



Small arms and light weapons control

A training manual



February 2012



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Acknowledgements

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Introduction

Illegal possession and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) cause hundreds of thousands of deaths across the globe each year. In order to address these problems, action needs to be taken at many different levels. At the international level, more robust regulatory mechanisms are needed to better control the production, sale and movement of SALW between and within different countries. And at the national and sub-national level, a comprehensive approach is needed to address the reasons why so many civilians regard it as necessary to own a firearm.

This set of training materials aims to assist those in government and civil society who work to control the flows, use and possession of SALW. It was produced for use in South Sudan, but can be used more widely. We encourage great flexibility in using the SALW training modules, drawing on information from the various modules as suits your purpose and needs.

The materials are organised into nine training modules that can be combined and adapted to suit different audiences and needs. Each module is designed so that it can be used alone, or in conjunction with other modules, and includes:

- a suggested lesson plan to guide planning and delivery of training sessions
- information about the topic, with a list of sources and additional resources
- handouts that can be used when providing training and as a reference by trainees.

Modules

- 1. Defining small arms and light weapons**
- 2. Supply and demand of small arms and light weapons**
- 3. Impact of small arms and light weapons on conflict, security and human development**
- 4. Role of civil society in small arms and light weapons control**
- 5. Planning and taking action on small arms and light weapons**
- 6. National strategies and action plans for the control of small arms and light weapons**
- 7. Collection of small arms and light weapons**
- 8. Destruction of weapons and ammunition**
- 9. Stockpile management of weapons and weapons safety**

MODULE 1

Defining small arms and light weapons

Objective

To familiarise trainees with some types of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and to give them a basic understanding of SALW proliferation issues, in order to enhance the effectiveness of measures taken to prevent, combat, control and eradicate the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Summary

This module provides an introduction to SALW and outlines some dynamics that influence the flow of weapons in South Sudan. It will enable participants to identify different types of SALW by providing an understanding of their physical appearance, uses, and primary users. Participants will be able to recognise different types of SALW and therefore be more effective in preventing, combating, controlling and eradicating the illicit proliferation of SALW.

SALW pass through many channels to arrive at their point of use, often through military as well as civilian hands; the transfer process differs according to geographic location and political context. Understanding these processes helps practitioners to focus control strategies to better control illegal possession of SALW and to combat the unregulated proliferation of SALW. This module also deals with the lifecycle of SALW.

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Introduction					
Introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Become comfortable with group. 		Introductions – find out and present name and 3 things about partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ List of participants ■ Name badges 	9.00–9.20am (20 mins)
Course overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand what is included in the curriculum. ■ Agree on the agenda. 	Exercise to identify participants' expectations from the training.	On flash cards participants write their expectations from the training (1–2), read out to others and paste on the wall. These can be revisited at the end of the workshop to check whether the workshop met their expectations.	Workshop agenda	9.20–9.45am (25 mins)
Establishing ground rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establish ground rules for training. 		Ground rules – group brainstorm.		9.45–10.00am (15 mins)
Morning tea break					10.00–10.30am (30 mins)
Module 1: Defining small arms and light weapons					
Defining SALW (box)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand key concepts that will be used in the course: small arms, light weapons, SALW proliferation, stockpile management. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorm possible definitions for small arms, light weapons, proliferation, stockpile management. 2. Affirm key points and definitions. 	Ask participants the first thing that comes to their mind when you say 'SALW', write them on a flip chart to build up definitions.	Handout: Definitions	10.30–11.15am (45 mins)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Recognising small arms 2 Recognising light weapons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ To identify the various small arms and light weapons. ■ To distinguish between small arms and light weapons. 	Workshop exercise 1: Identifying small arms and light weapons.	Using pictures of different types of small and light weapons, ask participants to separate small arms from light weapons, to name them, to describe them, and to outline their use. Ask participants which of these weapons they have seen before in the areas where they live and work.	Handout: Definitions	11.15am–12.30pm (75 mins)
Lunch					12.30–1.30pm (60 mins)
3 SALW life cycle and proliferation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ To understand the many ways in which SALW can end up being misused in environments where the state is unable to fully control the accessibility possession of arms. ■ To be able to identify some of the socio-economic and political factors shaping SALW proliferation. ■ To gain a broad understanding of the many ways for dealing with SALW proliferation. 	<p>Brainstorm the possible ways in which SALW can eventually find their way into the hands of civilians. (see Workshop exercise 1)</p> <p>Workshop exercise 2</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Discuss the number of socio-economic and political factors shaping SALW proliferation. 2. Drawing on the South Sudan example, discuss mechanisms that can be applied in preventing circulation of SALW. <p>For all exercises, allow 15–20 minutes for discussion and then request each group to give a 5–10 minute feedback presentation.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Give out handouts 	<p>Workshop exercise 2</p> <p>Divide participants into groups of three to six persons for all exercises.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ask participants to produce a diagrammatic drawing of how a gun, after manufacture, can circulate legally or illegally, and of its potential users. Encourage participants to draw on their own experience and knowledge when thinking of a potential life cycle of a weapon (45 mins) 2. Ask participants to identify at least five of the socio-economic and political factors that shape SALW proliferation. Discuss strategies that can effectively reduce the impacts of these factors (45 mins). 3. Identify and describe the means through which SALW circulate. Discuss mechanisms that can be applied in preventing circulation (45 mins). 	Handout: Definitions	1.30–4.30pm (180 mins)
End of day: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Wrap-up ■ Complete evaluation forms 					4.30–5.00pm (30 mins)

Defining SALW¹

For the purposes of these modules:

Small arms

'Small arms' are weapons designed for personal use, including: light machine guns, sub-machine guns, including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles, and semi-automatic rifles.

'Small arms' also include:

1) 'Firearms', meaning:

- (a) Any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899.
- (b) Any other weapon or destructive device such as an explosive bomb, incendiary bomb or gas bomb, grenade, rocket launcher, missile, missile system or mine.

2) 'Ammunition', meaning the complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles, that are used in a small arm or light weapon, provided that those components are themselves subject to authorisation in the respective State Party.

3) 'Other related materials', meaning any components, parts or replacement parts of a small arm or light weapon, that are essential to its operation.

Light weapons

'Light weapons' include the following portable weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortars of less than 100 mm calibre, grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, recoilless guns, shoulder-fired rockets, anti-aircraft weapons and launchers, and air defence weapons.

1 Recognising small arms²

Small arms are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use.³ They are usually at the lower end of the calibre spectrum (4.6–40 or 66 mm). Small arms include handguns (self-loading pistols and revolvers) and shoulder arms (rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns and light machine guns, and grenade launchers).

- **Handguns** are small arms which, in theory, can be fired one-handed. They are widely available and can be easily concealed, which makes them one of the weapon types most often used in crime, especially in urban areas. Their military use is limited, but police officers are often armed with handguns.
- **Automatic pistols** store the ammunition in the grip, and prepare a new round for firing until the magazine in the grip is empty.
- **Revolvers**, which tend to be older weapons and have bullets in a rotating cylinder above the trigger, are seen less frequently.
- **Shoulder arms** are designed to be fired with the back end – the butt – held into the shooter's shoulder for greater stability. They are the most common SALW found in South Sudan and other parts of Africa, and are the cause of most arms-related deaths and injuries, both accidental and deliberate. A shoulder arm requires two hands to use effectively.

¹ Definition in *The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa*, p 3.

² This and the following section, including text and photographs, are substantially reproduced from BICC 2005, pp 23–31.

³ UNODA 2008, p 19.

- **Assault rifles** are capable of automatic fire – i.e. squeezing the trigger once releases a burst of bullets. They are the most common shoulder arm today, and are found in almost all areas of civil or military conflict. The most (in)famous are the Kalashnikov family (AK-47, AKM, AK-74). They tend to be short (up to 70 cm with the butt) and light-weight, and can be identified by the presence of a large semi-curved (banana-shaped) magazine.
- **Bolt rifles** are long guns that shoot single bullets to a great distance. After each round is fired, the shooter moves a bolt to load the next round for firing.
- **Semi-automatic rifles** use the energy released during firing to reload another round from a box magazine suspended underneath the weapon. Semi-automatic rifles can be configured to full automatic fire.
- **Shotguns and hunting rifles** are intended primarily for sport and hunting. They are extremely lethal. As shotguns fire cluster pellets instead of bullets, they are very dangerous to bystanders.
- **Machine-guns** are firearms that fire in bursts and are capable of a high rate of sustained fire. Both light machine-guns and submachine guns are portable and can be fired by one person.
 - **Light machine-guns** are usually belt-fed and can fire in rapid bursts to extended ranges. They are sometimes mounted on bipods or tripods for stability. They most often look like large assault rifles.
 - **Submachine guns** can be conceived of as a hybrid between pistols and assault rifles, with a longer barrel than a pistol and a larger magazine capacity, but a size that is smaller than an assault rifle. Some are very small, light and quick firing, and they are easy to conceal. As they are relatively easy to operate but usually inaccurate, they can inflict a great deal of ‘collateral damage’, as people the shooter was not aiming at get hit as well.
- **Under-barrel hand-held grenade launchers** are designed to fire grenades beyond throwing range. The launchers (tubes) come in three formats: a tube suspended underneath an assault rifle barrel; a hand-held tube that looks like a stubby, thick-barrelled rifle; or a heavy machine gun. The first two are usually lightweight, single-shot, shoulder-fired weapons.⁴

2 Recognising light weapons

Light weapons are weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. Light weapons include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 mm.

- **Heavy machine guns**, like light and medium machine guns, are belt-fed and are designed to fire at high, sustained rates. They are supported by a tripod at the centre of the body, or mounted on vehicles. The main difference between heavy and other machine guns is their size and weight and the penetrating power of their ammunition.
- **Light cannons** generally tend towards the heavier end of the SALW calibre spectrum (57mm–100mm). They sometimes fire single shots and sometimes may have automatic loaders attached to the rear. Like heavy machine guns, they need mechanical support. They often have two wheels.

⁴ *Ibid*, p 27.

- **Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG)** are small rocket-propelled explosives larger than a grenade, designed to be fired at distant targets. The tube of the grenade launcher is a steel pipe with a firing grip and sights attached. Both the warhead and the propellant are explosive and must be treated as highly dangerous. It is also very dangerous to stand behind them when they are fired.
- **Recoilless rifles** are a form of man-portable artillery that must be fired from over the shoulder or placed on a tripod or a vehicle. The warhead is explosive and can cause considerable damage, even to buildings and armoured vehicles, with a dispersal radius of over 20 meters.
- **'Portable missile launchers'** is a catch-all term for a family of relatively new light weapons used to destroy armour, personnel and fortifications with a guided missile. They are highly portable and normally look like stubby (1.5 m or more long) thick (20–30 cm) tubes that are fired over the shooter's shoulder or from a tripod. The round is guided to its target using a control mechanism attached to the tube.
- **Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)** are portable missile launchers used mainly against aircraft.

3 SALW lifecycle and proliferation⁵

Lifecycles of SALW

There are many ways in which SALW can end up being misused in environments where the state is unable to fully control the accessibility to and illegal possession of arms. In general, political, economic and social transformations within countries tend to increase availability of arms.

SALW, unlike heavy arms, circulate in both the military and civilian markets. While military markets involve legal transfers from the producers and certified states to the purchasing state, civilian markets are flooded with excess arms that might result from either military budget cuts or producers' surplus production⁶. While it is not always possible to accurately pinpoint how SALW find their way into one country from another, and eventually into the hands of civilians, seven possible ways can be identified⁷:

- Arms captured from enemies during fighting
- Soldiers defecting from armed groups
- Stolen or captured peacekeeping stocks (from UN troops)
- Arms supplied by the armed forces
- Purchase through the open market
- Supply from government stockpiles of neighbouring states
- Inheritance from family and relatives or friends.

For example, let's consider the life of a gun manufactured in a developed country considered to be at peace, and purchased legally for national defence by another country that has recently been embroiled in a domestic conflict. The gun is initially in the possession of state forces. However, in this instance, corrupt officials permit the looting of a stockpile containing the gun for personal profit, or looting of stockpiles is made easy because the


⁵ UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) is in the process of developing International Small Arms Control Standards, or "ISACS". The primary objective of these Standards will be to enhance the effectiveness of policymaking, programming and practice across the UN system by providing clear and comprehensive guidance on a wide range of small arms control issues. Two of the most relevant modules being developed are on marking and record-keeping and on tracing. Once completed, these standards will not only be of great use to actors working on small arms within the United Nations system, but also will assist States wishing to implement both the UN Programme of Action on SALW and the International Tracing Instrument. See CASA website www.un-casa-isacs.org/isacs/Statements.html (accessed October 20 2011).

⁶ Small Arms Survey, 2001.

⁷ Araba, 2007, pp 31–32; HSBA, 2009.

facilities are not secure. The gun, along with many other weapons, is sold to a small armed group that is operating outside the law and is building on popular discontent to overthrow the government. This group has found it easy to play on the fears of those in small villages and towns and recruit members. Suddenly, the gun is now being used in rapes, assaults and other violations of human rights. The diagram below illustrates this and other paths.

Lifecycle of a gun



*Figures from the Small Arms Survey, Geneva.
Source: International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)

Many ways have been suggested for dealing with these all-too-typical problems. One would be to tighten trade regulations and procedures. Another would be to address governmental corruption. Yet another would be making sure that stored weapons are difficult to access, marked and traceable. Or one could focus on reducing the demand or reasons for using weapons, for instance by educating people and providing employment that prevents them from falling under the influence of armed groups and criminal gangs. In the end, a combination of all of these approaches is necessary to reduce the problem.

SALW proliferation in the Horn of Africa

Various domestic and regional dynamics contribute to the widespread proliferation of SALW in the Horn of Africa. These dynamics are shaped by the trade and trafficking of SALW in the region, which are conditioned by many structural factors.

- Political tension and environmental scarcity at the regional level give rise to the diffusion of arms, while longstanding migratory patterns facilitate their transfer across borders.⁸
- Combinations of political manipulation, extreme poverty, deteriorating livelihoods, and environmental degradation contribute to people's willingness to take up arms.⁹
- The presence of poorly-paid and poorly-trained security forces further ensures a steady supply of weapons to civilians.¹⁰
- The political tradition in the Horn of outsourcing armed conflict to non-state armed groups is another factor driving proliferation.¹¹

Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and the transition to independence in 2011, South Sudan has also been bolstering its arms acquisition on the international market. As the new state seeks to become the primary provider of security services – both from a policing and military viewpoint – and to develop professional and effective security agencies, South Sudan has a legitimate right to obtain military equipment and material. Available information indicates that South Sudanese arms acquisitions are rooted in civil war-era political alliances, with regional allies, including Ethiopia and Kenya, acting as conduits for arms supplied from their own stocks, or acquired on the international market.

It is not only the military that has driven arms flows in the region. The tradition of cattle raiding, exacerbated by growing populations and diminishing access to natural resources, has provided a clear incentive for civilians or pastoralists along the Kenyan, Ugandan, and South Sudanese borders to acquire small arms. Pastoralists in these areas have been well-supplied with weapons; they have been disarmed at various stages, but some of these weapons have trickled back into the fighting areas.¹²

⁸ For a review of the history of arms flows in the region, see Saferworld, May 2011, pp 4–5.

⁹ *Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA)*, 2007, p 2.

¹⁰ Saferworld, May 2011, p 4.

¹¹ Arms are often legally procured by states ostensibly for national security, and then are covertly distributed to paramilitaries, local defence forces and militia who wage war in lieu of standing armies (HSBA, 2007, p 2).

¹² Saferworld, *ibid.*

EXAMPLE**SALW in Sudan and South Sudan**

Sudan and South Sudan both receive and act as conduits for SALW from the rest of the world to other countries in Africa (Chad, DRC, and Uganda). There has been an established arms supply route between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan¹³ for many years supplying the SPLA and civilians. In Eastern Equatoria, both the LRA and other Khartoum-supported militias had most of their weapons supplied in the government-held Torit area. Nimule, although held by the SPLA at the time, remained a major black market trading centre for weapons coming from Uganda, many of which seemed to have been picked up by civilians. The supply routes taken were just east of Nimule, although they later became increasingly difficult to use because of the presence of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF). More recently, there has been an increase in arms trafficking from Kenya and Somalia to Uganda – an indicator of the unstable situation in Somalia, but also of the increased sense of instability in the entire region, which is inevitably shared by the South Sudanese living along those routes.¹⁴

As of late 2009, an estimated 2.7 million weapons were in circulation in the Sudan, with just under 20 percent held by the Government of National Unity at the time, less than 10% held by the then Government of Southern Sudan and the rest held by current and former armed groups, civilians and foreign forces in Sudanese territory (such as the UN mission and UPDF).¹⁵ Despite the fact that Sudan is a producer of some SALW, according to UN Comtrade data (2007), between 1992 and 2005, Sudan spent about US\$ 70 million to import SALW from at least 34 countries. Out of these weapons, more than 90 percent came from China and Iran. However, these figures would be higher if the real value of all legal and illegal trade were computed.¹⁶

From inventories taken of firearms in 2009, it is estimated that the SPLA may possess some 200,000 firearms.¹⁷ However, civilians and armed groups are believed to possess many more weapons than the Sudanese state security forces and the SPLA combined. At the time, it was estimated that the average civilian holdings in the ten Southern states were twice that of the fifteen Northern states; and that the weighted average civilian holdings across the country were a little below five weapons per hundred persons. With some forty million inhabitants, civilian holdings at the time were placed at roughly two million weapons. Only a tiny percentage of these weapons were registered with the authorities. As the rearmament of Southern pastoralist groups in the wake of GoSS and SPLA arms recovery initiatives attests, weapons have remained in plentiful supply and ongoing cycles of bloody clashes among ethnic groups in the South suggest that there is no shortage of weapons or ammunition.

Basic visual assessments suggest that arms held by non-state actors across North and South Sudan are dominated by two unsurprising types of SALW – AK-type (7.62 x 39 mm) assault rifles and RPG-2 or RPG-7 rocket launchers, as well as RPK and 'DshK'-type machine guns. Many of these are relatively old weapons, manufactured in several dozen countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia and widely circulated within and between armed groups and communities across the region and beyond, making it difficult to establish their original source or route to Sudan.¹⁸

¹³ Reference is made here to 'Sudan' when describing conditions and events from before the independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011.

¹⁴ Schomerus 2007, p 44.

¹⁵ HSBA 2009, p 8.

¹⁶ Cited in Araba 2007, p 29.

¹⁷ HSBA 2009, p 9.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p 9.

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Workshop exercises

Exercise 1

Identifying small arms and light weapons

Using pictures of different types of small and light weapons, ask participants to separate small arms from light weapons, to name them, to describe them, and to outline their use. Ask participants, if they are comfortable with this, which of these weapons they have seen before in the areas where they live and work.

Exercise 2

Circulation, use, control of proliferation and recovery of weapons

Divide participants into groups of three to six persons.

- Ask participants to produce a diagrammatic drawing of how a gun can, after manufacture, can circulate legally or illegally, and of its potential users. Encourage participants to draw on their own experience and knowledge when thinking of a potential life cycle of a weapon.
- SALW proliferation is shaped by a number of socio-economic and political factors. Ask participants to identify at least five of these factors, drawing on participants' own experience, and discuss some strategies that can effectively reduce the impacts of these factors.
- Identify and describe the means through which SALW circulate. Using the example of South Sudan, discuss mechanisms that can be applied in preventing circulation through the means identified by groups.

Allow 20–30 minutes for discussion for each of the above exercises and then request each group to give a 5–10-minute feedback presentation.

MODULE 1: HANDOUT

Definitions

Defining SALW¹

Small arms

'Small arms' are weapons designed for personal use, including: light machine guns, sub-machine guns, including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles, and semi-automatic rifles.

'Small arms' also include:

1) 'Firearms', meaning:

(a) Any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899.

(b) Any other weapon or destructive device such as an explosive bomb, incendiary bomb or gas bomb, grenade, rocket launcher, missile, missile system or mine.

2) 'Ammunition', meaning the complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles, that are used in a small arm or light weapon, provided that those components are themselves subject to authorisation in the respective State Party.

3) 'Other related materials', meaning any components, parts or replacement parts of a small arm or light weapon, that are essential to its operation.

Light weapons

'Light weapons' include the following portable weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortars of less than 100 mm calibre, grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, recoilless guns, shoulder-fired rockets, anti-aircraft weapons and launchers, and air defence weapons.

¹ Definition in *The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa*, p 3.

Common terms

Automatic type of weapon not requiring that the trigger be pulled for each shot

Barrel tube which bullet is fired out of

Bolt action way of loading bullet – bullet is loaded and ejected from chamber by manipulating a manual bolt (handle that is pulled back and forth to unload and load the cartridge) such that it must be lifted, pulled to the rear, returned to the front and then locked down to operate the action

Bore diameter of gun barrel

Bullet projectile fired from end of firearm

Calibre diameter of bullet

Cartridge casing which contains the explosive element to propel the bullet

Chamber holds the round during firing process

Firearm any device which will expel, or is readily capable of expelling, a projectile by the action of an explosive and includes any such device, loaded or unloaded

Hammer part of gun which hits the base of a bullet to ignite explosive

Magazine part of the firearm that holds extra ammunition and which is inserted into the firearm; can look like a tube, a box that is built into the gun or a box that can be removed from the gun

Mortar shell hollow projectile containing an explosive substance, which is fired out of a mortar launcher through the ignition of its fuse and explodes on contact

Round refers to the cartridge and bullet as a single unit

Semi-automatic type of weapon where bullets are loaded through a spring mechanism and fires one bullet each time trigger is pulled

Shot small round black pellet consisting of lead, which comes in various sizes and is fired as a projectile primarily from shotguns

Stock/Butt part of the firearm which rests against the body, often the shoulder. It can be folding or retractable, wooden or metal, and serves to stabilise the gun while firing. Usually found on rifles and some machine-pistols, like the Uzi

Trigger part of the firearm which is pulled to release the firing mechanism

Recognising small arms & Recognising light weapons (M1 SS1&2)

Table: Sub-types and examples of small arms²


Type	Explanation	Example
Handguns	Handguns are small, portable and easily concealed. They can be fired with one hand and use small calibre ammunition. There are two main types of handguns – semi-automatic with a magazine in the handle or revolvers. Both types can be fired easily with one hand and are easy to carry and conceal. Because of the shorter barrel, handguns are not very accurate over a long distance.	Makarov Pistol 
Revolvers	Revolvers are a type of handgun which fire rounds from a revolving cylinder (called a revolver because the chamber revolves after each shot). Revolvers normally take up to six shots. They are often the older version of a handgun.	
Rifles (including assault rifles and carbines)	Designed to be used with two hands. They have a long barrel, are usually fired from the shoulder and are more accurate than handguns. Rifles are sub-divided into five groups: shotgun, bolt action, repeating, semi-automatic and assault. 'Shotgun', 'bolt action' and 'repeating' rifles are loaded manually. 'Semi-automatic' rifles use the recoil energy released on firing to load another round.	AK S74 
	'Assault' rifles are capable of select fire – their fast firing sequence allows the individual user to deliver a high rate of accurate fire to ranges of up to 400 metres. Of all SALW, assault rifles are thought to have been the highest source of human war casualties since 1944. Common models include AK 47, M16 (weapon of choice of US Army), FN-FAL (produced by Belgian FN Herstal).	AK 47 Automatic Kalashnikov 1947 
	Sniper rifles are high precision weapons because of their telescopic lens. They generally have a long barrel and fire small bullets, and are extremely accurate over a long distance. They are often single-shot but can be semi-automatic.	Dragunov SVD Automatic Rifle 
Shotguns	Shotguns are a type of rifle that shoots shots (which spray rather than go in a straight line) rather than bullets. They are extremely lethal at short range. The shots tend to be manually loaded. Usually single or double-barrelled. Typical hunting rifle.	Winchester Model 12, 12 gauge 
Machine-guns (sub-, light, or general-purpose)	All machine-guns are capable of a high rate of sustained fire. Sub-machine-guns (SMG) are small calibre weapons that fire pistol cartridges but have longer barrels and a larger magazine capacity. MP5 sub-machine-gun is produced by Heckler and Koch, a British and German company which is owned by a subsidiary of British Aerospace. It is produced under license around the world. MP stands for multi-purpose.	Heckler and Koch machine gun 

² This handout draws from images and descriptions in SEESAC's (South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons) *Small Arms and Light Weapons Awareness Support Pack (SASP)* 2003.

Type	Explanation	Example
Machine-guns <i>continued</i>	Light, medium or general purpose machine-guns are designed to be used by an individual or by a crew of two. They are generally belt or magazine fed and are mounted on tripods or bipods for stability. Most weapons of this type use gas expansion to complete the firing sequence and have a maximum effective range of 500–700 metres. They utilise major calibre rifle ammunition.	MG42 Machine Gewehr Model 42 
Hand-held, under-barrel grenade launchers	Hand-held and under-barrel grenade launchers are generally lightweight, single-shot, shoulder-fired weapons designed for attachment to a rifle. Most fire a 37mm–40mm grenade and have a maximum range of 400 metres.	Hechler and Koch Model 69 40mm Grenade Launcher 
	Rocket-propelled grenade launchers are man portable, and shoulder-launched weapons which are capable of firing an explosive device. They are composed of two major parts, the launcher and the grenade.	RPG-7 
Heavy machine-guns	Like all machine-guns, heavy machine guns (HMG) are designed to maintain a high rate of sustained fire. HMG are heavy-barrelled weapons that use major calibre ammunition (between 12.7mm to 14.5mm) and are mounted for stability. They require two or more crew to operate. Most weapons systems of this type have a maximum effective range of 1500 metres, with an extreme range of 3000 metres.	M2HB Browning Model 2 Heavy Barrel .50 calibre 
Mounted automatic grenade launchers	Mounted automatic grenade launchers are fully automatic, crew-served weapons. They can fire a variety of 40mm high-velocity grenades, some armour-piercing. For example the M430 HEDP 40mm grenade launcher (right) will pierce armour up to 2 inches thick, and will produce fragments that kill individuals within 5 metres and wound individuals within 15 metres of the point of impact.	MK19 grenade launcher & M430 grenades 
Portable anti-aircraft guns	See Heavy Machine Guns. 20mm–40mm cannons can fall into this category.	
Recoilless rifles	Recoilless rifles are crew-served weapons capable of firing artillery size ammunition at a range and velocity normally associated with a light cannon. They operate somewhat like a rocket launcher by firing a rocket-propelled charge. A venting system allows the weapon to operate without recoil. These weapons are generally between 57–106mm in calibre, can penetrate between 30mm to 10cm, depending on the size of the projectile and have a maximum effective range of 800–1500metres.	57mm Recoilless Rifle 
Anti-tank rocket and missile systems	Anti-tank rocket launchers are designed to be deployed by an individual and are shoulder-fired. As well as being effective against tanks, they are highly effective against light armoured vehicles and fortifications. They usually have a maximum range of 200 metres for stationary targets and a maximum range of 150 metres for moving targets. Their maximum range is approximately 1000 metres. Anti-tank missile systems are similar but include a guidance system, such as a command wire.	Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) 

SALW life cycle and proliferation (M1 S3)

Lifecycle of a gun



*Figures from the Small Arms Survey, Geneva.
Source: International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)

SALW, unlike heavy arms, circulate in both the military and civilian markets. There are seven possible ways in which SALW find their way into hands of civilians:

- Arms captured from enemies during fighting
- Soldiers defecting from armed groups
- Stolen or captured peacekeeping stocks (from UN troops)
- Arms supplied by the armed forces
- Purchase through the open market
- Supply from government stockpiles of neighbouring states
- Inheritance from family and relatives or friends.

MODULE 2

Supply and demand of small arms and light weapons

Objective

To provide trainees with information regarding the motivations for the supply and demand of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

Summary

The SALW problem can be seen consisting of three interdependent dimensions: availability¹, misuse, and demand². This module focuses on the supply of SALW into conflict zones and developing countries – what makes SALW available – and on why there remains a demand for SALW in post-conflict, transitional and developing countries.

Since the mid-1990s, formal negotiations at the United Nations about small arms control have been dominated by supply aspects, with the focus on shrinking the availability of the weapons themselves. Nevertheless, an increasing number of analysts, policy makers and civil society actors have been urging the international community to give equal attention to the demand side of the small arms trade. More than half the world's small arms are in the hands of civilians, and are considered valuable tools by those who acquire and keep them. Given the very large number of small arms in circulation, plenty of such weapons are likely to be available for people who see them as desirable or essential. These realities indicate that, along with efforts to curb the supply, there is an equally important need for parallel programmes aimed at lessening the perceived value of, and need for, small arms.

1 'Availability' can be defined as the supply and transfer of weapons (e.g. production, ownership, trade, brokering, etc). Godnick *et al* 2005, Section 2, p 17.

2 'Demand' can be defined as the factors driving the acquisition of small arms by states, groups and individuals, *ibid*.

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Introduction					
Introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Become comfortable with group. 		Introductions – find out and present name and 3 things about partners.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ List of participants ■ Name badges 	9.00–9.20am (20 mins)
Course overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand what is included in the curriculum. ■ Agree on the agenda. 	Exercise to identify participants' expectations from the training.	On flash cards participants write their expectations from the training (1–2), read out to others and paste on the wall. These can be revisited at the end of the workshop to check whether the workshop met their expectations.	Workshop agenda	9.20–9.45am (25 mins)
Establishing ground rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establish ground rules for training. 		Ground rules – group brainstorm.		9.45–10.00am (15 mins)
Morning tea break					10.00–10.30am (30 mins)
Module 2: Supply and demand of small arms and light weapons					
1 Supply of SALW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ To understand the diverse routes through which SALW can find their way into society, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Misuse by government military or police forces <input type="checkbox"/> Arming of civilians or militias by governments <input type="checkbox"/> Recycling from conflict to conflict <input type="checkbox"/> Brokers <input type="checkbox"/> Homemade weapons. 	<p>Workshop exercise 1: part 1</p> <p>Allow 15–20 minutes for discussion and then request each group to give a 5–10 minute feedback presentation.</p>	<p>Divide participants in groups of three to six:</p> <p>Ask participants to discuss the diverse ways in which SALW reach communities in South Sudan.</p> <p>Encourage participants to draw on their own experience and knowledge.</p>	Handout: Supply and demand	10.30am–12.30pm (120 mins)
Lunch					12.30–1.30pm (60 mins)
2 Demand for SALW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ To understand the motivations and means which shape the demand for small arms. ■ To understand the factors that can lead to a demand for SALW, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Problems and weaknesses of governance in the security sector <input type="checkbox"/> State supply of SALW <input type="checkbox"/> Civil conflict <input type="checkbox"/> Economic factors <input type="checkbox"/> Culture, attitudes and traditions. 	<p>1. Workshop exercise 1 cont.</p> <p>Allow 15–20 minutes for discussion and then request each group to give a 5–10 minute feedback presentation.</p> <p>2. Hand out Handout.</p>	<p>Divide participants into groups of three to six persons:</p> <p>Ask participants to discuss the motivations (reasons) and means (how they obtain the weapons) that drive communities to seek SALW in South Sudan, drawing on their own experiences.</p>	Handout: Supply and demand	1.30–3.3pm (120 mins)
End of day: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Wrap-up ■ Complete evaluation forms 					4.30–5.00pm (30 mins)

1 Supply of SALW

The control of the flow of SALW is critical to combating the easy availability and misuse of weapons. However, this is not a straightforward task. SALW have many legitimate military and civilian uses, and their production is highly decentralised – almost 1,250 companies operating in at least 92 countries produce weapons, weapons parts or ammunition.³ Nevertheless, stronger national, regional and international controls are essential if arms that start their lives as legal exports are to be prevented from ending up in the possession of criminals or non-state armed groups.

SALW can find their way into society through many diverse routes. These include:

Diversion: According to the United Nations, it has been estimated that as much as 40 percent of the licit global arms trade has been diverted through illicit markets to the regional conflicts that have erupted since 1990.⁴

Theft: All stockpiles are subject to the risk of theft. Physical security and stockpile management, which refers to the procedures and activities regarding safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation and handling of munitions and weapons,⁵ is necessary for reducing the risk of theft.

Misuse by government military or police forces: Individuals issued with arms by government sometimes misuse their weapons. For example, police officers sometimes “rent out” their official police weapons to relatives and friends when they are off-duty to boost low incomes, as for instance was the case in Cambodia in the late 1990s. During the conflict in Aceh, meanwhile, members of the Indonesian military at times actually sold weapons to gain income on the side – Human Rights Watch reported that the Indonesian security forces represented the largest source of weapons for rebel forces.⁶

Arming of civilians or militias by governments: Governments sometimes provide arms to groups loyal to them in order to help fight another armed group. For example, in South Sudan, the Lou Nuer ethnic group received weapons from both the Sudan Armed Forces (via the South Sudan Defence Forces) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) at different times during the civil war (see box).

EXAMPLE

South Sudan

During the civil war in Sudan, the Lou Nuer so-called ‘White Army’ – a loose coalition of armed groups made up mostly of youths from local cattle camps ostensibly serving as a tribal ‘defence group’ – received weapons from both the Sudan Armed Forces (via the South Sudan Defence Forces) and the SPLA at different times. However, in contrast to most other such tribal defence groups, the White Army was largely independent, often offensive in nature, and extremely violent.

A Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) post-war disarmament effort in 2006 was supposed to put an end to the White Army, but instead sparked heavy fighting leading to at least 1,600 deaths, only temporarily suppressing the group’s operations. Since then, the White Army has re-emerged for a number of reasons, including a widespread perception among the Lou Nuer that the state-level government is unwilling or unable to protect them from ongoing raids and the kidnapping of their children.⁷

³ These figures and others are taken from Small Arms Survey 2004.

⁴ UNDDR 2006, p 2.

⁵ King 2011, p 2.

⁶ Human Rights Watch, 2001, p 5.

⁷ McEvoy and LeBrun, 2010, p 25.

Recycling from conflict to conflict: Conflicts can quickly flow across borders, and the supply of weapons will follow the conflicts.⁸ For example, in Georgia in the early 1990s, arms moved from back and forth between the overlapping ethnic and political conflicts flaring across the country, including the Georgian civil war and conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (see box).

EXAMPLE

Georgia⁹

Like many of the wars which accompanied the end of the Cold War, Georgia's conflicts of independence consisted not of a single war but rather of a series of overlapping ethnic and political conflicts, including the Georgian civil war, the South Ossetian conflict, and the Abkhaz conflict. These armed conflicts were not the longest or most deadly internal wars of the early 1990s, but they were deeply affected by the uncontrolled proliferation and availability of small arms. Prior to mid-1991, few small arms were available and the sources of supply were primarily non-military. From mid-1991 onwards, however, public institutions disintegrated, including the Russian armed forces. Small arms suddenly became widely available through massive leakages from Russian military bases and through a thriving regional trade involving Azerbaijan and Armenia, as evidenced by decreasing small arms prices after 1991. While weapons collection programmes weakened paramilitary groups, they did not result in the comprehensive disarmament of Georgian society.

The increased availability of small arms changed and aggravated conflict in Georgia. By 1992–93, armed militias had acquired at least 40,000 weapons with which to intensify their struggle, and political conflicts were transformed from low-level social violence into full-scale warfare. In 1993–95, President Eduard Shevardnadze restored a degree of order in parts of Georgian territory. However, despite numerous attempts to reduce the number of weapons spread throughout the country, little progress was made. Weapons collection made little difference: former combatants and a suspicious public hesitated to participate, mostly offering up weapons that were old, obsolete, or inoperable. The greatest contribution of the collection programmes was to build confidence in the political structures of the re-emerging Georgian state. Nevertheless, most of the small arms, the seeds of future fighting, remained in circulation.

Brokers: According to the UN, private arms brokers¹⁰ play a particularly negative role in supplying weapons to areas of actual or potential conflict.¹¹ Arms brokers include negotiators, financiers, exporters, importers, and transport agents, and are used to arrange every aspect of an arms deal between the supplier and an intended client. They trade most heavily in SALW and landmines. These intermediaries seldom own or even possess the arms supplies outright, and typically live neither in the country where the weapons are supplied nor the one in which they are received.¹²

Arms brokerage is still fairly weakly regulated and the strongest mechanisms that exist are regional ones, for instance the EU Common Position on Regulating Arms Brokering. This is a legally binding agreement that obliges all EU Member States to develop controls over brokering based on the licencing of all individual brokering transactions. By July 2008, 19 out of 27 member states had put in place such controls.¹³ The Nairobi Protocol¹⁴, to which the Republic of Sudan is a signatory, also requires both the registration of SALW brokers and the licencing of individual transactions. However, despite these agreements, many national legal systems still do not prohibit or clearly regulate the activities of arms brokers or when they have measures in place, do not enforce these effectively. This leaves a lot of opportunity for brokers to exploit the gaps and continue with their activities.

