-credit, followed by health and sanitation issues and education (48 percent each) and development issues (38 percent). In total, only a quarter of respondents were aware that safety

and security was a part of NGO activities in their locality. Of those NGOs that were considered to be addressing safety and security issues, most were thought to be 'supporting safer neighbourhood initiatives' and 'providing access to ADR mechanisms'. NGOs involved in promoting 'community policing' were recognised by a total of 74 individual respondents, and 'developing interaction between community and the police' by 31 individuals. Overall, this indicates that community safety and security initiatives – capable of facilitating greater inclusion of different groups in the security sector infrastructure – are not particularly prominent features of NGO activity in the SE border area – or, at least, are not widely known.

Conclusions and recommendations

THIS RESEARCH HAS SHOWN that residents in the SE border area share many of the security concerns that have been highlighted in previous national surveys in Bangladesh. Socio-economic and cultural threats remain the primary concern for the majority of people, although there is considerable anxiety about violence and criminal threats. Nonetheless, clear links between the two mean that their respective importance can never be considered in isolation. Poverty as a result of unemployment and/or social marginalisation, for example, has increased the perceived rate of crime, and probably the likelihood that an increasing number of people will turn to crime to find money and meet basic needs. Conversely, the impact of crime can increase deprivation by potentially depriving victims of the means for meeting basic needs (as a result of the theft of fishing equipment or money to buy food, for instance).

As chapter 2 demonstrated, public attitudes to security have improved in the past two years. However, while a greater number of people reported that they feel safer in their locality, the percentage of respondents reporting that they have been a victim of crime over the past 12 months has increased in the SE border area. This is a significant concern and needs to be addressed. These findings suggest that while there have been some positive trends, many threats to security remain. Personal property crime remains widespread in the SE border area, while gender-related violence and insecurities related to dowry, domestic abuse and 'eve teasing' are very common and under-reported. This survey and previous research undertaken by Saferworld also indicate that the majority of crimes remain unreported.¹⁵⁷ While many crimes are not reported to the police because people consider them to be personal or family matters, some victims of crime are reluctant to go to the police because they fear reprisals from the perpetrators, because they do not have trust or confidence in the police, because of alleged dishonesty or because they believe the police will be ineffective or uninterested.

An issue unique to the SE border area is concern with the Rohingya. In spite of known sectarian violence in Myanmar, the Rohingya are largely considered to be illegal economic migrants. Rohingya, including registered refugees, are excluded from any form of formal recognition and from accessing legal employment and education above primary level in Bangladesh. Antagonisms towards the Rohingya felt by host communities in the Chittagong Division (particularly in Ukhiya and Teknaf) focus upon concerns regarding competition for limited resources and gainful employment, and alleged involvement by Rohingya in criminal activities as a result of their

¹⁵⁷ Saferworld (2008), *op cit.*, Saferworld (2010), *op cit.*, and PRP (2011), *op cit.*

marginalisation. The vast majority of Bangladeshis interviewed want the Rohingya to return to Myanmar. Only a very small number of respondents accepted that integration of the Rohingya is a possible solution to much of the tension between the host communities and the Rohingya.

Another security-related concern specific to the SE border area is illicit trafficking. The greatest threat appears to come from narcotics, particularly *yaba* and heroin from Myanmar and codeine from India. There is also extensive production of hashish throughout South Asia, including Bangladesh and Myanmar. Drugs are thought to be a considerable threat to social harmony in this region and traffickers are perceived to be drawn from very diverse backgrounds, including unemployed fishermen, women, children, students, ethnic minorities and criminal gangs. It is widely recognised that trafficking is often driven by poverty.

Human trafficking also appears to be a considerable problem in the SE border area, with vulnerable men, women and children (particularly from the Rohingya community) being tricked or sold into prostitution, bonded labour or slavery. Traffickers exploit victims by promising employment opportunities (recruitment fraud, which is a tempting offer as many Bangladeshis are legitimately employed abroad to financially support their families in Bangladesh), marriage or freedom from domestic abuse. Trafficking occurs by both land and sea, with trafficked persons largely transiting to South-East Asia (particularly Malaysia and Thailand) or India.

Trafficking of SALW appears to be less overt, perhaps because the trade is limited, but maybe because of an unwillingness of respondents to admit the true extent of their knowledge. However, survey participants alleged that there is extensive production of homemade weapons in illegal factories in the SE border area. These SALW are produced and procured both for personal security and criminal activities.

