SUPPORTING AFRICA-CHINA-EU DIALOGUE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS
AFRICA-CHINA-EU EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS

TACKLING ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) AND AMMUNITION IN THE GREAT LAKES AND HORN OF AFRICA

Final Working Paper

Africa Peace Forum
China Arms Control and Disarmament Association
Saferworld

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June 2014

Author

This report was researched and written for the Africa-China-EU Expert Working Group (EWG) on Conventional Arms by Claudio Gramizzi.

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Disclaimer

There exists a wide spectrum of opinions, perspectives and normative judgements on efforts to tackle illicit SALW in Africa. As such, the author has strived to gather and represent the views of experts from Africa, China and the EU, in particular the members of the EWG, in the most accurate and balanced way possible. However, the possibility of errors cannot totally be excluded. The author of this report bears the sole responsibility for its content.

List of Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APFO	Africa Peace Forum
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AU	African Union
BCSSAC	Bureau for Community Safety and Small Arms Control of South Sudan
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
CACDA	China Arms Control and Disarmament Association
CAR	Conflict Armament Research
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DPKO	United Nation Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
DRC	The Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community for West Africa States
EU	European Union
EWG	Experts Working Group
EWRS	Electronic Weapons Registration System
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GRIP	Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
ISACS	International Small Arms Control Standards
KNFP	Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons
LRA	The Lord's Resistance Army
NISA	National Intelligence and Security Agency (Somalia)
OAS	Organization of American States
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SNA	Somali National Army
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SPLA	Sudan People’s Liberations Army
SSANSA	South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFP	Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms
UPDF	Uganda People’s Defence Force
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPoA	United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

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I. Introduction

I.i Project background

Following a decision of the Council of the European Union on 27 February 2012, a two-year project on 'Supporting EU-China-Africa dialogue on conventional arms control' was launched on 5 June 2012. Implemented by Saferworld, together with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) and the Africa Peace Forum (APFO), the project was aimed at enhancing dialogue between the African, the Chinese and the European civil society and research communities on conventional arms control and the struggle against illicit proliferation and circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) through the creation of an 'Africa-China-EU Expert Working Group on conventional arms' (later referred as EWG) and its activities. The EWG is made up of nine high-profile arms control and non-proliferation experts from Africa, China and Europe:

- Ambassador (retired) Ochieng Adala, APFO, Kenya
- James Bevan, Weapon and Conflict Analyst, Conflict Armament Research (CAR), United Kingdom
- Claudio Gramizzi, Weapon and Conflict Analyst, Italy
- Major General (retired) Daniel Deng Lual, South Sudan
- Richard Nabudere, SALW Consultant, Uganda
- Professor Ouyang Liping, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, China
- General (retired) Henny van der Graaf, SALW Consultant, The Netherlands
- Zhai Dequan, CACDA, China
- Major General (retired) Zhu Chenghu, National Defence University, China

During the aforementioned project, the EWG held several meetings and acted as a driving force to facilitate dialogue, dissemination of information and research, and to share ideas and expertise on key conventional arms control issues among its members and relevant partners.

Encompassed in the broader framework of Africa-China-EU dialogue, the EWG activities offered, in particular, the opportunity for regular exchanges on the phenomenon of the illicit proliferation and circulation of SALW and conventional military equipment in Africa, with a specific focus on the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region of the continent. Driven by the individual experience of its members and the different dimensions of related issues, the EWG set its objectives as follows:

- to increase dialogue and mutual understanding on conventional arms among African Chinese, and European experts and officials;
- to promote practical trilateral collaboration to address the proliferation of SALW in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa, thereby assisting with the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA)[1] and existing regional programmes (in particular the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States of 2004)[2] ; and
- to support the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)[3] negotiation and subsequent ratifications process.

[1] The full text of the UNPoA (A/CONF.192/15) is available at http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/poahtml.aspx
[2] The full text of the Protocol is available at http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/RECSA/Nairobi%20Protocol.pdf
[3] The full text of the Treaty is available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/

The EWG has principally dedicated its attention to three Eastern African countries, namely Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. Such focus emerged from the necessity to maximise resources and capacities within the EWG and took full advantage of the expertise provided, in particular, by its African members.

The main objective of this Working Paper is to

- provide an assessment of the threats posed by the proliferation and illicit circulation of SALW and their impact on security and social-economic development in the countries of the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa;
- illustrate the outcomes of the EWG activities and experiences;
- highlight lessons learnt during the meetings and consultations held within the EWG and with relevant partners in Africa, China and the EU; and
- formulate recommendations regarding ways to maximise the results obtained over the two-year period of the project, and how this might be used to inform future work through Africa-China-EU tripartite cooperation in the area of SALW and arms control.

Data and information presented in chapter III reflect the analysis elaborated by the EWG, based on the information generated during the project, and on the outcome of the two field research missions conducted on behalf of the EWG, in South Sudan (June 2013) and Somalia (January 2014).

I.ii Project activities

Between June 2012 and June 2014, the EWG conducted various activities, including working meetings, outreach seminars, consultations with relevant government officials and civil society organisations, and fact-finding missions as well as field research activities. In addition, two joint statements were published by the EWG to raise awareness about the ATT process, one before the convening of the final Diplomatic Conference in March 2013 and one after the Treaty opened for signature and ratification in June 2013.

The comprehensive list of these activities is presented below:

Four EWG meetings were held:

- on 13 November 2012, in Brussels (Belgium);
- on 9 April 2013, in Kampala (Uganda);
- on 16 May 2013, in Beijing (China); and
- on 14 November 2013, in Brussels (Belgium).

Six policy seminars:

'*Towards an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013: The Draft Text of the ATT and Remaining Core Issues*', held in Brussels on 14 November 2012.[4] The seminar focused on the state of negotiations on the future ATT, and was attended by the EWG members, as well as officials from the EU member states and the EU institutions;

'*The Next Steps of the UN Arms Trade Treaty*', held in Beijing on 16 May 2013.[5] The seminar was attended by 65 participants from various backgrounds, including members of the EWG, Chinese think tanks and scholars, government and military officials, representatives of the Chinese defence industry, officials from the EU member states and Africa, as well as Chinese diplomats and Beijing-based foreign diplomats. The main objective of the seminar was to exchange views on the work of the UN ATT diplomatic conferences and the outcome of the

[4] Please view the seminar report at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/704-towards-an-arms-trade-treaty-att-in-2013

[5] Please view the seminar report at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/740-beijing-seminar-looks-at-the-next-steps-of-the-arms-trade-treaty-process

UN General Assembly (UNGA) vote, with issues related to signature, ratification, and implementation of the ATT serving as focal points of discussion; it also aimed at clarifying the implications of China's abstention at the UNGA vote and how China intended to remain engaged in the ATT process;

'*Regional Conference on Tackling Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and Ammunition in Eastern Africa*', held in Nairobi on 2 July 2013,[6] with the participation of key Kenyan stakeholders (including officials and representatives from the National Focal Point on SALW, the National Police Service, the Kenyan Defence Forces and civil society organisations); officials from the UN and sub-regional organisations such as the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) and the East Africa Community (EAC); and Nairobi-based foreign diplomats. The seminar was held with the objective of assessing the state of the SALW challenges in the Nairobi Protocol sub-region and to identify areas where international assistance appeared most urgent;

'*Enhancing Capacity and Cooperation to Tackle Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and Ammunition in Eastern Africa*', held in Brussels on 13 November 2013.[7] The seminar was attended by officials from the EU institutions and member states, as well as from African countries and China, together with international scholars from various think tanks and research institutions, and NGO representatives; participants focused on the priorities of African countries, China and the EU with respect to international assistance for the implementation of ATT;

'*Supporting Peace and Security in Africa: Towards Collaborative Actions for Combating Illicit Small Arms and Ammunition*', held in Beijing on 18 March 2014.[8] More than 60 senior international arms control officials and experts, Chinese officials, scholars and think tanks, as well as diplomats and representatives from international organisations based in Beijing exchanged views on the need to refocus SALW intervention on impact and to consolidate joint efforts, by China, the EU and the international community as a whole, to tackle illicit SALW circulation; and

'*Enhancing Capacities and Cooperation to Tackle Illicit SALW and Ammunition in Eastern Africa*', held in Nairobi on 6 May 2014. The seminar was attended by more than 40 participants including Kenyan officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Kenyan Police and the Kenyan National Focal Point on SALW, representatives of regional and international organisations (including the African Union - AU, the EAC, UNDP and RECSA) and civil society organisations. Regional and international initiatives on SALW were assessed with a view to identifying their impact and those challenges that remain to be tackled, and to enable the EWG to conclude practical recommendations for external assistance in priority areas;

Consultations with key stakeholders:

'*Consultations of the Africa-China-EU Expert Working Group (EWG) on Conventional Arms with Ugandan Stakeholders*', held in Kampala on 10 April 2013. The seminar provided the opportunity to the EWG to exchange information with a number of key Ugandan stakeholders, including officials and representatives from the National Focal Point on SALW, the Uganda Police Force, the Uganda People's Defence Force (national armed forces) and civil society organisations;

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[6] Xinhua, 'Sino-Africa cooperation to strengthen action on illicit weapons: scholars', http://english.people.com.cn/90883/8308732.html