Other factors that allow arms brokers to continue operating include deficits in the national capacity of many countries to control and monitor their airspace. Air cargo firms play an

⁸ UNDDR, 2006, p 21.

⁹ This box is substantially reproduced from Small Arms Survey, 2003, pp 1–2.

¹⁰ The SAS defines an arms broker as 'an individual who facilitates and organizes arms transactions on behalf of suppliers and recipients for some form of compensation or financial reward'. Small Arms Survey 2001a.

¹¹ UNDDR 2006, p 2.

¹² Austin 2002, p 204.

¹³ Greene and Kirkham 2009, pp 46–47.


¹⁴ Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, signed in 2004.

essential role in arranging the actual delivery of arms shipments, particularly in Africa, where the size of the continent and lack of road and rail infrastructure make air transport more convenient. Studies have indicated that some air transport agents even have expertise in the falsification of documentation and circumvention of inspection to conceal cargoes.¹⁵

Two UN Panels of Experts on Sierra Leone and Liberia¹⁶ that examined illegal arms transfer to the respective countries, identified a number of ways in which the brokers managed to obtain, ship and deliver weapons despite international sanctions. These included using false aircraft registration certificates, false flight plans and using end-user certificates that indicate Nigeria as the final recipient of the arms shipment while the arms were going to Liberia instead and Nigeria had no knowledge of the transaction.¹⁷

Illegal arms brokering is further enabled by corrupt government officials, especially at points of entry and exit and a lack of border control. This situation also makes it possible for certain governments to use brokers in order to conceal their small arms exports or procurement if they wish to do so.

Arms supply routes to UNITA (1993–99)



Home-made weapons: These usually circulate in small quantities, used by militia groups that do not have resources to acquire proper weapons and ammunition. An example is the case of the 200-plus Obo scouts of the Central Africa Republic (CAR), who have grouped together since 2008 to fight the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Too poor for military-grade weapons or even the kind of firearms American hunters take for granted, these ad hoc groupings have set about building an arsenal of homemade, single-barrel shotguns loaded with hand-packed shells.¹⁹

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p 2.

¹⁶ See Report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arms appointed pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1306 (2000), UN Doc S/2000/1195 par 203–207, www.un.org/sc/committees/1132/pdf/sclct11952e.pdf and Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia, UN Doc S/2002/1115 par 64–74 <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/626/79/IMG/N0262679.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁷ Greene and Kirkham 2009, p 43.

¹⁸ Small Arms Survey 2001a, p 2.

¹⁹ Axe 2011.

EXAMPLE**Unregulated arms flows to UNITA**

The case of the Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) provides a good example of the complexity of arms flows into a conflict, despite the existence of UN sanctions against supplying arms to the warring parties in Angola. According to the independent Fowler Report submitted to the UN Security Council in March 2000, in the early 1990s, UNITA procured large amounts of arms, mainly manufactured in Eastern Europe, through a South African arms dealer, Ronnie De Decker. The purchases were financed with diamond sales. Then in the mid-1990s, UNITA began tapping into other sources of supply. From 1995 on, then-president of Zaire Mobutu Sese Seko, agreed to assist UNITA in its arms procurement. Weapons were shipped from Eastern Europe to Zaire and then passed on to UNITA. Mobutu provided UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi with Zairian end-user certificates and received diamonds and cash in return. Zaire's Mobutu was not the only Head of Government involved in the supply of arms to UNITA. Following the overthrow of Mobutu, President Eyadema of Togo became UNITA's main arms supplier. It was agreed that Togo would keep 20 percent of the arms shipments bound for UNITA, either in kind or in cash, in return for Togolese end-user certificates to purchase more arms. Other arms and military equipment reached UNITA through Burkina Faso, Rwanda, and Congo. The original sources of arms implicated in the deals included Bulgaria, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation.²⁰

2 Demand for SALW

While SALW supply and regulations regarding the proliferation, manufacturing and marking of SALW have been discussed for many years, the demand side of SALW has only more recently moved into focus with the realisation that successful and sustainable disarmament needs to address underlying causes for weapons acquisition.

Small arms are attractive tools of violence for a number of reasons. They are widely available, low in cost, extremely lethal, simple to use, durable, highly portable (even by children), and easily concealed. As a consequence, they are present in virtually every society.

The demand for small arms is shaped by a combination of motivations and means.²¹

- **Motivations** include the political, economic, social and cultural reasons for needing to be armed and for preferring different types of firearms. These motivations are dynamic and wide-ranging – from a need for personal or collective self-defence to a culture of hunting and sport shooting, the pursuit of social status, or predatory behaviour.
- **Means** include the price (and ease) of obtaining firearms and the relative resources and assets available to purchase, rent, steal or borrow them.

Those seeking to acquire arms often have complex and overlapping motivations for seeking particular weapons, and a constantly shifting set of means that constrain or facilitate the acquisition of these weapons.²²

While this module focuses on the topic of supply and demand for SALW by an armed group and a community/individual level, it is worth noting that state-level demand for weapons is also influenced by a range of internal and external political, economic, social and security conditions. Routine modernisation programmes and evolving technology, as well as changing regional security dynamics and internal political conditions, all contribute

²⁰ Small Arms Survey 2001b, p 173.

²¹ Muggah 2004, p 2.

²² *Ibid.*

to persistent but changing demand for small arms and light weapons.²³ As a new state, the Republic of South Sudan for instance is committed to establishing professional security forces and this includes adequate and appropriate weapons and ammunition.

Factors that can lead to a demand for SALW include:

Problems and weaknesses of governance and the security sector: Demand for SALW on the part of civilians may be boosted by:

- High levels of crime or violence
- Weak security forces who are unable – or seen to be unable – to provide security to its citizens
- Lack of trust in the security sector and the judiciary
- Human rights violations, especially by state security forces but also by others
- Limited (if any) civilian participation in decision-making processes.

Weak security sectors are a particularly notable driver of demand for SALW. More than half the world's SALW are in the hands of civilians who consider them to be valuable means for security and protection.²⁴ A 1997 UN Panel of Experts Report²⁵ noted that when the state loses control over its security functions and fails to maintain the security of its citizens, the subsequent growth of armed violence, banditry and organised crime increases the demand for weapons for self-defence by citizens seeking to protect themselves and their property from the security sector, criminals, former enemies or vengeful community members.

Weak, unaccountable security sectors also often lead to privatised security arrangements such as body guards and security firms. According to IANSA, private security companies, when authorised by the state, increase demand for legal SALW but can also increase the supply of the illicit market if stockpile management is weak or there is internal corruption. Poorly trained private security guards can also be responsible for SALW misuse and in some cases have been implicated in criminal activity and human rights violations. Private security companies are difficult for government authorities to regulate, and internationally, control over private security stockpile management is weak, particularly in the practical application of policy.²⁶

Countries or regions with weak security sectors also tend to be highly politicised, which leads to a lack of accountability, increased corruption, and lack of co-ordination, limited professional competence and interagency rivalries. This in turn can lead to a security vacuum that may be filled by warring factions or organised criminal groups, resulting in greater insecurity and increased demand for and use of weapons by the community.²⁷

State supply of SALW: As noted above, seriously weakened governments sometimes supply small arms to select groups of their own citizens to use against traditional rivals who are also threatening the state.²⁸ However, the supply of weapons to one group can generate new demand from others – for instance the weapons might also be used for other purposes, like cattle raiding, which then prompts neighbouring groups to arm as well. Similar pressures to arm occur when states supply arms to political insurgent groups in neighbouring states as part of destabilisation tactics related to regional dynamics and competition. In both of these instances, surplus weapons inevitably find their way into economically depressed and socially unstable environments.²⁹

Civil conflict: Civil conflict often stems from state policies that fail to protect people and recognise their basic rights, leading citizens to seek power or liberation through weapons.³⁰ The demand is not limited to armed groups: wherever there are internal conflicts or groups

²³ Regehr 2004, p 5.

²⁴ QUNO 2006, p 1.

²⁵ UN 1997, Par 42.

²⁶ IANSA 2006, p 231.

²⁷ UNDDR 2006, p 22.

²⁸ Regehr 2004, p 5.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Buchanan and Atwood 2002, pp 35–36.

engaged in violent conflict, there will be a growing demand for SALW among civilians, due to fears of continuing or resurgent conflict.

EXAMPLE

Eastern Equatoria State (EES)

Located in the south-eastern corner of South Sudan, EES shares borders with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Like the communities across those borders, EES is populated primarily by agro-pastoralists who have long suffered from a range of development and governance problems, including a lack of basic services, unreliable water supplies, poor leadership, depressed local economies, insufficient responses to drought, widespread poverty, and extremely poor health and education. Within the East and Horn of Africa region, EES is noticeably prone to conflict, a situation that is exacerbated by a culture of cattle rustling and widespread access to and use of firearms. Governments have periodically attempted to 'pacify' these marginalised communities using aggressive, militarised tactics – including forcible disarmament – generally without addressing underlying grievances or improving access to services.³¹

Economic factors: Economic factors, such as high rates of unemployment and low incomes, may cause people to turn to crime using SALW as a means of survival. This could mean becoming involved in gangs, militias or other armed groups that bring some economic benefits. Young people may be particularly vulnerable in these situations. Meanwhile, conflicts over land and water resources – including issues of use, distribution, and ownership – are a key driver of demand for SALW in many regions.³² This continues to be the case in many parts of the Horn of Africa, including in South Sudan where clashes continue every dry season between different ethnic groups, particularly in Jonglei State and on the border of Lakes, Warrap and Unity states.

Culture, attitudes and tradition: In some cultures, the display of weapons is seen as important. This is often referred to as a 'gun culture'. 'Macho' cultural norms may prevail, in which both males and females place symbolic social value in the armed male as a source of status and security.³³ Women can also play an instrumental role in motivating and encouraging young men to perpetrate acts with weapons, for example, to go out on cattle raids. Therefore, women can play an important role in changing the image of gun ownership by showing that the use of a gun does not impress them.³⁴

Women in many pastoralist or semi-pastoralist areas, such as Eastern Equatoria State in South Sudan, compose songs to shame those who have not yet gone raiding or who have come back empty-handed. This behaviour increases the pressure on young men to secure the necessary heads of cattle for a dowry. Educating girls to reject raided cows as part of their dowries, and to delay their marriages, can prevent violence by reducing the pressure on young boys to find large numbers of cows.³⁵ Beyond these practices, for youth in some contexts, weapons and violence are related to rites of passage into adulthood.

EXAMPLE

Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands

The demand for small arms in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, which may appear at first to be driven by self-interest, is in fact often heavily influenced by tribal, clan, household and familial affiliations and corporate interests. Demand is driven by kinship and tribal affiliations, and the preference for certain weapons, the price of firearms, and the resources available to purchase them are strongly related to predominant social networks. The relative influence and importance attached to kinship and tribal affiliations must be adequately recognised in any consideration of demand reduction initiatives.³⁶

³¹ Quoted from HSBA 2010, pp 1–2.

³² Buchanan and Atwood 2002, pp 35–36.

³³ *Ibid*, p 39.

³⁴ BICC 2007, p 6.

³⁵ HSBA 2010, p 5.

³⁶ Muggah 2004, p 4.

Taken together, these factors create complex local conditions of demand.

EXAMPLE**South Africa**

The preferences for small arms and light weapons in South Africa are historically and socially conditioned. During the more than four decades of apartheid, the South African state was highly militarised. White government soldiers, white civilian–military commandos, and leaders of ‘homelands militia’ brandished a range of arms. The apartheid state reacted to the creation of the mass-based United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 with increased armed oppression and the declaration of a state of emergency between 1985 and 1990. Members of the liberation movements, especially youth members of self-defence or self-protection units, armed themselves in response, and many black townships installed self-governing structures, including ‘people’s courts’, which sometimes enforced their decisions through armed violence. In the late 1980s, some members of self-defence units began to pursue criminal instead of political goals. Demand for guns thus increased, and greater numbers of weapons moved into black communities. On the one hand, therefore, firearms were crucial to maintaining the apartheid system of oppression. On the other hand, weapons – in particular the AK-47, which was the weapon of the liberation armies – came to symbolise freedom for the majority of disenfranchised South Africans. In the post-apartheid period, when black South Africans were no longer denied firearms ownership, firearms became a symbol of full citizenship for many. At the same time, weapons were, and continue to be, linked to masculine identity and social status.³⁷

³⁷ Atwood, Glatz and Muggah 2006, pp 27–29.

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Workshop exercises

Exercise 1

Pathways, motivations and means in South Sudan

Divide participants into groups of three to six persons. Ask participants to discuss:

- The diverse ways in which SALW reach communities in South Sudan. Encourage participants to draw on their own experience and knowledge when thinking of examples.
- The motivations (reasons) and means (how they obtain the weapons) that drive communities to seek SALW in South Sudan, again drawing on their own experiences and knowledge.

Allow 15–20 minutes for discussion and then request each group to give a 5–10-minute feedback presentation.

MODULE 2: HANDOUT

Supply and demand

Supply of SALW (M2 S1)

SALW can find their way into society through many diverse routes. These include:

Diversion	UN estimates that as much as 40% of the legal global arms trade has been diverted through illicit markets to regional conflicts since 1990.
Theft	All stockpiles of arms are subject to the risk of theft.
Misuse by government military or police forces	Individuals with government issued arms (such as police, soldiers, etc.) sometimes misuse their weapons. For example, police officers sometimes "rent out" their official police weapons to boost their incomes.
Arming of civilians or militias by governments	Governments sometimes provide arms to groups loyal to them in order to help fight another armed group.
Recycling from conflict to conflict	Conflict can quickly flow across borders, and the supply of weapons will follow the conflict. ¹
Brokers	Arms brokers include negotiators, financiers, exporters, importers, and transport agents, and are used to arrange every aspect of an arms deal between the supplier and an intended client. They trade most heavily in SALW and landmines.
Home-made weapons	These usually circulate in small quantities, used by militia groups that do not have resources to acquire proper weapons and ammunition.

Demand of SALW (M2 S2)

The demand for small arms is shaped by a combination of motivations and means²:

- **Motivations** include the political, economic, social and cultural reasons for needing to be armed and for preferring different types of firearms. These motivations are dynamic and wide-ranging – from a need for personal or collective self-defence to a culture of hunting and sport shooting, the pursuit of social status, or predatory behaviour.
- **Means** include the price (and ease) of obtaining firearms and the relative resources and assets available to purchase, rent, steal or borrow them.

Factors that lead to a demand for SALW include:

Problems and weaknesses of governance and security sector	<p>Weak security sectors are a particularly notable driver of demand for SALW. More than half the world's SALW are in the hands of civilians who consider them to be valuable means for security and protection.³</p> <p>Weak, unaccountable security sectors also often lead to privatised security arrangements such as body guards and security firms.</p> <p>Countries or regions with weak security sectors also tend to be highly politicised, which leads to a lack of accountability, increased corruption, and lack of co-ordination, limited professional competence and interagency rivalries.</p>
State supply of SALW	<p>Weakened governments sometimes supply small arms to select groups of their own citizens to use against traditional rivals who are also threatening the state.⁴ The supply of weapons to one group can generate new demand from other.</p>
Civil conflict	<p>The demand is not limited to armed groups: wherever there are internal conflicts or groups engaged in violent conflict, there will be a growing demand for SALW among civilians, due to fears of continuing or resurgent conflict.</p>
Economic Factors	<p>Economic factors, such as high rates of unemployment and low incomes, may cause people to turn to crime using SALW as a means of survival.</p> <p>Conflicts over land and water resources – including issues of use, distribution, and ownership – are a key driver of demand for SALW in many regions.⁵</p>
Culture, Attitudes, Tradition	<p>In some cultures, the display of weapons is seen as important. This is often referred to as a 'gun culture'. 'Macho' cultural norms may prevail, in which both males and females place symbolic social value in the armed male as a source of status and security.⁶</p>

This handout is taken from *Small arms and light weapons: A training manual*, published by Saferworld, February 2012

² Muggah, 2004, p 2.

³ QUNO, 2006, p 1.

⁴ Regehr, 2004, p 5.

⁵ Buchanan and Atwood 2002, pp 35–36.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p 39.

MODULE 3

Impact of small arms and light weapons on conflict, security and human development

Objective

To outline the impact that the illicit and uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) have on conflict, security and human development, including the different impacts experienced by men, women, and different age groups.

Summary

This module looks at some factors behind the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW, and illustrates the different ways in which widespread availability of small arms affect peace, conflict, security and development. Although the presence of SALW does not necessarily cause conflict, it does contribute to the level of violence and the intractability of some conflicts. Similarly, easy access to illicit weapons also fuels insecurity, particularly within and among communities, as grievances can easily escalate into violent confrontation and people resort to violence to resolve disputes even after conflict has ended. Violence and insecurity in turn threaten development by contributing to displacement, hindering access to education and health care, undermining or overturning livelihoods and commercial activity, and destroying or damaging infrastructure. This module also considers the impact of SALW through a gendered and age-related lens. Men, women and people of different ages have fundamentally different experiences of life and livelihoods, and different groups experience the impact of SALW differently.

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Module 0: Introduction					
Introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Become comfortable with group 		Introductions – find out and present name and 3 things about partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ List of participants ■ Name badges 	9.00–9.20am (20 mins)
Course overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand what is included in the curriculum ■ Agree on the agenda 	Exercise to identify participants' expectations from the training.	On flash cards participants write their expectations from the training (1–2), read out to others and paste on the wall. These can be revisited at the end of the workshop to check whether the workshop met their expectations.	Workshop agenda	9.20–9.45am (25 mins)
Establishing ground rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establish ground rules for training 		Ground rules – group brainstorm		9.45–10.00am (15 mins)
Morning tea break					10.00–10.30am (30 mins)
Module 3: Impact of small arms and light weapons on conflict, security, and human development					
2 Impacts of SALW on conflict and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ To understand the different ways in which widespread availability of small arms affect peace, conflict, and security. ■ To be aware that the range and frequency at which SALW have been used in recent conflict suggests that modern SALW are both increasing in numbers and becoming more prevalent in armed conflict. ■ To recognize that the widespread availability of SALW is a threat to human security because their presence encourages violent rather than peaceful ways of resolving problems. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Give out handout 2. Present case study on the LRA to highlight the impact of armed rebel groups on local and regional security. 3. Present case study on security in Lakes State since 2005. 	Case study examples	Handout: Conflict, security, and development	10.30am–12.00pm (90 mins)
3 Impacts of SALW on development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ To grasp that the socio-economic under-development is both a breeding ground for and a consequence of the proliferation and misuse of SALW. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Present case study on Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria states. 2. Workshop exercise 1 Allow 20 minutes per group exercise for discussion and then request each group to give a 5–10 minute feedback presentation. 	Workshop exercise 1 Divide participants into groups of three to six persons. Ask each group to discuss how SALW has impacted on conflict, security, and development in South Sudan, drawing on their own knowledge and experience.	Handout: Conflict, security, and development	12.00–1.30pm (90 mins)
Lunch					1.30–2.30pm (60 mins)
4 Impacts of SALW by gender and age	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ To recognize the different ways in which SALW impacts harmfully on the young and old, women, men, and children. 	Workshop exercise 2 <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Discuss the impact of illicit proliferation and misuse of SALW on gender. 2. Discuss the impact of illicit proliferation and misuse of SALW on children/youth. 	Workshop exercise 2 Divide participants into groups of three to six persons. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ask each group to imagine themselves being one of the following: a group of young women; old women; young men; old men. (Depending on the context of those being trained, you could add/substitute with other types of groups as well, for instance particular tribes.) Ask each group to discuss: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What do they think is the impact of SALW proliferation and misuse from their points of view? b. How has it affected their lives and their futures? 2. Ask each group to discuss: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What they thought of the idea that women and children could use SALW and be active combatants in armed conflict? b. What they thought of the idea that men could be victims of armed conflict and SALW use? 	Handout: Conflict, security, and development	2.30–4.30pm (120 mins)
End of day: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Wrap-up ■ Evaluation 					4.30–5.00pm (30 mins)

1 SALW, security and development

SALW have many uses beyond their primary function as weapons of war. As a consequence, the effects of their proliferation are widespread. The first cluster of effects is connected with **conflict** and **insecurity**, and includes both the direct costs (deaths and injuries in conflicts) and the indirect costs (post-conflict insecurity, inter-communal tensions, etc.) of SALW proliferation and use. Although the presence or proliferation of small arms and light weapons does not *cause* the conflicts that are evident around the world, they do contribute to their level of violence, and generally therefore make the resolution of these conflicts more difficult.

The second cluster relates to **development** and governance issues. Investments of time and money – by governments, the international development community, major international aid agencies and NGOs – often have little impact in conflict-affected environments because gains are undermined by violence and insecurity. Up to 1.5 billion people live in countries that are affected by conflict and fragility, and 70% of fragile states have experienced conflict since 1989.¹ SALW misuse is one of the factors that cause insecure situations and therefore undermines development. At the same time, a lack of development and a state that does not provide security to its people are some of the factors causing people to have weapons. For this reason, international focus on SALW issues has often been cast more broadly to address the roots of conflict and strengthen security provision through processes like security sector reform.²

2 Impacts of SALW on conflict and insecurity

Since the invention of SALW, they have been used in many wars and conflicts, including between states, but also at sub-national level. Because of SALW being so easily available, relatively cheap (in comparison to conventional weapons) and easy to carry or move around, it has become possible for ordinary people to possess and use SALW relatively easily. But the illicit, uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of SALW have severe effects on conflicts, security and human development, as outlined below.

Impact on conflict

Earlier wars in the 19th and 20th centuries already involved the use of rifles, carbines, machine guns and similar weapons, but the range and frequency at which such weapons have been used in more recent conflict suggests that modern SALW are both increasing in numbers and becoming more prevalent in armed conflicts. For example, armed conflicts Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda all witnessed child combatants using small arms with ease. And since these weapons are easy to move around – and given the history of so many armed conflicts in Africa already – SALW are already present to a large degree in many societies.

SALW are used both by government forces (military and police) and by non-state actors (guerrillas, ethnic militias, self-defence units, violent criminals etc) engaged in conflicts

1 IDPS 2012, p 1.

2 DFAIT 2008.

against each other or against the state, or in violent criminal activities. Of the 49 armed conflicts since 1990, all but three relied on SALW as the only instrument of war, and only one, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, was dominated by heavy weapons.³ Modern small arms – especially assault rifles like the Soviet/Russian AK-47 and the US-made M-16 – have played an especially conspicuous role in recent conflicts, accounting for anywhere between 35 and 60 percent of all of the deaths and injuries in warfare since 1990.⁴


EXAMPLE

South Sudan

Until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, South Sudan experienced decades of armed conflict, and was in 2011 still suffering from the consequences, including underdevelopment, large-scale displacement and continuing armed conflict at the community level. There are many different causes and levels of conflict in South Sudan, ranging from conflicts between individuals and groups over such things as marriage, cattle, water and pasture to conflicts at the political level. The presence of small arms contributes to these conflicts and makes them more deadly. For example, violence between pastoralists and crop farmers or among pastoralists over cattle rustling or grazing rights has historically occurred in South Sudan. Traditionally, these conflicts were fought with spears and sticks. However, this has changed due to the circulation of small arms during the civil war. Cattle raids with the use of guns can now lead to dozens or even hundreds of deaths. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, such as negotiations between community elders, are also less effective, as power is now often wielded by well-armed young men.⁵

In 2009, South Sudan experienced a major spike in armed violence, causing some 2,500 deaths and displacing 350,000 (see Map 1 below). The violence took place as implementation of the CPA reached crisis point, with the (then) Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) almost exclusively preoccupied with countering perceived Northern aggression, at the expense of security and governance issues closer to home.⁶

Map 1 Significant violent incidents causing displacement, South Sudan, 2009



Source:
UN OCHA 2009⁷

³ Klare, undated webpage.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ BICC 2007, p 9.

⁶ McEvoy and LeBrun 2010, p 19.

⁷ *Ibid.*

EXAMPLE**Impact of armed rebel groups on local and regional security**

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, remains a serious threat to security and stability, both in South Sudan and regionally. While the LRA was originally a northern Ugandan rebel group of ethnic Acholi with grievances against the Kampala government, more recently it has recruited an unknown number of South Sudanese Acholi and Congolese and has maintained an itinerant existence in areas bordering South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR). It has long engaged in opportunistic violence in South Sudan, terrorising communities and maintaining its numbers through kidnapping and the theft of ammunition and food. Khartoum supported the LRA against the SPLA during the civil war – countering support of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) for the SPLA – and though its forces in South Sudan reportedly numbered fewer than 50 out of an army estimated at present to be 300 strong, the group is still widely feared.⁸

Impact on security

The widespread availability of SALW is a threat to human security because their presence encourages violent rather than peaceful ways of resolving problems, and negate confidence- and security-building measures.⁹ The unregulated circulation of SALW to a wide range of unaccountable and untrained actors also contributes to violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Even after a conflict has officially ended, SALW often remain in the conflict zone in the hands of ex-combatants, civilians and criminals, making it easy for fighting to restart. Even when further combat is avoided, small arms become tools of other forms of violence, such as criminal activity, ethnic and political rivalries, and interference with efforts to deliver food, medicine, and supplies to people in dire need of relief. Refugees are often afraid to return to their homes because of the large number of weapons that remain in the hands of ex-combatants who have not been demobilised or have become affiliated with local gangs, warlords, or militias.¹⁰ While some people may feel that they and/or their families are made more secure by owning a weapon, particularly in situations where governments cannot protect their citizens, this arming of civilians can create a feeling of insecurity among other members of the community. More deaths, injuries and accidental wounding are likely during quarrels and disagreements if a weapon is available in households. Psychological consequences such as trauma may also result. Meanwhile, the proliferation of criminal, domestic and anti-state violence can lead governments to commit resources to security rather than development.¹¹

After a conflict, SALW may become instruments for other forms of violence, such as crime and banditry and disruption of economic activities. In countries that receive development assistance or where emergency relief is required for people affected by violence or other disasters, SALW use can make it too unsafe for such help to be provided.¹²

EXAMPLE**Security in Lakes State, South Sudan since 2005**

A study undertaken by the Small Arms Survey in Lakes State in 2006 found that every third respondent admitted to owning a firearm (most commonly an AK-47 assault rifle) either individually or as part of a family. The survey found that most residents of Lakes State were in favour of stronger measures to control private gun ownership. It also found that while some respondents said that security had improved after the signing of the CPA, others reported feeling less secure than during the conflict. Most households had experienced armed robberies and fights involving firearms since January 2005.¹³

⁸ HSBA 2011, p 4; McEvoy and LeBrun April 2010, p 27.

⁹ UNDDR 2006, Introduction, p 3. UNDP defines human security as a broad range of seven threats (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political) to individuals. See UNDP 1994.

¹⁰ Klare, undated webpage.

¹¹ UNDDR 2006, Introduction, p 3.

¹² Klare, undated webpage.

¹³ BICC 2007, p 11.

3

Impacts of SALW on development

Socio-economic underdevelopment presents both a breeding ground for and a consequence of the proliferation and misuse of SALW.¹⁴ The long-term impacts and costs of SALW in terms of human and economic development affect societies as a whole, and the adverse effects of armed violence on poverty, social spending and economic development perpetuate human suffering. SALW can have a negative and destructive impact on human development, including health and mortality, knowledge and education, income and standard of living, and community participation.¹⁵ SALW also play a key role in criminal activities and damage to property and can become an integral part of day-to-day business and commerce, which have a negative impact on employment, investment and growth of post-conflict countries. Widespread use of small arms in business and commerce frequently has a detrimental effect on business activity and employment which in turn fuels poverty. As a result, there may be less opportunity to work and earn an income as investment declines – not only large-scale Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), but also by local or regional entrepreneurs who may not want to take the risk.

There is an increasing recognition that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will not be achieved unless more is done to increase and promote security, as a secure environment is a precondition for development. For example, in its assessment of current threats to international peace and security, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recognised that extreme poverty creates environments which make the emergence of threats such as terrorism and civil conflict more likely. The proliferation of SALW interferes with the provision of basic needs, and creates difficulty in carrying out development programmes because of the threat of violence.

In recognition that most conflict-affected states will not reach the MDG targets, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)¹⁶ was initiated in 2008 to develop strategies for promoting development in countries affected by conflict and fragility. The members of the IDPS include conflict-affected countries, donor countries and international institutions and they agreed in 2011 on a new way of supporting conflict-affected states, with five priority areas:

- Legitimate politics: Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
- Security: Establish and strengthen people's security
- Justice: Address injustices and increase people's access to justice
- Economic foundations: Generate employment and improve livelihoods
- Revenues and services: Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.¹⁷

These priorities reflect an international commitment to improve the security of people living in insecure states – including through tackling SALW issues – as part of a broader development agenda. South Sudan is a member of the IDPS process and is one of the first countries in which the above priorities will be implemented.

The presence of SALW also has direct costs to governments. In some countries, as much as 25 percent of annual gross domestic product is spent on treating victims of armed violence and on increased policing, with firearms being involved in over 80 percent of all violent deaths.¹⁸ Greater personal insecurity means that increasingly, disposable income

¹⁴ Heinrich 2006, p 5.


¹⁵ BICC 2006, p 6.

¹⁶ The website is: www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_43407692_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.

¹⁷ IDPS 2012, p 2.

¹⁸ UNDDR 2006, Introduction, pp 2–3.

is directed to the purchase of arms and ammunition. Economic factors such as high rates of unemployment and low wages may also cause people to use weapons as a means of survival.¹⁹ There is two-way relationship between economic and social stability in that victims of negative economic conditions may join forces to resist the prevailing social order, precipitating social instability. In addition, armed violence has a particularly negative impact on vulnerable groups such as women (see Section 4 below).



Source: People Safe from Guns in South Sudan. A Training Manual for Local Stakeholders. BICC 2006, p 7.

EXAMPLE

Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria States, South Sudan

Home to 1.3 million inhabitants, Jonglei State in South Sudan is also among the most underdeveloped regions in the world. Multiple ethnic communities migrate seasonally to sustain cattle and preserve their pastoralist way of life. Access to water and grazing areas, as well as cattle rustling, are thus primary triggers of conflict. Tensions between communities are aggravated by pervasive tribalism and perceptions of state bias, the virtual absence of roads and infrastructure, widespread food insecurity, land disputes and limited access to justice. The prevalence of violence in Jonglei is also partly due to the fact that many former fighters who have not been absorbed into the SPLA or other security institutions and have nothing much to do retain their guns, military orientation and old allegiances.²⁰

In Eastern Equatoria State (EES), severe drought and food insecurity affecting large parts of the state since April 2009 have been widely reported as another key reason for increasing levels of armed violence and insecurity. Violence peaked at the end of 2009, coinciding with the height of the migratory period for cattle keepers, who in the face of drought have to venture farther into unfamiliar or hostile territory in search of pasture and water points. For example, in Isoke *payam*, Ikotos county, 40 out of 60 reported violent incidents from September to December 2009 involved gunshot injuries. Where the previous norm was one to two gunshot wounds per month, by the end of 2009 the rate had increased to one to two per week.²¹

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p 3.

²⁰ International Crisis Group 2009, p i.

²¹ HSBA 2010, p 4.

4 Impacts of SALW by gender and age

It is important to bring a gender and age analysis to our understanding of the impact of the illicit proliferation and misuse on all levels of society. The key insight brought by a gender and age analysis is not merely the articulation of gendered differences but, more significantly, how to address the inequalities between women and men and girls and boys which are manifested in the fact that globally, women have less access to power, resources and decision-making processes than men. Furthermore, it provides us with analytical tools that address and find solutions to structural inequalities between women and men and girls and boys.²² SALW impact harmfully on young and old, women and men and children – but often in somewhat different ways.

Men: The highest percentage of both perpetrators and victims of SALW violence are men. Men often see weapons as symbols of ‘courage’, ‘masculinity’ or ‘honour’, and therefore as positive and necessary for their survival.²³ For example, in the Horn of Africa generally, social ideas and beliefs about masculinity and manhood are closely connected to weapons and arms. A man without a gun in zones of conflict is often not considered “a real man”. At the same time, masculinity and femininity are often defined in such a ways as to support military approaches to conflict and to retain the dominance of men in decision-making.²⁴

“I don’t think I would like to have a daughter who is an amputee, or see my wife with one arm. That decreases the value of woman for us. I would rather come home with one leg. So, we felt [in the SPLA] that it is our duty as men to do the fighting, the dirty job. We do it, and the women take care of the children. Therefore most of the women are discouraged from the army. When we told them that fighting is not your work, they didn’t quarrel. They just went away in peace and got married and they have children now.”²⁵

This quote illustrates the beliefs of many people in the Horn of Africa that men need to ‘be masculine’ by using SALW in defence of their nation and women. While men perform this role, the appropriate role for women is to become the bearers of culture and to socialise the next generation of male fighters.²⁶ Yet in many countries across the globe this idea that women are always pacifist and stay at home when there is war has been disproved: women too have taken up arms.

EXAMPLE

Women and conflict

There are myriad examples of women who go beyond supporting the conflict in some way to engaging actively in acts of violence as combatants. Women have participated as active combatants in conflicts around the world, including in Algeria, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. Their numbers are not insignificant: for example, 25 percent of the combatants in El Salvador’s Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) were women. In the case of Nicaragua, approximately 30 per cent of soldiers and leaders of the Sandanista National Liberation Front were female. In the latter case, many of the high-ranking women were also later involved in the peace negotiations – although, as one noted, not “as a woman, but as a representative of a powerful armed group”. In cases such as El Salvador and Sudan, women have filled leadership positions, both within the military and paramilitary structures as well as within the government. It should be noted, however, that such gender changes at the micro level are often not accompanied by corresponding changes in political or organisational influence, and they do not necessarily fundamentally alter patriarchal ideologies.²⁷

²² El Jack 2002, p 52. See also Eckman *et al* 2007 and Krienert 2003 for more critical discussions on questions of masculine expression.

²³ BICC 2007, p 5.

²⁴ El Jack 2002, p 53.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Kaufman and Williams 2010, p 133.

Women: The uncontrolled proliferation of SALW increases the threat of intimidation and abuse of women and heightens the lethality of violence against women,²⁸ both inside and outside the home. Sexual and gender-based violence is also often committed against men and boys, but this issue has been severely under-reported and under-researched to date.²⁹ During armed conflict, women may also choose or be forced to perform certain roles for combatants – act as ‘wives’ (often forced), porters, cooks, spies, or messengers. In this context women often endure sexual violence as well. Nevertheless, women also can play roles that are conducive to SALW proliferation. Sometimes they encourage their men to arm, or play a key role in encouraging small arms violence, including by supporting and promoting cycles of revenge.³⁰ Sometimes they play a role in weapons smuggling; sometimes they arm themselves; and sometimes they also serve as combatants in civil conflict.

EXAMPLE

Women’s agency in conflict periods

The organisation Sudanese Women’s Voices for Peace (SWVP) has been networking through community-based mechanisms for peace mobilisation since 1994 in the difficult environment in South Sudan and other parts of the country. SWVP’s membership is based on activism, with a special focus on the human rights of all Sudanese people. The main goal of SWVP is to strengthen network members, enhance small arms control to achieve ‘families free of gun violence’, and to establish dialogue and ensure disarmament in Sudan. Since 2000, SWVP has been working near the Kenya-South Sudan border developing posters addressing the issue of small arms, focusing on getting guns out of public places such as schools, hospitals, churches and markets.³¹

Children/youth: In situation of violence and conflict, children and youth are pushed, pulled and forced into various actions by people, events and decisions over which they have little or no control. It is estimated that since 1990, more than 2 million children have been killed in wars, 6 million have been seriously injured and more than 22 million have been driven from their homes.³² The vast majority of the casualties are directly attributable to SALW. In societies destabilised by the use of SALW, children are denied many of their human rights, including their rights to freedom from violence and exploitation, survival and development, health care, education and care within a family environment. As a result, progress that had previously been made, for instance on extending education to children or on providing them with health care, can be undermined or even reversed. In many countries around the world there is a relationship between youth unemployment and violence that requires further consideration in relation to the impact of SALW.