Additionally, and perhaps most surprisingly, armed robbery against ships was recorded as a considerable problem, with respondents in both the FGDs and KIIs stating that fishermen were particularly vulnerable to attacks, including being targeted for their nets, catch and other equipment and held to ransom. These acts can be violent, sometimes fatal.

From the findings it is clear that there is overwhelming public support for more and improved policing. However, confidence in the police is low, as respondents were largely dissatisfied with their effectiveness and level of honesty. Attitudes towards the BGB and the Coast Guard were much more positive. Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence that these institutions require strengthened human resource management systems along with additional resources and further training to help improve their professionalism and performance. High levels of public trust in border security indicate that there is widespread support for the BGB and the Coast Guard.

As demonstrated in chapter 5, to better improve ongoing and future reforms in law enforcement agencies it is clear that fundamental institutional changes and changes in the working culture are necessary. Reforms must not be seen as only ‘technical and capacity building.’ Many of the changes that the public wish to see include changes in ‘working culture and attitudes.’ The public wants better community-police relations; more community-oriented law enforcement, including community policing; and equal treatment and inclusion of marginalised groups, particularly the rural and urban poor, women and ethnic and religious minorities, so that all have access to justice and security. The PRP addresses most of these priorities through promoting overall strategic and organisational reform, human resource management and training, crime prevention and community policing, and gender-sensitive policing. However, as evidenced by previous research,¹⁵⁸ the concepts and practices promoted by the PRP remain largely unknown to the wider population in Bangladesh. More work is required to raise public awareness and encourage public support, as these reforms will

158 Saferworld (2010), *op cit.*, and PRP (2011), *op cit.*

require fundamental changes in behaviour and attitudes from both the police and the public they serve.

Chapter 5 also demonstrated that there is widespread public support for formal and informal justice mechanisms. While this is encouraging, limited access to justice for women remains a concern. Reforms to popular and cost-effective informal justice mechanisms (e.g. *shalish*) must be encouraged in order to make them accessible and responsive to women and other minority groups.

There is also a need to address widespread concerns about alleged human rights violations by law enforcement agencies in the SE border area. These must be addressed and accountability to the public increased, not least in order to improve public confidence as well as the effectiveness and professionalism of the security sector. There should also be efforts to increase public awareness of the Citizen's Charters and the means by which a complaint can be made against a law enforcement official.

There is strong public support and demand for law enforcement officers to engage with communities and to encourage greater public involvement in the provision of security. With regard to the SE border area, this is very important with regard to policing and border control activities. Community support and engagement to reduce, prevent and manage crime and illegal activities in the SE border area is also pertinent considering their local knowledge and understanding of the context. Community engagement will further improve relations between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve, resulting in increased public confidence and trust in these agencies.

Recommendations

In response to the challenges facing the law enforcement agencies as well as the concerns and needs of the public in the SE border area, the following recommendations are made to the GoB, law enforcement agencies, civil society, NGOs/INGOs and international aid/humanitarian agencies active in the SE border area, and donors that wish to promote safety and security in the SE border area.

The Government of Bangladesh

1. Accelerate steps to promote the operational independence of law enforcement agencies by removing all undue interference and having processes in place to prosecute those involved in corruption.
2. Undertake a legislative review to ensure that law enforcement agencies are not able to act with impunity. Encouraging change in attitudes and working cultures is also required so that illegal actions do not go unpunished. There is also a need for greater public accountability. The implementation of Citizen's Charters for all law enforcement agencies and an independent complaints commission to review allegations of wrongdoing could help address these concerns.
3. Ensure that socio-economic and cultural threats are not neglected in law and order initiatives, including the development of the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, as deprivation can motivate violence and crime as much as opportunity.
4. As a matter of urgency, develop and introduce sustainable information exchange mechanisms between domestic law enforcement agencies, particularly between the police, RAB, BGB and Coast Guard, to better co-ordinate joint operations and improve overall effectiveness.
5. Engage with key law enforcement and civil society stakeholders to respond strategically to community safety and security concerns; this process can also be used to highlight recommendations for the proposed Bangladesh National Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

6. Complement community safety initiatives by supporting educational and employment-generating initiatives so that children, youth, the unemployed and other marginalised groups have more opportunities to secure gainful employment; this process will challenge some of the root causes of personal, community and national insecurity.
7. Work with Myanmar and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to ensure a positive resolution to Bangladeshi and Rohingya insecurities by improving dialogue, co-operation and co-ordination to facilitate durable solutions.