[7] Please view the seminar report at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/782-brussels-seminar-seeks-international-cooperation-on-tackling-salw-in-eastern-africa

[8] Please view the seminar report at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/801-beijing-meeting-on-african-peace-and-security

A round of consultations held in Beijing between 20 and 24 May 2013 with head and senior officials of 11 African missions, with the aims of discussing the current status of the ATT process, presenting the EWG activities and advocating the inclusion of SALW-related issues in the dialogue with Chinese authorities;

A roundtable meeting with representatives of key Chinese think tanks and scholars, held in Beijing on 18 September 2013, in order to present the outcome of the EWG fact-finding mission conducted in South Sudan;

A second round of meetings with head and senior officials of 13 African missions were held between 16 and 27 September 2013, to advocate the continuation of dialogue with Chinese officials on issues related to security cooperation, in particular on tackling illicit SALW in Africa under the framework of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC);

Numerous meetings with senior diplomats of the African missions, and Chinese authorities, held in Beijing between 17 and 21 March 2014, with the presence of the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs of Tanzania on behalf of the Council of Ministers of RECSA. This visit of international arms control experts and officials witnessed the establishment of the 'Group of Ambassadors of the RECSA member states in Beijing' and the appointment of the Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania in Beijing as RECSA's diplomatic focal point in China;

'*Consultations of the Africa-China-EU Expert Working Group on Conventional Arms with Kenyan Stakeholders: Enhancing Capacities and Cooperation to Tackle Illicit SALW and Ammunition in Kenya*', held in Nairobi on 7 May 2014. Kenyan officials (from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Service, the Kenyan Defence Forces and the National Focal Point on SALW) and representatives of civil society shared their experiences on and lessons learnt from SALW-oriented initiatives undertaken over the last decade, and highlighted the need for more efficient action; and

Consultations between the EWG and the RECSA Secretariat, held in Nairobi on 8 May 2014. Exchanges focused on RECSA's current activities, plans for future action and needs for international assistance.

Field research:

- Between 25 and 29 June 2013, a delegation of the EWG undertook a fact-finding mission to South Sudan, with the aim of holding meetings with representatives of the National Police and the national armed forces (Sudan People's Liberation Army – SPLA). The mission provided the EWG delegation with an opportunity to assess first-hand the national standards and capacities for management of the state's stockpiles and the resulting broad circulation of illicit military-type SALW used by local population and armed opposition groups;
- Between 19 and 24 January 2014, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) was commissioned by the EWG to conduct a comprehensive stockpile assessment of weaponry storage facilities in Mogadishu, Somalia to assess the standards of physical storage infrastructure and its appropriateness. The sites included stores under the authority of the police, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Somali National Army (SNA). The assessment discovered serious safety and security concerns at all locations inspected — including newly-constructed ones — highlighting the necessity for urgent coordinated international assistance.

Joint statements and communication:

In order to support the ATT negotiation process and, subsequently, the quick signature and ratification of the Treaty adopted in April 2013, the EWG issued two joint statements, calling for international commitment to the adoption of the ATT and for international efforts to

ensure its quick entry into force and full implementation. Both statements (listed below) were echoed by several media in Africa, China and Europe.

- '*A Robust Arms Trade Treaty: Where national interest and global responsibility aligns*', published on 15 March 2013[9]; and
- '*Turning words into action: The Arms Trade Treaty deserves the world's full support*', published on 1 October 2013[10].

An 'Africa-China-EU Resource Centre on Conventional Arms Control', offering a set of materials accessible through a library and a website in both Chinese and English, was also established, as the public interface of the EWG. This resource centre is hosted by the CACDA website.
(http://www.cacda.org.cn/a/ENGLISH/cacda&safeworld/)

[9] Xinhua, 'Africa-China-EU experts urge improvement of global arms trade treaty', http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/8169863.html
[10] Xinhua, 'Africa-China-EU experts urge ratification of global arms trade treaty', http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/817896.shtml

II. SALW proliferation in Africa: its impact on the ground and beyond

Examples abound of the threats posed by uncontrolled proliferation and dissemination of small arms in the recent history of the African continent, where a number of conflicts[11] have been fought, mainly with individual infantry-type weapons or, in other words, small arms or light weapons. Recent warfare in a number of countries (Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, South Sudan, Sudan, as well as Nigeria and Kenya as indirectly war-affected countries) further illustrate how SALW and their illicit circulation contribute to rapid and violent shifts of political regimes, instability, humanitarian crisis and terrorism, with a dreadful impact across the continent.
In the aftermath of the Cold War several African countries were confronted with armed conflicts conducted with significant amounts of weaponry transferred from stockpiles of former members of the Warsaw Pact,[12] readily available and poorly controlled, due to the collapse of the socialist states' authorities. As a result, supply chains and mechanisms, legally or not, evolved during the last two decades; the challenge itself remains, however, topical. Illicit circulation of small arms remains, in many African regions, a serious and immediate threat to the security of the populations, to institutional stability and rule of law, and to national, regional and international peace and development. Whether illicit weapons are used for armed criminality, banditry, poaching or military conflicts, the fact that they have a damaging impact on all aspects of people's life and societies is clear.

Although this report is not meant to quantify the impact of illicit SALW in Africa, the following indicators may usefully illustrate the scope of their effects in Africa:

- estimations of circulating volumes of illicit SALW inevitably are approximate but they are useful to measure the extent of the phenomenon: between 640 and 850 million SALW are thought to be in circulation around the world, 100 to 150 million of those in Africa, where they are mainly in the possession of the civilian population;[13]
- six of the eleven currently most intense armed conflicts (by death rate) are being fought in Africa (Central African Republic, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan), mainly using SALW;
- out of eight United Nations arms embargoes currently in force worldwide, six target African countries, all of them facing internal conflicts between the national government and armed rebellion(s);[14]
- nine out of the currently seventeen peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate are deployed in Africa;[15] and
- in early 2014, UNHCR was providing assistance to 3.4 million refugees (compared to 3.1 million in 2012) and 5.4 million internally displaced persons in Africa, most of whom were fleeing the effects of armed conflicts in their area/country of origin.[16]

In fact, SALW exports to African countries only represent a very small percentage of the annual global trade volume; these figures therefore well underline the disproportion between the influx of weapons to Africa and the ravaging effects they produce because of their easy availability by armed movements and insurgent groups (all illicit users), whether originating

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[11] Conflicts or serious political crises in the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan can be cited among the most important of the last few years.
[12] The Warsaw Pact established calibre standards for the armies of the Socialist block that imploded after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the sudden collapse of the Socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the dismantling of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The majority of illicit weapons and ammunition circulating on the African continent use, or are, Warsaw Pact-compliant calibres (including 7,62x39mm for AK-type assault rifles).
[13] Figures cited in '*Organized Crime and Trafficking in Eastern Africa*', Discussion Paper, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), November 2009.
[14] Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Libya, Eritrea, Somalia and the Sudan. Non-African countries targeted are the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
[15] In Africa, UN Peacekeeping Operations are located in the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Mali, South Sudan, Sudan and in Western Sahara.
[16] Figures available on http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02d7fd6.html

from domestic stockpiles or external supply chains. This aspect equally underlines the necessity to improve capacities of SALW control in African countries.

II.i Circulation of illicit SALW in Africa: one continental problem or several national challenges?

As shown by the few figures presented above, SALW proliferation remains, despite recent efforts and initiatives by states and relevant regional organisations, an issue of primary concern in Africa.

If the general perception is that weapons are inextricably related to war, weapons are, in fact, only vectors of violence. Illicit weapons and ammunition are therefore a phenomenon that cannot be reduced, in Africa or elsewhere, to a simple formula. It can arise in war-torn societies as well as in peaceful and politically stable ones, as it responds to different needs, patterns and trends. SALW proliferation that emerges in many regions of the continent, should be viewed as one dimension of multifaceted phenomena such as criminality (local or trans-national), competition over resources, intra-community tensions and violence, and insecurity in the broader sense; and stands as a continental issue, closely linked to under-development, poverty and political instability.

On the other hand, in order to better reflect the complexity of the challenges and to avoid naive conclusions, it is important to take additional aspects into account.
First, despite the possibility of identifying and extrapolating common trends across the continent, it would be inadequate to consider Africa as a single and homogenous object therefore dismissing the diversity of each national context and local background. Challenges associated with SALW control that each state has to tackle are likely to be both unique and consistent with those experienced elsewhere on the continent. While commonalities can be extracted through looking at the regional or the continental scale, proper analysis needs to concentrate on each national or local context. This is what the EWG has focused on, namely individual analyses in three countries: Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda.
Secondly, it is necessary to underline that Africa as a continent is the coexistence of dozens of specific entities rather than a united body; and each individual entity is very much connected with the others because of shared history, common communities, and the sometimes virtual nature of borders. As a result, the phenomenon of circulation of illicit small arms in one country appears simultaneously unique and strongly influenced by the neighbouring environment. In some cases, greater availability of illicit SALW, possible logistical advantages of supplies from abroad, and legal loopholes in the neighbouring countries make them more attractive as suppliers. Similarly, experience gathered over recent decades from the implementation of initiatives specifically oriented to reinforce SALW control clearly suggests that regional approaches are essential in order to better understand the dynamics, and that SALW proliferation rarely remains strictly confined within one country (or falls solely under its jurisdiction). The necessity to approach the challenges from a regional perspective is further confirmed by the fact that over the past decade, regional initiatives and (sub-) regional entities proved to be the driving forces for action in sub-Saharan Africa. Even though it remains difficult to quantify the impact of different programmes implemented or supported by the relevant regional organisations, and many technical areas still need to be addressed, the central role of these regional organisations should be commended and considered as one of the most encouraging outcomes of the efforts undertaken.