In conflict situations, SALW heighten levels of violence and prevent humanitarian assistance from reaching those who need it. They also create opportunities for violence to continue in other forms long after peace agreements are signed. In communities enjoying relative peace, children witness and are traumatised by the use of SALW in domestic violence and in disputes. Children also become accidental victims because adults fail to keep the weapons out of their reach.³³

Another consequence of the availability of SALW and their use in conflicts is the use of child soldiers. Experience in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Northern Uganda has shown that children can easily be frightened and exploited, and then trained to handle SALW. An estimated 300,000 children worldwide are currently fighting in adult wars.³⁴

²⁸ Gender-based violence (GBV) is a form of violence that targets individuals because of their gender and can be perpetrated against women or men. GBV includes violent acts such as rape, torture, mutilation, sexual slavery, forced impregnation and murder. Especially in war and conflict situations, the risk and incidence of GBV increases. In BICC 2006, pp 10–11.

²⁹ RLP 2009.

³⁰ BICC 2007, p 6.

³¹ IANSA 2005, p 46.

³² UNICEF 2001.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

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Workshop exercises

Exercise 1

Impact of SALW in South Sudan

Divide participants into groups of three to six persons. Ask each group to discuss how SALW has impacted on conflict, security and development in South Sudan, drawing on their own knowledge and experiences. Allow 20 minutes per group exercise for discussion and then request each group to give a 5–10-minute feedback presentation.

Exercise 2

SALW, gender and age in South Sudan

Divide participants into groups of three to six persons.

1. Ask each group to imagine themselves being one of the following: a group of young women; a group of old women; a group of young men; a group of old men. (Depending on the context of those being trained, you could add/substitute with other types of groups as well, for instance particular tribes.) Ask each group to discuss:
 - a. What do they think is the impact of SALW proliferation and misuse from their points of view?
 - b. How has it affected their lives and their futures?
2. Ask each group to discuss:
 - a. What they thought of the idea that women and children could use SALW and be active combatants in armed conflict?
 - b. What they thought of the idea that men could be victims of armed conflict and SALW use?

Allow 20 minutes per group exercise for discussion and then request each group to give a 5–10-minute feedback presentation. Exercise 2 can be expanded by changing the assignments so that by the end of the training every group has presented on each of the different genders and age groups.

MODULE 3: HANDOUT

Conflict, security and development

Impacts of SALW on conflict and insecurity (M3 S2)

Effects include both direct costs (deaths and injuries in conflicts) and indirect costs (post-conflict insecurity, intercommunal tensions, etc.).

The widespread availability of SALW is a threat to human security because their presence encourages violent rather than peaceful ways of resolving problems, and negates confidence- and security-building measures.¹

CASE STUDY

Impact of armed rebel groups on local and regional security

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, remains a serious threat to security and stability, both in South Sudan and regionally. While the LRA was originally a northern Ugandan rebel group of ethnic Acholi with grievances against the Kampala government, more recently it has recruited an unknown number of Sudanese Acholi and Congolese and has maintained an itinerant existence in areas bordering South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR). It has long engaged in opportunistic violence in South Sudan, terrorising communities and maintaining its numbers through kidnapping and the theft of ammunition and food. Khartoum supported the LRA against the SPLA during the civil war – countering support of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) for the SPLA – and though its forces in South Sudan reportedly numbered fewer than 50 out of an army estimated at present to be 300 strong, the group is still widely feared.²

CASE STUDY

Security in Lakes State, South Sudan since 2005

A study undertaken by the Small Arms Survey in Lakes State in 2006 found that every third respondent admitted to owning a firearm (most commonly an AK-47 assault rifle) either individually or as part of a family. The survey found that most residents of Lakes State were in favour of stronger measures to control private gun ownership. It also found that while some respondents said that security had improved after the signing of the CPA, others reported feeling less secure than during the conflict. Most households had experienced armed robberies and fights involving firearms since January 2005.³

Impacts of SALW on development (M3 S3)

Socio-economic underdevelopment presents both a breeding ground for and a consequence of the proliferation and misuse of SALW.⁴

After a conflict, SALW may become instruments for other forms of violence, such as crime and banditry and disruption of economic activities. In countries that receive development assistance or where emergency relief is required for people affected by violence or other disasters, SALW use can make it too unsafe for such help to be provided.

¹ UNDDR 2006, Introduction, p 3. UNDP defines human security as a broad range of seven threats (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political) to *individuals*. See UNDP 1994.

² HSBA 2011, p 4; McEvoy and LeBrun April 2010, p 27.

³ BICC 2007, p 11.

⁴ Heinrich 2006, p 5.

EXAMPLE

Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria States, South Sudan

Home to 1.3 million inhabitants, Jonglei State in South Sudan is also among the most underdeveloped regions in the world. Multiple ethnic communities migrate seasonally to sustain cattle and preserve their pastoralist way of life. Access to water and grazing areas, as well as cattle rustling, are thus primary triggers of conflict. Tensions between communities are aggravated by pervasive tribalism and perceptions of state bias, the virtual absence of roads and infrastructure, widespread food insecurity, land disputes and limited access to justice. The prevalence of violence in Jonglei is also partly due to the fact that many former fighters who have not been absorbed into the SPLA or other security institutions and have nothing much to do retain their guns, military orientation and old allegiances.⁵

In Eastern Equatoria State (EES), severe drought and food insecurity affecting large parts of the state since April 2009 have been widely reported as another key reason for increasing levels of armed violence and insecurity. Violence peaked at the end of 2009, coinciding with the height of the migratory period for cattle keepers, who in the face of drought have to venture farther into unfamiliar or hostile territory in search of pasture and water points. For example, in Isoke *payam*, Ikotos county, 40 out of 60 reported violent incidents from September to December 2009 involved gunshot injuries. Where the previous norm was one to two gunshot wounds per month, by the end of 2009 the rate had increased to one to two per week.⁶

Impacts of SALW by gender and age (M3 S4)

The key insight brought by a gender and age analysis is not merely the articulation of gendered differences but, more significantly, how to address the inequalities between women and men and girls and boys which are manifested in the fact that globally, women have less access to power, resources and decision-making processes than men.

Men	The highest percentage of both perpetrators and victims of SALW violence are men. Men often see weapons as symbols of ‘courage’, ‘masculinity’ or ‘honour’, and therefore as positive and necessary for their survival. ⁷
Women	The uncontrolled proliferation of SALW increases the threat of intimidation and abuse of women and heightens the lethality of violence against women, ⁸ both inside and outside the home. Sexual and gender-based violence is also often committed against men and boys, but this issue has been severely under-reported and under-researched to date. ⁹ Women also can play roles that are conducive to SALW proliferation. Sometimes they encourage their men to arm, or play a key role in encouraging small arms violence, including by supporting and promoting cycles of revenge. ¹⁰ Sometimes they play a role in weapons smuggling; sometimes they arm themselves; and sometimes they also serve as combatants in civil conflict.
Children/ youth	In situations of violence and conflict, children and youth are pushed, pulled and forced into various actions by people, events and decisions over which they have little or no control. In many countries around the world there is a relationship between youth unemployment and violence that requires further consideration in relation to the impact of SALW.

This handout is taken from *Small arms and light weapons: A training manual*, published by Saferworld, February 2012

⁵ International Crisis Group 2009, p i.

⁶ HSBA 2010, p 4.

⁷ BICC 2007, p 5.

⁸ Gender-based violence (GBV) is a form of violence that targets individuals because of their gender and can be perpetrated against women or men. GBV includes violent acts such as rape, torture, mutilation, sexual slavery, forced impregnation and murder. Especially in war and conflict situations, the risk and incidence of GBV increases. In BICC 2006, pp 10–11.

⁹ RLP 2009.

¹⁰ BICC 2007, p 6.

MODULE 4

Role of civil society in small arms and light weapons control

Objective

To show why civil society actors should contribute to small arms and light weapons (SALW) control and to emphasise the role that civil society can play in addressing the wide range of SALW, security and conflict issues.

Summary

Democracy means that ordinary people should be able to participate in the processes that affect their lives. This module considers the role of civil society organisations in the control of SALW. Because there are different types of civil society organisations, there are various roles that they can play. In Module 5, we look at how best civil society can engage on the issue of SALW control. This module presents a clear picture of what civil society is and why civil society engagement in SALW control is important. It also highlights the challenges that impede civil society engagement in SALW control and outlines a framework of international agreements and protocols within which civil society organisations can be involved in SALW control.

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Introduction					
Introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Become comfortable with group. 		Introductions – find out and present name and 3 things about partners.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ List of participants ■ Name badges 	9.00–9.20am (20 mins)
Course overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand what is included in the curriculum. ■ Agree on the agenda. 	1. Exercise to identify participants' expectations from the training.	On flash cards participants write their expectations from the training (1–2), read out to others and paste on the wall. These can be revisited at the end of the workshop to check whether the workshop met their expectations.	Workshop agenda	9.20–9.45am (25 mins)
Establishing ground rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establish ground rules for training. 		Ground rules – group brainstorm		9.45–10.00am (15 mins)
Morning tea break					10.00–10.30am (30 mins)
Module 4: Role of civil society in small arms and light weapons control					
1 Defining civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An ability to define and identify civil society actors. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorm possible definitions of civil society. 2. Affirm key points and definitions. 3. Give out handouts. 	Ask participants the first thing that comes to their mind when you say 'civil society', write them on a flip chart to build up definitions.	Handout: Role of civil society	10.30–11.30am (60 mins)
2 Why is it important for civil society to be involved? (<i>Part 1</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An awareness of the legislations that underpin policies in favour of civil society in SALW control. 	Brief overview of the relevant international and regional agreements and protocols that have been drafted that underline the importance of civil society in SALW control.		Handout: Role of civil society	11.30am–12.30pm (120 mins)
Lunch					12.30–1.30pm (60 mins)
2 Why is it important for civil society to be involved? (<i>cont.</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding of the various roles civil society can play in efforts to control the proliferation of SALW. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorm the roles civil society can play in SALW control. 2. Affirm responses. 		Handout: Role of civil society	1.30–2.30pm
3 Challenges of civil society engagement on SALW, security, and conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An awareness of the challenges and limitations to civil society engagement on SALW, security, and conflict. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorm the challenges of civil society engagement on SALW, security, and conflict. 2. Reaffirm key challenges: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Lack of capacity of CSOs b. Tensions with national government c. Lack of international community support d. Internal social and political constraints. 3. Workshop exercise 1 Allow 20 minutes for the groups to prepare for the debate. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Divide participants into two groups to debate the role of civil society in SALW control. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Group 1 – opposes the idea of civil society engagement Group 2 – supports the idea of civil society engagement. <p>Allow 20 minutes for the groups to prepare for the debate. Each group should select three people as their representatives and assist with the development of the themes to be argued.</p> <p>Each group should provide examples from their experiences to support their arguments. After the preparation time, host a debate with the groups alternating speakers (Group 1, Speaker 1; Group 2, Speaker 1; Group 1, Speaker 2; Group 2, Speaker 2; etc).</p> <p>Each speaker should be allowed 5 minutes (the facilitator will need to enforce time constraints) and after the final speaker, the audience should select a winning team.</p>	Handout: Role of civil society	2.30–4.30pm (120 min)
End of day: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Wrap-up ■ Evaluation 					4.30–5.00pm (30 mins)

1 Defining civil society

The presence of SALW threatens the lives and livelihood of individuals as they go about their daily activities. The problem of the proliferation, availability and use of SALW is therefore not only a problem that affects the state, but also one that threatens the security and well-being of ordinary people. Thus, civil society organisations as well as individuals have an interest and a role in becoming an effective part of SALW collection and destruction programmes. In particular, civil society organisations can exert a special influence over SALW control activities, as they often have the trust of the communities where they work and are seen to be relatively impartial and/or neutral.

Though there are many distinct definitions of ‘civil society’, the simplest way of thinking of civil society is that these are institutions or groups that are distinct from state authorities and state-related institutions. Therefore, civil society refers essentially to intermediary institutions that give voice to various sectors of society and enrich public participation in governance.¹

Civil society includes, among others:

- registered charities or non-profit groups
- non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
- community groups or ‘community-based organisations’ (CBOs)
- women’s organisations
- faith-based organisations and religious groups
- professional associations and representatives of the private sector/business community
- self-help groups
- social movements
- coalitions and advocacy groups
- media organisations
- think tanks
- schools and universities
- political parties in their capacity as generators of security policy
- youth groups
- traditional groups or structures, such as elders or ‘generational groups’.

2 Why is it important for civil society to be involved?

There are many possible reasons why it can be important for civil society to be engaged on SALW, security and conflict issues. The context in which civil society work, and the nature of the problems in each country, will determine what is feasible and useful in terms of civil society’s role and activities.

¹ DCAF 2009, p 3.

International practice

States have recognised the important role civil society can play, which has been affirmed in many international, regional and national declarations, agreements and guidelines.

Relevant international agreements and protocols include:

United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA) (2001).² Section I, 16 of UN PoA recognises “the important contribution of civil society, including non-governmental organisations and industry in, *inter alia*, assisting governments to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”.³ It also acknowledges the vital role of civil society and NGOs, especially in the field of public awareness and confidence building on the problems and consequences of the illicit trade in SALW, with a view to eradicating the illicit trade in SALW. The PoA also encourages the relevant international and regional organisations and states to facilitate the appropriate co-operation of civil society, including NGOs, in activities related to the prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects.⁴

Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000). Resolution 1325 specifically affirms international recognition of the impact of war on women and of women’s contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace: “... the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace building, and ... the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution”.⁵

In recognising the role of women, Resolution 1325 seeks to refine the roles and obligations of civil society by calling on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, *inter alia*: (a) the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; and (c) measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary.

Relevant regional agreements and protocols

The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (adopted at Bamako, 3 November 2000)⁶ recognises the involvement of civil society in support of the central role of governments, specifically committing states to “encourage, where appropriate, the active involvement of civil society in the formulation and implementation of a national action plan to deal with the problem” of illicit SALW.⁷ The Declaration also calls for close co-operation between the Organisation for African Unity (OAU, now the African Union or AU), regional economic communities (such as the East African Community), the United Nations Agencies, and other international organisations in close association with civil society organisations to address the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW.

The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004), Article 2 (c), commits states to “promote and facilitate information sharing and co-operation between

² For a brief overview of the UN PoA, see Coe and Smith 2003, pp 42–44.

³ UN PoA.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000).

⁶ For a brief overview of the Bamako Declaration, see Coe and Smith 2003, pp 47–49.

⁷ *Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Section 3.A (viii) p 4.

the governments in the sub-region, as well as between governments, inter-governmental organisations and civil society, in all matters relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons”.⁸

The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2000)

recognises the need for information-sharing and co-operation in all matters relating to illicit SALW, including the promotion of research and data collection in the region and encouraging co-operation among governments and civil society;⁹ and acknowledges that the effective implementation of the declaration by individual states requires the co-operation of the UN, international organisations, regional organisations, as well as participation by civil society in preventing and reducing the problem of illicit SALW.¹⁰ Civil society has been engaged throughout the development of the Nairobi Declaration and is now supporting the implementation of the Declaration’s provisions; a large number of local civil society organisations are members of their respective National Focal Points. For instance, People with Disabilities, Center for Conflict Resolution, Oxfam GB, and Uganda Joint Christian Council are members of Uganda’s National Focal Point (NFP).¹¹

Democratic practice

Civil society and the government have different roles and responsibilities. However, a meaningful improvement of dynamics surrounding SALW, security and conflict requires action from both government authorities and civil society. This is why civil society groups need to engage in partnership with government.¹²

Because civil society is generally autonomous from government interests, it has the potential to become a means by which to increase accountability, credibility and responsiveness of actors such as government, police and the military. Civil society actors may become an important force for peace and security, for example by monitoring abuses of power, human rights violations, and small arms issues and by increasing public awareness of these issues through advocacy. These actions could put pressure on government authorities to reduce the use of violence, to be more responsive and accountable to its citizens, and to ensure justice and respect for human rights. Civil society can check the power of the state and private sector by playing a type of ‘watchdog’ role.¹³

However, it is important to note that, especially in post-conflict environments, this type of role and action by civil society can carry **risks** (e.g. personal safety and security, politicisation, etc.). This work needs to be planned and carried out with great care in order to minimise potential risks. In situations where there is (still) a high level of mistrust between civil society and the security sector, it may be important to approach the security sector slowly and cautiously and build trust first in order to ensure the safety of staff, decrease risks and maximise outputs. It is also important to critically assess what levels of influence civil society may have over state actors: in some cases there may be considerable potential to influence the state, while in others there is very little potential for influence.

Civil society groups may also be able to help pressure belligerents, facilitate and increase common understanding and support for peace processes, facilitate and increase the voice of women and other vulnerable groups, and monitor that peace accords are respected by the parties.¹⁴

⁸ *Nairobi Protocol For The Prevention, Control And Reduction Of Small Arms And Light Weapons In The Great Lakes Region And The Horn Of Africa*, 2004, pp 3–4.

⁹ *Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa*, 2000, p iii.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p iv.

¹¹ Coe and Smith 2003, p 52.

¹² GTZ and BICC 2005, p 41.

¹³ *Ibid*, p 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p 2.

The involvement and participation of civil society in policy making is a core element of good governance. The term ‘good governance’ means that government decision-making and the distribution of state resources is participatory (ordinary people are consulted), accountable (people can complain about problems), transparent (everybody knows why certain decisions are made), effective, and respects the rule of law. Many governments have declared their commitment to fulfilling these criteria of good governance or ratified agreements in this regard. Civil society is an important stakeholder within this process, as it can sometimes: improve the quality of policy making by providing the government with a wider spectrum of information, views and suggestions; voice the concerns and needs of groups who might otherwise not be heard, including women and youth, and integrate their views within decision-making; inform and mobilise the public; enter into dialogue with the government, politicians and other actors of the security sector; and engage in lobbying.¹⁵

Additional capacity

Civil society is sometimes better placed than government or outsiders to identify the genuine/root causes of security, conflict, or SALW problems that are having an effect on daily security and the experience of people. This is because civil society actors often have an in-depth and valuable knowledge of the local context and sensitivity to the needs of local populations and cultural norms.¹⁶ Moreover, civil society actors often have better access to and understanding of the different conflict and security experiences of men, women and children in communities than outsiders or government actors. Therefore, in these ways, civil society may be able to highlight these issues and develop appropriate responses in ways that government and outsiders cannot.

In many situations where the state’s ability is weak, civil society actors may be the only ones capable of responding to security and SALW threats or of managing conflict prevention/peacebuilding processes. In these situations, civil society actors need to be brought in as partners on these issues, particularly in communities where the footprint of the state is sometimes non-existent. In a post-conflict peacebuilding situation, civil society actors have the potential to lead initiatives in communities through actions such as reconciliation, mine action, and so forth. In addition, civil society organisations often play a role in supporting peace dialogues or helping conflicting groups in reconciliation processes. In these processes, civil society can also play an important role in making sure that vulnerable or otherwise marginalised groups (e.g. women, youth or minority groups) are able to participate in peace and reconciliation processes.¹⁷

Civil society actors can also potentially help to reduce mistrust in the security forces by becoming engaged in, for example, SALW reduction, community policing, peace committee or other very local and community-based activities meant to improve security and conflict prevention capacities. Civil society actors may be able to play a vital role in monitoring tensions and providing early warning of the risks of an outbreak or recurrence of conflict.¹⁸

¹⁵ GTZ and BICC 2005, p 41.

¹⁶ Adapted from OECD 2005.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p 2.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p 3.

3

Challenges of civil society engagement on SALW, security and conflict

While there may be increasing trends for greater civil society engagement on SALW, security and conflict, there are still a number of significant challenges.

Lack of capacity of civil society organisations

In order for civil society to play an important role and make a positive impact, civil society actors need to be **independent, strong, credible**, hold the **respect** of the community, and not be marginalised. If civil society organisations or actors are “to serve as an ongoing source of input to government decision-making and public debate, solid leadership is required, alongside an ability to inform and engage the public, and to engage with the state on policy issues. This requires capacity on the part of the [civil society organisation (CSO)], and explains the effort directed towards CSO capacity-building in many donor programs”.¹⁹ In order for civil society actors to effectively engage on SALW, security and conflict issues, they first need to examine their own credibility, capacities and limitations.

There often is capacity (expertise, partnerships, influence, funding, etc.) within countries that is not being engaged. It is quite uncommon for civil society actors engaged in non-security issues (such as aspects of democracy promotion) to either be unaware of or actively avoid SALW, security and conflict issues. Similarly, those civil society actors already engaged on these issues frequently do not seek out ‘external’ expertise as often as is desirable.

Tensions between civil society actors and national government

Governments can obstruct the efforts of civil society actors by limiting access to information and by limiting or completely barring their participation in security policy development and implementation.²⁰

There is often a long history of mutual suspicion between government and the security services on the one hand and civil society on the other hand, leading to unwillingness on the part of civil society actors to engage in dialogue on security sector reform and policies.²¹ This may result in a breakdown of respect and confidence between the two sides, thus making it difficult for them to collaborate. Similarly, there may be histories of suspicion or conflict between government actors or between different civil society actors themselves. The building up of confidence and relations between civil society actors can often be a significantly difficult process as their relationships may already be severely politicised or contention may emerge as they begin to try and collaborate. Building confidence and credible relationships between all actors needs to be a part of any civil society engagement and capacity-building process.

Nature of the support to civil society

There may also be **sustainability constraints** when it comes to strengthening civil society in a given context. In South Sudan, for instance, most civil society organisations are externally funded, with little or no local funding. If donors withdraw their financial support, civil

¹⁹ Caparini 2004, p 10.

²⁰ Ball 2006, p 8.

²¹ *Ibid*, p 9.

society activities will probably cease.²² This issue is largely taken for granted, with little discussion by civil society or donors.

In addition, opinions about how best SALW, security and peacebuilding issues should be addressed can differ between national governments, civil society groups or organisations and international and donor agencies. In these cases, international funding to civil society may not support either what civil society thinks should be priority or what national governments would like to engage. International donors have in recent years made strong commitments to working to support government priorities as well as civil society capacity. But issues around peace and security remain sensitive because they touch on the central authority of the state and the way in which people relate to each other and the state within the country.

The personal safety of civil society activists particularly on issues of security and SALW control cannot always be guaranteed. They may be targeted with threats or violence by actors whose interests are threatened by civil society engagement. It has been suggested that in countries where there is limited freedom for discussing peace and security issues, and for civil society to be active on these issues, that the international community (both official and non-governmental) can play an important role in legitimising the actions of local civil society, creating space for them to work, and protecting those who speak out for change.²³

Internal social and political constraints

There is a danger of seeing civil society in a given context as a uniformly positive force. Civil society simply **reflects the local situation**, and civil society actors may pursue undemocratic and unprogressive goals. For example, in a diverse society where democratic values are still weak, civil society actors can sometimes promote the interests and views of only certain groups, which can impede democracy and development. Similarly, civil society actors may exclude women from broader public processes if they simply **reinforce existing values** or do not challenge public decision-making that only represents certain interest groups (e.g. civil society organisation could be allied to a particular ethnic group or political party).

External actors need to be cautious when dealing with civil society actors. They should ensure that despite civil society actors' diverse and sometimes opposing interests, they promote democracy and development rather than ethnic conflict and patronage. Civil society organisations that emphasise **internal democracy**, for example, may be more credible in the eyes of the community and the government.²⁴

Civil society actors often also experience internal problems, such as not having enough knowledge of the issues or being nervous about engaging with representatives of the security institutions. This is especially common in countries with a history of authoritarian governance that has "made security off-limits not only to civil society actors but also to many within government who should have been involved in the development and implementation of security policies".²⁵ But they can also be the result of severe conflict during which access to information, education and more formal governance structures has broken down.

²² Duhu 2005.

²³ Ball 2006; although this chapter specifically looks at civil society engagement on security sector reform, its analysis is broadly appropriate for both SALW and conflict issues.

²⁴ Duhu 2005.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

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For further reference on the dilemmas and historical problems in developing gendered approaches to SALW, security and conflict, see:

- Vanessa Farr, Henri Myrtilinen and Albrecht Schnabel, *Sexed Pistols: The Gendered Impacts of Prolific Small Arms* (United Nations University 2010), www.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/

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- some more recent outputs from Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO):
 - Inger Skjelsbæk, 'The Elephant in the Room: An Overview of How Sexual Violence came to be Seen as a Weapon of War' (PRIO, May 2010)
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- The impact of armed violence on poverty and development – Full report of the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, March 2005), pp 17–23
- *Gender and Armed Conflict: Cutting Edge Pack* (BRIDGE, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2003)²⁶
- The PeaceWomen web portal also keep resources relating to gender/women and SALW, security and conflict: www.peacewomen.org/portal_resources.php

Peace Women, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html#Full

²⁶ BRIDGE was a project to "support gender advocacy and mainstreaming efforts by bridging the gaps between theory, policy and practice with accessible and diverse gender information in print and online." It is somewhat dated, but still provides reasonably good reference material in this case.

Workshop exercise

Exercise 1

Debating the role of civil society

Divide participants into two groups. Ask participants to prepare themselves for a debate on the role of civil society in SALW control.

- Group 1 – opposes the idea of civil society engagement
- Group 2 – supports the idea of civil society engagement

Allow 20 minutes for the groups to prepare for the debate and 30 minutes for the debate. Each group should select three people as their representatives and assist with the development of the themes to be argued. Each group should provide examples from their experiences to support their arguments. After the preparation time, host a debate with the groups alternating speakers (Group 1, Speaker 1; Group 2, Speaker 1; Group 1, Speaker 2; Group 2, Speaker 2; etc). Each speaker should be allowed 5 minutes (the facilitator will need to enforce time constraints) and after the final speaker, the audience should select a winning team.

MODULE 4: HANDOUT

Role of civil society

Civil society organisations can exert a special influence over SALW control activities, as they often have the trust of the communities where they work and are seen to be relatively impartial and/or neutral.

Defining civil society (M4 S1)

The simplest way of thinking of civil society is that these are institutions or groups that are distinct from state authorities and state-related institutions. Therefore, civil society refers essentially to intermediary institutions that give voice to various sectors of society and enrich public participation in governance.¹

Why is it important for civil society to be involved? (M4 S2)

Legislations underpinning civil society involvement in SALW control

States have recognised the important role civil society can play, which has been affirmed in many international, regional and national declarations, agreements and guidelines.

The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons recognises the involvement of civil society in support of the central role of governments, specifically committing states to “encourage, where appropriate, the active involvement of civil society in the formulation and implementation of a national action plan to deal with the problem” of illicit SALW.²

The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004), Article 2 (c), commits states to “promote and facilitate information sharing and co-operation between the governments in the sub-region, as well as between governments, inter-governmental organisations and civil society, in all matters relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons”³

Civil society has been engaged throughout the development of the the **Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2000)** and is now supporting the implementation of the Declaration’s provisions.

Importance of civil society in SALW control (M4 S2)

Because civil society is generally autonomous from government interests, it has the potential to become a means by which to increase accountability, credibility and responsiveness of actors such as government, police and the military.

The involvement and participation of civil society in policy making is a core element of good governance. The term ‘good governance’ means that government decision-making and the distribution of state resources is participatory (ordinary people are consulted), accountable (people can complain about problems), transparent (everybody knows why certain decisions are made), effective, and respects the rule of law.

¹ DCAF 2009, p 3.

² *Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Section 3.A (viii) p 4.

³ *Nairobi Protocol For The Prevention, Control And Reduction Of Small Arms And Light Weapons In The Great Lakes Region And The Horn Of Africa*, 2004, pp 3–4.

Challenges of civil society engagement in SALW, security, and conflict (M4 S3)

While there may be increasing trends for greater civil society engagement on SALW, security and conflict, there are still a number of significant challenges.

- 1. Lack of capacity of civil society organisations:** In order for civil society actors to effectively engage on SALW, security and conflict issues, they first need to examine their own credibility, capacities and limitations.
- 2. Tensions between civil society actors and national governments:** Governments can obstruct the efforts of civil society actors by limiting access to information and by limiting or completely barring their participation in security policy development and implementation.
- 3. Nature of support to civil society:** There may be sustainability constraints when civil society organisations are externally funded – if donors withdraw support, civil society activities can cease.
- 4. Internal social and political constraints:** There is a danger of seeing civil society in a given context as a uniformly positive force. Civil society simply reflects the local situation, and civil society actors may pursue undemocratic and unprogressive goals.

MODULE 5

Planning and taking action on small arms and light weapons

Objective

To detail how civil society can become actively engaged in measures to address small arms and light weapons (SALW). Participants will have an enhanced understanding of the range of actions that civil society actors can take and how to plan and implement such actions effectively.

Summary

This module focuses on identifying specific actions which civil society actors can take with regards to SALW control, including research, awareness campaigns, education, advocacy and coalition-building. It also outlines the ways in which civil society actors can plan actions on SALW, taking into account the nature, extent and impact of SALW-specific problems. Some planning tools are suggested, as well as ways of developing strategies for achieving set goals.

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Introduction					
Introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Become comfortable with group. 		Introductions – find out and present name and 3 things about partners.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ List of participants ■ Name badges 	9.00–9.20am (20 mins)
Course overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand what is included in the curriculum. ■ Agree on the agenda. 	Exercise to identify participants' expectations from the training.	On flash cards participants write their expectations from the training (1–2), read out to others and paste on the wall. These can be revisited at the end of the workshop to check whether the workshop met their expectations.	Workshop agenda	9.20–9.45am (25 mins)
Establishing ground rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establish ground rules for training. 		Ground rules – group brainstorm.		9.45–10.00am (15 mins)
Morning tea break					10.00–10.30am (30 mins)
Module 5: Planning and taking action on small arms and light weapons					
1 Civil society actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding of the various civil society actions that can influence SALW control measures, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Research, assessment, and analysis <input type="checkbox"/> Public awareness-building and campaigning <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Advocacy <input type="checkbox"/> Networks and coalitions <input type="checkbox"/> Accountability and good governance <input type="checkbox"/> SALW collection and control <input type="checkbox"/> SALW destruction <input type="checkbox"/> Facilitating dialogue and longer-term conflict transformation. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorm with group what actions civil society can take to influence SALW control measures. 2. Pass around handout. 		Handout: Planning and taking action	10.30am– 12.00pm (90 mins)
Lunch					12.00–1.00pm (60 mins)
2 Planning action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ A broad grasp of the necessary stages needed when planning an action to influence SALW control. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Go over six planning stages, as outlined in handout. 2. Workshop exercise 1 Planning a civil society action. 	<p>In groups of three to six people, participants are required to plan a civil society action on SALW using some of the tools discussed. The groups will be required to make a presentation that includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Problem and solution trees <input type="checkbox"/> Goals and objectives of action <input type="checkbox"/> Action plans, including methods to be used, where and when. <p>Allow 30–40 minutes for the groups to prepare. It may be easier for each group to form a civil society organisation and give it a name and specific geographic area of operations.</p> <p>Each group should be allowed 5–10 minutes to present and allow for questions.</p>	Handout: Planning and taking action	1.00–3.00pm (120 mins)
End of day: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Wrap-up ■ Evaluation 					3.00–3.30pm (30 mins)

1 Civil society actions

Given that civil society is made up of a wide range of actors, there is also a wide range of actions that civil society actors can take to influence SALW control measures. This section outlines possible actions that civil society actors can undertake on their own or in partnership with government actors on issues related to SALW control.

Research, assessments and analysis

Civil society actors are well-placed to conduct needs assessments, analyses, or research into local perceptions of security and root causes of conflict, due to their closeness to specific communities. Such assessments can provide valuable insights and information for local governments as well as international organisations to incorporate into their policies and programmes to ensure that responses are addressing the real problems of people and are sustainable.¹ A survey or campaign on SALW issues, for example, should not only highlight those groups that possess illegal weapons but should also find out reasons why a society has developed a demand for arms, why people do not feel protected by the state security forces, and why people prefer to protect themselves instead of relying on the state security forces.²

Because they are often seen as ‘unthreatening’, civil society actors can sometimes be better placed to research and analyse the conflicts that affect communities than other actors who may be seen as having been actively engaged in precipitating the conflict. This can include documenting and analysing the successes and failures of peace processes, reporting on incidents as a means of conflict ‘early warning’ and recommending preventative measures by informing relevant stakeholders about signs which may trigger violent incidents. However, civil society actors can sometimes be politicised or may not be able to work in particular communities because of identity and other dynamics. In such cases, collaboration between different civil society organisations that have access to different communities becomes very important.

Public awareness-raising and campaigning

Public awareness-raising can be defined as a formal or informal information-sharing and persuasion process which targets a set of specific actors or groups that are meant to change behaviour or values in the short term (e.g. violence-free elections, participation in a gun collection, etc.) and over the long term (e.g. changing the values and perception about the utility of cattle raiding). Public awareness-raising is a key activity of civil society that is crucial in security provision, conflict prevention and processes for SALW control. The success of any security, peace and SALW control action depends to a great extent on making people aware of security and SALW problems; new policies and laws dealing with these issues; possible solutions to the problems; and opportunities for people to participate in resolving peace, security and SALW control issues.

Public awareness campaigns are very important in SALW control work. There are many different options and forms for undertaking awareness-raising, and the choice of specific activities should always depend on the local context. Some general forms of awareness-raising include:³

¹ One such example is the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), an initiative of the seven-member Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), www.cewarn.org/. CEWARN’s collection and analysis of information received from the field is done through National Research Institutes (NRIs), independent civil society bodies contracted directly by CEWARN.

² GTZ and BICC 2005, p 5.

³ Godnick *et al*/2005, Section 3, pp 41–55.

- **Community meetings or public awareness workshops:** The disadvantage of such meetings is that they usually do not reach a large number of people. Also, there is the problem of criteria for the selection of participants. For example, often only a limited number of people can participate due to the size of the venue. However, if carefully selected, these people can then go back to their communities and continue to spread the messages.
- **Public performances:** Theatre, circuses, puppets, dancing, music and other stage performances. The disadvantage is that participation from the audience is usually very limited or non-existent. However, many cultures respond very positively to drama and music, which resonates with the audience; this helps to get messages across.
- **Media:** Radio shows, TV series/soap operas, newspaper opinion pieces. However, other than in discussion formats, participation by the audience is non-existent or very limited, and no immediate feedback or answers to any questions can be given. The monitoring of broadcasted information can be difficult.
- **Sports events or festivals:** These are enjoyable and usually attract big crowds of people, which make the dissemination of a message very easy. But they run the risk of losing the message to the event itself.
- **Arts:** Civil society organisations can support a public awareness campaign by drawing or printing posters, slogans, stickers, or producing a video.
- **Working with college students and university faculties:** This permits organisations to gather resources and support for civil society actions or for creating educational events at the grassroots.
- **Reaching out to school students:** Certain issues could become part of the school curriculum, and some high schools encourage students to be involved in community projects.
- **Reaching out and working with 'invisible' groups:** In contexts where formal institutions (e.g. schools, universities, etc.) do not exist, there are usually other existing social frameworks and systems that can be worked with. This could mean engaging with cattle camp youth leaders or women in the village, or with church groups and networks.

EXAMPLE

Brazil

Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO, launched a campaign based on gender roles and illicit SALW possession. The campaign "Choose Gun-Free! It's Your Gun or Me!" encouraged women to persuade their husbands, fathers, boyfriends, cousins and neighbours to give up their weapons. Top female television stars served as spokespersons for the campaign and tried to promote a message that a man is actually more attractive without a gun. Combined with other initiatives to collect/destroy guns, as well as improved police capacity to store confiscated weapons and restrict trade, the campaign has been productive.⁴

Education

Education on issues pertaining to SALW is an element of awareness-raising. For example, the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) defines SALW Risk Education as "a process that promotes the adoption of safer behaviour by at-risk groups and by SALW holders, and which provides the links between affected communities, other SALW components and other sectors".⁵

Another relevant definition can be drawn from Mine Risk Education (MRE), which, according to SEESAC, refers to "activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines/UXO by raising awareness and promoting behavioural change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison."⁶

⁴ *Ibid*, Section 3, p 54.

⁵ UNDP SEESAC 2005, p iii.

⁶ *Ibid*.