The Bangladesh Police

1. Develop and implement communication strategies and outreach initiatives at the grassroots level to improve confidence and transparency and publicise the achievements and efforts of the PRP more widely. This will further build public confidence and trust. Develop and implement a progressive approach to address public concerns regarding the accessibility of the police, including the employment of greater numbers from under-represented groups (including women and ethnic minorities). Undertake complementary processes to enable greater access by improving police presence in communities and developing an action plan to activate community policing forums.
2. Develop a formal and transparent mechanism for the processing and investigation of public complaints. Ensure external control mechanisms including parliamentary oversight are also robust.
3. Undertake a comprehensive training needs assessment to inform the development and implementation of a long-term training strategy to ensure that all ranks receive training to perform their duties and that their skills are continually upgraded. Reinforced training should address issues related to supporting victims of crime and protecting the human rights of victims and witnesses of crime as well as suspects. It should also ensure officers are familiar with best practices for cataloguing criminal incidents, investigations, operations and prosecutions. In respect of cataloguing criminal incidents, improving the ability to maintain accurate records would enhance police effectiveness and also greatly aid in the sharing of information within the security sector.
4. Encourage communities to assist the police by establishing a strategic partnership to prevent crime and build public safety through the implementation of a Community Policing Forum Action Plan.
5. Building on the Police Gender Guidelines, develop and implement an Equality Strategy to increase representation of women and under-represented ethnic and religious minority groups.

The Border Guard Bangladesh

1. Undertake a comprehensive training needs assessment to inform the development and implementation of a long-term training plan ensuring that all staff receive the training they require to perform their duties and that their skills are continually upgraded.
2. Co-operate with other law enforcement agencies (such as the Coast Guard) to enable more comprehensive anti-trafficking operations, including through the use of (RAB's) dog and aerial surveillance capabilities.
3. Work with neighbouring border guards from Myanmar (Nasaka) and India (Border Security Force) to improve co-operation and synchronised operations for the effective management of the safe and legitimate movement of people, including for trade, tourism or immigration, and to better guard against corruption by individuals.
4. With the support of the MoHA and other law enforcement agencies, develop and implement strategies to monitor the collection, marking, tracing and destruction of illegal SALW.

5. Proactively contribute to community policing activities in the border areas of Bangladesh to ensure that communities are encouraged to assist in preventing cross-border crime and improving public safety.

The Coast Guard

1. Improve co-operation with members of the Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the Bangladesh Navy to more effectively patrol the coastal waters of Bangladesh to combat armed robbery against ships, trafficking and illegal migration. Also liaise with relevant authorities to ensure the rights of those seeking asylum or fleeing persecution are protected.
2. Co-operate with other law enforcement agencies (e.g. BGB) and the Bangladesh Navy to enable more effective anti-trafficking operations by sharing information and co-ordinating operations to make full use of law enforcement resources in the SE border area.
3. Identify lessons that can be learnt and develop and implement processes to address concerns, such as the need for data management training to improve the recording of incidents of armed robbery against ships, which would enable the Bangladesh Coast Guard to better map and address the problem of armed robbery against ships in Bangladesh's territorial waters.
4. Be responsive to the concerns of fishermen and help to increase their awareness of relevant legislation and international best practices to increase on-board security.
5. Proactively contribute to community policing activities to ensure that communities are encouraged to assist in preventing crime and contributing to public safety.

Civil society, NGOs/INGOs, international aid/humanitarian agencies and donors

1. Ensure that socio-economic and cultural threats are not neglected in law and order initiatives, as deprivation can motivate violence and crime as much as opportunity.
2. Support government efforts on drug rehabilitation infrastructure to better help addicts, particularly heroin addicts requiring expensive methadone treatment, avoid returning to drug dependency.
3. Support government efforts to develop the capacity of local and national infrastructure to support the rescue, return and rehabilitation of trafficked persons by implementing international best practices and developing bilateral contacts with receiving states, including in South and South-East Asia and the Middle East.
4. Improve access to information, using either written materials or radio broadcasts, to improve awareness of drug misuse, the dangers of human trafficking and the dangers of religious extremism.
5. Promote context-sensitive programme design and implementation to ensure that aid, development and safety and security programmes in the SE border area are implemented in a positive and culturally sensitive manner and without duplication.
6. Donor assistance is needed to overcome the fundamental resource and capacity constraints of DNC in order to develop drug enforcement best practices and modernise investigative techniques and data management systems. Support is also required for the development of infrastructure and purchase of equipment, particularly modern equipment for the interception of illicit drug transfers at possible points of entry. Additionally, support is required in fostering adequate information exchange between different security providers in the region.