II.ii Regional context in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa

Difficulties in providing a unique definition and assessment of SALW proliferation at the continental level perfectly apply to the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region, where well over a million illicit SALW are believed to be in circulation,[17] and locally-manufactured ammunition is reported to represent almost 50 per cent of the small-calibre overall consumption.[18]

The diversity of the national contexts is clearly shown by the list of the Nairobi Protocol signatories (roughly covering a region that corresponds to Great Lakes and Horn of Africa), where at least four categories of states can be identified:

- **longstanding war-affected countries**: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Sudan;
- **countries affected by low-intensity conflicts or in post-crisis phase**: Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia;
- **stable and relatively peaceful countries facing armed violence challenges and security threats**: Kenya and Rwanda to a smaller extent; and
- **stable and peaceful countries experiencing limited security threats**: Djibouti, Seychelles and Tanzania.

Based on this consideration, and in order to maximise its capacity and expertise, the EWG opted for a more detailed analysis of three countries, namely Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. In addition to practical considerations, the selection of these three countries was also justified by the fact that they represent an interesting sample of profiles, since:

- these countries border each other;
- some challenges emerging from the circulation of illicit SALW in Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda are associated with inter-community conflicts among pastoralist groups living in the bordering area of the three states;
- while Kenya and Uganda experience political stability and peace, South Sudan is affected by longstanding violent conflicts; and
- the impact of SALW circulation in South Sudan generates direct repercussions in both Kenya and Uganda, in particular due to the humanitarian effects of the conflicts.[19]

[17] The New Times (Kigali), '*Trafficking of illicit firearms 'still a problem in Africa''*, 2 March 2012.
[18] Among the Nairobi Protocol signatories, some (Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania) have the industrial capacity to manufacture ammunition. See '*The Karamoja cluster in East Africa: Arms transfers and their repercussions on communal security perceptions*', International Peace Information Service (Antwerp), December 2010.
[19] In Uganda, for instance, the number of refugees from South Sudan reached almost 140,000, of whom more than 117,000 were displaced after the break-out of the December 2013 crisis (UNHCR figures, May/June 2014, available at http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/country.php?id=229).

III. A closer look: effects of SALW proliferation in Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda

One of the main objectives of the EWG is to identify those areas of intervention where international cooperation and assistance appear to be more pertinent, thus the EWG has conducted an assessment on the national context in each country. The following section provides a short summary of the main problems related to the circulation of illicit SALW in each of the three countries. It then presents the outcome of the fact-finding missions and field research activities conducted by the EWG in South Sudan, and the technical assessment commissioned by the EWG in Somalia. This will be followed by concluding key areas where initiatives of SALW control from a tripartite perspective could respond to the most urgent and serious requests.

III.i Kenya

Although the country enjoys relative political stability, Kenya has been facing challenges emerging from the illicit circulation and easy availability of SALW for years.
Recent episodes of armed violence, mainly consequences of broad use of illicit weapons in the aftermath of the general elections in 2007[20] and those of international terrorism (among which the spectacular attack in the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in September 2013, and also the attacks in Mombasa and Nairobi in early May 2014), further persuaded the government of the necessity for further and more effective initiatives for SALW control and reduction. In practice, however, the capacity of state institutions and agencies to tackle the issue remains weak.

III.i.a SALW challenges and impact in Kenya

As is often the case, challenges posed by the circulation of illicit SALW in Kenya take different forms and find their roots in different contexts. According to the most recent research conducted (mainly by RECSA and the Small Arms Survey)[21], the SALW problematic mainly refers to:

- **militarisation of the society and armed criminality**,[22] often instigated by the weak governance structure in the peripheral regions of the country, limited provision of law and order, poverty and socio-economical exclusion;
- **inter-community armed tensions resulting from competition over natural resources**, in particular among pastoralist groups living in the North Eastern, Upper Eastern, and North Rift areas, where individual possession of illicit firearms and insecurity are considered to be the highest in the country and gun culture is well established;
- **a broad perception of insecurity by the population** (both rural and urban), resulting from the traumatising experience of the post-electoral violence in 2007, and

[20] The report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (often referred as 'Waki Report') establishes that 'gunshots accounted for 962 casualties out of whom 405 died' (pp. 345–46).
[21] See for instance '*Blowback. Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District*', Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper, June 2008; '*Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment*', Small Arms Survey Special Report, June 2012; '*Policing the Periphery. Opportunities and Challenges for Kenya Police Reserves*', Small Arms Survey Working Paper No.15, March 2013; and '*Efficacy of Small Arms Control Measures and National Reporting: Learning from Africa*', Small Arms Survey Research Note No.33, August 2013. Information provided by RECSA and the Kenyan partners of the EWG is also reflected in this section.
[22] According to the estimate published by the Small Arms Survey in 2012, between 530,000 and 680,000 firearms may be in civilian hands nationally. See '*Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment*', Small Arms Survey Special Report No.16, June 2012. The number of state-owned stocks is considered well inferior.

the negative experience of disarmament programmes, from a community point of view, contributing to high demand for firearms[23];

- **diversion of arms and ammunition from state-owned stockpiles and domestic ammunition manufacturing facilities**[24] as result of widespread corruption among officials, and lack of transparency and stockpile practices of law enforcement agencies[25]; and
- **direct fallouts of large-scale and longstanding armed conflicts in some of the neighbouring countries** (in particular in Somalia and South Sudan), increasing the availability of large volumes of illicit weapons, fuelling illegal trafficking from and to Kenya,[26] severely challenging the capacity of the state to efficiently monitor border areas and, more recently, exacerbating terrorist threats.

Although it is almost impossible to exactly identify the origins of the illicit arms and ammunitions circulating in Kenya, researchers tend to agree that the majority of the illicit weapons originated from neighbouring countries (in particular from Somalia, but also from Ethiopia, Uganda, South Sudan and to a smaller extent Tanzania),[27] while a non-negligible proportion of them, in particular ammunition, appears to be domestically manufactured and diverted from the state-owned stockpiles.[28]

The different facets of the SALW problem in Kenya result in a series of distinct impacts, with the most recent researches underlining the following:

- the emergence of an **insecure environment** (including food insecurity in the most rural areas) with **elevated rate of armed violence**;[29]
- **significant displacement of population**, as a result of domestic tensions, as well as of trans-border conflicts (among pastoralist communities) and armed conflict in neighbouring countries. As is easily understandable, the presence of vast refugee communities creates a number of important challenges, not only in terms of security and legality, for the hosting countries' populations and authorities[30]; and
- a **consistent social cost**, measurable in terms of loss of productivity, missed opportunities for poverty reduction and investments for development, limited access to health and education services for the general population, prevailing intra-community tensions and increased pressure on land and natural resources.

As suggested above, challenges related to SALW in Kenya are, as they were in the past, both domestically generated and consequences of the unstable regional environment. The dual origins of the phenomenon on the one hand increase the complexity of designing appropriate measures to reduce small arms, and on the other hand dictate the necessity for the

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[23] The Small Arms Survey estimated the number of firearms possessed by civilian to be between 530,000 and 680,000 nationwide, while 210,000 households are thought to own illicit small arms.

[24] Kenya Ordnance Factory, a company affiliated to the Kenyan Defence Force, is the only manufacturer authorised to manufacture ammunition in the country.

[25] Kenya is ranked 136th worldwide in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2013 and allegations suggesting the involvement of security officers in criminal networks are regularly echoed by Kenyan media.

[26] Several cases of SALW and ammunition traffic can be found in the open-source literature. Documented cases range from small-scale trafficking to large volumes (130,000 rounds of ammunition were seized, for instance, in a private residence in Narok town, in 2009).

[27] See for instance '*Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment*', Small Arms Survey Special Report, June 2012.

[28] '*Blowback. Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District*', Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper, June 2008.

[29] Figures provided by the Kenya Police indicate that between 2004 and 2009, a yearly average of 1,400 deaths were caused by firearms. It is important to highlight here that such figures do not apply to violent deaths provoked by conflicts between communities and that, according to the UNODC, violent crimes in Kenya are likely to be under-reported and underestimated.

[30] According to figures released by the UNHCR in early 2014, Kenya is hosting more than 620,000 refugees (or asylum seekers) from neighbouring countries (especially from Somalia, South Sudan, DRC and Ethiopia). For additional details, see http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483a16.html

government to develop simultaneously not only responses that can be effective within its territory, but also bilateral or regional initiatives to mitigate the spread of illicit weapons and violence from neighbouring countries.

III.i.b Initiatives and achievement; a model for the complex region

Since the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol, the Kenyan government has dedicated significant efforts to reducing the circulation of illicit SALW and, despite practical difficulties, achieved encouraging progress.