Civil society organisations can conduct education using a variety of methods, including:

- Collecting, compiling, storing and disseminating information on SALW at the local, national, regional and international levels.
- Analysing collected information in relation to the SALW problem in the local context.
- Sharing and disseminating information on ongoing research and activities to actors at all levels.
- Liaising with the national and international media to raise public awareness of the dangers of SALW proliferation, the potential roles and responsibilities of the public and the ongoing and future initiatives of the organisation.
- Raising awareness and disseminating information on relevant laws and regulations.
- Co-ordinating the design and implementation of small arms and public education and awareness-raising campaigns.
- Reporting to relevant international and regional bodies on national small arms initiatives in accordance with commitments made within regional and international small arms agreements.⁷

Advocacy

Advocacy is a strategic *process* to *influence* the policies and practices that affect people's lives.⁸ Advocacy activities serve as one of the means to exercise influence, and is closely related to awareness-raising activities. Advocacy efforts may target people and institutions with influence at different levels, including at:

- **The local level**, such as local police stations, local government institutions, local party representatives, local chiefs.
- **The national level**, such as ministers or other senior government officials that initiate the development of security policies, and parliaments that approve or reject policies and budgets for their implementation.
- **The international level**, such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, key decision-makers and officials at the UN, AU, EU, OSCE, other multilateral organisations, and donors as well as country missions that are engaged in formulating, negotiating and ratifying treaties, declarations and protocols on SALW control. Important players at the international level also include other governments, especially through their embassies, and international NGOs that can be lobbied to support advocacy strategies.⁹

EXAMPLE

Kenya – advocacy from the bottom up and the top down

Kenya has been a key proponent of SALW control, both through the Nairobi Protocol processes and by strong involvement in international efforts to establish a global Arms Trade Treaty.¹⁰ The Kenyan National Focal Point on SALW Control (KNFP) has played a key role in this regard. The KNFP consists of representatives from a number of government departments, the security services and civil society and is mandated to co-ordinate national action on SALW control. Through their participation in the KNFP, civil society has been able to ensure that the voices of different groups within Kenyan society were reflected in national policies and international engagement on SALW issues.

At the local level, Kenyan civil society is also active in advocacy and action on SALW control. In North Pokot for example, local NGOs PeaceNet and SIKOM (supported by Saferworld) support community-based initiatives for arms management and control. Reformed warriors are encouraged to voluntarily surrender their guns through an adult education and sports programme. In parallel, the authorities of North Pokot have been trained on SALW control and discussions have been supported between them and the local youth about the best solutions to the SALW problems in the area.¹¹

⁷ Adapted from UNDP 2008, p 12.

⁸ Saferworld and Conciliation Resources 2011, p 3.

⁹ DCAF and UNDP 2008, pp 97–98.

¹⁰ Saferworld May 2011, p 11.

¹¹ Saferworld, Kenya case study: Changing attitudes to guns, www.saferworld.org.uk/where/kenya-case-study

Civil society actors need to be aware that there are a number of challenges they may encounter when conducting advocacy activities on SALW issues. One of these is the size of the SALW trade and therefore the interests involved in keeping the trade going. The reported (that is, legal) trade in SALW and ammunition is estimated to be more than US 6 billion per year.¹² The illegal trade is more difficult to estimate but given the evidence of SALW reaching countries that are under UN arms embargoes,¹³ or armed groups that are not authorised to acquire weapons, it is a very significant market. Illegal SALW trade often involves very powerful people – there are even allegations that some heads of state have been involved in this practice – which can make it very dangerous to challenge the practice.

In addition, most of the countries where the influx of SALW has been reported are emerging from years of civil war or state collapse. These countries suffer from high levels of poverty, lack of education, and lack of infrastructure such as roads, leaving some areas nearly inaccessible. Consequently, it may be difficult to gather the necessary information about the nature of the SALW problems and it may also not be clear who to target for advocacy work. The context within which advocacy work on SALW issues is conducted is also important in determining the changes that are advocated for. For example, in many post-conflict countries in the Horn of Africa, owning weapons is central to people's ability to protect their cattle and other economic assets. Any efforts to reduce SALW possession in civilian hands therefore needs to go hand in hand with more economic opportunities and better security provision.

Whereas governments are the authorities legally instituted to deal with the issue of proliferation of small arms, international organisations draw their authority mainly from their mandates and from their claim of global citizenry. However, for the most part they lack authority to impose any outcomes and are limited to using soft approaches of advocacy and lobbying political forces and communities around issues of SALW control and disarmament. Their successes therefore depend almost entirely on political good will and resources available for them to lobby communities and do advocacy work.¹⁴

Networks and coalitions

Building networks and coalitions of organisations or groups that care about the same issues and have the same goals can strengthen an organisation's actions. Generally, civil society campaigns are likely to be more powerful if they are promoted through a network or coalition of CSOs. A network provides strength in numbers, and can help protect individual organisations from being targets of abuse or political pressure. Through networks, civil society groups are able to pool human and financial resources and may be more efficient and effective.

EXAMPLE

International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)

The International Action Network on Small Arms is a key global movement against gun violence, linking civil society organisations working to stop the proliferation and misuse of SALW. IANSA supports efforts to make people safer by reducing demand for such weapons, improving firearm regulation and strengthening controls on arms transfers. IANSA is composed of a wide range of organisations concerned with small arms, including policy development organisations, national gun control groups, women's groups, research institutes, aid agencies, faith groups, survivors, human rights and community action organisations. It aims to reduce small arms violence by raising awareness among policy makers, the public and the media; by promoting civil society efforts to prevent arms proliferation and armed violence through policy development, public education and research; and by facilitating civil society participation in global and regional processes.

Source: IANSA website, www.iansa.org/aboutus

¹² Small Arms Survey website, www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets.html

¹³ For more info on UN arms embargoes and their monitoring see www.un.org/sc/committees

¹⁴ Ogalo 2008, pp 10–14.

At the national level, networks and coalitions dedicated to SALW control work have also come into being, offering important opportunities for collaboration within countries as well as between specific country networks and global networks to influence global policy processes.

EXAMPLE

South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms

SSANSA is a network of over 40 civil society organisations from across the ten states of South Sudan. The network was formed to facilitate national civil society organisations' action to make people safer from gun violence by preventing the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in South Sudan, the region and beyond. SSANSA is a national civil society network mandated to work with communities, churches and the government on issues of arms control and community security in South Sudan. SSANSA is a member of the regional Eastern Africa Action Network on Small Arms (EEANSA) and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). SSANSA has a national secretariat in Juba and affiliate networks in all ten states.

Source: SSANSA webpage, <http://ssansa.wordpress.com/about/>

Accountability and good governance

Civil society organisations can play a key role in advancing accountability and good governance in relation to arms control. They can do this through: (1) parliamentary engagement; (2) monitoring and reporting on disarmament programmes; and (3) advocating for better global arms controls (such as the efforts to establish a global Arms Trade Treaty or ATT) and monitoring the implementation of existing national or international measures that seek to regulate arms transactions. At the same time, advocacy on SALW issues can be linked to advocacy on poverty reduction, as it is impossible for development goals to be accomplished if SALW availability is fuelling insecurity.

SALW collection and control

Civil society organisations can play an important role in weapons collection and control processes as they can **mediate** between the government and the local population. SALW collection and control activities should be considered and embarked upon only within the framework of co-operation with the national government, civil authorities, legislators, the security sector and other civil society organisations. Civil society actors can participate in disarmament programmes in a number of different ways, including **raising awareness** of and spreading information about collection programmes to ensure that the communities where collection will take place are well informed about details of such programmes, including benefits, incentives, penalties and amnesty. Civil society actors can further encourage or persuade individuals or groups who may not be willing to surrender SALW directly to security forces to give up their weapons to other collectors.

Civil society can also make a contribution to building and enhancing public confidence in the SALW collection, control and destruction process by fulfilling the role of **independent monitors** ensuring the transparency of such processes. This role can include manning or attending weapon collection points as part of building public confidence in collection and control processes. In this way, civil society can confirm the accuracy and transparency of SALW collection and destruction processes and make independent reports to the national SALW authority, diplomatic representatives, international organisations and the media.¹⁵

EXAMPLE**'Bottom-up disarmament' in Somaliland**

When the Somali National Movement (SNM) came to power in the early 1990s, large quantities of weapons remained in the hands of the civilian population. Armed young men quickly established new clan-based militias and bandit deydey gangs. While the former had some legitimacy in the eyes of the people as clan defence organisations, the latter preyed on the civilian population and were viewed as criminals. Both types of groups extorted taxes from the civilian population, and in practise were often indistinguishable. The SNM's embryonic police and army were incapable of dealing with either the clan militia or deydey bandits, and unable to establish law and order. Crime, shoot-outs and an atmosphere of armed terror and impunity pervaded Somaliland. The new government formally announced a disarmament and integration process but lacked the capacity and authority to implement it. Instead, a popular community-based effort involving traders, civil society groups, traditional and religious leaders, women's groups and female kiosk traders successfully mounted a "No Gun" campaign, in which men with guns were shunned, heckled on the streets and refused services. Poets and musicians joined the campaign with public anti-gun performances while sheiks preached against the carrying of weapons at Friday mosque. In a matter of weeks this campaign cleared the streets of weapons and created sufficient popular pressure to persuade clan militias to disarm and join the national security forces. To this day, although Somaliland has not formally disarmed and few personal weapons have actually been collected, guns are seldom if ever seen in public. The Somaliland police and army remain, in the eyes of the public, the only legitimate persons entitled to carry weapons.¹⁶


SALW destruction

It is important to note that the destruction of collected weapons has to be executed by experts (usually the military) and not by civil society organisations. However, civil society can play other roles:

- **Monitoring:** Civil society organisations can assume a neutral role as observers by monitoring the process, ensuring transparency and accuracy. This activity needs to be done in co-operation with the executing agency/actor.
- **Awareness-raising:** By providing information on issues surrounding destruction, civil society organisation can ensure that the public feels involved and part of this process. Awareness-raising forms part of confidence-building measures, a vital aspect of wider peacebuilding.
- **Confidence-building:** By providing information on the 'when, where and why' of upcoming or planned destruction events, civil society organisations can help build confidence in and support for the process among the general public.

Artists, architects and students can participate in activities to design monuments or other works of art with the destroyed weapons. These can be done on site as part of an arts event, or can be stored and used later, as was done in Mozambique, or Cambodia. Some examples of works of art made with destroyed SALW are shown opposite.

It is important to note that not all destruction methods render SALW 100 percent inoperable – often weapons can still be stripped of workable parts and partly re-utilised (see Module 8). One such ineffectual method is open burning of SALW: though impressive as a ceremonial statement and public awareness material, weapons can end up still being usable, or at least salvageable. At times a second destruction phase is therefore necessary.



ABOVE Credit: W C Paes, BICC¹⁷

RIGHT Palm Trees II sculpture by Mao Makara. This work was produced using weapon parts destroyed in the 'Flame of Peace' weapon destruction programme in 2004. It forms part of Peace Art Project Cambodia, a collaboration between British artist Sasha Constable and the European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia. © Emma Phillips/Saferworld



Facilitating dialogue and longer-term conflict transformation

Particularly in post-conflict environments, civil society can play a crucial role in the long-term transformation of social values, beliefs and behaviour crucial for improving security, reducing armed violence, controlling weapons and prevention conflict or building peace. South Sudanese civil society organisations and groups have been very active since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in conducting grass-roots work on a range of peace, security and conflict issues. For example, campaigns were held (in collaboration with central and state government authorities) for a peaceful referendum without guns in different states of South Sudan before the 9 January 2011 referendum on independence.

2

Planning action

As noted in the previous section, there are various actions that civil society organisations can take to influence SALW control. In order to ensure that the limited resources available to civil society organisations are put to good use and that they achieve the maximum impact of their efforts, clear planning is required. The planning of an action can be a complex task. However, good planning is essential to a successful and sustainable activity, as it makes the most of opportunities and reduces the risk of failure. Before deciding to take action on such a sensitive issue as SALW control, assessments on the nature, extent and impact of specific SALW problems are vital for efficient and effective planning activities.

The following six phases should be considered when planning an action, though not all of them may be applicable to every context.

Overview of the six planning stages

Phase	Key questions to address	Steps involved
Phase 1 – assessing the situation	What is the context that you are operating in and what strengths do you bring to meet the challenges of that context?	Understanding problems and solutions Mapping solutions Analysing the environment Analysing your strengths and weaknesses
Phase 2 – establishing your goals	What kind of change are you seeking and who needs to make the change?	Prioritising solutions Setting goals
Phase 3 – developing your strategy	How can you most effectively influence those who need to change?	Framing the issue Identifying stakeholders Devising a strategy for influence
Phase 4 – planning the activity	Who will do what and when?	Setting objectives Developing an action plan
Phase 5 – implementing and monitoring	Are you doing the right things at the right time and are they working?	Implementing programmes and monitoring
Phase 6 – evaluating	What have you achieved and learned and what should you do differently in future?	Evaluation

Phase 1: Assessing the situation¹⁸

Analysing the situation is the basis of good planning. During this phase the following steps should be taken:

- Understanding problems and solutions
- Mapping potential solutions
- Analysing the environment.

This phase of the planning process is important in enabling civil society activists to use limited resources most effectively because:

- Unless there is a common and clear understanding of the problems faced, as well as their causes, consequences, and possible solutions, it is impossible to be clear about what it is exactly that the action is trying to change, how and why.
- Unless the factors – both internal and external – that may either help or hinder the action are understood, the programme of action may encounter difficulties that were not predicted.

It is important for activists to understand the problems they face, and their causes. This will help them decide where they should focus their efforts in addressing the problems. In addition, activists should be analysing their environment and thinking about how their organisation/group (internal factors) and their environment (external factors) will help them to maximise their potential and avoid problems as they develop their plan. They could consider how to use their particular experience and other strengths in order to respond to the main features of the environment. This will enable them to choose approaches that have the best chance of success.

¹⁸ Adapted from Coe and Smith 2003, p 80.

A number of factors will affect an action, such as:


- External factors, including main political, social, and economic conditions that might affect the ability of activists to make a contribution.
- Internal factors including activists own strengths, experience, resources, and contacts.

Tools that can be used to assist this stage of the process include:


- **Problem and Solution Trees:** Problem and Solution Trees are tools to help outline the problems that a society faces, their causes and their consequences. This analysis can then be used as a basis for developing a positive response to the situation. Problem and solution trees provide a way of representing complex issues more simply and identifying ways of addressing seemingly intractable problems.¹⁹

Problem Tree

Step 3




Step 2




Solution Tree

Step 5



Step 4



¹⁹ *Ibid*, p 72.

- **SWOT Analysis:** Analysis of **S**trengths, **W**eaknesses, **O**pportunities and **T**hreats can help to develop an overall sense of the main factors – both internal (Strengths and Weaknesses) and external (Opportunities and Threats) – that will have an influence on the action.

Phase 2: Establishing goals

Once the environment has been assessed, activists will be in a much better position to identify what they are trying to achieve. This phase of planning involves the following two steps:

- Prioritising solutions is the first step towards making sure that what an action seeks to achieve is **manageable, realistic, and relevant** to the context of the external environment, and within activists' own abilities.
- Clarifying the change that is being sought and identifying people to help focus and organise the analysis during this phase of planning.

Civil society engagement can take place in a variety of contexts (e.g. SALW, conflict and security issues); therefore, the **goals** each action will differ. The broader goals of engagement might be:

- Collecting specific types of weapons that are particularly dangerous or misused
- Removing weapons from the possession of specific actors
- Preventing weapons from re-inciting violence or conflict
- Mobilising society to deal with violence, insecurity and conflict in general
- Discrediting weapons and changing the mindset of people to emphasise bad aspects of weapon possession
- Preventing theft of weapons from government arsenals and stockpiles
- Drawing attention to the relationship between weapons, violence, insecurity and conflict
- Minimising criminal incidents involving SALW
- Reducing domestic and gender-based violence
- Removing SALW as a means of resolving conflict²⁰
- Making your community safer
- Making policing more effective in your area and security provision more accountable and responsive to your needs
- Supporting peace processes and peaceful dialogue
- Warning of and preventing violent conflict.

Once the specific goals of the action are defined, civil society activists should be well placed to develop a strategy that helps them make the most effective use of the opportunities available to them. The next section describes methods that may help in thinking about means to make the change happen.²¹

Phase 3: Developing a strategy

The third step is to think about the best ways to achieve the stated goals of the action:

- Framing the issue: Consider how to communicate about the issue the action will be focusing on, to both internal and external actors/audiences.
- Identifying and categorising stakeholders: Identify what actors might be interested in or directly affected by the action – potential allies and opponents, beneficiaries, etc.
- Devising an influencing strategy: Consider the different ways of influencing decision-makers, and select those that are likely to be most effective.

²⁰ Adapted from Godnick *et al*, 2005, Section 3, p 7.

²¹ Coe and Smith 2003, p 95.

Tools that may help during this phase of planning include:²²

- **Proposition statement:** A proposition statement can help frame the issue by providing a summary of the problem, your position, the proposed solution, and the response actions that are sought.
- **Influence map:** This is a tool that might be used in developing, presenting, and explaining the influencing strategy. It provides a simple visual guide to the routes that the activists will be taking in order to influence the target.

Phase 4: Planning an activity

This phase involves the following two steps:

- **Setting objectives:** A **goal** is a desired but not necessarily immediately measurable target: e.g. making people satisfied; ridding a community of firearms; decreasing violence in society thereby making communities safer. An **objective**, however, is a target that should be **specific** and **measurable**. A vital part of the planning process is to set the ‘short-term’ objectives which identify some of the steps on the way to achieving the action’s ultimate ‘long-term’ goal. For example, achieving effective change on small arms abuse is often a long-term process, so it is important to **quantify progress**. Setting short-term objectives should help to maintain motivation and demonstrate to supporters and funders that the work is making progress.²³

After establishing goals (see 1.2 above), to turn a goal into an objective, try to think of ways to measure the goal. For example:

Goal	Objective
Ridding a community of firearms	By the end of 2012, there will be no more than ten firearms in the community.
Decreasing violence in society	The number of violent acts will drop by 50 percent compared to the previous year.

Example: A goal can be stated as a general statement of a desired end-state – such as decreasing violence in society – and then broken down into a number of sub-objectives:

- By February, violent acts will have dropped by 20 percent
- By June, violent acts will drop a further 30 percent
- By November, violent acts will drop a further 10 percent.

Note: Objectives should be “SMART”: **S**pecific, **M**easurable, **A**ttainable, **R**ealistic and **T**imebound.²⁴

- **Developing an action plan:** This involves matching objectives with projected activities and resources. Activities are the means by which activists will achieve the change identified in their objectives. Ensuring that the most appropriate and effective action are implemented to achieve these objectives is fundamental to the success of the work.

Ask the following questions: *What activities will be needed? What resources will be needed?* Consider these two questions together in the action planning.

In order to achieve each objective that has been set consider what activities or **tasks** need to be done and in what order. Then for each, answer these questions:

- **Who** is responsible for getting it done?
- By **when** does it need to be done?
- **What** resources will be needed to get it done?

²² *Ibid*, pp 96–116.

²³ *Ibid*, p 118.

²⁴ Godnick *et al*, 2005, Section 3, pp 5–7.

Remember that resources include people (working/staff time, volunteers, etc.), partnerships, materials, and appropriate skills and competencies, as well as funding and other financial resources.

Action plans need to be built around the available opportunities for influencing people, institutions, or events. The SWOT analysis conducted during earlier phases of planning should remind activists of the opportunities that were previously identified. In answering these questions, activists should be realistic about their own capacity.²⁵

Activists are likely to encounter both **obstacles** and **opportunities**. Therefore, the SWOT is important to ensure that planning also bears in mind potential obstacles and challenges and enable an action to adapt to changes in the environment and respond to events as they occur. Even the best plan can become irrelevant very quickly if the environment changes. Ensure that the plan is flexible by building in consideration of contingencies; adaptations can be made to changing circumstances as they arise. Contingency planning involves asking the following questions:

- How might the political environment change? How would this affect our work? How would we react if it happened?
- How might those whom we are targeting, and others, respond to our actions? How might this affect our subsequent activity? Have we taken this into account in our planning?²⁶

Phase 5: Implementing and monitoring

As the plan is implemented, progress should be monitored. This phase in the process is important because it helps to identify what is working and what is not working. It also helps learning and adaptability, allowing activists to modify their strategy and tactics as events develop. As activists learn more about the context in which they are operating, and as the situation changes, they should be prepared to revise the objectives they established earlier. Effective monitoring, which involves comparing actual progress against original objectives, should help to do this appropriately. It may also be important to monitor the actions of others, in order to assess their successes and failures and learn from them.

To do this, information needs to be gathered about the following:

- What you, or others, have been doing
- The results achieved as a result of these interventions
- The environment and the way in which it is changing, as a result of the interventions or for other reasons.²⁷

Tools that may help focus and organise analysis during this phase of planning:

- **Setting indicators:** Indicators are measures of progress and must relate to the objectives that have been set.²⁸

²⁵ Coe and Smith 2003, p 122.

²⁶ *Ibid*, pp 122–123.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p 128.

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp 131–134.

Key factors to consider in setting indicators

- Initial data must be collected during a SALW survey, or soon after, so that progress can be identified as accurately as possible.
- Operational objectives for SALW control interventions must be SMART (see above).
- A range of progress indicators should be agreed and adopted.
- Monitoring and evaluation techniques, and the financial resources to support them, must be included as a component of the project document.
- The progress indicators must be included as a component of the Project Document.
- Part of the project may be to enhance the capacity of national data collection and analysis systems in order that information is available to feed into the various performance indicator mathematical models.
- The ground security environment and literacy levels of the population will be key factors in determining the most appropriate progress indicators to consider. *Statistical western style marketing surveys cannot be done with reasonable accuracy in disparate, illiterate communities under war conditions.* Notwithstanding these problems, it is possible to use appropriate progress indicators in such conditions, although a caveat should again be used when such data is released.
- All stakeholders should agree on the appropriate progress indicators before the commencement of a programme. This means that they have all then agreed on their objectives for the programme, which increases their motivation for participation and strengthens stakeholder ownership of the process. Different stakeholder aspirations may well mean using different progress indicators for what appear to be very similar programmes.²⁹

Phase 6: Evaluation

This phase in the process is important, as it allows activists to consider their effectiveness, to learn and improve and to determine if their actions were an efficient use of resources. The evaluation process could, for example, include:

- Periodic partner reviews to review relationships, procedures, and progress against targets and agree contingency action as necessary
- A mid-term review to review progress towards goals and to reassess the programme's strategic direction at the halfway point in its implementation
- A completion report to identify what went well and what did not go well, as a basis for establishing and disseminating lessons learned.³⁰

²⁹ See SEESAC 2004, p 3.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p 137.

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Workshop exercises

Exercise 1

Planning a civil society action

Divide participants into groups of three to six people. Ask participants to plan a civil society action on SALW, using some of the tools discussed. Depending on the level of the group, they could be asked to do one, or all of the elements below, and then to present back to the plenary:

- A problem and solution tree.
- Describing the goals and objectives of a certain action.
- Describing a plan for undertaking certain advocacy activities, including how this will be done, who the advocacy targets will be, where and when this will be done.

Allow 30–40 minutes for the groups to prepare one of the above. It may be easier for each group to form a civil society organisation (or to work as if they all belong to an existing organisation) and give it a name and specific geographic area of operations. Each group should be given 15–20 minutes to present and allow for questions.

MODULE 5: HANDOUT

Planning and taking action

Civil society actions (M5 S1)

Given that civil society is made up of a wide range of actors, there is also a wide range of actions that civil society actors can take to influence SALW control measures.

- **Research, assessments, and analysis** – many civil society organisations are uniquely placed within their local communities to access all members of society and to collect information from them. Civil society is sometimes better placed than government or outsiders to identify the genuine/root causes of security, conflict, or SALW problems that are having an effect on daily security and the experience of people.
- **Public awareness raising and campaigning** – civil society has the ability to reach out to all members of the local community and with a degree of authority and respect.
- **Education** – placing issues of security, peaceful conflict resolution and firearms control within the existing school curriculum can be an effective way of reaching the youth at an early and formative stage of their development.
- **Advocacy** – advocacy activities serve as one of the means to exercise influence. Advocacy efforts may target people and institutions with include at the local, national, and international levels.
- **Networking** – the sharing of information among civil society on efforts to control small arms is crucial. Creating effective networks can be a good way of ensuring the regular flow of information between organisations and of sharing experience so as to ensure that civil society is working in an efficient and complementary manner.
- **Accountability and good governance** – Civil society organisations can play a key role in advancing accountability and good governance through: (1) parliamentary engagement; (2) monitoring and reporting on disarmament programmes; and (3) advocating for better global arms controls (such as the efforts to establish a global Arms Trade Treaty or ATT) and monitoring the implementation of existing national or international measures.
- **SALW collection and control** - Civil society organisations can play an important role in weapons collection and control processes as they can mediate between the government and the local population. Civil society actors can participate in disarmament programmes in a number of different ways, including raising awareness of and spreading information about collection programmes.
- **Monitoring and evaluation** – because civil society is generally autonomous from government interests, it has the potential to become a means by which to increase accountability, credibility and responsiveness of actors such as government, police and the military. Civil society can check the power of the state and private sector by playing a type of ‘watchdog’ role.¹
- **Facilitating dialogue and longer-term conflict transformation** – Particularly in post-conflict environments, civil society can play a crucial role in the long-term transformation of social values, beliefs and behaviour crucial for improving security, reducing armed violence, controlling weapons and prevention conflict or building peace.

¹ *Ibid*, p 2.

Planning action (M5 S2)

Overview of the six planning stages

Phase	Key questions to address	Steps involved
Phase 1 Assessing the situation	What is the context that you are operating in and what strengths do you bring to meet the challenges of that context?	Understanding problems and solutions Mapping solutions Analysing the environment Analysing your strengths and weaknesses
Phase 2 Establishing your goals	What kind of change are you seeking and who needs to make the change?	Prioritising solutions Setting goals
Phase 3 Developing your strategy	How can you most effectively influence those who need to change?	Framing the issue Identifying stakeholders Devising a strategy for influence
Phase 4 Planning the activity	Who will do what and when?	Setting objectives Developing an action plan
Phase 5 Implementing and monitoring	Are you doing the right things at the right time and are they working?	Implementing programmes and monitoring
Phase 6 Evaluating	What have you achieved and learned and what should you do differently in future?	Evaluation

MODULE 6

National strategies and action plans for the control of small arms and light weapons

Objective

To explore options and obligations for national governments to combat small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation and misuse.

Summary

This module provides an overview of international SALW control measures, outlining international, regional and sub-regional agreements and protocols. It outlines general components of national SALW control measures, focusing on national regulation and national action plans, and illustrates examples of national plans in various contexts. It also outlines principles that should be applied for SALW control measures. Three types of national control programmes – directed, co-operative or nationally controlled – are also discussed in the module.

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Introduction					
Introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Become comfortable with group. 		Introductions – find out and present name and 3 things about partners.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ List of participants ■ Name badges 	9.00–9.20am (20 mins)
Course overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand what is included in the curriculum. ■ Agree on the agenda. 	Exercise to identify participants' expectations from the training.	On flash cards participants write their expectations from the training (1–2), read out to others and paste on the wall. These can be revisited at the end of the workshop to check whether the workshop met their expectations.	Workshop agenda	9.20–9.45am (25 mins)
Establishing ground rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establish ground rules for training. 		Ground rules – group brainstorm.		9.45–10.00am (15 mins)
Morning tea break					10.00–10.30am (30 mins)
Module 6: National strategies and action plans for the control of small arms and light weapons					
1 Regulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding of the issues distinguishing the question of SALW control from other arms control issues. ■ An awareness of the international and regional protocols for SALW control. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorming with group the issues that differentiate SALW control from other arms control issues. 2. Affirm key issues. 3. Provide brief overview of regulatory frameworks: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects b. Bamako Declaration c. Nairobi Protocol for the prevention, control, and reduction of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. 		Handout: National strategies and action plans	10.30–11.30am (60 mins)
1 Regulation: Guiding principles of SALW control (<i>subsection</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding of the basic principles of SALW control programmes. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorming the basic principles of SALW control programmes. 2. Affirm key principles and provide overview. 		Handout: National strategies and action plans	11.30am–12.30pm (60 mins)
Lunch					12.30–1.30pm (60 mins)
3 National SALW control measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding of the range of measures and activities introduced to control the proliferation of SALW. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Overview of National SALW Control measures (reduction, prevention, and co-ordination) and activities, including: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Cross border control issues b. Legislative and regulatory measures c. SALW surveys d. SALW awareness and communication strategies e. SALW collection operations f. SALW destruction operations g. Management of information h. SALW stockpile management. 		Handout: National strategies and action plans	1.30–2.30pm (60 mins)
4 Types of SALW control programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An awareness of the various SALW control programmes, including direct, co-operative, and national programmes. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Overview of the various SALW control programmes. 2. Case Study Review: Namibia and West Africa. 		Handout: National strategies and action plans	2.30–3.15pm (45 mins)

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Break					3.15–3.30pm (15 mins)
5 Gender in national SALW control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding of the importance of implementing gender mainstreaming in national SALW control. 	Discussion of the meaning of gender mainstreaming and the need to implement interventions based on context-specific evidence about what women and men are doing.		Handout: National strategies and action plans	3.30–4.15pm (45 mins)
6 National regulation of civilian possession	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ A grasp of the underlying principles of legislation governing the civilian possession of firearms. ■ An understanding that national legislation should regulate possession and use in an effort to prevent misuse and diversion. ■ An awareness of the ways in which to strengthen controls on civil possession of SALW at an international, national, and regional level. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorming the principles of legislation governing the civilian possession of firearms. 2. Affirm key principles. 3. Brainstorming the ways in which legislation can be strengthened to control civilian position of SALW 4. Affirm approaches. 5. Workshop exercise 1. 	<p>Participants are divided into groups and assigned specific questions to answer and present to the whole group.</p> <p>The exercise is repeated until all groups have presented on all the questions.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What kinds of impact does the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW have on individuals, communities and nations? 2. What are the differences between disarmament and SALW control measures? 3. What are the guiding principles of SALW control measures and who developed them and when? 4. What are the international agreements which cover the control and prevention of the proliferation of SALW? 5. What regulations exist at the international, regional and national levels that cover SALW? 6. What should be contained in National Action Plans to prevent and control the proliferation of SALW? 7. What factors are important for National Action Plans to prevent and control the proliferation of SALW to work? 8. Why are National Action Plans more effective than UN protocols in the prevention and control the proliferation of SALW? 9. How has the gender issue been addressed in issues to do with SALW? 	Handout: National strategies and action plans	4.15–5.45pm (90 mins)
End of day: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Wrap-up ■ Evaluation 					5.45–6.15pm (30 mins)

1

What distinguishes SALW from other arms control issues?

Four issues distinguish the question of the control of SALW from other arms control issues and complicate their legal regulation.

- There are limited institutional mechanisms for SALW control, and the few existing regimes aimed at control are relatively weak.
- Control efforts must distinguish between legitimate users of these categories of weapons, namely state security forces, and the illicit (illegal) proliferation that takes place outside the state system (e.g. transfer of state-held arms to non-state users).
- Regulation is also hampered by the involvement in illicit proliferation of non-state or sub-state actors operating outside the state system. These include ethnic and dissident groups, private commercial concerns, terrorist groups, rebel movements, irregular forces, private security companies and mercenaries. Such non- and sub-state proliferation has seriously undermined the state's traditional monopoly over the legitimate use of force to provide internal security and defence from external threats.
- The linkage between armed conflict over the control of resources and the trafficking in SALW makes legislation more difficult to implement. Revenues from the exploitation of natural resources are used not only for sustaining armies but also for personal enrichment and building political support. As a result, leaders of armed groups involved in exploitation are unwilling to give up control over these resources, or the SALW that makes control possible.¹

2

Regulation

Regulation of civilian possession is a major issue in the control of SALW. The need for effective regulation of civilian possession is widely recognised: despite some claims to the contrary, there is no general right to unrestricted civilian access to arms under any international instrument. There have been important initiatives at the regional and national levels to strengthen regulation over civilian possession. Additionally, the responsibility of countries to control weapons they have issued as well as those possessed by civilians has been reiterated at the international level. In addition, regional and international agreements, such as the UN Security Council Resolution 1209 (1998) on Adequate Regulation of Civilian Possession and Use, provide some support for the regulation of civilian possession.

Regulatory frameworks

By 1990, when the Cold War came to an end, well-defined agendas, structures and institutions had been developed to negotiate the control of nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons (excluding SALW) and to ensure compliance with, and enforcement of, the large number of negotiated international agreements on these issues.² These weapons

¹ United Nations Expert Group Meeting Report 2006, p 7.

² Barrie 1999.

are primarily in state control. The proliferation of SALW poses new challenges to the international system, however, as most illicit proliferation takes place outside the state system.³

At the international level, through ratification of the **UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects**, governments undertake to put into place adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production of SALW within their areas of jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such weapons, in order to prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in SALW, or their diversion to unauthorised recipients (Clause 2).

A variety of regional-level initiatives have also taken shape. For instance, as a member of the African Union, the Republic of South Sudan is required under the 2000 **Bamako Declaration** to take measures at national, regional and international level to deal with the problem of SALW. These include, among other measures, the development and implementation, with the involvement of civil society, of national programmes for the responsible management of illicit arms, the voluntary surrender of illicit SALW and the reintegration of demobilised youth; the codification and harmonisation of relevant legislation; the strengthening of regional and continental co-operation among police, customs and border control services; the elimination of the practice of dumping excess weapons in Africa; and the enactment of stringent legislation to control arms transfers. South Sudan is also likely to ratify the 2004 **Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa** (known simply as the Nairobi Protocol), under which it is compelled to take such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its national law the following conduct, when committed intentionally: (i) illicit trafficking in SALW; (ii) illicit manufacturing of SALW; (iii) illicit possession and misuse of SALW; and (iv) falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing or altering the markings on SALW.⁴ ‘Best Practice Guidelines’ assist the parties in implementing the Nairobi Protocol and are available at: www.recsasec.org/pub.htm

Guiding principles of SALW control

The basic principles of SALW control programmes are *safety, control, transparency, sustainability, replicability, impartiality* and *legitimacy*. They are to a certain extent interrelated, and can be adapted to fit any type of SALW control programme.⁵

- **Safety** is arguably the most important principle. The nature of SALW control programmes often requires that the local population or former warring factions surrender their weapons to some form of lawfully appointed national or international body. Inevitably, this also results in the movement of potentially dangerous or unstable ammunition and explosives, which poses a significant threat to human life. Any loss of life as a result of an internationally mandated or supported programme is likely to be considered by some to be a direct result of the establishment of that programme, and will have an impact on credibility of the programme in the eyes of the local population – without whose support the programme will fail. Programmes therefore must always have safety as their highest priority.
- The second principle of **control** is also directly related to that of safety. The operational aspects of the programme (i.e. SALW collection and destruction) should be carried out in a planned and controlled way. The programme should be properly managed to ensure a smooth, progressive, safe and secure collection and destruction plan. As a consequence, SALW collection and destruction operations require substantial logistical resources to ensure maximum effectiveness.

³ Stemmet 2001, pp 90–91.

⁴ See www.recsasec.org/pdf/Nairobi%20Protocol.pdf

⁵ Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson 2001.

- **Transparency** is an important principle in gaining and keeping the support of the local population or former warring factions. These groups should be allowed complete access to the process of collection and destruction, within the bounds of operational security. They must be confident that the weapons that they surrender are not going to be used against them by a rival faction or by the government. To ensure fairness and natural justice, it is important that all parties to the conflict are adequately represented in the decision-making process. Such involvement also helps to ensure that all interests and concerns are adequately dealt with. Transparency is also an important principle in the verification of the final disposal of the recovered weapons and ammunition.
- The **sustainability** of the programme is related to the principle of transparency. For operational reasons, it is necessary to start the collection or surrender process at a specific place in the community and then expand into other areas. Sufficient financial and logistic resources should be made available to sustain the surrender process until the whole community has been covered. No one part of the community will be persuaded to surrender weapons unless it can be convinced that the process will be applied throughout the entire community, and that rivals in the region will also have to surrender theirs. It is therefore important that programmes are not started until all necessary resources have been, and have been seen to be, identified. This statement does not necessarily prevent 'pilot' projects or 'preparatory assistance' from taking place; but no firm commitments to support a national programme should be made until resources have been identified and are available.
- The principle of **replicability** (i.e. the capacity of a programme to be repeated in different contexts) ensures that similar operating methods can be used throughout the programme. This means improved training, better use of resources, safe collection and destruction, complete visibility of weapon and ammunition accounting, and easily understood operating procedures. These also help to ensure the sustainability of the programme.
- The final principle of **legitimacy** is important to the development of a secure environment and the provision of resources to support an SALW control programme. The organisation responsible for the programme must be legitimate, and operate according to a national or international mandate given by an appropriate body. This mandate could come from the UN Security Council, a regional organisation or the recognised national government of the country. A programme that has not been formally mandated is very unlikely to succeed, as it will fail to attract the donor resources necessary or the support of the community it is trying to disarm.