7. Support government efforts to modernise the Bangladesh Police (such as the PRP) and other key security providers.
8. Promote community-based initiatives to encourage better co-operation and improved relations between community and key security providers.

Recommended research

1. It is essential that the security sector in Bangladesh continually undertake baseline surveys to collect and analyse information on safety and security.
2. Community-based initiatives are a good way of uniting the public with local authorities; however, it is important to link these ongoing processes (including the Community Policing Strategy and related work done in the field by NGOs/INGOs) to ensure complementarity and mutual reinforcement. Therefore, an ongoing study of community-based initiatives is essential to monitor activities and protect against overlap and insensitivities.
3. The GoB needs to undertake a thorough examination of perceptions of what constitutes 'crime', to better understand trends in under-reporting in the SE border area and address those crimes that may be marginalised or ignored by elements of society or certain institutions (such as crimes that occur in the home or may be more socially acceptable).
4. Bangladesh has been identified as a country vulnerable to climate change and associated economic, food and health insecurity. It is, therefore, important that future research identify how refugee flows are impacting on already threatened resources in the SE border area.
5. Radio is a cost-effective and easy-to-use medium for information sharing and communication. Therefore, research should be undertaken to record levels of ownership, to understand how community radio and mainstream radio programmes (particularly talk shows and awareness-raising programmes) are perceived, to evaluate levels of trust held by listeners towards content and look at areas for further improvement.
6. It is important that further research is undertaken to identify perpetrators of human trafficking so that law enforcement agencies can better target their interventions to address the problem.
7. It is evident that there is a need for further research into the effects of financial crime and money laundering on safety and security in Bangladesh.

ANNEX A: Methodology

Research was conducted using a public perceptions survey, focus groups discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs) and desk research.

Household survey sample

The household survey (HHS) involved interviewing a sample of adults aged 18 or over from the *upazilas* of Cox's Bazar Sadar, Ukhia and Teknaf. Based on the 2001 census (data from the 2011 census was not publicly available at the time of interviewing), the numbers of households were proportioned as follows: 1,261 from Cox's Bazar Sadar, 696 from Teknaf and 543 from Ukhia (table M.1). In the initial design of the methodology, a greater number of respondents from urban areas were to be interviewed. However, because of an inability to identify all 'other urban' areas identified in the 2001 census, Mitra and Associates, as implementer of the HHS, undertook a pre-sampling scoping mission to identify a usable distribution of households by 'rural' and 'urban' environments.

Table M.1: Distribution of rural/urban households by *upazila*

	Rural areas		Urban areas		Total	
	Total	Sample size	Total	Sample size	Total	Sample size
Cox's Bazar Sadar	39,907	862	18,443	399	58,350	1,261
Teknaf	28,547	617	3,658	79	32,205	696
Ukhia	25,119	543	–	–	25,119	543
Total	93,573	2,022	22,101	478	115,674	2,500

Selection of respondents

In 2007, the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey documented that the male/female ratio in almost every division was 1:1 for those aged over 18. Consequently, the HHS was designed to collect the opinions of an equal number of men and women. This means the overall sample comprised 1,250 men and 1,250 women.

The ethnicity of HHS respondents was as follows:

Table M.2: Distribution of HHS respondents by ethnicity

		Bengali	Rohingya	Rakhine	Tribal
Sex	Male	97.8	0.7	1.3	0.2
	Female	97.7	1.1	1.1	0.1
Area	Rural	97.4	1.0	1.5	0.0
	Urban	99.2	0.4	0.0	0.4
Upazila	Cox's Bazar Sadar	97.1	0.3	2.4	0.2
	Ukhia	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Teknaf	97.1	2.7	0.0	0.1
All		97.8	0.9	1.2	0.1

Focus group discussions

The FGDs were organised and carried out by Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) in the *upazilas* of Cox's Bazar Sadar, Teknaf and Ukhia between 7 and 13 May 2012. There were between six and nine participants in each focus group. Guide questions relating to safety and security were used where necessary to steer the conversation.