From an institutional point of view, Kenya established, in 2003, a National Focal Point on SALW (KNFP) as an inter-agency directorate mandated to coordinate governmental policies on the matter. Mandated to coordinate the national agenda on SALW control issues, the KNFP has adopted, since its establishment, a multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder approach, and cooperated with both relevant state institutions and national civil society.[31]
In order to elaborate its strategy upon the outcome of a national SALW mapping undertaken in 2003, the KNFP formulated a National Action Plan that included ten priority areas,[32] and directly contributed to the drafting of the National Small Arms Policy, which was finalised and submitted to the government for adoption in December 2009, but yet to be adopted.

In order to improve its efficiency, and guided by the experience gathered over its first five years, the KNFP endorsed a second Strategic Plan in compliance with provisions contained in the UNPoA (the Strategic Plan 2010/11–2014/15, aiming to lay the foundations of a 'peaceful, secure and prosperous society free of illicit SALW for sustainable development') and refined its monitoring and evaluation strategy in 2011. Priorities identified in the Strategic Plan include:

- Stockpile management;
- Capacity building among law enforcement and relevant governmental agencies;
- Sensitisation and awareness raising of the population; and
- Consolidation of the institutional capacity of national stakeholders, including state agencies and national civil society.

With a view to developing a bottom-up approach, the KNFP has also created Provincial Task Forces (PTFs) in each of the eight provinces of the country and fifty-three District Task Forces.[33]

Finally, in 2013, the KNFP developed a National Disarmament Action Plan 2013 as a strategy for arms collection programmes for a three-year period.

Among the concrete achievements of the Kenyan government, the following are equally worthy of note:

- destruction of over 25,000 illegal weapons and 500,000 rounds of ammunition;[34]

[31] Entities contributing to the KNFP activities are the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Immigration and Registration of Persons, Trade and Industry, Environment and Natural Resources, Information and Communication, the National Intelligence Service, Directorate of Public Prosecution, State Law Officer, Kenya Revenue Authority, National Crime Research Centre, Kenya Wildlife Service, the National Police Service and the Kenyan civil society.
[32] Thematic areas include the institutional framework, policy and legislation, stockpile management, public awareness, international and regional cooperation, border control, human development planning, training and capacity building, research, and critical areas of support.
[33] After the entry into force of the new constitution, the PTFs are expected to be replaced with County Task Forces (CTFs). It is important to note that the administrative structure in Kenya has changed since the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010. The new administrative structures, which revolve around county governments (47 in total), are now reflected in the SALW Policy mentioned.
[34] Figures provided by the Kenya National Focal Point on SALW, in May 2014.

- acquisition of five marking machines,[35] establishment of a national mechanism for record-keeping and data management, and marking – with consequent registration of approximately 70 per cent of the total stockpile of the state;[36]
- the disarmament operation Dumisha Amani ('sustain peace' in Kiswahili),[37] designed with an elaborate and inclusive multi-actor approach and pairing dismissal of weapons by the communities with incentives (alternative livelihoods and refurbishing of local infrastructures). Undertaken in two waves (2005–2006 and 2010), the operation resulted in the collection of 3,499 firearms and 6,083 rounds of ammunition. Even though the outcome of this initiative remained well below expectations, it was regarded by the majority of observers and the targeted communities as an encouraging experience, in particular when compared with previous (forced) disarmament exercises;[38]
- deployment of Kenyan Police Reserve contingents in several rural areas, with the objective of increasing the presence and the reactivity of law enforcement agencies in those areas with significant rates of armed violence;[39] and
- conduct of 20 sensitisation and awareness campaigns, some resulting in the voluntary disposal of weapons in several provinces of the country, including the North Rift Valley, Upper Eastern, Western, South Rift and North Eastern Provinces.

It is also important to underline the active role Kenya has been playing, over the past decade, in advocating stricter controls on SALW and arms trade in regional and international forums. Such a positive attitude by the Kenyan government was further reflected during the process that led to the adoption of an ATT in 2013, where the very supportive role of Kenya as co-sponsor of the initiative along with six other countries has been widely acknowledged.

III.i.c Major obstacles and areas for future action

Previous examples suggest that despite numerous challenges it is faced with in its struggle against illicit SALW, Kenya has already harvested important results and can be regarded as one of the most encouraging models in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa sub-region.

A review of existing literature and inputs collected during the consultations, however, reveals that the success of future Kenyan initiatives critically depends on the state's capacity to overcome a number of obstacles and flaws. As reflected in many observers' views, these need to be addressed through the following:

- **undertaking a new national baseline assessment**, with a view to better understanding and measuring the extent and the nature of the phenomenon. Kenya's recent history has seen some security challenges; the population's insecurity still fuels the demand for firearms in some provinces, and the absence of recent (and centralised) data on the prevalence of armed violence might, in fact, represent a major obstacle for the establishment of appropriate measures;
- **strengthening of the capacities of KNFP**, especially through institutional support, financial resources and working equipment, all of which are necessary in order to fully implement the National Strategic Plan;
- **reinforcement of laws and regulations in the rural areas**, where insufficient presence of government's security and law enforcement agencies have contributed –

[35] Currently, two of these machines are reportedly unserviceable.
[36] Figure refers to April 2013.
[37] In origin, the operation was intended to be conducted with a regional approach and in cooperation with Uganda and Ethiopia, but talks with these partners were temporarily interrupted in 2006 and 2007. Other joint operations to monitor common borders have however been conducted with both Ethiopia and Uganda.
[38] More than fifty disarmament programmes – the majority coercive – have been conducted in Kenya over the past century.
[39] For additional information on this subject please see '*Policing the Periphery. Opportunities and Challenges for Kenya Police Reserves*', Small Arms Survey Working Paper No.15, March 2013.

among other factors – to increasing the communities' pursuit of alternative means of protection and their demand for weapons;

- **conclusion of the review process of the national relevant laws**, through the adoption of the full set of bills and regulations that are essential to the full implementation of the reviewed national legislative framework;
- **improvement of employment and working conditions of law enforcement agencies**, in order to increase their professionalism and motivation and to reduce corruption practices; and
- **establishment of more efficient monitoring mechanisms at border areas**, through provision of better training, increased resources and improved working conditions for the personnel deployed in the periphery areas, as well as a greater level of cooperation and coordination with relevant neighbouring states.

The analysis undertaken by the EWG also highlighted those domains where efforts should be prioritised in the future and where international assistance (delivered through bilateral, trilateral or multilateral mechanisms) could bring added value and lead to concrete and positive changes. These areas – some of which are not immediately connected to weapons control – include:

- **legislative review**, in particular with respect to the quick adoption of the Draft Bill on firearms and the National Small Arms Policy, to the adjustments of the institutional architecture that is necessary to ensure the full implementation of the provisions of the ATT (when signed and ratified), and to the regulation of brokering activities;
- **stockpile management**, with a view to improving the effectiveness of the current practices in compliance with international standards (IATG and ISACS)[40], and to reducing the risk of diversion of arms and ammunition from the state's custody;
- **marking and record-keeping of weapons already in the Kenyan territory**, in order to capitalise on efforts undertaken so far, and enlarge the scope of the marking exercise to cover stocks in the peripheral counties through supporting (currently under-equipped) marking mobile teams, extending in the long term to civilian-owned weapons;
- **monitoring and control at border areas**, with the objective of enhancing existing monitoring systems, reinforcing coordination and cooperation with neighbouring states, and drawing multi-actor mechanisms;
- **intelligence capacity**, to tackle trafficking networks for illicit weapons, and prevent terrorist attacks;
- **law enforcement capacity**, to adequately equip the relevant agencies, with transportation means, communication devices and training, so as to improve their presence (in particular in the border areas), skills and ability to react promptly; and
- **fight against corruption** by state officials and representatives, to achieve better governance and to improve the population's perception of and trust in the state institutions.

III.ii. South Sudan

South Sudan, as the youngest state of the world, gained its independence in an environment deeply marked by the violent liberation wars (1955–1972 and 1983–2005) that resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA) with Sudan and the subsequent proclamation of sovereignty in July 2011. Since then, state building has been severely hampered by the legacy of the five decades of conflict: extreme poverty, under-development,

[40] IATG (available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/) and ISACS (available at http://www.un-casa-isacs.org/) were developed in 2011 in the framework of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs' SaferGuard Programme, and in 2012 by the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN-CASA) mechanism, respectively.

hostile inter-community relationships and cohabitation, militarisation of the society and armed violence in almost all its expressions.

The ongoing internal conflict that erupted in December 2013 further exacerbated latent tensions, undermining the fragile national cohesion and dragging the country into large-scale armed confrontations, with spreading armed violence. In addition to serious political and humanitarian fallout, this new round of conflict is undermining the fragile improvements that were achieved through consistent efforts in the recent past, and is creating additional challenges for South Sudan, including in the area of SALW reduction and control.

III.ii.a SALW challenges and impact in South Sudan

The most urgent challenges for South Sudan are inherent to the building of the state as both an institution and a nation, and to a stable and peaceful environment; both are prerequisites to any adequate SALW control strategy and policy. In many regards, since the signature of the CPA in 2005, the root causes of armed violence, demand for weapons and insecurity are still intertwined in South Sudan, and social and political contexts remain favourable to illicit SALW circulation and misuse.