3 National SALW control measures

The range of measures introduced to attempt to control the proliferation of SALW fall into three main groups:

- Reduction measures
- Preventative measures
- Co-ordination measures.⁶

These three broad themes of reduction, prevention and co-ordination provide an overview for the implementation of SALW collection programmes, stockpile management and destruction of SALW. The activities that combine to form national SALW control are:

⁶ UNDDR 2006, p 6.

- **Cross border control measures** – These efforts should include, but not be limited to, training; the exchange of information to support common action to contain and reduce illicit SALW trafficking across borders; and the conclusion of necessary agreements in this regard.⁷ They address operational capacity and law enforcement, and involve strengthening regional and continental co-operation among police, customs and border control services to address the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW.
- **Legislative and regulatory measures** – These address some of the legal considerations that underpin the implementation of an effective system of stockpile management, defined as the control and management, in all its aspects, of SALW in state and non-state possession.
- **SALW surveys** – These highlight critical areas where engagement is necessary to address the challenges posed by the presence of SALW. Surveys are useful for developing an accurate picture of the situation on which to build accurate responses for national and international policy makers. Such surveys could examine various dimensions of the SALW issue. For example, surveys could be done to assess the distribution of SALW in the country; the social impact of the presence of SALW; society's perceptions of the issue; and government capacities pertaining to SALW control.⁸
- **SALW awareness and communications strategies** – These strategies are aimed at enhancing the involvement of the public and communities. They support efforts to tackle the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW, and encourage responsible ownership and management of SALW. These strategies also facilitate free and fast flow of information among the law enforcement agencies in the sub-region.
- **SALW collection operations** – The most effective way that SALW can be kept in check is by programmes for small arms collection. The Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards/Guidelines (RMDS/G) establish best-practice technical guidelines and requirements for small arms collection programmes, from conception to execution, to ensure maximum effectiveness and safety.⁹
- **SALW destruction operations** – Recovered weapons need to be immediately and systematically destroyed in order to prevent further proliferation and reduce the risk of collected arms 'leaking' out of state possession again. The continued presence of weapons inevitably acts as a destabilising influence in the area, and the potential for illicit trade remains. If the public perceives that the weapons that they had handed in are just being transferred elsewhere, either legally or illegally, then essential public confidence in the programme will collapse.
- **Management of information** – Information management entails collecting, analysing, exchanging and disseminating information related to SALW control work. This information-sharing role should encompass informing, shaping and changing individual knowledge, perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, as well as institutional policy and practice. It should also include co-ordinating with public education and awareness-raising initiatives by civil society organisations.¹⁰
- **SALW stockpile management** – These are strategies to ensure security of national stockpiles of weapons and ammunition.

⁷ Nairobi Protocol, Articles 4 and 15.

⁸ Paes, Risser and Pietz 2004, p 5.

⁹ The Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards/Guidelines (RMDS/G) establish the guiding principles and technical methodology for the safe planning and execution of SALW collection activities in support of a SALW Control programme. See www.seesac.org/uploads/documents/0510e.pdf

¹⁰ UNDP 2008, pp 11–12.

4

Types of SALW control programmes

The debate on how to categorise the different types of SALW control programmes is still in progress. Categorisation has so far been based on the experience of programmes over the last ten years, which have indicated that there is no one ‘template’ (i.e. standard way of carrying out a programme). For the purposes of the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), three main types of programme have been suggested:

Directed programmes

The concept of a ‘directed’ SALW control programme allows more options for the way in which such programmes can take place. It covers the use of UN Security Council mandates, military technical agreements and legislation passed by UN transitional authorities or national governments to disarm warring factions, and is usually the concept behind the disarmament component of a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. It recognises that the initial aim of an SALW control programme should be to assist in the establishment of a secure and safe environment, rather than political stability, which can only survive in a secure environment. ‘Incentives’ are not used under this type of programme as they are ‘co-operative’ programmes, although there are occasions when it may be possible to run a ‘directed’ programme in parallel with a ‘co-operative’ programme.

The danger with this approach is that without co-ordination among the different units carrying out the physical disarmament of the various warring parties, there is a risk of creating a weapons imbalance. Should one party surrender a large proportion of their arms without the other doing the same, then it becomes highly vulnerable in the event of a breakdown in the peace process. This is particularly important if there are no external or international guarantors of security.¹¹

Co-operative programmes

This concept proposes the use of ‘incentives’ to disarm. It can be operated together with a ‘directed’ programme if the appropriate mandate exists. The concept accepts the complexity of operational environments in which SALW control takes place and therefore the potential future need to rapidly introduce a ‘directed’ programme if necessary. A major issue affecting ‘co-operative’ or voluntary disarmament is the type of incentive to be offered in return for the voluntary surrender of weapons.¹²

National control programmes

‘Directed’ or ‘co-operative’ programmes do not take account of environments where political stability and local security exist, but where there still are large amounts of illegally held weapons, or cases where the national government wishes to downsize its security forces. In these cases, the objectives that should be aimed at are either stockpile reduction or the prevention of crime. National control programmes recognise the need for legislative support for an amnesty programme to include the use of punitive measures (i.e. punishments of some kind) for those failing to comply. In effect, this concept is a combination of the ‘directed’ and ‘co-operative’ concepts, which are more specifically targeted at immediate post-conflict environments.

¹¹ See www.unddr.org/iddrs/04/download/IDDRS_411.pdf, p 9 for details of directed programmes.

¹² See www.unddr.org/iddrs/04/download/IDDRS_411.pdf, pp 9–11 for details of co-operative programmes.

National control programmes are aimed at criminal elements who try to keep weapons for criminal purposes. The development of legislative measures then allows for the implementation of ‘search-and-seize’ operations against criminal elements, while allowing people who legally hold weapons to keep them. Voluntary surrender programmes have previously been criticised for never targeting criminals; the development of the concept of this type of programme acknowledges this criticism and attempts to develop a framework to deal with the problem. Where strict national legislation is in place, and the local population is in no doubt of the legal consequences of illegal possession and use, weapons will be either surrendered or less frequently used, and, most importantly, the public perception of safety will be improved.¹³

The decision as to which type of programme to adopt will depend less on the political situation within a society than on the strength of the movement towards peace, the DDR operational plan, other peace support operations and the resources available. Whatever the type of SALW control programme developed, it should be designed to:

- **Deter** individuals, groups and organisations from illegally possessing or transferring SALW.
- **Deny** access to SALW by inappropriate holders or users.
- **Disrupt** criminal operations, and the movement and storage of SALW.
- **Destroy** surrendered, captured or surplus SALW.¹⁴

EXAMPLE

National Action Plan of Namibia¹⁵

In Namibia, Saferworld and SaferAfrica have assisted the National Focal Point (NFP)* in undertaking a comprehensive assessment, or mapping, of the small arms problem. During the mapping, Saferworld and SaferAfrica assisted the NFP in convening and facilitating workshops with law enforcement agencies and civil society organisations in all thirteen regions of the country and in conducting a survey with over 3,000 members of the public. The information collected during this exercise was then analysed and used to inform the development of a National Action Plan (NAP) for small arms control. The NAP outlines action to be taken across a range of issues, including education and awareness-raising, stockpile management, training and capacity-building, border controls, and policy and legislation. As part of their support to the implementation of this plan, Saferworld and SaferAfrica have provided training to civil society organisations in Namibia on the small arms issue and how to tackle it and on the role that civil society can play in implementing the NAP.

*Namibia uses the term ‘National Focal Point’ as the designation of its National SALW Commission

EXAMPLE

Control initiatives in West Africa

West Africa is at the forefront of African regions in efforts to curtail the proliferation of light weapons in the continent. Just under half of the ECOWAS states have signed the UN Firearms Protocol (in full, the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacture of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition). West African states are also engaged in regional and continental initiatives such as the Bamako Declaration. This declaration was the result of a ministerial conference at the end of 2000, which recommended national action including the co-ordination of agencies working on small arms issues; destruction of surplus stocks and confiscated weapons; and conclusion of bilateral arrangements for small arms control along borders. The key initiative is the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of SALW in West Africa. The moratorium has three main instruments: (a) the Moratorium Declaration; (b) the Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED) – UNDP support programme approved in March 1999; and (c) a Code of Conduct, adopted on 10 December 1999, which includes the establishment of national commissions (NatComs), preparation of reports, development of a regional arms register, harmonisation of legislation, training of security personnel, and the declaration of weapons and ammunition used for peacekeeping operations. There was also a commitment to arms collection and destruction.¹⁶

¹³ UNDDR, IDDRS, Module 4.11, p 12.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p 9.

¹⁵ UNDP 2008, p 8.

¹⁶ Vines 2005, pp 342–43.

5 Gender in national SALW control

The term 'gender' is used to describe those characteristics of women and men, which are socially constructed, while 'sex' refers to those which are biologically determined. People are born female or male but learn to be girls and boys who grow into women and men. This learned behaviour makes up gender identity and determines gender roles.¹⁷ The concept of gender relations refers to a complex system of personal and social relations of domination and power through which women and men are socially created and maintained and through which they gain access to power and material resources or are allocated status within society.¹⁸ In October 2000, the UN adopted Resolution 1325, which formally recognises that achieving gender justice is as central to social transformation as any other form of reparations after war. One of the key pillars of gender justice is through the mainstreaming of gender.

Gender mainstreaming recognises that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, which impacts significantly on the possibility for durable peace and reconciliation. Mainstreaming of gender is also undertaken in recognition of the fact that women play an important role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding. They must therefore participate equally, and be fully involved in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and deserve an increased role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.¹⁹ It is, however, important to note that a gender-sensitive approach is not exclusively about women, but about analysing gender more broadly. This approach factors in the special needs and capacities of men and women, and boys and girls, into the formulation of appropriate responses to issues of gender and SALW.

Interventions, such as humanitarian assistance, SALW control programmes and DDR programmes for ex-combatants, worsen gender inequality if they are administered in gender-blind ways. Mainstreaming gender awareness into the structures that govern armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction requires better co-operation between international institutions, states and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).²⁰

This can be done by taking the lead from the local realities, whereby interventions need to be based on context-specific evidence about what women and men are doing, and not on stereotypical interpretations of gender roles and relations that presume to know what they should be doing. Interventions should involve local organisations – particularly women's groups – in decision-making capacities. Outreach and support designed to help families and communities adjust to shifting gender roles and relations should be assessed on the local level to ensure they are appropriate to the particular community or region. The programmes of states and international organisations must also reflect the concerns and priorities expressed by local populations.²¹

Gender mainstreaming also requires improved implementation of existing international laws by international institutions and states, particularly in terms of recognition of impacts of armed conflict such as forced displacement, impoverishment and gender-based violence as violations of human rights and not as private, cultural concerns that are unavoidable outcomes of war. Implementation and enforcement of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 would represent a significant step forward.

¹⁷ World Health Organization 2002, p 4.

¹⁸ International Fund for Agricultural Development 2000, p 4.

¹⁹ Farr 2002, p 16.

²⁰ El Jack 2003, p 2.

²¹ *Ibid*, pp 2–4.

It is also necessary to involve women and provide gender training, although that does not in itself guarantee that gender concerns will be addressed or that women are automatically gender-aware. Training in identifying and addressing gendered concerns is important for everyone involved in post-conflict reconstruction. Any government should seek involvement of women and incorporate gender analysis into the formulation of strategies for SALW control.

EXAMPLE

National Action Plan for UN Resolution 1325 in the Philippines

In 2010 the government of the Philippines adopted the National Action Plan on 1325, which includes a commitment to enact and enforce laws regulating the possession of small arms. This is an explicit recognition of the impact of SALW on women and women's security. The Philippines is awash with small arms. Civilian firearms holdings in the country stand at 4.2 million. The Philippine National Police (PNP) puts loose firearms holdings at 1.1 million; there are roughly 500 applications for gun licensing processed every day. It was essential that small arms were included in the National Action Plan to implement 1325. Twenty six people are killed every day through murder and homicide, nearly 80 percent by small arms; this means that guns are used to kill twenty one Filipinos on a daily basis. According to the Zenarosa Commission's report *A Journey Towards HOPE*²² the Philippines ranks 10th in the number of gun homicide rates worldwide. In the 2010 Global Peace Index the Philippines was among the least peaceful countries in the world, placed 130 out of 149 countries ranked.²³

6 National regulation of civilian possession

Most countries have legislation governing the civilian possession of firearms, although the nature of this legislation varies considerably. While approaches vary, the underlying **principles** remain the same: they regulate possession and use in an effort to prevent misuse and diversion.

There are three essential principles for regulating small arms in the hands of civilians:²⁴

Regulating the firearm itself: Some policies target specific small arms because they are particularly dangerous for civilian use, often because they are highly deadly or easy to conceal. Specific small arms may also be prohibited because they are not only extremely deadly, but appear to serve no legitimate civilian function.²⁵

Regulating the use of the firearm:²⁶ In general, this refers to the need to set the terms and minimum competencies for people to legitimately use guns. It also usually sets out what types of behaviours or actions are deemed particularly dangerous to individuals using small arms or those around them.

Regulating the user of the firearm: This set of policies is designed to formalise who may or may not own and use small arms, and the procedures and administrative requirements necessary for keeping guns out of the hands of those who are prohibited.²⁷

In order to establish effective policies dealing with the civilian control of small arms there is also a need to address the many other factors driving demand and misuse of SALW.

²² Independent Commission Against Private Armies 2010.

²³ See full report at www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/2010/2010%20GPI%20Results%20Report.pdf

²⁴ See Annex 1 for details of content of the legislation.

²⁵ UNDP 2008, p 24.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p 28.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p 31.

These factors include:

- Economic inequality
- Fear of security forces or crime
- Corruption
- Injustice or oppression
- Cultures of violence.²⁸

Similarly, supply factors that enable availability and access to SALW need to be addressed. The regulation of civilian possession is integrally linked to issues of human security and although it has been acknowledged that regulation alone is not a simple solution, it is certainly seen as a positive step. Using a bottom-up approach to understand the demand factors of SALW, complemented with national legislation regulating civilian possession, is an effective way of reducing uncontrolled SALW and avoiding generic policies with little impact.²⁹

The regulation of civilian possession not only improves human security but also emphasises the need for people-centred regulation. In other words, the regulation of small arms needs to be done in a way that understands why civilians would want to possess small arms and should work in parallel with other efforts to address these reasons while regulating the arms.³⁰

National action in practice

In the last few years, many governments in a variety of contexts have strengthened controls on firearms possession by civilians. The nature of these changes has varied according to the priorities of the governments and the specific problems that have been highlighted. Yet viewed together, these changes seem to indicate a shift in many governments' attitudes and a gradual recognition of the importance of such regulation. Increasing national action may also provide the impetus for the development of further regional and international agreements.³¹

EXAMPLE

National action in South Sudan

The Government of South Sudan, in partnership with UNDP, established the South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control as a government focal point on small arms control initiatives and community security issues within government, and to work with development partners active on these issues. The Bureau started in the Office of the Vice-President, and then moved to the Ministry of Interior. Its mandate was approved by the Council of Ministers and it works to a Strategic Plan that guides the execution of its mandate as a government institution. Bureau staff have received trainings in technical areas of Community Security and Small Arms Control from both UNDP and Saferworld. The Bureau has attracted strategic partnerships with regional organisations like Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) and the national focal points on small arms from neighbouring countries, including Kenya and Uganda. RECSA has accepted the Bureau as a fully-fledged member. This collaboration is guiding policy development on small arms control issues.³²

Establishing norms of SALW control

There have been numerous national and regional initiatives in recent years to strengthen controls on civilian possession of SALW. However, in practice, inadequate controls on civilian possession and trade of SALW are undermining efforts to prevent and reduce trafficking and proliferation of SALW in many regions.³³

²⁸ Miller *et al* 2003, p 17.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p 15.

³² UNDP, Community Security and Arms Control in Southern Sudan.

³³ For example, weak border controls facilitate flows of illicit arms from states where civilian possession of SALW is widespread, weakly regulated and monitored.

It is therefore important to consider ways to strengthen such controls at an international level as well as at a national and regional level.

One approach can be to establish certain **minimum standards**. For example, one that has been widely discussed is to firmly establish that civilians should not have access to military-style SALW, or SALW specifically designed for military purposes. For many countries, such a standard would be an extreme example of 'lowest common denominator' commitments. For others, however, it might present alarming ambiguities (what exactly does 'military-style' mean?). Defining standards in terms of weapons that are specifically designed for military purposes raises problems relating to the production of highly capable automatic or semi-automatic weapons for the civilian market.

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Annex: Regulating small arms in the hands of civilians³⁴

Regulating small arms in the hands of civilians		
Regulating the firearm itself	Restrictions and prohibitions of certain types of weapons and of ammunition that can be held by civilians.	No military style weapons should be possessed by civilian. Further restrictions and prohibitions can focus on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Type and quantities of guns ■ Types and quantities of ammunition.
	Record-keeping and registration	Accurate and where possible computerised records should be maintained to clearly track the life span of a weapon, as well as those who use it or own it. A central firearms bureau typically maintains records on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Licence holders ■ Registered firearms ■ Seized or recovered firearms. And should also maintain records on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Private security companies ■ Gun dealers ■ Gun clubs.
	Ammunition	A valid firearms license should be shown every time ammunition is purchased, and dealers should record the quantity and information on the purchaser. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Limits can be placed on the amount that can be purchased in a month, as well as a limit to the amount of ammunition that can be stored. ■ Limits could be different for each category of firearm license. Ammunition for proscribed firearms use should also be prohibited for civilian purchase.
	Safety devices	As and if available technology permits, imposing safety devices on guns can be included in the legislation.
Regulating the use of firearms	Good reason for possession/genuine need	Acceptable reasons for possessing a firearm should be stipulated in the law.
	Public space and the carrying of guns	Restriction should be placed on the possession of firearms in public places. A licence to carry a firearm for an exceptional and limited period can be granted under the law.
	Storage	Safe storage requirements typically include unloading the gun, separating it from its ammunition, and the use of locked containers and trigger locks. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Inspections of storage facilities can be built into the process of registering a firearm.

³⁴ UNDP, *Small arms and light weapons legislation: How to Guide, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery*, July 2008, pp 39–42, www.undp.org/cpr/documents/sa_control/SALWGuide_Legislation.pdf

Regulating the user of firearms	Licence criteria	<p>Licenses or permits must be granted after a process of verifying individual's background, reasons for wanting to own or use a gun, competency and knowledge of laws, firearms use, and storage facilities. Is typically based on meeting requirements related to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Age limits ■ Criminal record check ■ Mental health ■ Domestic violence ■ Certification in safety or competency training ■ Proven knowledge of the gun laws.
	Licence and competency certificate renewal	<p>A firearms licence should not be permanent, and neither should a competency certificate. A licence renewal process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ verifies that the holder is still a responsible firearms user ■ places responsibility on licence holder to maintain 'fit and proper' behaviour, since there is a risk that the licence will be revoked ■ provides a disincentive to sell the firearm privately, since in that case the firearm cannot be produced at the time of licence renewal and the holder will be prosecuted for breaking the law. <p>Licences or permits should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ be subject to periodic renewal to keep pace with changing circumstances and competencies ■ are not transferable to another person or organisation ■ be revoked if they expire without being renewed.
	Keeping track of firearms and users	<p>Licenses or permits should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ not be permanent ■ be subject to periodic renewal to keep pace with changing circumstances and competencies ■ are not transferable to another person or organisation ■ be revoked if they expire without being renewed ■ or if necessary for reasons of public safety or national defence.
	Waiting period	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ A waiting or 'cooling off period' is a useful measure to establish a distance of time between application submission, review of the request and the granting of a licence. ■ 'Cooling off' periods may also be established between the date of purchase and the date of delivery of a firearm.
	Number of firearms permitted	<p>Limits on the number of firearms an individual can possess are typical.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Good reason should be required for every gun possessed under a firearms licence. ■ Good reason to possess a single firearm should not automatically justify a second firearm, or a third. Separate reason is needed for each firearm.

	Controlling retransfer	Need to match individual owner licenses with specific firearm registration data.
	Gender aspects	<p>Specific measures are required for perpetrators of domestic violence including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Spousal notification requiring current and former spouses to be notified before a gun licence may be issued. ■ Background and criminal record checks should include verifying an applicant's past record related to family or partner violence. ■ Making it a criminal offence to possess a gun while subject to an domestic violence restraining order. ■ Prohibition on gun ownership for a period of time for past domestic violence offences. ■ Police should seize firearms when a person becomes subject to a restraining order for the first time and owns a gun(s). ■ Safe storage should apply in all circumstances but is critical in situations where family or partner violence is occurring.
Implementation and enforcement	Power of enforcement	<p>There are numerous actions to be established as an offence in the law, some key items include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Possession without licence. ■ Holding an unregistered firearm. ■ Withholding information or misrepresentation in order to obtain a gun licence and to register a firearm. ■ Negligent discharge or use. ■ Breaching the criteria established for holding a licence such as not using a firearm under the influence of drugs or alcohol. ■ Carrying a firearm in a public place if deemed illegal under the law or in particular places specified gun free (e.g. schools, churches, hospitals). ■ Poor or illegal storage of guns and ammunition. ■ Police need to be empowered by the law to seize firearms of those deemed unfit to use firearms in some cases. ■ This power needs to be made mandatory and not discretionary to ensure maximum effect. ■ Capacity to safely store seized firearms also needs to be considered.
	Circumstances warranting seizure of a firearm	<p>Circumstances warranting seizure of a firearm(s) include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ If an individual is convicted of a crime relevant to possession of a firearm. ■ If an individual has perpetrated partner or family violence, and is convicted of that crime or placed under a restraining order. ■ If an individual is deemed unfit for firearm possession by a medical practitioner. ■ If an individual is deemed unfit for firearm possession by the police upon reasonable grounds. ■ If an individual dies, and the firearm is inherited by someone else (who should then go through the licensing procedure for that firearm).

Regulating the private industry	Licensing and registration fees	Need for a balanced registration fee.
	Communicating changes	Need to communicate changes in aspects of the legislation governing possession of firearm by civilian through awareness-raising activities.
	Private security companies	Private security companies require regulation premised on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ the accountability of the employer and employees to acquire store and use weapons with at least the same criteria and process as other civilians ■ a detailed appreciation of the use of the force.

Workshop exercises

Exercise 1

Group discussion of key issues

Divide participants into small groups. Ask each group to discuss one question from the list below and to make a presentation to the whole group on their conclusions.

1. What are the differences between disarmament and SALW control measures?
2. What are the guiding principles of SALW control measures?
3. What are the international agreements that cover the control and prevention of the proliferation of SALW?
4. What should be contained in a National Action Plan for South Sudan to prevent and control the proliferation of SALW?
5. How can the gender issue be addressed in relation to SALW control in South Sudan?

Allow 20 minutes for small group discussion and 20–30 minutes for presentation and whole group discussion. Repeat the exercise until all groups have discussed and made presentations on all the questions.

MODULE 6: HANDOUT

National strategies and action plans

Regulation (M6 S2)

There have been important initiatives at the regional and national levels to strengthen regulation over civilian possession.

- **UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects**
- **Bamako Declaration:** Countries required to take measures at national, regional, and international level to deal with SALW problem.
- **Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa:** Countries compelled to take such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its national law the following conduct, when committed intentionally: illicit trafficking, manufacturing, possession and misuse of SALW, in addition to falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing, or altering the markings on SALW.

Guiding principles of SALW control

The basic principles of SALW control programmes are:

- Safety
- Control
- Transparency
- Sustainability
- Replicability
- Impartiality
- Legitimacy.

National SALW control measures (M6 S3)

The range of measures introduced to attempt to control the proliferation of SALW:

- Reduction measures
- Preventative measures
- Co-ordination measures.¹

The activities that combine to form national SALW control are:

- Cross border control measures
- Legislative and regulatory measures
- SALW surveys
- SALW awareness and communications strategies
- SALW collection operations
- SALW destruction operations
- Management of information
- SALW stockpile management.

¹ UNDDR 2006, p 6.

Types of SALW control programmes (M6 S4)

For the purposes of the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), three main types of programme have been suggested:

Directed Programmes	<p>It covers the use of UN Security Council mandates, military technical agreements and legislation passed by UN transitional authorities or national governments to disarm warring factions, and is usually the concept behind the disarmament component of a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme.</p> <p>The danger with this approach is that without co-ordination among the different units carrying out the physical disarmament of the various warring parties, there is a risk of creating a weapons imbalance.</p>
Co-operative Programmes	<p>This concept proposes the use of 'incentives' to disarm. It can be operated together with a 'directed' programme if the appropriate mandate exists.</p> <p>A major issue affecting 'co-operative' or voluntary disarmament is the type of incentive to be offered in return for the voluntary surrender of weapons.²</p>
National Control Programmes	<p>National control programmes recognise the need for legislative support for an amnesty programme to include the use of punitive measures (i.e. punishments of some kind) for those failing to comply. In effect, this concept is a combination of the 'directed' and 'co-operative' concepts, which are more specifically targeted at immediate post-conflict environments.</p>

Whatever the type of SALW control programme developed, it should be designed to:

- **Deter** individuals, groups and organisations from illegally possessing or transferring SALW.
- **Deny** access to SALW by inappropriate holders or users.
- **Disrupt** criminal operations, and the movement and storage of SALW.
- **Destroy** surrendered, captured or surplus SALW.³

Gender in national SALW control (M6 S5)

This approach factors in the special needs and capacities of men and women, and boys and girls, into the formulation of appropriate responses to issues of gender and SALW.

Training in identifying and addressing gendered concerns is important for everyone involved in post-conflict reconstruction.

National regulation of civilian possession (M6 S6)

There are three essential principles for regulating small arms in the hands of civilians:⁴

- Regulating the firearm itself
- Regulating the use of the firearm

This handout is taken from *Small arms and light weapons: A training manual*, published by Saferworld, February 2012

² See www.unddr.org/iddrs/04/download/IDDRS_411.pdf, pp 9–11 for details of co-operative programmes.

³ *Ibid*, p 9.

⁴ See Annex 1 for details of content of the legislation.

MODULE 7

Collection of small arms and light weapons

Objective

To create deeper understanding of how the collection of small arms and light weapons (SALW) can help in reducing illicit possession and use of SALW and increase security.

Summary

This module begins with an outline of the risks and reasons for collection of SALW and suggests best practices for weapons collection. It distinguishes between two different types of weapons collection programmes – command/coercive and voluntary – and discusses the features of each type. It also briefly outlines steps to be taken in setting up a SALW collection programme. These include determining what types of weapons to collect, understanding SALW demand, and familiarisation with legal and political considerations. A number of case studies of weapons collection programmes relevant to South Sudan are presented in conclusion.

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Introduction					
Introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Become comfortable with group. 		Introductions – find out and present name and 3 things about partners.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ List of participants ■ Name badges 	9.00–9.20am (20 mins)
Course overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand what is included in the curriculum. ■ Agree on the agenda. 	Exercise to identify participants' expectations from the training.	On flash cards participants write their expectations from the training (1–2), read out to others and paste on the wall. These can be revisited at the end of the workshop to check whether the workshop met their expectations.	Workshop agenda	9.20–9.45am (25 mins)
Establishing ground rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establish ground rules for training. 		Ground rules – group brainstorm.		9.45–10.00am (15 mins)
Morning tea break					10.00–10.30am (30 mins)
Module 7: Collection of small arms and light weapons					
1 Why collect SALW?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding of the risks of SALW and the reason for their collection. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorm reasons why SALW collection is important. 2. Reaffirm responses. 		Handout A: Collection of SALW	10.30–11.30am (60 mins)
3 Different types of SALW collection programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An awareness of the different SALW collection programmes. 	Overview of both forced and voluntary disarmament programmes.		Handout A: Collection of SALW	11.30am–12.30pm (60 mins)
Lunch					12.30–1.30pm
4 Steps towards a SALW collection programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding of the steps necessary to create a SALW collection programme. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorm the steps needed for a SALW collection programme. 2. Affirm steps: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Determining what types of weapons to collect b. Understanding SALW demand c. Legal and political considerations d. Selecting incentives e. Looking for partners/organizing coalitions. f. The 'where and when' g. Raising public awareness h. Registering collected weapons i. Dealing with collected SALW. 3. Provide Handout B: Case studies. 4. Workshop exercise 1. Allow 20–30 minutes for group discussion and preparation and 5–10 minutes for group presentation and questions. 	<p>In groups of three to six people, the participants will discuss different case study examples from various states.</p> <p>Handout B: Case studies are provided and can be duplicated for use in this exercise.</p> <p>Groups should consider the good practices from each example and highlight any weaknesses or obstacles. They should also consider if any of the lessons from these experiences could be useful for weapons collection programmes in South Sudan.</p> <p>Each group will then be required to report back to plenary providing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An overview of the country case study ■ Good practices and weaknesses ■ Lessons for South Sudan. 	Handout A: Collection of SALW	1.30–4.00pm (150 mins)
End of day: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Wrap-up ■ Evaluation 					4.00–4.30pm (30 mins)

1 Why collect SALW?

Governments and national partners undertake weapons collection programmes at various times for various reasons. Weapons collection programmes are often implemented as part of post-conflict stabilisation operations with the support of international actors and are meant to aid peace-building. They can also take place as part of crime prevention strategies, particularly in communities that experience problems with violent crime.

Risks of SALW

As addressed in other modules, the presence of illicit small arms and light weapons threatens both the lives and livelihood of individuals as they go about their daily activities. Illicit SALW represent both direct and indirect risks to the civilian population. Because SALW are so durable, once they are present in a country, they present a continuous risk of continuing or increased levels of violence. This is particularly the case in post-conflict societies, where SALW frequently outlast peace agreements and are taken up by criminal gangs, vigilantes, dissidents, and individuals concerned about personal security. The low cost and ready availability of SALW can also promote or feed into a culture of violence, where gun ownership becomes a symbol of power and status, and gun violence a first resort for the settlement of personal and political disputes.¹

The presence of illicit SALW also carries indirect risks, such as social, political and economic instability and tension. Their presence further leads to an erosion of the rule of law, as justice systems are unable to cope with and prevent the increase in gun violence and demand for small arms. Governments and local and international development and relief organisations may also be unable to carry out development projects because of insecurity and continued disruptions caused by widespread civilian possession and misuse of firearms.²

Collection as a means to address the presence and proliferation of SALW

Removal of weapons from society is widely recognised as an important means of reducing the proliferation and misuse of SALW. In recent years, weapons collection initiatives have been undertaken around the world when a country or a community wishes to put an end to a violent or traumatic period in its history. In this regard, as well as helping to reduce numbers of SALW circulating in society, weapons collection initiatives may also serve as powerful symbols of hope for a more peaceful future. Weapons collection and disarmament programmes (WCDPs) are therefore important tools in conflict prevention.³

Weapons collection initiatives have also been undertaken within the context of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding programmes. Where violent conflict has recently abated, efforts to remove weapons from society must be coupled with initiatives to address the **root causes** of conflict, as in the cases of Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland. Failure to take a comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding can mean that demand for SALW remains, thereby undermining efforts to remove these weapons from society as a whole.⁴

¹ Fleshman 2001.

² Adapted from Godnick *et al* 2005, Section 1, p 7.

³ Godnick *et al* 2005, p 9.

⁴ Coe and Smith 2003, p 23.

Recommendations for best practice in weapons collection programmes

Governments, together with civil society organisations, should seek to set up weapons collection programmes whenever there is an opportunity to do so. Information exchange and capacity-building programmes, including technical and financial assistance, should also be undertaken, in order to promote an international understanding of best practice. Generally speaking, sustainable weapons collection initiatives are characterised as follows:

- They are coupled with efforts to tackle the root causes of conflicts and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- They benefit from the active support of all protagonists, thus ensuring that all parties concerned have the confidence to relinquish arms.
- There is wide public support for the initiative.
- They are accompanied by measures to control access to SALW on the part of civilians.
- An appropriate balance is struck between the imposition of sanctions and the provision of incentives.
- All weapons seized and surrendered are quickly destroyed to prevent their re-circulation into society.⁵

Obstacles to SALW collection

Weapons collection programmes – even well-designed ones – face severe obstacles in implementation. Reducing demand for weapons in post-conflict societies is difficult, especially if weapons are part of the civilian culture or important for self- or collective defence in the absence of a trustworthy and competent police force and justice system.⁶ Ex-combatants and other weapons holders may not be convinced about the durability of the peace, the authorities' intentions, or the ability of peacekeeping forces to protect them. Furthermore, they might decide to keep them as insurance in case they are unable to find other means to sustain themselves and feel compelled to turn to pillaging or other unlawful activities.⁷ A community's weapons may be a deterrent to attacks by a neighbouring community, and removing them may invite violence towards that community. The possession of weapons may also be of cultural significance to the population that existed before violent conflict broke out. Even if there is popular support for the principle of weapons collection, the way programmes are designed and conducted will help determine their success.

2 SALW collection as a stand-alone activity or as part of a wider programme?

While SALW collection is at times implemented as a stand-alone activity, it is often carried out as an integrated part of a much wider programme, linked to activities such as:

- Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants
- Weapons registration, licensing, and safe storage
- Public awareness campaigns on the dangers of SALW ownership and the responsibilities of owners to prevent them from being stolen or misused
- Overall reduction of the demand for SALW

⁵ *Ibid*, pp 23–24.

⁶ Brewer 2010, p 9.

⁷ Spyros, Muggah and Biddle 2001.

- Peace agreements
- Security Sector Reform
- Fighting of crime
- Establishment of weapons-free zones
- Poverty reduction.⁸

A combination of different measures, including SALW collection (and, wherever possible, destruction) as one of the elements, is usually the best means for removing SALW permanently from a community. Such combined measures not only aim at removing illicit SALW, but also at reducing the factors that lead to SALW ownership and misuse in the first place.

EXAMPLE

Liberia

After the war, UNDP developed a weapons-for-development programme in Liberia, which succeeded in collecting a number of guns. However, it became clear that many communities were still insecure and that a broader approach was needed. A Community Security and Social Cohesion (CSSC) programme was developed which aimed to address the range of threats that citizens face. According to UNDP, local CSSC plans were developed in a number of communities and funds made available to support key development projects identified by local stakeholders as part of the process. Support was also provided to the Liberia National Police to build their capacity to implement community-based policing and enhance their relationship with citizens.⁹ For example, UNDP's Community-based Recovery Programme has supported the establishment of District Development Committees which include local chiefs, women, youth and ex-combatants.

3 Different types of SALW collection programmes

SALW collection programmes fall into two categories: command/coercive or voluntary. They can be further categorised as 'Phase I' (**'disarmament by command'**) and 'Phase II' (**'voluntary weapons collection'**) programmes. Their main distinguishing features are outlined in Table 1 below.¹⁰

Peacekeeping experience clearly points to the need to arrange an orderly 'farewell to arms' on the part of armed forces very soon after a peace settlement. This is done through disarmament by command. The later removal of SALW from civilian circulation through voluntary weapons collection is a much more difficult and long-term project for maintaining peace and enhancing stability.¹¹

⁸ Adapted from Godnick et al/ 2005, pp 9–11.

⁹ UNDP 2009, p 28.

¹⁰ Laurance and Godnick 2001.

¹¹ Faltas 2001.