Participants represented a wide variety of stakeholders. The voices of many groups were invited to be heard – across categories of age, ethnicity, education, gender, occupation and socio-economic position. While every effort was made to include all groups, equity in representation was not fully achieved, so there could be some limitations in looking at the focus groups in isolation. However, data from the focus group discussion does provide a complementary qualitative perspective to the quantitative household survey.

Following each focus group, BEI prepared analytical reports documenting discussions and key recommendations. These were then collated into a single report that subsequently informed the writing of this final report.

Table M.3: Disaggregation of FGD participants by gender

	Cox's Bazar Sadar		Teknaf		Ukhia	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Community people	5	2			7	0
Drivers	7	0			7	0
Farmers			7	0	7	0
Fishermen			7	0	7	0
Mixed group	7	0				
Small traders	7	0	6	0		
Students	5	2				
Rohingya (male)	7	0	9	0	7	0
Rohingya (female)			0	7		
Totals	38	4	29	7	35	0
	42		36		35	
	113					

Key informant interviews

A number of KIIs were conducted by BEI with a cross-section of society in Cox's Bazar District and the capital city, Dhaka. A combined total of 22 KIIs were conducted in Cox's Bazar city, Teknaf and Ukhia and a further 6 KIIs in Dhaka between 7 May 2012 and 11 June 2012.

Table M.4: Summary of key informants

Categories of respondents	Sex	Categories of respondents	Sex
Cox's Bazar Sadar			
Civil society representative	Male	Elected representative	Male
Female leader	Female	Government official	Male
Religious leader	Male	Local NGO	Male
Local NGO	Male	Media	Male
Office of the Refugee, Relief and Repatriation Commission	Male	Police	Male
Rakhine leader	Male		
Teknaf			
Ansar and VDP	Female	Police	Male
BGB	Male	School teacher	Male
Coast Guard	Male	Rohingya leader	Male
Ukhia			
BGB	Male	College teacher	Male
Lawyer	Male	<i>Madrasa</i> teacher	Male
Police	Male		
Dhaka			
Customs	Male	Academic	Male
Law enforcement agency	Male	Department of Narcotics Control	Male
Ministry of Home Affairs	Male	Police	Male

Desk research

In addition to the primary research, government statistics and a variety of secondary sources were also analysed to provide context for the data gathered. Sources consulted included official government statistics, newspaper articles, previous Saferworld research and relevant research reports and articles from respected sources.

ANNEX B: Crime statistics for Chittagong Range (January 2012–May 2012)

	January 2012	February 2012	March 2012	April 2012	May 2012
Dacoity	16	9	9	11	13
Robbery	15	12	10	5	4
Burglary	47	28	30	28	31
Theft	96	93	114	89	94
Murder	81	56	72	56	62
Rioting	0	4	1	0	0
Cruelty to women	318	374	423	338	382
Child abuse	11	19	25	21	27
Kidnapping	6	8	12	8	17
Violation of Arms Act	19	14	15	23	19
Violation of Explosives Act	0	2	1	0	3
Narcotics	370	402	379	459	471
Smuggling	54	59	60	58	54
Others	1,189	1,175	1,371	1,385	1,636
Total	2,222	2,255	2,522	2,481	2,813

Data taken from 'Crime Statistics of Chittagong Range', Bangladesh Police, www.police.gov.bd/monthly.php?category=47

Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) is a non-profit, non-political research centre. Established in October 2000, the Institute has established for itself a reputation for excellence in its research and advocacy work focusing on the growth of private enterprise in Bangladesh. The Institute promotes issues of importance to the private sector and seeks to initiate essential measures and influence policy for the development of a market-oriented economy. Through the promotion of sustainable growth in domestic trade, commerce and industry, BEI hopes to address the enormous challenge for Bangladesh in securing a fair share of the global market. BEI also undertakes research and policy advocacy work focusing on the issues of foreign policy and security, particularly those of terrorism/counter terrorism impacting Bangladesh and South Asia.

Mitra and Associates is a pioneer private sector survey-research firm of Bangladesh. Established in 1983, it has gradually grown to be a most sustainable and dependable organisation in the country for quantitative and qualitative research, evaluation and surveys, predominantly in the fields of health, population, nutrition, communication/media, formal and informal legal systems and community peace and security.

Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe that everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from insecurity and violent conflict.

COVER PHOTO: A local fisherman with a scull walking towards his fishing boat in Shah Porir Dip, Teknaf, Bangladesh, May 2012.
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