Since the proclamation of independence, South Sudanese authorities have been confronted with:

- the **absence of a legal framework** regulating SALW-related activities, and limited resources available to ensure implementation of the incomplete existing laws and provisions;
- the correlated **lack of long-term oriented national strategies and action plans**, undermining the effectiveness and the coherence of efforts undertaken, and the consolidation of achieved improvements;
- the **high rate of militarisation of the population**, as a result of the widespread distribution of weapons to communities, by all parties, during the liberation wars, and from ongoing flows from abroad;[41]
- the associated **widespread circulation of illicit and uncontrolled weapons**;[42]
- the persistence of **armed opposition movements and armed groups** fighting against state authority in several regions within the country;[43]
- the **difficulty of conducting efficient disarmament programmes** for both former combatants and civilians, as a result of the volatile environment and the lack of appropriate means;
- several **armed tribal and inter-community conflicts** driven by competition over resources (in particular cattle) or longstanding hostilities and grievances;[44]
- a **general insecurity** associated with large and small-scale criminality, exacerbated by the weakness of the state authority and the progressive disintegration of traditional authorities, eroded by the decades-long liberation war and its shortfalls;
- the **security agencies' inadequate capacity to secure and manage their stockpiles** of arms and ammunition, contributing to immediate availability of illicit SALW. As highlighted by recent assessments (see Box 1 below) procedures applied are

[41] Regarding recent illicit flows of weapons in South Sudan, see Box1 below.
[42] One of the most recent estimates, made in 2007, concluded that the number of SALW in circulation nationwide is between 2.9 to 3.2 million. Approximately two-thirds of them are believed to be outside of the government's control and owned by civilians without authorisation. In addition, no database is in place to register civilian-owned weapons.
[43] Several armed movements have been operating in South Sudan during the past few years, including domestic and foreign ones (Sudanese armed opposition and the Ugandan LRA).
[44] These inter-tribal conflicts can be particularly ravaging. Between December 2011 and January 2012, for instance, confrontations – connected with cattle rustling – between Murle and Lou Nuer groups in Jonglei State caused, according to UN statistics, approximately 4,000 casualties. On this argument, see for instance '*My neighbour, my enemy. Inter-tribal violence in Jonglei*', HSBA Issue Brief No.21, October 2012, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB21-Inter-tribal_violence_in_Jonglei.pdf

rudimentary and well below international standards in all the relevant domains, including storage (often in inadequate facilities), marking and record-keeping (incomprehensive and done in paper registers only);[45] and
- the **incapacity** of the state **to monitor** and control the **long and porous borders and the border areas**.

The uncontrolled circulation and proliferation in SALW in South Sudan therefore affects the whole country and generates severe impacts, in particular:
- **political instability and war**, with immediate consequences for the whole sub-region;[46]
- **displacement of populations** fleeing insecurity and war;[47]
- **humanitarian crisis** and survival challenges for the population; and
- **missed opportunities for development** and poverty reduction.

III.ii.b Recent initiatives: between good will and mitigated achievements

Until December 2013, despite severe shortages of funding and the weakness of the institutional capacity, South Sudan had undertaken a number of positive initiatives to enhance control on the circulation of SALW and to reduce armed violence.

Between 2005 and 2013, most of the efforts were undertaken in the areas of:
- institutional and capacity building. A National Focal Point on SALW was established in 2008 under the name of Bureau for Community Safety and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC), a state institution within the Ministry of Interior. Although the BCSSAC was mandated to coordinate the action and initiatives of the state's ministries and domestic civil society, it has not fully succeeded in establishing a regular working framework with institutional partners[48] and suffers from severe budget shortages to conduct its activities.[49] While a two-year strategy framework (the Strategic Plan 2010–2011), was elaborated by the BCSSAC in 2010, no long-term National Action Plan was subsequently adopted; such a conceptual loophole has hampered the Bureau's efforts, complicated the establishment of cooperation programmes with regional and international partners and reduced its liberty of initiative towards international donors and supporters.
- reinforcement of the domestic legislative and regulatory framework. Regulations, legislation, SALW control policies and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been under development since independence. Similarly, security agencies have been subject to a transformation process aimed at improving efficiency (including through demobilisation) and professionalism. On the legal level, the existing legislation appears to be outdated and inadequate to both face the challenges experienced by the country and establish a normative framework where SALW initiatives can be

[45] For more details, see for instance '*Excess Arms in South Sudan. Security Forces and Surplus Management*', Small Arms Survey Issue Brief No.6, April 2014.
[46] The engagement of the Ugandan army (UPDF) alongside the governmental forces in the ongoing crisis, the mediation efforts undertaken by regional organisations, in particular IGAD, to find a negotiated solution to the conflict, the alleged presence of Sudanese armed groups in the support to the South Sudanese governmental party and the claims of support from Khartoum for the rebel forces (SPLM-In Opposition) soon after the eruption of the ongoing crisis well illustrate how instability in South Sudan bears a regional dimension.
[47] According to UNHCR, more than 394,500 South Sudanese refugees where sheltered in neighbouring countries as of April 2014. Among these, more than 283,000 left South Sudan after the internal conflict started in December 2013. In addition, approximately 623,000 individuals (approximately 223,000 refugees from outside South Sudan and 400,000 South Sudanese internally displaced persons) benefit from UNHCR assistance in South Sudan. Data are available on http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4e43cb466.html and https://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php
[48] The Multi-Ministries working group, first established in 2008 to coordinate multi-sector action, has reportedly not met since 2009.
[49] The BCSSAS's budget only covers staff salaries. Activities can therefore be conducted only if funded by international donors.

conducted. A Small Arms & Light Weapons Control Bill was drafted in 2012, with the support of Saferworld, with the objective of lining up the national normative architecture with regional and international standards contained in the UNPoA and the Nairobi Protocol. The Bill could not be signed into law before the eruption of the December 2013 crisis and it is impossible, at the time of drafting, to predict when the process will be brought to an end.

- marking of state-owned weapons. BCSSAC was provided by RECSA with two marking machines that were used, in 2011, to mark newly-imported weapons by the Ministry of Interior (between 40,500 and 47,000 weapons according to available data). Since then, and despite the fact the exercise was initially planned to last over a period of three years, no subsequent marking exercises were conducted, mainly as a result of the lack of adequate funding and operational capacities. Such an initiative produced limited results and appears as a missed opportunity, as it failed to mark weapons in conformity with the Nairobi Protocol's Best Practice Guidelines and it did not produce any usable records. [50] In order to continue the effort, UNMISS provided the BCSSAC with five additional marking machines in 2012 and a new programme was developed in order to re-energise the marking effort. At the time of writing, however, no such programme had started.
- improvement of stockpile management practices. Several workshops and training sessions addressed to security officers have been organised by the BCSSAC in order to sensitise the institution about international standards and best practices. Although the appreciation of the importance of this component of the SALW control architecture by the South Sudanese authorities should be regarded as a positive factor, the state's stockpiles nevertheless remain a systematic source of illicit weapons, and numerous efforts are needed in almost all the relevant areas (safety of storage, upgrade of storage facilities, inventory of the stockpiles, marking and record-keeping, adoption of SOPs in compliance with regional and international best practices and standards, identification of surplus, etc.) in order to produce positive and tangible effects.
- disarmament and demobilisation programmes. Several exercises were conducted in this respect since the CPA was signed in 2005. In practice, however, the results in terms of weapons reduction proved to be modest and did not reverse the trend, as the number of illicit weapons circulating in the country was not considerably reduced and as most of the reasons behind the demand for weapons remain unchallenged. In addition to these difficulties, no legal frameworks provide explicit guidelines and coordination for these processes, multiplying the effort, resources and time needed for planning and implementation.
- sensitisation campaigns. Several public awareness-raising programmes were conducted in South Sudan focusing on promoting peaceful coexistence and reducing the appeal of owning arms. The perception of security among the population, deeply affected by the traumatising experience of the liberation wars and influenced by both cultural and social traditions and longstanding tensions, are factors that inextricably drive demand for firearms.

With the emergence of a new internal crisis, in December 2013, SALW control activities were severely disrupted and efforts were diverted to other compelling priorities. While it is impossible, at the time of writing, to fully assess the impact of the crisis, it is easy to anticipate that it certainly undermined and perhaps reversed many of the results obtained in the past in the domain of SALW control, adding to what already appears to be a long list of challenges.

[50] Data were registered in such a manner that the information available only indicates in which state of the country the weapon was stored, thus making identification of each individual weapon impossible.

III.ii.c Areas for future action: not simply SALW control

Future SALW control-oriented action will need to focus on many different areas and be part of a more comprehensive, multi-dimensional strategy of state building, conflict resolution, post-crisis reconstruction, poverty reduction and national reconciliation. In addition, looking at South Sudan's national capacity, it is reasonable to believe that most future initiatives – as well as their chance of success – will drastically rely on the availability of international support (financial as well as technical).