Table 1: Practical disarmament for peacebuilding

	Phase 1: Disarmament by Command	Phase 2: Voluntary weapons collection
Timing	Soon after a peace settlement	Later
Objective	Establish political stability	Maintain political stability, enhance public safety
Inducements	Command, penalties, rewards	Penalties, rewards
Scale	Collective	Individual
Visibility	Public	Public and private
Policy framework	Demobilisation	Demobilisation, crime prevention
Responsible actors	Governmental and political organisations	Governmental, political, or private organisations

Command-oriented and coercive SALW collection programmes are often implemented at the end of an armed conflict as part of a ceasefire or peace agreement. The former combatants of one or all armed groups involved in the conflict may be required to surrender their weapons for collection, safe storage and/or destruction, often as part of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) process. In addition, security forces may carry out raids and operations to confiscate weapons owned without a license, or in the pursuit of criminal groups.¹² Unless they are conducted as part of a broader DDR process, coercive collection programmes tend not to be very useful in terms of confidence-building measures, due to their forced character.

Voluntary collection programmes offer the opportunity to improve the security of a region while at the same time boosting the confidence of those participating in the programme. Voluntary collection programmes are participatory, in that they encourage individuals or groups of people to take part, sometimes by providing incentives. In weapons collection programmes, incentives chosen may include amnesty, anonymity, or some material benefit in the form of cash, in-kind incentives (e.g. tools, motorbikes, or cattle), or development incentives (e.g. wells, roads, or bridges). While voluntary weapons collection programmes often take place in post-conflict contexts, they are also organised in non-conflict situations where there are high levels of SALW availability and/or armed violence. Depending on the context, the collected SALW are in some cases stored for further use by the security forces, or can be stored for further re-distribution based on a new legal framework, including a licensing process.

One of the most frequently discussed issues in weapons collection is the **choice of rewards and penalties**. Three criteria are important in this regard:

- the **effectiveness** of rewards and penalties in accomplishing the immediate objective of disarmament
- their **contribution** to long-term programme goals (such as public safety and/or political stability)
- their **cost**.

There are often unavoidable trade-offs between these areas. For instance, offering attractive rewards to firearm holders will usually boost the number of weapons collected, but is costly, and may lead to increased gun imports and thefts as people without weapons try to get their share of the rewards being offered. People receiving cash for their weapons might use the money to buy other arms, perhaps more lethal ones. Avoiding such pitfalls may thus entail using a mix of incentives and sanctions.¹³

¹² *Ibid*, p 15.

¹³ Faltas, McDonald and Waszink 2001, p 7.

Examples of different types of voluntary SALW collection programmes¹⁴

- **Door-to-door collection** (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina): Soldiers go from door-to-door asking people to voluntarily turn in illegal weapons left over from the Bosnian War.
- **Weapons/Arms for Development** (e.g. Cambodia, Sierra Leone): Weapons are handed in in exchange for wells, duck ponds, schools, and so forth.
- **Tools for Arms** (e.g. Mozambique): Weapons, rounds of ammunition and explosives are submitted in exchange for bicycles, sewing machines, food commodities, zinc roofing sheets, construction materials and a wide range of tools.
- **Goods for Guns** (e.g. El Salvador, Colombia): Civilians are encouraged to surrender their weapons in exchange for vouchers for supermarkets, shoe stores and pharmacies. The value of the vouchers depends on the model, condition and number of weapons turned in.

Different types of incentive-based programs have different potential drawbacks.

- **Exchanging weapons for cash (buy-back)** can increase the value of arms if the price is not carefully controlled; the cash can be used to buy newer weapons; and buy-back can have damaging economic effects if large amounts of cash are injected into fragile economies.
- **Weapons in exchange for development (WED, WfD)** only works if there is a perception of joint weapons ownership, and if donor assistance available from other sources is limited. It may also be expensive if a community project (e.g. road repair) is not tied to a minimum number of weapons handed in.
- **Weapons in competition for development (WCD)** is the same as WED, but putting communities in competition with each other so that whoever hands in most weapons will receive the promised projects. However, this approach can spur new conflicts between participating communities.
- **Weapons linked to development (WLD)** creates a direct link between numbers of weapons handed in and an increase in ongoing development assistance – but this needs to be tied to other donor priorities, demands significant negotiation before launch, and requires the adoption of shared guidelines.¹⁵

These and other issues have led some to question the value overall of offering incentives as the primary mode of small arms collection.

EXAMPLE

Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms was created in 2010 as a means of controlling the proliferation of those lethal weapons in the country, in line with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms. One of the recommendations made in Parliament was to make possible the registration and licensing of small arms and light weapons for citizens with genuine intentions, making it possible to return some of the weapons collected by the UNDP Arms for Development Project to owners who have acquired a license for those weapons.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ UNDDR, IDDRS Module 4.11, p 31.

¹⁶ Samba 2010; adapted from Godnick *et al* 2005, Section 1, p 13.

4 Steps towards a SALW collection programme

Step 1: Determining what types of weapons to collect

Before an organisation plans and carries out a SALW collections programme, it needs to determine what types of weapons it intends to collect. Will you accept only weapons in good working order, or should you accept all weapons, even if they are rusted beyond repair, have missing parts, or are damaged? Will you collect only SALW with clear military use, or collect all arms, no matter which category they fall into (e.g. shotguns)? Will you only target weapons, or also accept ammunition and explosives? There is no simple answer to these questions; the decision will depend on funding for incentives and final objectives.¹⁷

Step 2: Understanding SALW demand

Understanding the reasons behind the demand for SALW in a region is crucial for developing a strategy for collection, as a weapons collection programme should ideally also target the underlying reasons for SALW demand in order to maximise its effectiveness. A preliminary assessment should help in understanding the sources of demand.¹⁸ In South Sudan for example, demand for SALW is driven by a combination of factors, including regional insecurity, competition over resources and insufficient trust in the ability of the security services to protect people and their property.¹⁹

EXAMPLE

Georgia

In Georgia, as of 2006, many people were still unwilling to hand in firearms because of fear of crime and a general sense of insecurity. The majority of respondents to a household survey stated that a more effective police force was the factor most likely to reduce illegal small arms distribution, while the third most frequent reply (was a 'justice system that works'. While policing and security had improved in recent times, more needed to be done in this area, primarily through more detailed law enforcement planning, the mainstreaming of community based policing and greater outreach and promotion of the police's activities. Any proposed collection campaign would have required a comprehensive assessment of the attitudes of Georgia gun owners in each targeted region during its preparation phase to help to identify the methods most likely to respond to each community's needs and vulnerabilities.

Source: Wood 2006, pp 74–75

Step 3: Familiarisation with legal and political considerations

Prevailing laws and regulations, as well as the political environment, need to be taken into account when planning SALW collection. For example, an offer of amnesty might require amending or suspending existing laws and necessitate the intervention of the national executive or legislative branch of government. Political events (occurring simultaneously) such as elections, might affect the programme outcome. Endorsement of the initiative by the major political players, including, in particular elected and public officials, can encourage and reassure potential participants.²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibid*, Section 2, pp 25–26.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p 27.

¹⁹ See further Saferworld October 2011 (Unity State) and September 2011 (Jonglei and Warrap states).

²⁰ Faltas, McDonald and Waszink 2001, p 23.

Step 4: Selecting incentives

The choice of what type of incentive to use is one of the most delicate features of a SALW collection programme. The following factors may need to be kept in mind when selecting incentives:

- The attractiveness of the incentive to individuals and/or to communities.
- The potential for corruption and profiteering from weapons trafficking, and the risk of people bringing in more weapons to enjoy more of the incentives.
- The existence of counter-incentives to hang on to SALW. For example, if incentives are collective, but people believe an individual cash incentive programme might be offered later, they will be less ready to give up their arms.
- Budgetary issues, in particular, collection programme planners have in the past underestimated the numbers of weapons likely to be surrendered, and budget shortfalls have led to some weapons remaining in circulation, leading to a lack of public faith in collection programmes.

All of the above factors depend on local conditions, and they should be realistically assessed before deciding on a course of action.²¹

Examples of individual and collective incentives²²

Intended target	Type of incentive	
	Cash	In-kind
Individual	Spending Cash	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Food ■ Tools and agricultural implements ■ Medicines ■ Clothing ■ Computers and cell phones ■ Tickets to sporting events ■ Training/education ■ Employment in public works
Collective	Budgets for development or salaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Bridges and roads ■ Clinics ■ Schools ■ Water wells ■ Parks ■ Sports facilities

Bear in mind that while **individual incentives**, especially cash, are often most attractive to weapons owners, they are problematic. In particular, programmes rewarding the individual with cash (so-called 'weapons buy-back-programmes') have proven to have several negative side-effects:

- Individual incentives could be seen as a reward to those who have possessed illegal weapons, or who have caused the most harm.
- In the past, a substantial amount of money offered as individual incentives has gone on to be spent on alcohol, drugs or the acquisition of new and more modern weapons – thereby effectively fuelling the weapons trade in a particular area.

When implemented in conjunction with measures that address the various social problems that underlie firearm proliferation and misuse, buy-back schemes have considerable potential. However, by themselves, buy-back schemes have little impact when there are huge numbers of weapons in circulation.²³

²¹ Adapted from Godnick *et al* 2005, Section 3, p 13.

²² *Ibid*, p 11.

²³ *Ibid*, p 13.

Communal or collective incentives have the advantage that the whole community can benefit.

The table below summarises the advantages and disadvantages of various types of incentives.²⁴

Incentive	Advantage	Disadvantage
Cash	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Cash can be a starting point for creating new income possibilities ■ Widely needed by most sectors of society ■ May be the only way to motivate more difficult target groups ■ Often cheaper than the provision of training, development, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Could increase black market for arms ■ Is often quickly spent on alcohol or entertainment ■ Creates a sense of buy/sell transaction ■ The 'right sum' for a weapon is difficult to estimate ■ Does not contribute to overall development ■ Only the individual benefits; could lead to wrongdoers being rewarded ■ Turns a weapon into a valuable good ■ Only short-term individual benefits
In-kind	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Less likely to create a black market ■ More likely to receive donations ■ Minimise the focus on economic transaction ■ Individual benefit which makes it attractive to those who qualify for it ■ Can create a new source of income and support a person's family 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Requires knowledge of incentives desired by target groups ■ Still requires placing an in-kind value on each weapon turned in ■ Only the individual benefits; could lead to wrongdoers being rewarded.
Collective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Promote community solidarity and civic-mindedness ■ Eliminate economic transaction aspects ■ Provides needed development projects and funding ■ Families benefit ■ Strengthens existing social structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Often ambiguous as to criteria for how many weapons need to be submitted in order to benefit. ■ If collective benefits are slow in coming, can cause mistrust and frustration ■ Communal resources can be monopolised for private gain by one person or a group of persons ■ Less attractive to the individual

Step 5: Looking for partners/organising coalitions

In general, national and local governments, including police and military forces, and national, local and/or international organisations and civil society play important roles in a voluntary weapons collection process. Drawing on the resources and capabilities of the immediate communities of those in possession of small arms can aid effective collection of weapons. For example, women can contribute substantially to a voluntary SALW collection programme, as often they have considerable influence on their husbands or sons, and may therefore be able to convince them to participate in the programme and to hand in their weapons.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p 17.

EXAMPLE**Rio de Janeiro**

An initiative by Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO, has encouraged women to play a key role in the prevention of the use of firearms in Brazil by launching a women's campaign. By equipping women with information and convincing arguments, the movement aims to help them disarm their husbands, sons, and communities. The goal of the campaign during 2001, the International Year of the Woman, was to mobilise the female population to actively say 'no!' to guns and to increase their participation in pro-disarmament events, including school educational programmes, publicity campaigns, and the establishment of gun-free zones. During the 24 June 2001 gun destruction ceremony, women from the campaign gathered holding banners with their slogan, 'Choose gun free: Your weapon or me!'

Source: Godnick *et al*, Section 3, p 54

Step 6: The 'where' and 'when'

The 'where' and the 'when' can have a significant impact on a collection programme's overall success. For example, if the chosen location is not easily accessible or does not inspire confidence and trust – for example, a location whose ownership is contested between two or more communities – people are less likely to turn up to hand in their weapons. The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) suggests a few additional considerations regarding place and time:

- Religious buildings, community centres, schools or union halls are usually preferred weapons collections points, as they are usually perceived as being less threatening to potential participants. This also gives civil society organisations that are not actively involved an opportunity to participate and contribute.
- If there are strong ethnic, political or other factional rivalries in the community, it may be necessary to have separate collection sites. In such a case, it may be useful to have representatives of each party at the other's collection site, so they can see that all are participating equally.
- In some places mobile collection and/or destruction units can pass through communities. Prerequisites are a good publicity and information system that will inform locals of the event, and sufficient local commitment and security to make the process cost-effective.²⁵

Traditional leaders such as community elders and chiefs should be involved in mobilisation, collection and awareness programmes as they usually have substantial influence over issues concerning security of communities. Youth leaders from cattle camps should also be engaged.

Step 7: Raising public awareness

Making the public aware of voluntary collection programmes, incentives and legal considerations is a crucial element in a programme's success. This should ideally take place well in advance of the start of the programme. One factor which an awareness campaign should aim to do is to build trust in both the collection and the collectors. This is at times difficult due to a lack of trust in the security forces. Lack of trust can in fact become the main factor undermining any collection campaign, as owners of illegal firearms fear arrest and harassment. Co-operation with civil society organisations on this issue could be very beneficial given their acceptance and closeness to the civilian population, and also as a confidence-building measure.²⁶

²⁵ Godnick *et al* 2005, Section 3, p 39.

²⁶ For means by which public awareness on this issue can be raised, please see Module 5 on 'Planning and taking action on small arms and light weapons'.

EXAMPLE**Georgia**

In the Georgian breakaway region of Ajara, the success of weapons collection campaigns has to a large extent been due to the goodwill felt towards the incoming authorities. However, in other parts of Georgia, trust in the police was very low, and it was therefore expected that a large proportion of the owners of unregistered weapons would be more likely to bury, hide or dispose of their weapons in some way other than surrender them to the police. The Georgian experience highlights the need for collection programmes to help boost trust in the police, whether this involves community-based policing, outreach campaigns and/or greater promotion of the police's activities. The establishment of an independent ombudsman to oversee weapons collections might also help to allay fears of arrest and police harassment.

Source: Wood 2006, pp 72–73

Step 8: Registering collected weapons

Whether collected weapons are to be destroyed or stored, they should be registered, ideally as they are collected. All weapons to be destroyed must be recorded carefully in order to prevent them from being diverted to criminal or other activities before being destroyed.

Some of the collected illicit weapons may be locally made and therefore may not have a serial number. In Sierra Leone, the UNDP Arms for Development Project addressed this problem by producing its own “serial number” stickers. A sticker was placed on each collected weapon, which became the number that appeared on all forms and receipts given to both the police and the owner.²⁷

The role of registering firearms could be taken either by civil society or in co-operation with a civil society representative who helps to receive and secure the registers, and follows the registration process from start to finish. This can be practiced as a confidence-building measure between communities and security forces.

EXAMPLE**RECSA**

The Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), established in 2000, is an institutional framework arising from the Nairobi Declaration to co-ordinate the joint effort by National Focal Points in Member States to prevent, combat and eradicate stockpiling and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, ammunition and related material in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa. RECSA has 13 member states and promotes small arms control and civilian disarmament across borders.²⁸ The Republic of Sudan is a full member of RECSA and the South Sudanese authorities have also been collaborating with RECSA since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control is functioning as the country's National Focal Point. RECSA has provided gun-marking machines for member states, and to South Sudan, to mark guns for collection and disposal. The marking of firearms helps in the identification of firearms in terms of their origin and ownership. As a result of RECSA, a vast number of firearms have been collected and destroyed.

²⁷ Godnick *et al* 2005, Section 3, p 63. A key issue with this is that stickers are easy to remove.

5 What to do with the collected SALW

Wherever possible, collected weapons should be destroyed immediately, or as soon as possible after collection.²⁹ There are a number of reasons for promoting immediate destruction of collected SALW. Firstly, the symbolism of destroying the tools of violence, especially in war-torn societies, does much to encourage an atmosphere of peace and to make a public and symbolic commitment to moving from a war society to a peace society. Secondly, immediate destruction guarantees to those who surrendered weapons that these will never be used against them, their families or community. Thirdly, weapons that have been immediately destroyed cannot be diverted into the hands of criminals, and thus the destruction enhances security. Lastly, destruction is often the most cost-effective solution, as providing proper storage facilities and security for stored weapons is expensive.³⁰

When weapons are not destroyed, they can be stored in a police, or military warehouse, or can be re-used by police and military forces. However, if weapons are not destroyed:

- All collected weapons must be fully and properly recorded.
- Safe storage and safe use must be guaranteed.
- Effective legal procedures must be in place, and sentences must be carried out, in case of illegal diversion and improper use of the weapons.³¹

²⁸ Saferworld 2011, pp 4–7.

²⁹ Weapons destruction is dealt with in more detail in Module 8, 'Destruction of Weapons and Ammunition'.

³⁰ Adapted from Godnick *et al* 2005, Section 3, pp 67–71.

³¹ *Ibid*, pp 67–69.

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Workshop exercises

Exercise 1

Case study analysis

Divide participants into groups of three to six people. Distribute **Handout B: Case studies** provided at the end of this module (these may be reproduced for classroom use). Ask each group to discuss a different case study and make a presentation on their conclusions. Ask them to:

- Provide an overview of the case study.
- Identify aspects of good practice from each example, and also weaknesses or obstacles.
- Consider the relevance of lessons from these experiences – both positive and negative – to potential weapons collection programmes in South Sudan.

Allow 20–30 minutes for group discussion and preparation and 5–10 minutes for group presentation and questions.

MODULE 7: HANDOUT A

Collection of SALW

Why collect SALW? (M7 S1)

Weapons collection programmes are often implemented as part of post-conflict stabilisation operations with the support of international actors and are meant to aid peacebuilding. They can also take place as part of crime prevention strategies, particularly in communities that experience problems with violent crime.

Recommendations for best practice in weapons collection programmes

Governments, together with civil society organisations, should seek to set up weapons collection programmes whenever there is an opportunity to do so. Information exchange and capacity-building programmes, including technical and financial assistance, should also be undertaken, in order to promote an international understanding of best practice. Generally speaking, sustainable weapons collection initiatives are characterised as follows:

- They are coupled with efforts to tackle the root causes of conflicts and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- They benefit from the active support of all protagonists, thus ensuring that all parties concerned have the confidence to relinquish arms.
- There is wide public support for the initiative.
- They are accompanied by measures to control access to SALW on the part of civilians.
- An appropriate balance is struck between the imposition of sanctions and the provision of incentives.
- All weapons seized and surrendered are quickly destroyed to prevent their re-circulation into society.¹

Different types of SALW collection programmes (M7 S3)

SALW collection programmes fall into two categories as 'Phase I' ('**disarmament by command**') and 'Phase II' ('**voluntary weapons collection**') programmes:²

	Phase 1: Disarmament by command	Phase 2: Voluntary weapons collection
Timing	Soon after a peace settlement	Later
Objective	Establish political stability	Maintain political stability, enhance public safety
Inducements	Command, penalties, rewards	Penalties, rewards
Scale	Collective	Individual
Visibility	Public	Public and private
Policy framework	Demobilisation	Demobilisation, crime prevention
Responsible actors	Governmental and political organisations	Governmental, political, or private organisations

¹ *Ibid*, pp 23–24.

² Laurance and Godnick 2001.

Steps towards a SALW collection programme (M7 S4)

- Step 1: Determining what types of weapons to collect
- Step 2: Understanding SALW demand
- Step 3: Familiarisation with legal and political considerations
- Step 4: Selecting incentives
- Step 5: Looking for partners/organising coalitions
- Step 6: The 'where' and 'when'
- Step 7: Raising public awareness
- Step 8: Registering collected weapons

Advantages and disadvantages of various types of incentives³

Incentive	Advantage	Disadvantage
Cash	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Cash can be a starting point for creating new income possibilities ■ Widely needed by most sectors of society ■ May be the only way to motivate more difficult target groups ■ Often cheaper than the provision of training, development, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Could increase black market for arms ■ Is often quickly spent on alcohol or entertainment ■ Creates a sense of buy/sell transaction ■ The 'right sum' for a weapon is difficult to estimate ■ Does not contribute to overall development ■ Only the individual benefits; could lead to wrongdoers being rewarded ■ Turns a weapon into a valuable good ■ Only short-term individual benefits
In-kind	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Less likely to create a black market ■ More likely to receive donations ■ Minimise the focus on economic transaction ■ Individual benefit which makes it attractive to those who qualify for it ■ Can create a new source of income and support a person's family 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Requires knowledge of incentives desired by target groups ■ Still requires placing an in-kind value on each weapon turned in ■ Only the individual benefits; could lead to wrongdoers being rewarded.
Collective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Promote community solidarity and civic-mindedness ■ Eliminate economic transaction aspects ■ Provides needed development projects and funding ■ Families benefit ■ Strengthens existing social structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Often ambiguous as to criteria for how many weapons need to be submitted in order to benefit. ■ If collective benefits are slow in coming, can cause mistrust and frustration ■ Communal resources can be monopolised for private gain by one person or a group of persons ■ Less attractive to the individual

This handout is taken from *Small arms and light weapons: A training manual*, published by Saferworld, February 2012

MODULE 7: HANDOUT B

Case studies

Case study 1: **SALW collection programmes in Albania**

Source: Center for Peace and Disarmament Education/Saferworld, *Turning the page: small arms and light weapons in Albania*, (CPDE/Saferworld, 2005), pp 108–112.

With differing degrees of success, ongoing weapons collection programmes were undertaken between 1997 and 2003 across Albania by the police, supported by local governance structures and civil society. A key player in the collection process throughout most of this period was the UNDP, which at different times organised incentive-based collections in specific parts of the country.

During the first weapons collection and amnesty period (1997–2002), it was estimated that Albanian police officers visited more than one million homes, asking people to voluntarily hand over guns or sign a declaration that they did not possess any unregistered weapons. The heads of communes would sometimes accompany police officers on their rounds collecting declarations and weapons from households in the locality during this period. In addition, members of the public could, in theory, surrender their unregistered weapons to local police stations. During the second amnesty and weapons collection period (2003–5), other methods were used; for instance, each police officer was tasked with collecting a certain number of weapons a month. Other police collection campaigns were carried out in co-operation with private security companies.

In February 1998 the Albanian Government requested assistance from the UN for the disarmament of the civilian population. They initially requested assistance with the establishment of a buy-back scheme, in which individuals would be financially rewarded for returning looted SALW, ammunition, explosives and other military equipment. Instead, however, the UN funded a project – the Gramsh Pilot Project (GPP), which ran on-and-off during 1998–1999 – which was a pilot project not only for Albania, but also for the concept of weapons collection programmes that did not reward individuals for voluntarily surrendering weapons, but instead provided incentives through funding small-scale community-based development projects. Following the end of the GPP, a similar ‘Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED)’ project ran from June 2000 until February 2002 in the regions of Diber and Elbasan. It had a larger budget than the GPP, but used the same three main approaches for attempting to reduce the number of weapons in the targeted communities:

- Public awareness raising through the print media, TV, local town hall meetings, the establishment of NGO networks and other events.
- The actual collection of weapons, ammunition and explosive materials, and the symbolic public destruction of some of the recovered items.
- Small-scale community-based development in the targeted communities in Diber and Elbasan districts.

However, the regions of Diber and Elbasan presented a number of different problems compared to Gramsh. For example, traditional customs were preserved in this area and strictly followed, even during communist times. Thus one of the main challenges was that the possession of weapons was considered to be the ‘right’ of every man aged over 18 years. Furthermore, there were no useful estimates of the number of weapons in the area; it had served as a trafficking route for arms into Kosovo and Macedonia. Elbasan presented a different set of problems due to the fact that it provided shelter to many of the refugees that had entered Albania from Kosovo during the crisis of 1999. In addition, the public destruction of weapons “was considered the most sensitive aspect of the weapons surrender and collection”. This was because it not only required public safety standards to be fulfilled, but also required the Government’s permission to destroy recovered state property –

property that the Government may have considered of value for the military or for export sales.

The 250 members of the weapons collection teams in 2000–2002 were mainly police officers and former military personnel who were recruited for their technical abilities and experience in handling weapons and ammunition. Additional training was provided by the then Ministry of Public Order's Weapons Collection Section (MOPOWCS), and included specific modules for the head of the prefecture's collection teams and the storehouse manager. The weapons collection process could take place in a village square or hall, or a person could voluntarily surrender their weapon(s) at a police station. In these cases, when the weapon was handed in, at least two police officers would be present. A receipt was then issued to the person who voluntarily surrendered the weapon, and a copy of the receipt was sent with the weapon to the police stores. The store-person then wrote another receipt, indicating that the weapon had been received. The receipts issued during the day were then added together to give a daily total for all weapons received and stored. At the end of the month, the weapons, ammunition and explosives that had been collected were counted and sent to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) with documents detailing the consignment. The collected weapons were then transported to the nearest military bases, where the military storehouse manager would compare the receipt for weapons and ammunition received with his own physical check.

The process was not a perfect one. The situation had certainly improved when compared to 1997, when "people were throwing boxes of ammunition out of third floor windows into the streets of Gramsh and sending children with guns and unexploded ordnance to the collection site."¹ However, best-practice methods were not always followed. For example, there were a number of instances where magazines had not been removed from collected weapons before being placed in police storage. Furthermore, in relation to ammunition, explosives and other military materiel, neither the police collecting military materiel nor the warehouse manager counted each round; indeed, they may not have been able to accurately identify the different types of rounds and explosives. The problem was made worse by the fact that the ammunition and explosives may have been delivered in bottles or unorthodox containers, which the police were unwilling to open for fear that the contents were unstable.

A third UNDP weapons collection programme in Albania, entitled Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project (SALWCP), ran from April 2002 until December 2003. It was based upon the same principles, and used the same methods, as the GPP and WED projects. However, it differed from previous weapons in exchange for development projects on three counts:

- It covered far more territory than the other projects.
- All of the weapons collection and destruction was carried out by Albanian authorities.
- Not all of the communities that took part in the project received development projects; rather, a competition was held for the limited pool of financial resources available for development projects.

It is this final point that is perhaps the most innovative, and perhaps the most controversial, as it might have led to lower interest because there would be no guaranteed 'reward' or resentment towards the 'winners' from those who did not feel that they benefited. However, according to the then head of the UNDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSSR) Programme, this was not the case. In his opinion, communities that collected weapons but did not receive a development project seemed willing to accept the rules of the competition. The rationale of the 'weapons in competition for development' approach resulted from the fact that the size of the territory to be covered was large compared to the total project budget. This meant that if each community that collected weapons received a development project, then it would have been so small as to be considered almost worthless. Larger projects were deemed to have more of an impact, with the competitive option the best way to encourage greater participation at a lower cost.

¹ SEESAC 2003, p 6.

Case study 2:

Voluntary weapons collection from the civilian population in Cambodia

Taken from: Godnick W et al, *Civil Society Action on SALW Control: Module CSA 05A02* (TRESA/Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2005), Annex IV, pp 1–5.

Thirty years of violent conflict have left Cambodia with anywhere from 500,000 to more than a million SALW. The transition from a post-conflict society to a culture of sustainable peace, security and development is hampered by the possession of illegal weapons and explosives by the civilian population. EU ASAC (EU Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia) has supported the weapon collection efforts of the Royal Government of Cambodia through a strategy called “Weapons for Development” (WfD) combined with a police capacity-building project. This strategy aims to provide a sense of security after people have turned in their weapons and to improve police-community relations.

In 1998, the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR) in Cambodia began advocating publicly for the government to take action on disarmament and small arms control. In 1999, by request of the Government of Cambodia, the European Union (EU) assisted the Cambodian Government in the drafting of a weapons law on use, possession, trade and transport of weapons; the safeguarding and registration of weapons in the hands of the military; public awareness campaigns on the destabilising effects of possession and use of weapons and the link between weapons security and development; the voluntary collection of weapons possessed by the civilian population through a process of exchange for community-owned development projects; and the destruction of the army surplus of weapons and of the weapons collected from the civilian population.

The WGWR did not participate directly in the SALW collection and destruction component of the EU-supported program, but its advocacy was, and continues to be, very important for obtaining the attention of the international community as well as providing preliminary baseline data regarding the SALW problem in Cambodia.

In 2001–2002, EU ASAC implemented pilot projects in two districts using community-owned development incentives, such as water wells and schools, to encourage the voluntary hand-in of weapons. EU ASAC rejected the practice of a direct exchange for cash, and demonstrating the progressive link between peace, security and development lies at the heart of the WfD philosophy. The two major projects involved advocacy and awareness; community involvement in deciding the collective rewards for disarmament in the form of development projects; improving capacity of local authorities; and weapons collection and public destruction. The minor projects only dealt with public awareness-raising and SALW collection.

Increasing local confidence in the capacity of the police forces to provide protection is extremely important in promoting a sense of local security. EU ASAC therefore also provided technical support and training in good governance and human rights to local police forces, as well as income-generation training to their families to help build this confidence. By the end of 2002, EU ASAC had brought together representatives from the Training Department of the National Police, the WGWR and national human rights NGOs to set up a training curriculum for police officers at the commune level to improve relations between police and the community and to draft a police training manual. In 2003 this training curriculum was implemented. The co-operation between the Cambodian Ministry of Interior and Cambodian NGOs during the training made this programme very unique. These training manuals are now being used by the Training Department of the National Police for training new policemen.

In 2002, seven local NGOs conducted workshops and provided water wells in return for weapons. Between May 2002 and May 2003, approximately 1500 weapons were voluntarily handed in to the police by the civilian population in the target areas. In 2003, EU ASAC

supported local NGOs in conducting public awareness workshops in nine provinces: when sufficient numbers of weapons were voluntarily handed in to the police, water wells were provided in return.

The Cambodian Government claims that, with the EU support, they were able to increase the number of collected weapons, decrease the number of armed crimes, and increase the sense of security and confidence in the police. Weapons handed in to the authorities were destroyed in local Flames of Peace ceremony as a symbolic demonstration of the shift to a culture of peace.

In 2004, in co-operation with the Department for Local Administration, EU ASAC set up a project to train commune councils and provide capacity to work on security and the problems caused by illegal weapons in the community. This complements EU ASAC's police-training programme, as both programmes aim to improve co-operation between the police, the community and the commune councils.

Case study 3: **'Goods for Guns', a voluntary weapons collection programme in El Salvador**

Taken from: Godnick W et al., *Civil Society Action on SALW Control: Module CSA 05A02* (TRESA/Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2005).

The Goods for Guns programme was a weapons collection programme implemented by the business community in El Salvador as a result of the high circulation of arms in the country and the impact it was having on the economy. By the fall of 1995, El Salvadoran society was suffering from the negative effects of the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons left over from a civil war that raged from 1981 to 1992. The peace brokered by the UN in 1992 had featured a major emphasis on disarming and demobilising both the opposition forces of the Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) and the El Salvador government forces (FAES). However, massive amounts of weapons were left uncollected: the Government, the FMLN and the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) estimated that approximately 360,000 military-style weapons remained in circulation and in caches.

As a result of incomplete disarmament and the widespread availability of weapons, by fall of 1995 the following conditions remained to be dealt:

- Criminal acts with military style weapons
- Arming of private citizens and development of private security groups
- Emboldening of disaffected citizens
- Threat to post-conflict political development and democracy
- Threat to the process of economic development
- Increasing harm to civilians.

All of this violence, aided and abetted by a seemingly unlimited supply of small arms and light weapons, was taking place in an economy with a 50 percent unemployment rate. New businesses began to suffer since customers were afraid to travel. Similarly, assaults taking place along the country's main roadways were threatening the disruption of commerce, transportation and security.

In November 1995, a citizens group in El Salvador that included leaders of the business community, alarmed by the impact of armed violence on the economy, formed the Patriotic Movement Against Crime (Movimiento Patriótico Contra la Delincuencia or MPCD). By April 1996 MPCD had decided to conduct a weapons collection programme. It should be noted that this was not a grass-roots programme. No attempt was made to include all levels of society. Had the opposition parties, especially the FMLN, been involved in the planning and implementation, the outcome would have been different, certainly spreading beyond the urban areas.

MPCD agreed on the following course and sequence of action for the weapons collection programme:

- Develop a Strategic Plan
- Seek the support of the Rotary Club of El Salvador, Catholic Church, Legislative Assembly, public security and defence authorities
- Designate a fundraising committee
- Design paperwork, forms, publicity, campaign materials and logistical details
- Seek the participation of the Association of Salvadoran Advertisers (AMPS) and that of all other modes of national mass communication
- Contract the services of a respected auditing firm
- Design a system for storage, transport and elimination of armaments.

- Estimate the quantity, and designate the final destination, of the weapons to be collected and destroyed
- Erect a peace monument (location, design and construction).

It was decided that the programme would not be a 'buy-back' programme in the sense that the MPCD would be providing cash for the return of weapons. Rather, citizens would be compensated for contributing to the development of a peaceful and secure future of El Salvador. The act of turning in weapons was the most important objective. As long as citizens continued to turn in weapons, the programme was considered a success.²

From the start, the MPCD programme was closely co-ordinated with the government. This was particularly necessary because the MPCD decided to focus on military-style weapons, the civilian possession of which had recently been banned; a temporary legislative decree was necessary to allow all citizens to bear illegally held military-style arms strictly for the purpose of turning them in at designated collection sites.

The military and new police forces offered to provide assistance – unarmed and out of uniform, so as not to intimidate potential participants – to evaluate, store and destroy the weapons. The Catholic Church provided its installations as collection sites throughout the country, while the national association of advertisers provided free publicity on television, radio and in print media. The Rotary Club also agreed to serve as an independent monitor of the entire process and provided observers at each collection site.

The programme was known as the 'Goods for Guns' initiative and was designed around collection weekends that were preceded by extensive publicity. In total, 23 collection weekends took place between September 1996 and June 1999. While the MPCD did make several marginally successful efforts to collect weapons in the country's interior, almost all of the collection efforts took place in the capital. Each collection site was staffed by a minimum of nine people from the civilian police force, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and civil society. The sites operated simultaneously from 8 am to 4 pm. Procedures for turning in a weapon included a welcome, a valuation of the weapon by the military, distribution by MPCD of vouchers (for supermarkets, pharmacies and shoe stores), and the recording of serial numbers. Each weapon received was documented individually, with every form signed by representatives from the MPCD, Rotary Club, police and the MoD. All of the forms and paperwork provided a paper trail that ensured the transparency and legitimacy of the Goods for Guns programme. All weapons were transferred to the MoD, which received, stored, and publicly destroyed them.

By the end of the twenty-third round of the Goods for Guns programme in June 1999, a minimum of 9,527 weapons were collected and more than 100,000 rounds of ammunition. No systematic polling of the population took place with regards to the efficacy of the Goods for Guns programme. The only evidence of its effectiveness available is the steady stream of citizens that continued to turn in weapons during 1996–1999. By far the most impressive aspect of the Goods for Guns programme was the camaraderie between the different collaborators and the expression of goodwill (albeit undocumented) by those turning in their arms. The programme also helped to create a public security dialogue that has resulted in a more dedicated effort to confiscate weapons in the black market and implement progressive community policing efforts.³

Despite its successes, the Goods for Guns programme had a number of shortcomings. For example:

- Funding, especially by donor states, was very unco-ordinated due to the fact that small arms and light weapons disarmament was a very new item on the international agenda.
- Those states and international organisations supporting the programme did so mainly because of the global lack of programmes addressing the small arms problem despite the noted seriousness of the problem.

² Kiflemerian, BICC: Report 12, 1997.

³ Laurence and Godnick 2001, p 21.

- There was no attempt to use the collection programme to foster the development of other types of violence prevention programmes (e.g. gang violence reduction programmes, firearms surveillance systems, etc.).
- While useful linkages developed between the private sector and the government, the programme was not used as part of community building *per se*. Other than having citizens continue to turn in weapons, there were few programmatic objectives that could be used in evaluating the programme. In addition, no attempt was made to interview participants as to their motives, experiences, etc. – a technique that has been used successfully in other collection programmes.
- The programme was not linked to policies designed to limit the resupply or restocking of weapons into the country during the programme period. This factor was critical in donor states discontinuing their support of the programme.

Indeed, the Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San Salvador (Archbishop's Office for Human Rights) thought that the money spent on the Goods for Guns programme administration and incentives could have been better spent elsewhere, since by the end of the programme El Salvador was no less armed than at the end of the conflict. In fact, 48,620 new firearms were legally imported into the country during the Goods for Guns collection period.