Among all the different SALW-related domains where action will be necessary, those requiring particular attention are:

- **reinforcement of the BCSSAC's capacity** (institutional, financial and operational). Improving BCSSAC resources and operational capacity is key, as it stands as a prerequisite for broader scope of action and degree of liberty from donors' priorities;
- **elaboration of a National Action Plan** to better focus efforts, avoid duplications, consolidate long-term achievements and facilitate the relationship with local, regional and international partners;
- **adoption of a comprehensive domestic legislative framework** addressing all the activities (possession, use, stockpiling, transfer, brokering, etc.) related to SALW monitoring and control;
- **marking of weapons owned and controlled by state security agencies**, in compliance with the Nairobi Protocol guidelines and best practices;
- **establishment of a reliable** and comprehensive **registration mechanism**;
- **upgrading stockpile management procedures and standards,** through marking, record-keeping, appropriate SOPs and upgrade of the storage facilities;
- **improvement of the state capacity** to monitor and mount effective control of borders and to engage in development programmes with communities most affected by armed violence; and
- **inclusive disarmament and re-integration programmes** for both former combatants and communities.

From 25 to 29 June 2013, a five-member EWG delegation[51] undertook a visit to South Sudan, with a view to conducting consultations with national authorities and international civil society organisations engaged in the different areas of SALW management and control, in order to collect information on the most appropriate and relevant form of international support to South Sudan.
During the visit, the EWG delegation met and exchanged views with representatives of the BCSSAC, the Ministry of Interior, the Inspector General of the national police, SPLA commanders, the Governor of Central Equatoria State, the South Sudanese Legislative Assembly's Committee on Security and Public Order, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and the national civil society working with the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA).
During the meetings, the EWG witnessed the government's engagement to support SALW control activities, and observed the enormous challenges experienced in SALW control, as a consequence of the country's limited capacities (lack of both financial and operational assets), the widespread circulation of illicit SALW, the persistence of armed opposition groups and the lack of proper infrastructures (in general terms in addition to those dedicated to storing SALW).
Among the key issues that emerged from consultations with South Sudanese stakeholders, the EWG identified, in particular, the following for follow-up and further investigation:

- the continued flows of SALW and ammunition from neighbouring Sudan; and

[51] The delegation included one EWG member from South Sudan, one from Uganda, one from United Kingdom, two from China.

- the poor domestic stockpile management capacity.

The first subject (suspected flows of SALW from neighbouring Sudan) was the main focus of the field research conducted under the framework of the EWG in July 2013, which conducted physical inspection of some of the weapons and ammunition seized by the SPLA from some of the armed opposition groups or that had been collected during disarmament exercises. Consistent with what emerged from previous research[52], the inspection confirmed the allegations expressed by South Sudanese stakeholders, identifying among arms held by armed groups a significant proportion of recently-manufactured (between 2008 and 2013) equipment produced by the Sudanese military industry or likely to have been exported to Sudan by other countries (namely Iran and China).
In particular, while tracing back the chain of custody of these weapons and ammunition, the EWG could determine that at least two rebel forces (the South Sudan Liberation Army – SSLA – and David Yau Yau's forces) received direct supplies from Sudan, through road delivery or airdrop operations, at least until 2013.
The sample of equipment inspected included 'CQ' 5.56x45 mm assault rifles[53], 5.56x45[54] and 7.62x54Rmm [55] ammunition identified as Chinese manufactured, RPG-7-type rocket launchers, 7.62x39mm Sudanese-manufactured ammunition[56] and RPG-7 rocket launchers consistent in design with known Iranian-manufactured weapons.
In September 2013, the conclusions of the EWG fact-finding missions were shared with a number of experts from different Chinese authorities during a roundtable meeting held in Beijing. The objective of the meeting was to provide concrete evidence to facilitate discussion on the effectiveness of export control policies and practices, in particular with regard to pre-export risk assessment procedures and end-user guarantees. The example of Sudan's non-compliance with end-user and no-transfer commitments, used as a mere practical illustration, proved useful in building a better and common understanding between the Chinese representatives and the EWG, of the existing potential risks connected with SALW transfers to some African actors.

In order to develop the second subject (stockpile management), the EWG planned a third field visit to South Sudan at the end of 2013, during which a technical assessment of the national stockpiling capacities was to be done and needs for international assistance evaluated. Unfortunately, the abrupt eruption of violence, on 15 December 2013 and the subsequent spread of the conflict between institutional forces and the SPLM-In Opposition, quickly affected the domestic security environment and modified the political priorities for the government, preventing the EWG from continuing its intended activities.

III.iii Uganda

Over the past decade, and since the termination of the conflict in the Northern part of the country, Uganda experienced political stability, economic growth and peace. However, illicit circulation of SALW and armed violence, in particular in the seven districts of the Karamoja

[52] Several publications focused on the tracing of weapons used in the different war-affected areas of the Sudan-South Sudan border area, between 2011 and 2013. See for instance the reports published by the Tracing Desk of the Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) programme (available at http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/arms-and-ammunition-tracing-desk.html) and those by Conflict Armament Research (http://www.conflictarm.com/publications/investigationreports.html).
[53] All with factory marking codes removed.
[54] Bearing the factory code '71' (known to be used by the Chongqing Changjiang Electrical Group and '08' as the date code.
[55] Mainly bearing markings with the '945' factory code and '10' as date code. This ammunition could be observed in its original crates, bearing a Chinese contract number for 2010 and a mention of the Sudanese Technical Centre as the consignee.
[56] Bearing markings indicating their manufacture in 2008, 2009 and 2010.

region, in the North East of the country, continue to present significant challenges for the government. Despite the efforts undertaken to curb the incidence of illicit weapons and progressive improvements in the security environment of the rural areas and pastoral communities, Uganda still needs to address a number of issues to consolidate the positive trends emerging over the past few years, and is confronted with numerous repercussions of longstanding armed conflicts affecting neighbouring countries (in particular in DRC[57] and in South Sudan[58]), including significant influxes of refugees and threats from terrorist groups affiliated with the Somali al-Shabaab jihadist militia.[59]

III.iii.a SALW challenges and impact in Uganda

SALW proliferation in Uganda appears under different forms, mainly:

- **uncontrolled circulation of weapons and ammunition**, originating both from outside the country (in particular South Sudan, Kenya and DRC) and domestically, as a result of poor custody capacities of governmental armed actors.[60] Although estimations only provide approximate quantifications, it is considered that some 200,000 firearms are owned illicitly by the Ugandan population, while the volume of legally-registered weapons is 88 times smaller (2,27o weapons)[61]; and
- **significant rates of armed violence and inter-community violence**, in particular in the Karamoja region where cattle raiding, insufficient presence of law enforcement mechanisms and clan tensions frequently translate into bloody confrontations between rival groups.[62]

Similarly to what has been elaborated regarding Kenya and South Sudan, these trends generate some serious impacts on the local population and the domestic security environment. If considering illicit SALW as the main reason of tensions, violence and conflicts would be misleading, their broad availability and relatively easy dissemination directly contributed to:

- **undermining the economic development** of areas most affected by armed violence, reducing the population's access to basic services (in particular health and education) and undermining the efforts aimed at improving the local infrastructures and economy; and
- instigating **massive displacements of refugees and local groups**, therefore bringing additional challenges in terms of governance in the hosting areas.[63]

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[57] The ADF-Nalu (Allied Democratic Forces-National Army of Liberation of Uganda) and the LRA, both Ugandan rebel forces, have long operated in the DRC (ADF-Nalu still does), in particular in the border regions with Uganda, Central African Republic and South Sudan.

[58] The Ugandan army (UPDF) deployed troops in support of the South Sudanese government since the very early stages of the conflict opposing SPLA and SPLA-In Opposition forces that broke out in December 2013.

[59] This group perpetrated a suicide bombing operation in Kampala, in July 2010, killing some 76 individuals. According to the group's claim, Uganda was identified as a target because of its engagement in the African Union peacekeeping operation AMISOM deployed in Somalia, where a Ugandan military (UPDF) and police contingent has been serving since 2007. Currently, the Ugandan contingent is composed of a force of approximately 6,500 men.

[60] Weaknesses of the domestic control system over the state's stockpiles was identified as one of the major factors contributing to SALW illicit circulation in the baseline survey realised by the Ugandan National Focal Point (f) in SALW, in 2003.

[61] These figures refer to the most recent estimate that is available in the public domain, elaborated in 2012.

[62] For additional information about the Karamoja, see for instance '*Crisis in Karamoja. Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda's Most Deprived Region*', Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No.21, June 2008; '*Karamoja conflict and security assessment*', Saferworld, September 2010; '*The Karamoja Cluster of eastern Africa: Arms transfers and their repercussions on communal security perceptions*', IPIS & Trasarm Research, December 2010; and '*Security Provision and Small Arms in Karamoja A Survey of Perceptions*', Small Arms Survey Special Report, September 2012.

[63] According to the UNHCR, more than 210,000 individuals seeking refuge in Uganda (mainly from Somalia, DRC and South Sudan) needed humanitarian assistance in early 2014. Detailed data are available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483c06.html

III.iii.b Recent initiatives and achievements: focus on disarmament

The persistence of severe challenges originated by SALW illicit circulation in Uganda should not be interpreted as a result of an underestimation of the phenomenon by the government, nor as an absence of national strategy to confront the challenges.

The Ugandan National Focal Point for SALW (UNFP), operating under the authority of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, was established in the very early days of the international commitment to curb the effects of illicit weapons' circulation, in 2001, with the mandate to coordinate all SALW-related issues, both internally and internationally. In order to elaborate an evidence-based road map for action, the UNFP adopted a comprehensive National Action Plan in 2007, built upon the outcome of a national survey conducted in 2003–2004.

UNFP-coordinated actions produced, since then, a number of significant results, most notably in the areas of:

- weapons collection among the civilian population (particularly in the Karamoja region). According to figures provided by the Ugandan government in 2010, over 50,000 illicit weapons have been collected (through different approaches) among the population.[64] In particular, with respect to disarmament operations in the Karamoja region, statistics produced by the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) show that 29,923 weapons were recovered over the last decade, contributing to a drastic reduction of the weapons in circulation (from 40,000/50,000 to 3,000/10,000 according to different sources). Overall, nine disarmament operations were conducted among the pastoralist communities in Uganda since 2001.[65]
- demobilisation and disarmament of combatants. In order to create incentives for demobilisation, the Ugandan government adopted, in 2000, the Amnesty Act, guaranteeing amnesty for voluntary defection from armed groups. Overall, and since this framework has been put in place, more than 26,000 former combatants abandoned the armed struggle and reintegrated into civilian life.[66] Although in the vast majority of cases demobilised personnel did not hand over weapons, the disarmament initiative still contributed to a relative improvement of the security environment and was considered a fruitful initiative by the authorities.
- weapons destruction. Several destruction programmes were conducted in Uganda over the past decade, the most important having taken place in 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010 and 2011. Between 2003 and 2005, Uganda destroyed 6,800 anti-personnel landmines and 3,000 SALW. Similar efforts continued in 2006 (with 41,000 SALW and 463 tonnes of ammunition destroyed)[67] and in 2011 (when 31,272 unserviceable, obsolete and unwanted weapons were also disposed of by the UPDF); and
- marking of state-owned SALW and record-keeping. The process started with SALW under the custody of the Ugandan Police Force and UPDF upon receiving four marking machines made available through RECSA support. Even if figures available on the volumes of marked weapons are sometimes contradictory[68] and lack of means limited the geographical implementation of the programme mainly to urban areas, this initiative represents an encouraging achievement, as it should lead to upgraded standards applied to stockpile management by governmental security agencies.

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[64] Data reflected in the Uganda report on the implementation of the UNPoA, dated 2010.

[65] Figures cited by the Small Arms Survey in the September 2012 '*Security Provision and Small Arms in Karamoja*' report conclude that the total number of SALW collected during these nine programmes is between 9,658 and 12,794 weapons only.

[66] See http://iwpr.net/report-news/no-more-amnesty-ugandas-lra

[67] Figures relating to the 2003–2010 period are reflected in Uganda's reports on the UNPoA, while data on the 2011 destruction exercise were mentioned in media articles (see, for instance, The Monitor, '*UPDF Destroys Over 30,000 Weapons*', July the 7th, 2011).

[68] The report submitted by Uganda during the 2006 Review Conference of the UNPoA indicated that all SALW operated by the National Police were marked. In 2013, however, the UNFP provided a different assessment, stating that 80 per cent of the police-owned, 50 per cent of the UPDF-owned and 100 per cent of the Prison Guards-owned weapons were marked in compliance with international standards.

III.iii.c Major obstacles and areas for future action

Analysts and practitioners that undertook an assessment of the implementation of policies and initiatives in Uganda since the establishment of the UNFP agree in identifying a number of weaknesses in the national architecture of the SALW control mechanisms as well as some recurrent and practical obstacles to its improvement:

- the **outdated current legislative framework on SALW control**, still based on the Firearms Act of 1970. A National Policy on firearms was adopted by the Ugandan government in October 2010 although it appears that implementation has not progressed significantly since, due to insufficient resources and necessary expertise. A Draft Bill, developed to amend the domestic legislation, has already been produced and is still in the consultative stages before it is submitted to government for adoption. The new legislation is expected to harmonise the national law in accordance with the UNPoA and the Nairobi Protocol and to extend the scope of the legislation with activities (such as brokering, manufacture of SALW, transit and transhipment of SALW, unification of record-keeping, etc.) that currently remain unregulated;
- the **relatively frail capacity of the UNFP** – related to both insufficient resources and institutional handicaps – and its difficulty in including SALW-related issues among the government's priorities;
- the **national practices in terms of stockpile management, still below international standards** in many respects (because of inadequate storage facilities in particular at UPDF district and sub-county police level,[69] lack of guidelines in terms of data collection and record-keeping, and insufficient control mechanisms on the movements of stored SALW and ammunition);
- the **practical and institutional obstacles that undermine the effectiveness and full achievement of the state-owned marking programme**, due to logistical challenges (for instance with regard to the lack of transportation means and sufficient equipment – like compressors, engines, electric generators and computers – necessary to establish mobile marking teams able to reach all the storage facilities, including those in the peripheral areas);
- the **persistence of separate and non-interconnected databases** where information on SALW is kept;[70]
- the **challenges posed by porous borders and cross-border movement of pastoral communities** (in particular in the North East region of the country) that contribute to jeopardising the efficiency of border areas monitoring and control, and SALW reduction measures.

Based on the considerations cited above, the EWG identified a number of domains where further efforts appear to be necessary to consolidate the achievements made so far by Uganda. Future action in these areas, which deserves the full attention of the national authorities, is likely to require international assistance and cooperation. Among these interventions, some could be envisaged under the framework of joint assistance from China and the European Union and include:

- the **conduct of a new survey on the phenomenon of illicit SALW circulation and proliferation in the country**, as the last exercise in this respect was undertaken in 2003–2004. More than a decade later, it is crucial to assess the evolution of the national context and to identify, if relevant, new emerging trends. Updating the outcome of the 2003–2004 survey appears to be of crucial importance

[69] This factor contributes to increased risks of diversion of the equipment stored – through theft – and of physical safety of both the staff and the population living in the proximity of the facilities.

[70] UPDF is reportedly keeping separate registers from the Central Firearms Register, although an interface between the two databases is in place. In addition, however, data are only collected and recorded manually by units deployed in the remote areas (at the district level) and this information is not systematically reflected in the centralised register.

in order to determine whether the 2004 National Action Plan (reviewed in 2013) remains relevant and how it might need to be adjusted to achieve better results;

- the **improvement of national practices in terms of stockpile management** will be essential for Uganda to effectively tackle uncontrolled SALW circulation. In this specific domain, and despite efforts recently undertaken, many initiatives need to be designed and implemented; from the upgrading of storage facilities to the adoption of national guidelines on stockpile management in accordance with international (IATG and ISACS) standards, from standardisation of data collection to unification and centralisation of record-keeping, from training to the relevant staff to provision of additional equipment to the security agencies (computers, appropriate data collection and software, transportation means, etc.);
- the **full implementation of SALW marking** in compliance with a single set of standard procedures in terms of marking, data collection and record-keeping for all national agencies concerned. In order to achieve this objective additional resources are needed to establish mobile marking teams (computer equipment, transportation means, compressors and power generators, etc.), as much as training and capacity reinforcement measures; and
- the **improvement of national capacity in terms of border control and monitoring**. Similarly to what has been elaborated in the previous sections on Kenya and South Sudan, it is crucial for Uganda to refine existing monitoring systems, to reinforce coordination and cooperation among border control agencies and with neighbouring states, in order to further develop multi-actor inclusive programmes addressed to the communities living in the peripheral areas of the country. In particular, it would be useful to increase the **institutional support provided to the UNFP**, an entity that still faces several challenges and suffers from institutional weakness and inadequate funding to fulfil its mission. The National Focal Point's dependence on external donors and other government institutions' backing reduces its degree of initiative and operational capacity, thus limiting the impact of its action and the ability to consolidate the positive achievements obtained in the past.

Box 2: Stockpile management in Somalia

Between 19 and 24 January 2014, CAR, commissioned by the EWG, conducted comprehensive stockpile assessments of three arms and ammunition storage facilities in Mogadishu, Somalia, including one recently-built police armoury, two storehouses operated by the NISA and the primary SNA storage facility at Halane, adjacent to Mogadishu.
The choice of Somalia was justified not only by pragmatism, but also because of the recent history of the country – characterised by more than 20 years of conflict – the volatility of the state's authority, widespread circulation of illicit SALW[71] and high rates of armed violence.

These assessments were conducted with a view to evaluating the appropriateness of storage infrastructure, determining the risk of unintended explosions at the sites, reviewing the security conditions under which weapons and ammunition are stored, and assessing potential enhancement measures and upgrading of current practices.