Case study 4

'Guns into ploughshares' in Mozambique

Taken from: Godnick W *et al*, *Civil Society Action on SALW Control: Module CSA 05A02* (TRESA/Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2005), Annex II, pp 1–5.

In 1995, the Mozambican Council of Christian Churches (CCM), the co-ordinating body of the Anglican churches of Mozambique, began the Tools for Arms project (TAE), one of the first civil society bodies to ever embark on such an effort. The TAE project was still in existence almost ten years later.

SALW are an important symbol in Mozambican society. The AKM assault rifle is emblazoned on the national flag due to its role in the war of independence. After independence was won from Portugal in 1974, an even bloodier civil war ensued until 1992, leaving at least one million people dead and even more displaced from their communities. Following the end of the war, the UN sponsored a peace process that demobilised more than 100,000 fighters and collected and destroyed some 214,000 weapons. Despite this success, hundreds of thousands of weapons continued to circulate in Mozambique threatening the peacebuilding and development processes. Police reform had made major progress in Maputo, the country's capital, but had less impact in the interior of the countryside, where many ex-combatants live.

When the cease-fire was agreed in 1992, United Nations troops were mandated to disarm both sides. They collected some weapons, but most remained hidden. Former soldiers knew where many of these hidden guns are and admitted that they remained a temptation to the dispossessed by providing a means to threaten, rob and kill fellow Mozambicans.

A voluntary arms campaign was initiated whereby citizens could give up their arms to a small church-based charity, the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM). In return, those who gave up their weapons were given tools – ploughs, bicycles and sewing machines. In a land where many struggle to make enough money to eat, a simple plough can be the difference between life and death.

The Mozambican Government supported the operation, since they were aware that former rebels were unlikely to hand in weapons to the authorities out of fear of prosecution. The government also did not have the capacity to deal with SALW collection and destruction beyond its joint border collaboration with South Africa, as it had many other priorities, such as promoting economic development and dealing with natural disasters. The CCM was therefore able to fill this gap and set out to collect weapons primarily from ex-combatants. In exchange, they provided tools, destroyed the weapons for artists to transform into works of art, and educated communities about the dangers of weapons.

Between 1995 and 2003, the CCM collected almost 8,000 weapons and more than 400,000 rounds of ammunition and explosives in exchange for bicycles, sewing machines, food commodities, zinc roofing sheets, construction materials and a wide range of tools. The funding came primarily from international donor governments and NGOs, while the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) provided personnel on a regular basis to support the programme's implementation.

In some cases, individuals or groups of individuals brought weapons directly to the CCM and its provincial offices, or provided information on where a weapons cache could be found. The point of the weapons exchange process was to provide resources to ex-combatants to assist them in generating income for their beneficiaries and families, though it has been difficult to determine the outcome of this process. Both the police and the military seconded officials as full-time employees to work with the TAE project as technical support staff for collection, safe storage and destruction. A formula was developed for determining the value of incentives for information or weapons: one operational weapon is equal to twelve non-operational weapons, which is equal to 520 units of ammunition, which is equal to ten zinc sheets (which itself is equal to one used bicycle, etc.).

The entire TAE project teams consisted of a national co-ordinator, seven project officers, a driver, security guard, two technical staff mentioned above and consultants from international volunteer agencies. Other NGOs, such as the Foundation for Community Development, the Association of Demobilised Soldiers and the peace group PROPAZ also provided moral support and *ad hoc* collaboration. The project enjoyed the endorsement of both major political parties in Mozambique as well. The weapons collected were cut up in CCM's compound in Maputo and the pieces handed over to a group of Mozambican artists who made sculptures with them – even including chairs and coffee tables out of cut-up Kalashnikovs. These works of art have served as an effective marketing tool and thus have been extremely helpful in obtaining international support for the TAE project.

MODULE 8

Destruction of weapons and ammunition

Objective

To provide an introduction to the justifications and international obligations for the destruction of weapons and ammunition, as well as to provide a general overview of the principal technical means for destruction.

Summary

In order to remove weapons from circulation and to prevent illicit proliferation, there are instances when the destruction of weapons and ammunition may be necessary. This module begins by outlining why weapons and ammunition may need to be destroyed, highlighting the importance of destruction to enhance security and build confidence in weapons collection exercises. It further outlines international agreements, laws and guidelines that codify weapons destruction. The module discusses the planning stages for small arms and light weapons (SALW) destruction, offering some practical considerations and ways of verification before destruction is undertaken. The module concludes by outlining some weapons destruction techniques, and various examples of destruction.

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Module 0: Introduction					
Introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Become comfortable with group. 		Introductions – find out and present name and 3 things about partners.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ List of participants ■ Name badges 	9.00–9.20am (20 mins)
Course overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand what is included in the curriculum. ■ Agree on the agenda. 	Exercise to identify participants' expectations from the training.	On flash cards participants write their expectations from the training (1–2), read out to others and paste on the wall. These can be revisited at the end of the workshop to check whether the workshop met their expectations.	Workshop agenda	9.20–9.45am (25 mins)
Establishing ground rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establish ground rules for training. 		Ground rules – group brainstorm.		9.45–10.00am (15 mins)
Morning tea break					10.00–10.30am (30 mins)
Module 8: Destruction of weapons and ammunition					
1 Why destroy weapons and ammunition?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding of the arguments in favour of weapons and ammunition destruction. ■ An awareness of the agreements and guidelines that codify and promote the destruction of SALW and ammunitions. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide brief definition of SALW and ammunition destruction. 2. Brainstorm the reasons underlying the destruction of weapons and ammunition. 3. Affirm reasons. 4. Provide brief overview of the agreements and guidelines promoting and codifying destruction. 		Handout A: Destruction	10.30–11.30am (60 mins)
4 Planning for SALW destruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ An understanding that the success of SALW control programmes is directly related to the final disposal of all collected weapons. ■ A grasp of the issues to consider in the planning phases of weapons destruction. ■ An understanding of the importance of safety transparency of the accounting and verification process of weapons. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brainstorm measures that need to be taken for an effective destruction plan. 2. Affirm measures and provide handout with checklist. 3. Discuss practical considerations that arise when planning. 4. Discuss the importance of transparency and verification of weapons and ammunitions, in addition to safety. 			11.30am–1.00pm (90 mins)
Lunch					1.00–2.00pm (60 min)
5 Weapons destruction techniques	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ A broad understanding of the various destruction techniques that differ significantly in terms of financial and technical resources required. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Overview of weapon destruction techniques divided into the following categories: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Simple and cheap techniques b. Low technology and medium cost techniques c. High technologies and high initial capital costs. 2. Overview of ammunition destruction techniques <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Open detonation b. Open burning c. Increased use in training exercises. 3. Workshop exercise 1. 	<p>Participants work in groups to discuss which destruction methods would be most suitable for use in South Sudan.</p> <p>They should discuss each option and write down some of the reasons why the options would or would not be suitable as a weapons destruction option for South Sudan.</p> <p>Allow 20 minutes for discussion and then facilitate a combined report-back session.</p> <p>In the report-back, the trainer can write the various options on flip chart paper and then solicit opinions from the groups.</p> <p>Handout B: SALW destruction techniques can be used during the report-back session.</p>	Handout A: Destruction	2.00–4.00pm (120 mins)
5 Weapons destruction techniques					
End of day: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Wrap-up ■ Evaluation 					4.00–4.30pm (30 mins)

1 Why destroy weapons and ammunition?

Weapons and ammunition are usually destroyed as a necessary follow-up to weapons collection. Destruction improves security and safety by reducing the total number of illicit weapons and ammunition in public circulation, as well as by preventing the re-circulation of collected illicit weapons and ammunition amongst civilians due to loss or diversion. The destruction of illicit weapons collected from civilians or surplus government weapons also ensures these weapons can never be used against civilians in the future.

Storage sites of collected or surplus weapons and ammunition can be a hazard to communities that live and work in or near to them. Stocks of ammunition and explosives present additional risks than stockpiles of SALW themselves, as major explosions can and do occur due to factors such as fire, human error, lightning strikes, instability of propellants or explosives or sabotage.¹ Swift destruction therefore reduces the safety risk that prolonged storage of these weapons and ammunition can present. The destruction of weapons considered to be surplus to national requirements is also an effective counter-proliferation measure² and helps to combat the illicit arms trade.

SALW control practitioners feel that prior agreement that collected weapons will be destroyed builds confidence in weapons collection programmes.³ The destruction of weapons is also a concrete measure to demonstrate that actors are genuinely committed to reducing violence and improving security. If the destruction is carried out publicly, it may have a large positive psychological and symbolic effect on the public by showing them that their country and/or region is moving towards a more peaceful future. For example, large bonfires of guns have been used in ceremonies to mark the end of conflicts in Cambodia, Kosovo and Serbia, and sculptors from Mozambique have transformed guns into works of art. The largest number of small arms ever destroyed in one day was 100,000 in Rio de Janeiro in 2001.⁴

Destruction of SALW and ammunition is often a crucial process in the context of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations and sometimes as part of post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes.⁵ Destruction in this context may reflect requirements included in a peace agreement and often involves an international organisation, such as the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).⁶

Other reasons for destroying SALW may be because national stocks have become obsolete; because there have been changes in security requirements or in abilities to adequately store weapons; or due to technical reasons – for instance, that SALW are beyond reasonable repair or have inherent flaws that make them unsuitable for their intended use.⁷

For the above mentioned reasons, it is recommended that illicit, collected or unnecessary surplus weapons and ammunition are destroyed wherever possible and feasible.

1 Greene, Holt and Wilkinson 2005, p 8.

2 UNCASA2010, ISACS 05.50-Destruction: Weapons (Draft 3.0), p V.

3 *Ibid.*, p V.

4 IANSA 2003, p 1.

5 Weapons collected from DDR processes are not always destroyed. Frequently, these weapons are re-assigned for use by the formal security services, e.g. police, military, etc.

6 OSCE 2003, p 3.

7 *Ibid.*

2 Brief definition of destruction of SALW and ammunition

The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) definition for the destruction of SALW and ammunition is “the process of final conversion of weapons, ammunition and explosives into an inert state that can no longer function as designed.”⁸ The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) believes that “destruction [...] must render the SALW totally inoperable and non-repairable with parts unavailable for non-authorized use.”⁹

However, as will be discussed in Section 5, not all destruction methods render SALW totally inoperable, and often they can still be stripped and part re-utilised. One of these examples is open burning: although impressive as a ceremonial statement, it is not effective, since weapons will still be usable, or at least salvageable. Another example is crushing by heavy vehicle (e.g. bulldozer, tank, steam-roller, etc.), which also does not fully destroy the weapon, but is often done for public events (e.g. in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, or in Colombo, Sri Lanka). After crushing, SALW have to be collected, re-checked and then smelted. Therefore, depending on the original method of destruction, at times a second destruction phase is necessary. The OSCE *Best Practice Guide* also emphasises the fact that “to ensure that parts are not reused or that a weapon cannot be reconstituted from spare parts, open burning, explosion and vehicle crushing should be followed by burying (preferably in a secure guarded site or buried so deep and covered as to make recovery non-cost effective) or ferrous shredder recycling, depending on funds and infrastructure.”¹⁰ If, for whatever reason, this second destruction phase cannot take place, it is very important to ensure, at the very least, that the moving parts and/or firing mechanisms of each weapon are destroyed during the chosen destruction method.

3 International instruments codifying and promoting the destruction of SALW and ammunition

The destruction of SALW and ammunition is codified in a number of international and regional agreements, protocols and guidelines. It is important to note that international commitments and measures to prevent, reduce and combat uncontrolled or illicit SALW possession and flows are widely understood to include not just the weapons themselves but also their ammunition. While global norms do not specifically refer to ammunition, they were established on the wide understanding that the term ‘small arms and light weapons’ referred to the category described in the 1997 and 1999 Reports of the UN Groups of Governmental Experts, and thus included the ammunition used by small arms and light weapons.¹¹

⁸ SEESAC 2006a, p 7.

⁹ OSCE 2003, p 12.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p 7.

¹¹ Greene, Holt and Wilkinson 2005, p 10.

International instruments

United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA) (2001): Under the PoA, states undertake to ensure that all confiscated, seized or collected SALW are destroyed, subject to any legal constraints associated with the preparation of criminal prosecutions, unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorised and provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered (Clause 16); to destroy surplus SALW designated for destruction, taking into account, *inter alia*, the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on methods of destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives (S/2000/1092) of 15 November 2000 (Clause 19); and to develop and implement, including in conflict and post-conflict situations, public awareness and confidence-building programmes on the problems and consequences of the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects, including, where appropriate, the public destruction of surplus weapons and the voluntary surrender of SALW, if possible, in co-operation with civil society and non-governmental organisations, with a view to eradicating the illicit trade in SALW (Clause 20).

United Nations Firearms Protocol (2005)¹² includes an obligation to destroy illicitly manufactured and trafficked firearms that extends explicitly beyond SALW to include other firearms and their ammunition (Article 6). However, the Protocol does not cover the medium and large calibre ammunition that accounts for over 70 percent of national stockpiles.

Selected regional instruments

The **Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (3 November 2000)** – recommends that Member States should at the national level develop and implement, where they do not exist, national programmes for “the identification and the destruction by competent national authorities and where necessary, of surplus, obsolete and seized stocks in possession of the state, with, as appropriate, international financial and technical support”.¹³

The **Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004)**, Article 8, provides that “State Parties undertake to identify and adopt effective programmes for the collection, safe-storage, destruction and responsible disposal of SALW rendered surplus, redundant or obsolete, in accordance with domestic laws, through, *inter alia*, peace agreements, demobilisation or reintegration of ex-combatants, or re-equipment of armed forces or other armed state bodies”.¹⁴

¹² UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), was adopted in 2001 by the UN General Assembly with resolution 55/255 and entered into force on 3 June 2005. The Firearms Protocol constitutes, to date, the only global legally-binding instrument addressing the issue of small arms. See www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf; www.poa-iss.org/FirearmsProtocol/FirearmsProtocol.aspx

¹³ Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, p 4.

¹⁴ RECSA 2005, p 17.

4 Planning for SALW destruction

The success of a SALW control programme is directly related to the final disposal of the collected weapons. Therefore, the introduction of an immediate process for the destruction of recovered weapons will significantly contribute to prevent further proliferation. There are many good reasons why the planning and resources for a final destruction process must be included in any SALW control project. Provisions for destruction are as important to the success of a programme as the initial political will of the government to destroy weapons. The method used for weapon recovery is also important.¹⁵

The table below provides a checklist of issues to consider in the **planning phase** of weapons destruction. Note that it is a non-specific generic checklist that needs to be adapted and modified to suit the specific context. Some procedures may not be necessary given the context, and the order of the steps may need to be changed depending on specific requirements.

Table 1: Planning checklist for SALW destruction¹⁶

Measure	Comments
1. Select SALW to be destroyed	What are the types, quantities and quality of weapons to be destroyed? This decision has to be founded upon existing laws, regulations, procedures, policies and accepted practices. <i>Information on the weapons to be destroyed is crucial for all planning elements (environmental, security, risks, destruction methods, costs, etc.).</i>
2. Authorisation for destruction	Obtain formal authorisation for destruction of SALW from the appropriate government authority (including for possible public destruction ceremony if desired). This authorisation should also certify that the weapons are no longer required as evidence and are free from the judicial process.
3. Identify and authorise holding authorities for SALW destruction	According to laws and regulations, obtain authorisation for holding authorities (e.g. military, police, commercial, etc.) to possess SALW during destruction phases.
4. Identify destruction location(s)	Select an appropriate destruction location, whether a permanent destruction facility, a mobile destruction process or another suitable location (military depot/stations, factory site, etc.). It is recommended that weapons should be destroyed as close as possible to the point of storage or collection in order to reduce security requirements.
5. Transportation of weapons to final destination	If weapons will be destroyed at a location separate from their storage, transportation and other logistical plans will need to be developed. These should include types of vehicles, recovery procedures in case of diversion, security requirements, whether weapons should be transported in pieces, etc.
6. Destruction technique	Examine and select the most appropriate destruction technique.
7. Final disposal plan	Every destruction method creates resulting scrap ('scrap arisings'). Consider what are the best permanent means for disposing of scrap, including recovery, recycling and re-use options.

¹⁵ SEESAC 2006a, pp 2–3.

¹⁶ Table adapted from guidelines presented in OSCE 2003, pp 13–14, and UNCASA 2010, ISACS 05.50-Destruction: Weapons, pp 2–5.

Measure	Comments
8. Environmental plan	Assess the environmental impact of the destruction and plan reduction and mitigation measures.
9. Risk management process	Develop a formal risk assessment and management process that follows the entire destruction process from beginning to end.
10. Security plan	Develop a security plan (drawing on risk management process), as any process involving the movement of weapons presents risks of weapon diversion or loss.
11. Safety plan	Develop a safety plan for implementing the destruction from beginning to end (drawing on risk management process). Not only should appropriate weapons handling procedures be adopted, but plans should include measures to deal with: hazardous materials; safety and occupational health measures applicable to the selected destruction method; appropriate protective equipment; the reporting of accidents; and medical evacuation.
12. Accounting and records	An information system needs to be developed that identifies, records and transparently accounts for each weapon to be destroyed. This includes: what information will be recorded, how it is recorded (paper, computer, etc.) and backed up (master register, back-up data drive, etc.); who is authorised to verify this information; and records (e.g. what records should be retained, the purpose of retention, for how long, in what type of media and where they should be held).
13. Verification	An important component of confidence-building and ensuring against weapons diversion/loss during the destruction process. Many measures are possible, but it is important to avoid over-bureaucratisation, which can add unnecessary complexity, costs and time delays. It may be preferable to have representatives from different agencies accompany the process continuously.
14. Financial plan	Based upon the above, establish the overall financial costs required to conduct the destruction. This will be important not only for obtaining government financing, but also for mobilising resources from donor agencies. It is recommended that destruction is not begun until all funds necessary to implement it are secured.
15. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)	Develop SOPs that will guide all elements of the destruction process (drawing upon environmental risk, security and safety plans).
16. Quality assurance/control	This is an ongoing procedure that constantly looks at ways to improve the destruction process through efficiencies and the elimination of potential problems. In this regard, after-action reports can sometimes be helpful.

Practical considerations in planning

All destruction methods range in cost and complexity, so before deciding on the method of destruction, several factors need to be considered. These include¹⁷:

- **Quantity and physical condition of weapons and ammunition to be destroyed.** These need to be recorded and entered either into a database or, where this is not possible, on sheets of paper stating type of weapon, serial number, manufacturer and its physical condition.
- **Time and location constraints.** If time plays a significant factor in the destruction process – and it usually is recommended that collected weapons are to be destroyed as soon as possible – safe locations in the vicinity need to be found to push the process forward in a timely manner.

¹⁷ Adapted from UNDDA 2001, p 10.

- **Security requirements for weapons and/or ammunition in storage awaiting destruction.** Depending on what means are available, security can be provided by having military and/or police personnel guard these stocks in a container or building with brick walls, to prevent any stocks from going missing and to prevent any unauthorised access.
- **Site, equipment and SALW/ammunition security and safety measures.** The destruction site and the equipment chosen for destruction, as well as the weapons, need to be safe and secure in order to prevent accidents.
- **Psychological, political and awareness needs.** Often, destroyed weapons are used for the building of a peace monument visualising the start of a more peaceful present.
- **National infrastructure** (roads, communications, equipment availability and domestic recycling capabilities). Generally, moving weapons and ammunition is a difficult task, and how, if at all, this will be arranged depends on what type of transport/vehicles are available, general road conditions, type of loads (only SALW, SALW and ammunition or just ammunition), the general security situation, and the financial means available.
- **Labour costs** for destruction of SALW and/or ammunition. The actual destruction needs to be carried out by trained military or police personnel.
- **Implementation funds.** Financial assistance could be sought by international donors/organisations to assist the government in its efforts to rid the region of illicit weapons and to destroy the collected SALW.

Transparency and verification of weapons and ammunition

In order to build local confidence in the planned destruction programme, transparency of the accounting and verification process is an essential requirement. Often civilians returning weapons and ammunition may have concerns that these may be used against them or diverted to others. Consequently, members of the community should strongly be encouraged to attend the verification process and subsequent destruction events as a confidence-building measure and to ensure transparency.¹⁸ According to SEESAC, “the system for the verification of the [destruction] programme is necessary for building confidence in the minds of stakeholders that the programme is being, and has been, carried out in the required manner. As such, it is an important part of the SALW programme.”¹⁹

The International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) suggest that greater SALW destruction transparency can also be useful in accomplishing wider objectives, including: “a) confidence and security building measures between states (usually in the context of surplus reduction); b) societal-level engagement in the observation of destruction, (usually in the context of post-conflict destruction); and c) local-level activities (during, for example, an urban crime gun reduction programme).”²⁰

For the sake of accuracy, accountability and transparency, all weapons and ammunition should be registered before they are destroyed. The ISACS recommends that the following minimum information is recorded for each destroyed SALW:²¹

- date of destruction
- location of destruction
- weapon type
- weapon make
- weapon model
- calibre
- weapon serial numbers (manufacturer’s and local)
- parts serial numbers (manufacturer’s and local)
- country and/or manufacturer monograms/markings.

¹⁸ Ruddock *et al* 2006, Section 2, p 19.

¹⁹ SEESAC 2006b, p iv.

²⁰ UNCASA 2010, ISACS 05.50-Destruction: Weapons, p 5.

²¹ *Ibid*, pp 6–7.

This information can be useful in future weapons tracking.

If verification is not done correctly, it will bring into question the credibility of the programme. It is important that only the stockpiles that have been physically seen to have been destroyed are verified as destroyed. Bear in mind that community members are not usually trained in the handling of weapons and ammunition. Therefore, they should not handle any of the weapons or ammunition being accounted for and verified, and should only operate in the vicinity of destruction under guidance and supervision of trained weapons and ammunition technical specialists.²²

Safety

Safety can never be compromised during destruction activities. In all SALW control programmes, there are dangers and risks involved which can, in the worst case, have lethal consequences. Thus, it is an absolute must to achieve optimum safety and security by assessing all risks and ensuring strategies and techniques are in place to reduce all risks.²³

According to the OSCE *Best Practice Guide on Destruction*, safety is always a determining factor, and goes beyond checking to see if the magazines and breeches contain ammunition. “Depending on the procedural technique to be used, it could involve ensuring that springs under tension are released, excess oil and lubricants are removed, and ancillary equipment such as batteries and target acquisition and target enhancement parts containing tritium and other such materials are removed. Safety should also be taken into account when considering other elements in the process, including the operation of destruction equipment, transport, storage and final disposal.”²⁴

5 Weapons destruction techniques

The following section provides a brief description of some of the most common methods that have been used for the destruction of SALW and ammunition. No matter what type of destruction is chosen, it must render the SALW totally inoperable and non-repairable even by a skilled armorer or gunsmith. Furthermore, parts that could be used for spares or in the making of new weapons should also be destroyed. The process must be safe and should be efficient and repeatable.²⁵

There are various techniques for the destruction of weapons, which differ significantly in terms of financial and technical resources required.

Simple and cheap techniques include:

- Burning
- Sawing: band-saw or electric circular saw (table-mounted or hand-held)
- Cementing weapons
- Hand method
- Crushing by tracked vehicle.

Low technology and medium cost techniques include:

- Cutting with oxyacetylene or plasma torch
- Open detonation
- Cutting/shearing.

²² Adapted from Ruddock *et al* 2006, Section 6, p 21.

²³ *Ibid*, Section 10, p 3.

²⁴ OSCE 2003, p 5.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p 4.

High technologies and high initial capital costs include:

- Shredding
- Smelting in industrial foundry.

The destruction of weapons is a technical undertaking, and this module does not provide in-depth technical guidance. Whenever weapons destruction programmes are undertaken, it is imperative to have technical expertise.

6 Ammunition destruction techniques

The options for the destruction of SALW ammunition are more limited than that of the SALW themselves, and involve much more significant safety and environmental issues. The destruction of ammunition should almost exclusively be undertaken only by military ordnance professionals.

There are few options available for the destruction of ammunition and explosives, as compared with SALW.²⁶ Regarding ball ammunition (i.e. bullets), two basic methods exist, depending on the amount to be destroyed:

- If there is only a small amount of ammunition to be destroyed, it can simply be fired normally into a backstop of some sort.
- For small or slightly larger amounts, or if a weapon suitable for expending the rounds is not available, ball ammunition can also be destroyed through burning.
- For very large amounts, destruction becomes more difficult without the aid of military ordnance professionals. Additionally, because the most likely method is burning, there could be environmental concerns arising from such a large-scale burn.

Destruction of explosive ordnance such as grenades, mines, mortar shells, etc. is somewhat more difficult and costly than that of ball ammunition. The easiest method is detonation, preferably soon after collection, as the unreliable disposition of this sort of ordnance could pose large safety risks if transported and/or stored.

- For example, in El Salvador, authorities dug several holes one meter deep and 50 cm wide for detonation.
- On other occasions, the explosives were used in conjunction with a construction project – cement blocks can be used in a number of ways in construction while making the weapons unusable by cementing them.²⁷

Open detonation (OD)

Open detonation (OD) is still the most cost-effective way of destroying ammunition. An additional high explosive charge (a 'donor charge') is used to initiate (set off) the target ammunition by detonation. High rates of destruction can be achieved and the logistic cost per round of ammunition can be relatively low. The disadvantages are that there will always be an **environmental consequence**: ground and air pollution. However, if managed properly and responsibly, these effects can be minimised by the use of monitoring equipment. There also will always also be a certain amount of noise pollution associated with OD, but this can be monitored and managed through the use of tamping.²⁸ OD projects require large danger

²⁶ There is limited public documentation available providing examples that demonstrate the various destruction techniques covered in this module, particularly from African contexts with weak infrastructure as in South Sudan.

²⁷ Ruddock *et al* 2006, Section 7, p 7.

²⁸ For further information on the environmental impact of OD, see SEESAC 2004.

areas and suitable qualified personnel to ensure the procedure is conducted correctly. The process can be dangerous if multi-item demolition techniques are not fully understood. Finally, OD operations can only be conducted during daytime hours.

Open burning (OB)²⁹

There are a number of open burning (OB) techniques which can be used to destroy ammunition safely and efficiently. These range from open pit burning to using specially built burning boxes, either static or mobile. There are also readily available materials, such as disused 50-gallon oil drums, which can act as excellent containers for burning SALW ammunition. The advantages are that high destruction rates can be achieved at very low costs. However, subsequent burns do have to wait 24 hours to allow the container to cool. The main disadvantage of OB procedures is the air pollution they can cause. However, if the temperatures exceed 850°C all volatile organic compounds (VOCs)³⁰ are destroyed. To increase the heat of the OB process, certain thermite charges can be used.

Increased use in training exercises

Increasing the use of ammunition during training exercises is one potentially desirable way of disposing of surplus ammunition stocks. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that any significant increase in training does not undermine security and confidence amongst neighbouring states. Moreover, only limited stocks can be disposed of in this manner, given the costs and time involved in training. When the ammunition is used, it will create additional wear on equipment (such as gun barrels, vehicle automotive systems etc.). This will inevitably reduce the life of the parent equipment and will result in additional maintenance costs. These additional costs therefore should be balanced against the value of the training obtained from firing surplus ammunition stocks. This method is thus unrealistic as a means of destroying a substantial proportion of a large surplus stockpile.³¹

²⁹ OB section adapted from Ruddock *et al* 2006, Section 8, pp 1–7.

³⁰ VOCs can pose significant health and environmental effects – see the US Environmental Protection Agency, www.epa.gov/iaq/voc.html

³¹ Greene *et al* 2005, pp 21–22.

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Workshop exercise

Exercise 1

Destruction methods

Divide participants into groups of three to six people. Distribute **Handout B** to all participants. Ask the groups to discuss which destruction methods would be most suitable for use in South Sudan and write down some of the reasons why each of the options outlined above would or would not be suitable as a weapons destruction option for South Sudan.

Allow 20 minutes for discussion and then facilitate a combined report-back session. In the report-back session, you can write the various options on flip chart paper and then solicit opinions from the groups.

Distribute **Handout C** for participants to refer to outside the training.

MODULE 8: HANDOUT A

Destruction

Why destroy weapons and ammunition? (M8 S1)

Destruction improves security and safety by reducing the total number of illicit weapons and ammunition in public circulation, as well as by preventing the re-circulation of collected illicit weapons and ammunition amongst civilians due to loss or diversion. The destruction of illicit weapons collected from civilians or surplus government weapons also ensures these weapons can never be used against civilians in the future.

The destruction of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition is codified in a number of international and regional agreements, protocols and guidelines.

- United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA) (2001)
- United Nations Firearms Protocol (2005)¹
- The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (3 November 2000)
- The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004).

Planning for SALW destruction (M8 S4)

Table: Planning checklist for SALW destruction²

Measure	Comments
1. Select SALW to be destroyed	This decision has to be founded upon existing laws, regulations, procedures, policies and accepted practices. <i>Information on the weapons to be destroyed is crucial for all planning elements.</i>
2. Authorisation for destruction	Obtain formal authorisation for destruction of SALW from the appropriate government authority (including for possible public destruction ceremony if desired). This authorisation should also certify that the weapons are no longer required as evidence and are free from the judicial process.
3. Identify and authorise holding authorities for SALW destruction	According to laws and regulations, obtain authorisation for holding authorities (e.g. military, police, commercial, etc.) to possess SALW during destruction phases.
4. Identify destruction location(s)	Select an appropriate destruction location, whether a permanent destruction facility, a mobile destruction process or another suitable location (military depot/stations, factory site, etc.). It is recommended that weapons should be destroyed as close as possible to the point of storage or collection in order to reduce security requirements.

¹ *UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition* (Firearms Protocol), was adopted in 2001 by the UN General Assembly with resolution 55/255 and entered into force on 3 June 2005. The Firearms Protocol constitutes, to date, the only global legally-binding instrument addressing the issue of small arms. See www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf; www.poa-iss.org/FirearmsProtocol/FirearmsProtocol.aspx

² Table adapted from guidelines presented in OSCE 2003, pp 13–14, and UNCASA 2010, ISACS 05.50-Destruction: Weapons, pp 2–5.

Measure	Comments
5. Transportation of weapons to final destination	If weapons will be destroyed at a location separate from their storage, transportation and other logistical plans will need to be developed. These should include types of vehicles, recovery procedures in case of diversion, security requirements, whether weapons should be transported in pieces, etc.
6. Destruction technique	Examine and select the most appropriate destruction technique.
7. Final disposal plan	Every destruction method creates resulting scrap ('scrap arisings'). Consider what are the best permanent means for disposing of scrap, including recovery, recycling and re-use options.
8. Environmental plan	Assess the environmental impact of the destruction and plan reduction and mitigation measures.
9. Risk management process	Develop a formal risk assessment and management process the follows the entire destruction process from beginning to end.
10. Security plan	Develop a security plan (drawing on risk management process), as any process involving the movement of weapons presents risks of weapon diversion or loss.
11. Safety plan	Develop a safety plan for implementing the destruction from beginning to end (drawing on risk management process). Not only should appropriate weapons handling procedures be adopted, but plans should include measures to deal with: hazardous materials; safety and occupational health measures applicable to the selected destruction method; appropriate protective equipment; the reporting of accidents; and medical evacuation.
12. Accounting and records	An information system needs to be developed that identifies, records and transparently accounts for each weapon to be destroyed. This includes: what information will be recorded, how it is recorded (paper, computer, etc.) and backed up (master register, back-up data drive, etc.); who is authorised to verify this information; and records (e.g. what records should be retained, the purpose of retention, for how long, in what type of media and where they should be held).
13. Verification	An important component of confidence-building and ensuring against weapons diversion/loss during the destruction process. Many measures are possible, but it is important to avoid over- bureaucratisation, which can add unnecessary complexity, costs and time delays. It may be preferable to have representatives from different agencies accompany the process continuously.
14. Financial plan	Based upon the above, establish the overall financial costs required to conduct the destruction. This will be important not only for obtaining government financing, but also for mobilising resources from donor agencies. <i>It is recommended that destruction is not begun until all funds necessary to implement it are secured.</i>
15. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)	Develop SOPs that will guide all elements of the destruction process (drawing upon environmental risk, security and safety plans).
16. Quality assurance/control	This is an ongoing procedure that constantly looks at ways to improve the destruction process through efficiencies and the elimination of potential problems. In this regard, after-action reports can sometimes be helpful.

Weapons destruction techniques & Ammunition destruction techniques (M8 SS5&6)

Weapon: There are various techniques, which differ significantly in terms of financial and technical resources required.

Simple and cheap techniques include:

- Burning
- Sawing: band-saw or electric circular saw (table-mounted or hand-held)
- Cementing weapons
- Hand method
- Crushing by tracked vehicle.

Low technology and medium cost techniques include:

- Cutting with oxyacetylene or plasma torch
- Open detonation
- Cutting/shearing.

High technologies and high initial capital costs include:

- Shredding
- Smelting in industrial foundry.

Ammunition and explosives: Regarding ball ammunition (i.e. bullets), two basic methods exist, depending on the amount to be destroyed:

- If there is only a small amount of ammunition to be destroyed, it can simply be fired normally into a backstop of some sort.
- For small or slightly larger amounts, or if a weapon suitable for expending the rounds is not available, ball ammunition can also be destroyed through burning.
- For very large amounts, destruction becomes more difficult without the aid of military ordnance professionals. Additionally, because the most likely method is burning, there could be environmental concerns arising from such a large-scale burn.

Destruction of explosive ordnance such as grenades, mines, mortar shells, etc. is somewhat more difficult and costly than that of ball ammunition. The easiest method is detonation, preferably soon after collection, as the unreliable disposition of this sort of ordnance could pose large safety risks if transported and/or stored.

SALW destruction techniques

Figure 1: Low technology, low cost destruction techniques

Low technology – low costs techniques						
Method	Advantages	Disadvantages	Materials needed	Skills and personnel required	Implications for PM - other considerations	Safety concerns
Burning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Makes a political and psychological statement signifying that steps are being taken toward peace. Very visible way to see that weapons will not be used again. Simple cost-effective High psychological and political value 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not 100% effective in destroying the weapons Minimal value for resulting scrap Environmental concerns 	Material for the pyre: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fuel (wood or coal) Flammable substance (e.g., gasoline) Wooden poles Sand bags 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stacking the firearms to a pyre to maximize their destruction Fire fighters and equipment Medical personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opportunity for destruction ceremony Great media attention and PR opportunity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low Depends on combustion material All SALW have to be checked before burning
Sawing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mobile Simple to use Requires little training Some costs can be recovered through recycling Mobile 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Time consuming and labor intensive Few weapons can be destroyed Not practical for Light Weapons except rocket launchers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Saw machine Electricity supply Replacement saw blades 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal safety and operating skills Personnel on the saws 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure supply of appropriate voltage and amperage electricity Ensure sufficient supply of replacement saw blades 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low All SALW have to be checked before sawing
Cementing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Simple to use Requires little training Large masses of weapons can be worked simultaneously Low costs Mobile Concrete blocks can be used for construction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weapons are put out of reach, but not truly decommissioned Use must be found for concrete blocks Not practical for Light Weapons except rocket launchers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concrete mix (cement, building sand, lime) Concrete mixer desirable for large quantities of SALW Forms of wood or wood and plastic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal construction skills Construction personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure supply of cement and other materials Ensure sufficient tools for mixing, and fuel for concrete mixers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low

Method	Advantages	Disadvantages	Materials needed	Skills and personnel required	Implications for PM - other considerations	Safety concerns
Hand method	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Very simple to use ■ Cost effective ■ Mobile 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Labour intensive ■ Only a handful of weapons can be destroyed at a time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Hand tools (e.g., hand saws, sledgehammer) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ None to little training ■ Destruction personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Coordinating and supervising work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Low to moderate ■ All SALW have to be checked before destruction
Crushing by tracked vehicle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Simple to execute ■ Requisite equipment widely available ■ Fairly inexpensive ■ Hundreds of weapons can be destroyed in one day 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Not 100% effective in destroying weapons ■ Not 100% effective in destroying all weapons ■ Difficult to do in remote, rural areas ■ Not practical for wide-ranging mobile destruction plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Tracked vehicle ■ Fuel for tracked vehicle ■ Railway rail or similar hard surface 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Heavy equipment driver 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Need to find local bulldozer or other heavy tracked vehicle. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Low ■ All SALW have to be checked before crushing

Figure 2: Low technology, medium cost destruction techniques

Low technology – medium costs techniques						
Method	Advantages	Disadvantages	Materials needed	Skills and personnel required	Implications for PM - other considerations	Safety concerns
Cutting: oxy-acetylene torch and plasma cutter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Simple (only little training) ■ Close to 100% effective if procedures are followed ■ Easily maintained and transported ■ Skills are transferable to civilian market 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Time consuming for large quantities of weapons ■ Equipment may be a target for theft ■ Expensive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Plasma cutter ■ Fuel ■ Safety gear 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Moderate skills required ■ Easily acquired ■ Personnel for the cutter 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Account for training/preparation day ■ Buy/rent calculation for equipment ■ Heightened security measures against theft 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Moderate, torch burns and explosions (affects user only)
Cutting/shearing: hydraulic shears	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Simple to use ■ requires some training ■ 100% effective in rendering the weapons useless ■ Reliable and long-lived ■ Large numbers of weapons can be destroyed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Expensive for small quantities of weapons ■ Smaller shears may be target of theft ■ Requires power or electricity source or fuel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Hydraulic shears ■ Fuel or power source 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Moderate skills required ■ Training ■ Personnel to work on shears 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Enhanced security needed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Enhanced security needed (cutting blades)
Open detonation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Large numbers of weapons can be decommissioned together ■ Cost efficiency if done together with disposal of explosives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Must be done by an expert ■ Not 100% reliable ■ Environmental concerns ■ Safety considerations unless done with disposal of explosives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Explosives ■ Ancillary material 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Detonation expert (EOD personnel) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Requires same handling as ammunition/explosives OBOD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ High ■ Requires expert handling

Figure 3: High technology, high cost destruction techniques

High technology – high cost techniques						
Method	Advantages	Disadvantages	Materials needed	Skills and personnel required	Implications for PM - other considerations	Safety concerns
Shredding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Large numbers of weapons destroyed in short time ■ 100% assurance of complete destruction ■ Some costs can be recovered through recycling ■ No environmental concern 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Extremely expensive equipment ■ Not very portable ■ Not cost-effective for quantities of weapons under several thousand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Shredder 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Shredder operator 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Transportation to the site ■ Security during the process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Normal
Smelting (in industrial foundry)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Large numbers of weapons destroyed in short time ■ 100% assurance of complete destruction ■ Some costs can be recovered through recycling ■ No environmental concern 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Extremely expensive equipment to buy if not already available in-country ■ Not portable ■ Not cost-effective for quantities of weapons under several thousand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Smelter 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Smelter operator 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Transportation to the site ■ security during the process ■ Must ensure that gun metal can be used 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Normal

This handout is taken from *Small arms and light weapons: A training manual*, published by Saferworld, February 2012

MODULE 8: HANDOUT C

Photo and video galleries of SALW and ammunition destruction

Example 1 – SALW destruction by cutting in Eastern DRC (MAG)

MAG was requested by MONUC to destroy a cache of 309 weapons in one day. The latter part of the video (www.youtube.com/watch?v=ca1OMddsToY – from 4:14 minutes onwards)¹ provides an overview of how this was accomplished by a small mobile team equipped with circular table saws. They destroyed the 309 weapons in 420 minutes.

Example 2 – SALW destruction with shears in Rwanda (MAG)

Photo gallery by MAG to demonstrate Rwanda military and police utilising hydraulic shears to destroy rifles: www.maginternational.org/news/rwanda-weapons-destruction-photo-gallery/. MAG has established a central weapons destruction facility in Rwanda in partnership with the government – refer to: www.maginternational.org/MAG/en/where-we-work/mag-rwanda-in-depth/

Example 3 – SALW collection and destruction in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Photo gallery of authorities in Rio de Janeiro bulldozing and burning almost 5000 fire arms confiscated between 1997 and 1998: www.australfoto.com/Politics/Gun-destruction-event/3967731_Sk4yH#230564246_7azLg.

Photo gallery of a mobile gun collection station in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2004: www.australfoto.com/Rio-de-Janeiro/Violent-Rio/2744322_hGpp4#145807760_Hyfo

Example 4 – Destruction of weapons by police, Virgin Islands

News report on a public information day with police destroying guns with circular saws: www.youtube.com/watch?v=bupou_lo9pA

Example 5 – Burning of guns, Kenya

News report regarding illicit gun traffickers and ceremonial burning of illicit weapons: www.youtube.com/watch?v=pJd5LO_oQy4

This handout is taken from *Small arms and light weapons: A training manual*, published by Saferworld, February 2012

¹ This is basically a MAG promotional video, but it provides an eyes-on example of weapons cutting in a context of limited resources. Any use of the video should acknowledge that it is from the documentary film "Peace Commandos" by SpinFilm (www.spinfilm.org/stockpile.htm).

MODULE 9

Stockpile management of weapons and weapons safety

Objective

To stress the importance of stockpile management, including the safe storage of weapons, ammunition and explosive ordnance, and to provide an overview of key issues to be considered for the effective management of stockpiles.

Summary

This module begins with a definition of stockpile management and the reasons why it is important to manage weapons and ammunition held by national armed forces, police and state security forces. It gives an overview of international and regional agreements codifying stockpile management and outlines ways of improving safety and storage of small arms and light weapons (SALW) stocks. It also briefly outlines some basic security measures that can be applied to SALW and ammunition storage and concludes with some case study illustrations of ways that stockpiles can be managed.

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Introduction					
Introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Become comfortable with group. 		Introductions – find out and present name and 3 things about partners.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ List of participants ■ Name badges 	9.00–9.20am (20 mins)
Course overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Understand what is included in the curriculum. ■ Agree on the agenda. 	Exercise to identify participants' expectations from the training.	On flash cards participants write their expectations from the training (1–2), read out to others and paste on the wall. These can be revisited at the end of the workshop to check whether the workshop met their expectations.	Workshop agenda	9.20–9.45am (25 mins)
Establishing ground rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establish ground rules for training. 		Ground rules – group brainstorm.		9.45–10.00am (15 mins)
Morning tea break					10.00–10.30am (30 mins)

Session	Learning objective	Lesson plan	Exercise/Tool	Handout	Time
Module 9: Stockpile management of weapons and weapons safety					
2 Why is stockpile management important?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An ability to define stockpile management and indicate why stockpile management is important. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Review the definition of stockpile management. Brainstorm why stockpile management is important. Affirm reasons: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Improving security Improving Safety Accountability. Brief overview of international laws, agreements, and protocols that codify stockpile management. 		Handout A: Stockpile management	10.30am–12.00pm (90 mins)
Lunch					12.00–1.00pm
4 Improving stockpile management and safety for SALW storage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An awareness of the OSCE best practices for national procedures of stockpile management and security. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Overview of the OSCE Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Appropriate characteristics of stockpile locations Lack-and-key and other physical security measures Access control measures Inventory management and accounting control procedures Protection measures in emergency situations Procedures aimed at maximising transport security Precautions and sanctions in the event of loss and theft Security training for personnel regarding SALW stockpile/ buildings. 		Handout A: Stockpile management	1.00–2.30pm (90 mins)
Afternoon tea break					2.30–2.45pm (15 mins)
5 Improving stockpile management and safety for ammunition storage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An understanding of the basic safety measures for ammunition storage. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Brainstorm the measures needed for ammunition storage. Affirm responses. Discuss further considerations, such as condition of the ammunition, storage buildings, fire prevention, and storage measures. Workshop exercise 1 	<p>Workshop exercise 1</p> <p>The workshop participants should be split into three groups to discuss stockpile management and weapons storage needs from the perspectives of three key actors:</p> <p>Group 1: South Sudanese Police Service</p> <p>Group 2: Bureau of Community Security and Arms Control (in the context of a voluntary disarmament programme)</p> <p>Group 3: South Sudan National Army.</p> <p>Each group presents their stockpile management requirements and plans specifically for South Sudan.</p> <p>Allow at least 20 minutes for the group work and 5–10 minutes per group for their presentations. For feedback, select three groups to present to keep to time and avoid too much duplication; the groups not presenting should be given opportunity to make additions.</p> <p>After the feedback session, provide participants with Handout B: Cambodia case study and after allocating time for reading, facilitate a general discussion on the case study and potential lessons for South Sudan. Allow 10 minutes for reading and then 15 minutes for discussion.</p>	Handout A: Stockpile management	2.45–4.15pm (90 mins)
End of day: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wrap-up Evaluation 					4.15–4.45pm (30 mins)

1

Brief definition of stockpile management

‘Stockpile management’ is a wide-ranging term that covers specific technical areas related to the safety and security of ammunition and explosives in accounting, storage, transportation and handling. In addition, it refers to issues such as the determination of stockpile size, types of stockpiles, location of stockpiles and the management of ammunition in service. Effective stockpile management requires comprehensive planning in order to ensure that all activities related to stockpile management work together as an integrated system.

Out of some 200 million military firearms worldwide, at least 76 million are surplus. Moreover, an estimated diversion rate of one in every 1,000 civilian-owned weapons amounts to a loss of some 650,000 firearms per year. Such diversion (i.e. ownership passing from legal owners to illegal or unlicensed owners) contributes to crime and armed violence in many countries. Research also shows that the widespread leakage of weapons from state and civilian stockpiles is primarily due to negligence. Many aspects of stockpile security can be enhanced by relatively low-cost improvements in accounting, monitoring and the physical security of arms and ammunition.¹

The secure management of national small arms stockpiles is instrumental in curbing small arms proliferation. Poor stockpile security is a prime means through which arms and ammunition are diverted from the legal to the illicit markets. Lax security makes theft easy. Corrupt officials may sell or otherwise transfer weapons under their care to criminal groups or rebel forces. Stockpile security is especially precarious in states suffering from violent conflict or weak governance.

In some cases, small arms stockpiles greatly exceed immediate and projected future needs. Surpluses arise for a wide variety of reasons: the end of armed conflict, changing perceptions of threat, the reduction or restructuring of armed forces, changed military doctrines, and the acquisition of new weapons. While it is increasingly acknowledged that surplus small arms are best disposed of through destruction, this remains the exception rather than the rule. In practice, surpluses that are not sold are stockpiled, sometimes for decades.²

Measures to enhance the security and management of legal stocks of small arms and to reduce ‘surplus’ weapons are clearly essential components of an effective international action programme to combat illicit trafficking and prevent and reduce the proliferation of small arms. The existence of large quantities of surplus small arms is a major factor in the excessive availability and flows of these weapons.³ This module relates to the management of small arms and ammunition held by governments (national armed forces, police, and other state security forces).

¹ NATO, Small arms and light weapons and mine action, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52142.htm

² Small Arms Survey, Stockpile Management and Security, [Online]. Available at: www.smallarmssurvey.org/regulations-and-controls/control-measures/stockpile-management-and-security.html

³ Greene 2000, p 2.

2 Why is stockpile management important?

Stockpile management of weapons and ammunition is very important for a number of reasons. These include:

Improving security: The safe storage of weapons, ammunition and explosive ordnance is crucial for the security of both civilians and security personnel. Often, a major source of weapons and ammunition for armed groups, militias, criminals, community defence groups, and others are weapons that have 'leaked' from official national stocks. Good stockpile management ensures that:

- Weapons leakage does not threaten the security that the military and police are trying to provide
- Weapons leakage does not threaten the security of military and police personnel themselves, as their own 'leaked' guns can be turned back on them
- Illicit or collected weapons and ammunition are not stolen, misused or re-circulated into civilian hands through loss or diversion.

Improving safety: Unsafe storage can result in the explosion of ammunition/ordnance stocks, killing and injuring many people as well as destroying/damaging costly facilities and equipment. If not stored properly, ammunition can be affected by conditions such as moisture, temperature and diurnal cycling.⁴ This can significantly affect the stability of ammunition and explosives to the degree that they become unsafe to handle.⁵

Accountability: By improving stockpile management, the exact number of weapons in stock become known, ideally matching the size of the force using them. Registering the amount of weapons and ammunition in stock can help identify when losses occur and their scale, and prompt recovery actions.

3 Examples of international instruments that codify stockpile management

Stockpile management is codified in two main international and regional agreements, codifications and guidelines.

International

Under the 2001 **United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA)**, states undertake to ensure, subject to their respective constitutional and legal systems, that the armed forces, police or any other body authorised to hold SALW establishes adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons. These standards and procedures should, *inter alia*, relate to: appropriate

⁴ Diurnal cycling refers to the exposure of ammunition and explosives to the temperature changes caused by day, night and change of season. From UNDDR 2006, Section 4.10, Annex A: Terms and Definitions.

⁵ Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson 2001, p 13.

locations for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security, accounting and control of SALW held or transported by operational units or authorised personnel; and procedures and sanctions in the event of thefts or loss (Clause 17). The PoA also encourages states to promote safe, effective stockpile management and security, in particular physical security measures, for SALW, and to implement, where appropriate, regional and sub-regional mechanisms in this regard.⁶

Regional

Article 9 of the 2001 **Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa**, 'Disposal of Confiscated or Unlicensed Small Arms and Light Weapons', requires that States establish an effective mechanism for storing impounded, recovered or unlicensed illicit SALW pending the investigations that will release them for destruction.⁷

4

Improving stockpile management and safety for SALW storage

The following eight headings and selected sub-headings are taken and adapted from the *OSCE Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security*,⁸ which aims to provide guidelines for the management and security of national SALW stockpiles. The *Best Practice Guide* is primarily based on information Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) member states have submitted to the OSCE Information Exchange on Stockpile Management and Security Procedures. It provides some suggestions on how to improve national stockpile management to increase security and safety of both civilians and security personnel. Note that not all steps/issues may be relevant in your context.

The appropriate characteristics of stockpile locations

Location of SALW stockpiles

Depending on the national defence policy and the view of the authorities on how quickly the SALW should be available to personnel, stockpiles can be concentrated in one location or more broadly spread. This mainly depends on the prevailing threat analysis. Forces designed for rapid reaction need to ensure that their SALW are available without delay, and so will need them to be stored locally; SALW for reserve forces and surplus weapons will more probably be stored at centralised sites. Please remember that wherever stockpiles are located, they should be regularly reviewed in terms of requirements and the stocks should be kept to the minimum levels consistent with the role of the personnel and/or the capacity of the site.

⁶ UN PoA.

⁷ *Nairobi Protocol For The Prevention, Control And Reduction Of Small Arms And Light Weapons In The Great Lakes Region And The Horn Of Africa*.

⁸ OSCE 2003, pp 4–11.

Assessment of environment

An assessment of the environment surrounding the stockpile location should be conducted in order to assess the potential security risk to the stockpile. This should take into account contingency plans for an emergency situation, as (for example) a heavily populated urban environment presents different conditions and factors to be considered from that of an isolated rural environment.

Standard laws and regulations

The stockpile location should operate within all appropriate national laws and regulations governing the storage of SALW, as well as those covering security, health and safety where such legal frameworks are in place. Where laws are not in place, policy procedures should be instituted within the state security services that can be enacted into laws.

Additional regulations governing stockpiles

Regulations for a stockpile location should:

- outline the scope of the instructions
- identify the officer in charge of the location (name, location and telephone number at minimum)
- outline any security threats
- identify all those at the location with security responsibilities (security officers, safety officers, armaments officers, transport officers, stores officers, accounting officers, etc.)
- outline security procedures to be followed in different areas of the establishment (storage, servicing, etc.)
- outline control of access to buildings, areas, and compounds
- outline control of security keys
- outline accounting procedures, including for audits and spot checks
- cover authorisation, security training, education and briefing of staff
- detail action to be taken on discovery of intrusion, theft, loss or surplus
- detail the response to be taken by any emergency or response forces
- prescribe actions to be taken in response to activation of alarms.

Each stockpile location should have its own set of regulations covering such issues, for ease of reference and to facilitate quick reaction in the event of an emergency.

Lock-and-key and other physical security measures

Security assessment

A security assessment should be developed for each stockpile, taking into consideration such factors as: object of protection, threat analysis, existing material stockpiled, surrounding area, possible physical measures of protection, other technical measures, access control, and guarding and controlling of stock inventory. The security system should reduce the possibilities of sabotage, theft, trespass, terrorism or any other criminal acts. It should also provide an integrated capability to detect, assess, communicate, delay and respond to any unauthorised attempt at entry.

Cost-benefit analysis

Bearing in mind that total security is unattainable, a reasonable cost-benefit relation between the means of physical security and the stores to be secured should be established. Security should be maintained at the maximum level possible, consistent with operational, safety and mission requirements to reduce protection cost.

Physical security

Physical security measures should include a combination of:

- security staff
- active or passive systems
- devices.

These measures depend on the location and type of the stockpiles and should be based on the security assessment.

Storage

Small unit level arms (i.e. guns) should be stored in arms racks or metal containers that should be constructed in such a way as to prevent easy removal, and should be secured with spot-welded bolts as a minimum. It should, however, be noted that it can still be easy to steal from containers, as was the case in South Sudan when civilians broke into containers and stole weapons when they felt the army could not protect them. Unless the arms are under constant surveillance, additional security measures should be considered.

Storage building doors and windows

The storage building doors should be armoury vault doors or solid hardwood with steel plate on the outside face, and with door bucks, frames, and keepers rigidly anchored. They should be secured with security padlocks and hasps. Windows and other openings should be kept to a minimum, and be kept closed and firmly locked. Armoury doors should be kept locked or bolted from the inside when individuals are working inside. Those inside should have the means to communicate with those outside.

Alarm and intruder detection systems

Only alarm systems approved to international standards should be used. They should be checked periodically. Daily visual checks and periodical in-depth checking should be undertaken. Intruder detection systems should include point sensors on doors, windows and other openings and interior motion or vibration systems. Intruder detection systems should activate a response from the guard force as soon as possible. The alarm system should be connected to a central monitoring station.

External lighting systems

Exterior building and doors should be equipped with appropriate lighting. The intensity of the light should allow detection of unauthorised activities. Switches for the light should be accessible only to authorised staff.

Guard patrols and dogs

Patrols should be made at prescribed intervals, and random checks should also be conducted. Security staff should check the arms storage installation during off-duty hours. Security staff should be designated, trained and properly equipped, and should be ready to react in a timely fashion to respond to possible incidents. Military working dogs should be used as a complementary measure.

Fencing

Required perimeters should be fenced, and they should meet minimum standards. Clear zones should be established around the fence, both inside and outside, with adequate extension. The perimeter fence should have a minimum number of gates consistent with operational requirement.

Key controls

Keys for armouries and/or stores should be issued only to those personnel who require access in order to perform their official duties. The number of keys should be the minimum necessary and the keys themselves should be difficult to reproduce. Keys for SALW storage locations should be held separately from those of their related ammunition stores, and within secure containers. Keys should not be left unsecured or unattended. The handling of keys should be registered. This registration should be kept for a minimum period of at least one year. Inventories of keys should be conducted periodically.

SALW and related ammunition

In principle, SALW and related ammunition should be stored separately. Small quantities of arms and ammunitions could be stored together for the purposes of maintaining limited site security (e.g. arming a reaction force to provide security for the storage site or arsenal). Weapons should be stored fully assembled only in very secure armouries.

Procedures for immediate reporting of any loss

Any losses or recoveries of SALW should be reported as soon as possible to the Security Officer (who should notify the overall site Security Officer and others as appropriate). Reports should include:

- Identification of the specific stockpile location and/or the storage sites (if the report is communicated externally) and of the individual reporting
- Item identification, quantity, serial numbers and other identifying marks
- Date, time and place of loss/recovery and outline of circumstances of loss or recovery
- Action taken: who is investigating the loss, who has been informed, and any action being taken to prevent any further loss.

Access control measures

The right of access should vary according to the type of installation and the category of SALW. Generally, only approved staff with a legitimate reason should be authorised to gain access. Full records of authorisations and access should be maintained. Authorisation should only be granted by designated Commanders or Chiefs of Security.

Inventory management and accounting control procedures

It is essential that a system is in place to manage the inventory of SALW and account for the stores. Whether the records are kept manually on paper or held on a computer database, backup copies of the data should be kept at a separate location in the event of loss or theft of the originals. It should be clear to all those involved in inventory management and accounting for how many years' records should be kept. Records should be held for as long as possible, with a view to improving the traceability of SALW.

Protection measures in emergency situations

Protection measures in emergency situations should be complemented by an overall site security plan together with comprehensive regulations for the stockpile location. An emergency plan should be prepared, which should include details of enhanced security procedures to be followed in emergency situations (or when the site is on a higher alert status than normal). Ideally, stockpile locations should be able to call on armed response forces to prevent loss or damage to the SALW in storage during an emergency situation (and any legal implications should be addressed beforehand).

Procedures aimed at maximising transport security

Transport of SALW requires specific security and safety measures. Transport regulations and security are imperative in order to prevent loss and theft of SALW as well as to prevent abuse and illicit trafficking. Strategies for clandestine transports are part of such standards.⁹

Precautions and sanctions in the event of loss and theft

Strict regulations and procedures for the investigation and clarification of the loss and theft of SALW, as well as the effective prosecution of any violations, can help reduce SALW proliferation. They are also an important factor in preventing the diversion of SALW from the legal to the illicit market. The lack of regulations, lax security, poor record-keeping, neglect and corruption can all increase the likelihood of theft and loss.

Security training for personnel regarding SALW stockpile locations/buildings

The careful and systematic selection and recruitment of all personnel involved in tasks regarding stockpile management and security of SALW is essential. The requirements should include reliability, trustworthiness, and conscientiousness, as well as the appropriate professional qualifications. In addition, every individual should be subject to security clearance.

5 Improving stockpile management and safety for ammunition storage¹⁰

There may be many types of ammunition that need to be stored. These can be broken down into the following categories:

Ammunition categories¹¹

Category I: Ammunition with high explosive risk	Category II: Ammunition with burning or fragmentation risk	Category III: Ammunition with only burning risk	Category IV: Ammunition with little or no hazard
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ High capacity shells ■ Grenades ■ Demolition explosives ■ Mortars ■ Rocket motors with warheads ■ Detonators of all types ■ Mines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Armour piercing bullets ■ Cartridge cases with propellant ■ 20 mm–37 mm high explosive shell/rounds 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Bagged propellant charges ■ Loose propellant ■ Rocket motors without warhead ■ Pyrotechnics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Small arms rounds (bullets)

⁹ Strategies for clandestine transports, such as air transport, may involve not flying directly to the final destination, using circuitous routes with multiple landings and involving several interacting groups, subsidiary or intermediate actors, not all of whom may be aware of the nature of the cargo. This strategy can also be used for official legal SALW transports in order to enhance security. For details of transport security, refer to OSCE 2003, pp 8–10.

¹⁰ This section is broadly taken and adapted from Ruddock *et al*/2006, pp 7–11 and BICC 2000, pp 15–16.

¹¹ BICC 2000, pp15–16.

Basic safety measures for ammunition storage

Should adequate storage facilities be available, the following rules should be observed:

1. Do not mix different categories of ammunition.
2. If it is not clear to which category an item of ammunition belongs, it should be stored as Category I.
3. If there is only one room for storage, then place items in each category in different parts of the room.
4. There should be no fuse detonator/igniter left in any ammunition if it can be removed by hand, such as by unscrewing the fuses, etc.
5. When detonators are stored, they should be separated from all other types of ammunition, whatever their categories.
6. Detonators, when possible, should be stored in closed metal boxes to prevent electrical static, as they are very sensitive to friction heat.
7. Smoking or fires must not be allowed within 25 meters of the area.
8. All magazines from weapons should be emptied and stored with the weapons.
9. Any directional weapons, such as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), should be placed with the warhead facing out of the stack and away from occupied areas.
10. If your storage area contains different types and categories of ammunition, boxes of Category IV ammunition may be used as a wall between them to prevent fragments from igniting other types of ammunition or explosives.
11. Should a fire get started, DO NOT enter the storage area until a fire brigade arrives.

Generally, storage buildings, rooms or containers should be secure, dry and without any electrical appliances or supply except for lighting. Storage should be in an isolated area without trees and overhead power cables. Some form of fire fighting equipment should be close to the storage facility. If both weapons and ammunition are to be stored, they should be stored separately in different buildings, containers or rooms. If this is not possible, they should be separated by a barrier of some kind, such as sand bags or empty wooden boxes filled with dry sand. It is understood that under certain circumstances all of the conditions noted may not be achievable, but when all of them can be met the likelihood of accidents can be reduced considerably.¹²

Further considerations in the safe storage of ammunition¹³

The environmental requirements (such as temperature and humidity) of ammunition and explosives vary and are dependent on their storage, handling and transportation conditions. The safety of ammunition is affected and governed by the following measures:

- **Condition of the ammunition:** A detailed knowledge on the origin, design, age, stockpile history and physical condition of the stocks is crucial for safety. All ammunition and explosives are affected by environmental influence throughout their life. The packing of the ammunition will also have a bearing on the condition. In storage, the following fluctuations will affect the life expectancy of the stockpile:
 - Humidity and ventilation
 - High temperature variations
 - Exposure to sunlight
 - Poor handling and transportation methods
 - Poor storage conditions
 - Vibration and shock.

¹² *Ibid*, p 15.

¹³ Taken and adapted from Ruddock *et al* 2006, 'Glossary'.

- **Storage buildings:** There are no specific international regulations for the storage of ammunition and explosives. However, storage buildings should have the following characteristics:
 - A permanent structure, either above or below ground
 - Weather-, bullet-, fire- and theft-resistant
 - Adequate ventilation to prevent excessive heating and humidity
 - Walls constructed of concrete, stone or brick, which are fire-resistant and structurally sound
 - Concrete floor, coated with a non-sparking material
 - Adequately constructed and weatherproof roof with a thermal shield to maintain temperatures below 40°C
 - Well-fitting metal doors
 - Doors secured with steel padlocks
 - Lightning protection.
- **Fire prevention:** The authority responsible for storing ammunition and explosives should establish fire preventive policies and measures. These should include the following:
 - Set of Standing Operating Procedures for fighting fires
 - No-smoking policy applicable within 20 m of any storage location
 - Maintenance under control of grass and undergrowth around the storage locations
 - Removal of all spark- and flame-producing material and equipment from the storage locations
 - Adequate fire fighting equipment on site to deal with incidents, fully maintained and regularly checked
 - No paints, oils, flammable materials or empty ammunition containers to be stored in the vicinity of the storage locations
 - Cigarettes, lighters, radios strictly prohibited under clear rules
 - Correct electrical installations, checked regularly and correctly earthed/ grounded.
- **Storage measures:** Correct storage procedures and measures are fundamental to the safe storage of ammunition and explosives. Key measures include:
 - Building storage facilities in a way that they will not damage buildings or civilian structures if an explosion did happen, or set off other ammunition or explosives stored nearby.
 - Additional construction measures within the storage location, like earth barriers between the storage locations, will reduce the impact of an unintended detonation.

EXAMPLE

Explosion of an ammunition depot in Juba¹⁴

On 23 February 2005, a store of ammunition at a military depot exploded in Juba, South Sudan. Up to 80 persons were killed, and more than 200 wounded. Nine hundred houses in a nearby residential area were damaged or destroyed by the explosion and the ensuing fire. The explosion also destroyed the market, disrupting the livelihoods of thousands of people who depend on it. According to an official statement from the government, the explosion was caused by high temperatures.

For further and more in-depth information on weapons and ammunitions storage, you can also consult: *Ammunition and Explosives: Storage and Safety – RMDS/G 05.40, 5th Edition (SEESAC, 20 July 2007)*.

6 Basic security measures for SALW and ammunition storage¹⁵

During weapon collection and disarmament processes, SALW and ammunition must be secured from malevolent actions (theft, sabotage, damage or tampering) by individuals or groups of individuals while they are being prepared for destruction. There are many reasons why stealing weapons might be attractive:

- Tensions or insecurity might make the weapons seem attractive to armed gangs or political interests.
- If the weapons are collected through a DDR programme, recycling weapons can lead to higher incomes or multiple demobilisation packages for some.
- Armed gangs and criminals might seek to enhance their arsenals with the collected weapons.
- Explosives are attractive for civilian pursuits, ranging from illegal fishing to quarrying.

Security regulations for storing SALW and ammunition are always a national responsibility. The most effective method to ensure security is to limit the access to unauthorised personnel. This can be achieved through a variety of ways:

- Controlled access measures
- Fencing and external lighting systems
- Inventory control measures, including audits and stock-checks
- Purpose-built storage facilities
- Installing surveillance equipment
- Guarding the site (patrols and dogs)
- Alarm systems.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, Section 10, pp 13–15.

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Workshop exercises

Exercise 1

Key actor perceptions of stockpile management needs

Divide workshop participants into three groups. Ask each group to discuss stockpile management and weapons storage needs from the perspective of one of three key actors:

Group 1 South Sudanese Police Service

Group 2 Bureau of Community Security and Arms Control
(in the context of a voluntary civilian disarmament programme)

Group 3 South Sudan national army

Ask each group to draw up a presentation of their organisation's stockpile management requirements and ideas for what might be possible in the context of South Sudan. Allow at least 40 minutes for the group work and 5–10 minutes per group for their presentations.

For feedback, let groups put their flip charts on a wall and let the other groups walk around to compare how this is the same or different from what they've done, and add ideas/suggestions. One person from each group should stay with their flip chart in order to explain to the visiting group what they have done. The facilitator can then pull together overall points made between the groups.

After the feedback session, provide participants with the **Handout B: Cambodia case study** and give them 20 minutes to read it and take notes. Allow 15 minutes for a general discussion on the case study and potential lessons for South Sudan.

MODULE 9: HANDOUT A

Stockpile management

'Stockpile management' is a wide-ranging term that covers specific technical areas related to the safety and security of ammunition and explosives in accounting, storage, transportation and handling. In addition, it refers to issues such as the determination of stockpile size, types of stockpiles, location of stockpiles and the management of ammunition in service.

Why is stockpile management important? (M9 S2)

Improving security: The safe storage of weapons, ammunition and explosive ordnance is crucial for the security of both civilians and security personnel.

Improving safety: Unsafe storage can result in the explosion of ammunition/ordnance stocks, killing and injuring many people as well as destroying/damaging costly facilities and equipment.

Accountability: By improving stockpile management, the exact number of weapons in stock become known, ideally matching the size of the force using them.

International and regional agreements codifying stockpile management

United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA),

Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa

Improving stockpile management and safety for SALW storage

(M9 S4)

1. Appropriate stockpile locations
2. Established security measures
3. Determined right of access
4. Proper inventory management
5. Protection measures in emergency situations
6. Procedures aimed at maximising transport security
7. Precautions and sanctions in the event of loss and theft
8. Security training for personnel regarding SALW stockpile locations/buildings

Improving stockpile management and safety for ammunition storage (M9 S5)

Basic safety measures for ammunition storage

Should adequate storage facilities be available, the following rules should be observed:

1. Do not mix different categories of ammunition.
2. If it is not clear to which category an item of ammunition belongs, it should be stored as Category I.
3. If there is only one room for storage, then place items in each category in different parts of the room.
4. There should be no fuse detonator/igniter left in any ammunition if it can be removed by hand, such as by unscrewing the fuses, etc.
5. When detonators are stored, they should be separated from all other types of ammunition, whatever their categories.
6. Detonators, when possible, should be stored in closed metal boxes to prevent electrical static, as they are very sensitive to friction heat.
7. Smoking or fires must not be allowed within 25 meters of the area.
8. All magazines from weapons should be emptied and stored with the weapons.
9. Any directional weapons, such as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), should be placed with the warhead facing out of the stack and away from occupied areas.
10. If your storage area contains different types and categories of ammunition, boxes of Category IV ammunition may be used as a wall between them to prevent fragments from igniting other types of ammunition or explosives.
11. Should a fire get started, DO NOT enter the storage area until a fire brigade arrives.

Basic security measures for SALW and ammunition storage¹ (M9 S6)

Security regulations for storing SALW and ammunition are always a national responsibility. The most effective method to ensure security is to limit the access to unauthorised personnel. This can be achieved through a variety of ways:

- Controlled access measures
- Fencing and external lighting systems
- Inventory control measures, including audits and stock-checks
- Purpose-built storage facilities
- Installing surveillance equipment
- Guarding the site (patrols and dogs)
- Alarm systems.

This handout is taken from *Small arms and light weapons: A training manual*, published by Saferworld, February 2012

¹ Ruddock et al 2006, 'Glossary', Section 10, pp 13–15.

MODULE 9: HANDOUT B

Cambodia case study

Improving record-keeping and safe storage of SALW/ammunition in Cambodia

Between 2000 and 2006, EU Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia (EU ASAC) assisted the Royal Government of Cambodia in implementing a comprehensive weapons management programme. The “Improved Weapons Record Keeping and Safe Storage” was a nationwide project and one of the components of this programme. It aimed at registering all SALW and the improving weapons storage within the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), and consisted of three components:

- Improvement of stockpiling
- Registration system
- Training of personnel.

The overall goal of the project was to increase stability and establish a secure environment in Cambodia. From 2001 to 2006, the Cambodian Ministry of National Defence, assisted by EU ASAC, set up a complete and coherent weapons registration and safe storage system for the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. All military weapons in the six Military Regions in Cambodia, plus those of the Navy, the Air Force and the Royal Gendarmerie, were entered into one centralised database by 2006, and were securely stored in weapons depots built to internationally acceptable standards. By 2004, all weapons in Military Region 2, Military Region 5 and Military Region 4 not immediately needed for security were registered and stored according to internationally acceptable standards. This will greatly improve the security in Cambodia and severely limit the dangers posed by military small arms to Cambodian society.

Improvement of the stockpiling

As a consequence of the programme, weapons storage in Cambodia now falls into three categories:

- A relatively small number of weapons remaining in each unit (duty weapons) stored on a short-term basis. These weapons are stored on lockable racks.
- The rest of the weapons in the military region are stored under medium-term conditions in specially constructed depots.
- At the national level, reserve weapons are stored on a long-term basis in pre-existing main national depots.

The racks

There are three models of racks, holding six, twelve and twenty four weapons. On each rack, weapons are locked vertically with a cable and padlocks. Small cabinets contain the magazines with ammunition.

The buildings

The size of the building depends on the number of weapons to be stored. Warehouses are built with reinforced cement according a simple design. All weapons are stored horizontally on lockable racks inside the building.

At the completion of this project, in Military Region 4, a total of 11,668 weapons were safely stored: 1,896 weapons were safely stored on racks, and 9,772 weapons were safely stored in newly constructed depots.

Registration systems

A network was created by EU ASAC during the Pilot Project in 2001. Each of the three levels of command (the Ministry of National Defence, High Command, and Army) was equipped with two sets of computers and one photocopier each. Each Military Region is also equipped with two sets of computers and one photocopier.

Central to the registration system is a special database for the registration of weapons. Developed in 2001 by a private Cambodian firm, this software was upgraded in 2003 in line with a model developed by the same company for the National Police. During the project, the registration information collected during the manual registration of weapons was loaded into the software by the computer teams. The result of this registration is backed up on zip drives, and held by three levels: the Military Region, the Army HQ and the Military High Command.

Training of personnel

Training of personnel formed an essential part of this project. Due to the restricted budget of the Ministry of National Defence, EU ASAC provided training on the management of small arms. All trainees were from the Ministry, from the High Command or from the Army HQ.

Four different sessions were organised by the Ministry itself and/or Military Region 4:

1. At the Royal Military Institute of Phnom Penh, a High Level training course was organised. Twenty four high-ranking officers from the Ministry, the High Command, the Army, three Military Regions, one division and one brigade attended a ten-day session.
2. Twenty four staff members from computer teams from the Ministry, the High Command, the Army, and two Military Regions also attended a ten-day training on the database software.
3. In Military Region 4, 100 Unit Commanders were briefed about the Project at a three-day training session.
4. In addition, 100 logistical officers from Military Region 4, Division 2 and Brigade 12 attended a ten-day session on the management of small arms, and a five-day session on manual registration.

A total of 248 staff participated in these sessions.



Warehouse in MR4 before the project



Warehouse in MR4 before the project



Weapons stored in MR4 before the project



Weapons stored in MR4 before the project



Building in Brigade 12



Building in Siem Reap MR4



Racks for short term stored weapons



Racks for short term stored weapons



Weapons stored and locked in depot



Weapons stored and locked in depot

Saferworld works to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote co-operative approaches to security. We work with governments, international organisations and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices through advocacy, research and policy development and through supporting the actions of others.

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