The technical assessment revealed that tangible risks are associated with existing stockpiles in Mogadishu, in particular with respect to the storage of explosive ammunition. All national ammunition and explosive stores have been severely damaged by decades of war and armed

[71] Despite the international sanctions regime established in 1992, the stream of weapons to Somalia remained significant and regular. According to the UN report of the Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia, for instance, 445 instances of arms transfers or seizures, involving almost 50,000 SALW, were recorded between May 2004 and July 2011. In addition, several other cases of embargo violations were documented, including arms deliveries by land, air and sea from abroad.

insurgency; many were destroyed and the overall majority of the few that survived are nowadays out of use for lack of appropriate refurbishing or insecurity of locations. While various international agencies – including United Nations branches and specialised international civil society – rehabilitated or built more storage infrastructures, efforts focused essentially on small arms storage facilities, which were not designed to stock explosive weapons. Due to the poor safety standards applied in the management of the stockpiles, the weakness of available storage facilities and the absence of appropriate infrastructures for explosive storage, risks of unintentional detonation of ammunition and explosives – with correlated threats for the physical security of the staff in charge of stockpiles and the numerous civilian populations in the surrounding areas – represent a concrete danger. This threat might even be increased by the recent partial lifting of the arms embargo targeting Somalia since 1992 and the resulting increase in imports into the country; the SNA site alone, for instance, is considered to already harbour a volume of 4 tonnes of net explosive quantity and any additional supply might simply increase risk.

As highlighted by the outcome of the assessment, there is a great need for efforts and resources, and the Federal Government of Somalia must rely on international cooperation concerning all aspects of the physical security of stockpiles management, with a particular priority on:

- rehabilitation and construction of additional storage facilities in compliance with IATG international safety standards, to be located in dedicated sites located at a safe distance from civilian populated areas;
- elaborate national guidelines setting norms, oversight mechanisms and SOPs reflecting, at least, the internationally-established standards in terms of physical security; and
- training and sensitising the staff of all security agencies to adopt and apply these standards.

III.iv RECSA: an essential actor in SALW control

Case studies presented in the above sections capture well the character of the regional dimension of the SALW challenge, not only because in many cases the flows of illicit weapons cross international borders and originate in (or simply transit through) neighbouring countries, but also because of the significant impact armed conflicts and armed violence generate on the regional scale.

The necessity to adopt a coherent approach by all states was well appreciated by states since the first steps taken against the proliferation of SALW and the adoption of the most relevant regional normative framework, the Nairobi Declaration in March 2000, which subsequently served as the basis for the Nairobi Protocol. Several provisions contained in the Protocol call upon states for reinforced regional cooperation and information sharing and for harmonisation of national legislative frameworks with those of the neighbouring countries.
In addition, the endorsement of the Nairobi Declaration (and Protocol) also resulted in the establishment, in 2005, of RECSA as the only African body specifically mandated to act as the coordination body for the implementation of national policies and programmes designed to combat the illicit proliferation of SALW.[72]

[72] For other African regional institutions and organisations (the African Union, ECOWAS, and SADC), coordination of SALW policies and initiatives is included in a much wider mandate, while RECSA was solely established (and mandated) to enhance the fight against the illicit proliferation of SALW.

- facilitating dialogue, experience sharing among signatory states and harmonisation of national legislations; [73]
- assisting the National Focal Points in establishing national action plans and strategic programmes;
- supporting capacity building and institutional empowerment of National Focal Points and other relevant agencies;
- sensitising the general public about the SALW problematic; and
- channelling international assistance and technical cooperation to regional beneficiaries.

Recognising RECSA's importance and valuable experience in the domain of SALW control in Great Lakes and Horn of Africa, the EWG invited RECSA senior officials and representatives to its public activities and engaged in regular consultations with its Secretariat with a view to sharing relevant information, identifying priority areas for future interventions, and facilitating the institutional dialogue between RECSA, the European Union and the Chinese national authorities.
As an immediate result of this line of sustained dialogue with the EWG and the Chinese authorities, the Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania in Beijing was appointed as RECSA Focal Point in China in March 2014 [74], and three assistance requests for future projects were submitted through this channel to the Chinese authorities for consideration, in April 2014.[75]

III.v RECSA: main recent achievements and challenges

The main goal of this Working Paper is not to assess in detail the activities implemented through RECSA's assistance over the past few years; nevertheless, it is worth highlighting two important achievements.

First, since 2010, RECSA was identified and acted as the main partner by the European Union for the implementation of the assistance provided to the Africa Union, through the multi-year project entitled 'The Fight against the Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of Firearms in Africa'. In this framework and since the EU-AU project was launched, RECSA enlarged the geographical scope of its activities, channelled AU assistance to a number of states that are not signatories of the Nairobi Protocol (namely Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali and Togo in the ECOWAS region) and shared experience with other regional organisations active in SALW control like ECOWAS, SADC or, outside Africa, the Organisation of American States (OAS).

Second, RECSA has assisted many states (mainly the signatories of the Nairobi Protocol, but also four from the ECOWAS region) in establishing a national programme for marking state-owned SALW, therefore initiating the first large-scale programme of this nature in Africa.[76]

[73] For more details on the process of harmonisation of national legislations, see for instance '*Harmonisation des législations sur les armes légères dans trois pays des Grands Lacs: le Burundi, la RDC et le Rwanda*', Note d'Analyse du GRIP, October 2004 and '*Harmonising small arms control legislation. Selected case studies from the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa*', Saferworld, March 2011.
[74] This decision to form a group of Ambassadors of RECSA Member States in four capitals: Beijing, Brussels, Nairobi and Addis Ababa to facilitate direct contact between RECSA and the four host countries has recently been formally adopted by the Council of Ministers (RECSA Resolution 3, 2014). The group of RECSA Ambassadors will be chaired by the Ambassador of the country that chairs the Council of Ministers, currently Tanzania.
[75] The three multi-discipline projects are respectively entitled '*Enhancing Human Security through Practical Disarmament along the Borderlands of Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia (2014-2018)*', '*Reducing vulnerability to armed violence in Somalia through the provision of basic services and strengthening household and community resilience (2014-2019)*' and '*Support to the prevention, control and reduction of SALW proliferation in the United Republic of Tanzania (2014-2019)*'.
[76] For a more in-depth analysis of this programme, see '*Making a Mark. Reporting on Firearms Marking in the RECSA Region*', Small Arms Survey Special Report, April 2013.

In this respect, RECSA provided forty-three marking machines to Nairobi Protocol signatories and ten additional ones to ECOWAS member states; it conducted training modules addressed to the staff involved in marking exercises in fourteen countries and developed software designed to manage databases containing the information related to each weapon over the marking process. This longstanding (and ongoing) programme directly emanates from obligations endorsed by states when signing the Nairobi Protocol and, in particular, their commitment (expressed in article 7 of the Protocol) to proceed with the marking of their national stockpiles according to the guidelines elaborated in the Best Practice Guidelines on the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol (2005).[77] The fact that a huge (although impossible to quantify) proportion of SALW in illicit circulation in the region appears to be generated – voluntarily or unintentionally – from states' stockpiles provides an idea of the importance of the efforts undertaken in this specific area.

The marking programme started in 2006 when the US Department of State offered RECSA the necessary funding to acquire a first set of weapon marking machines[78] and develop the associated training modules for the machine operators. In the following years, additional donors, including Japan and the EU, further contributed to the effort, enabling RECSA to procure more marking machines and to develop a database and inventory management software.[79] While the initial (and very ambitious) objective – to conclude the national marking processes by 2008 – was not met for a number of reasons, including the limited number of marking machines available, the programme implementation on the regional scale resulted in the marking of several hundred thousand weapons and brought significant, although still incomplete, improvements in the SOPs applied domestically in terms of registration and record-keeping, both essential components for efficient and safe stockpile management.[80]

In many regards, challenges and lessons that emerged from the different national marking programmes apply to almost the whole range of activities that were implemented so far with RECSA's involvement and contribution, and refer to:

- the **limitation of RECSA and its member states' financial and operational capacities** and their difficulty **in designing projects quantifying their needs and taking into account long-term and operational imperatives.** RECSA's weaknesses can be explained by the weak institutional and financial support provided by states, as reflected by the fact that most of RECSA's activities are in fact funded through international donors, including the EU, the US and Japan (to only mention the most important ones), while less than three per cent of the operating funds are provided by its members, with many in arrears with membership fees. The marking programme presented above, on the other hand, can provide a useful example of the regional limited operational capacities available. In many cases, in fact, states had to interrupt the exercise after having marked stockpiles located in the capital city because of the absence of adequate means (vehicles, compressors, generators, etc.) to establish mobile marking teams, undermining the chances of bringing the programme

[77] In particular, signatory States agreed upon a standard marking format, containing a star to identify state-owned weapons in the RECSA region, an International Standards Organization (ISO) country code and a unique serial number.

[78] The financial aid provided by the United States was used to procure 26 marking machines to signatory States of the Nairobi Protocol; a first set of 7 machines were purchased in 2008, while the 19 remaining ones were delivered in 2009. By the end of 2012, however, the total number of marking machines in the region had already increased to 38, after the EAC provided 12 additional ones.

[79] The design of the software began in early 2010 and the first version was briefly tested by Uganda and Seychelles. Experience gathered during this pilot phase was subsequently used during 2011 to improve the software, which was officially adopted in its final version in May 2012.

[80] Stockpile management remains a fundamental issue for many African countries. According to the findings of research conducted in 2013 by the Small Arms Survey and GRIP, less than half of African States have adequate policies and practices in place in this domain. For additional details, see '*Efficacy of Small Arms Control Measures and National Reporting: Learning from Africa*', Research Note No.33, August 2013.

to its conclusion in conformity with its original timeline;

- the **necessity for each initiative to be adopted and owned by the state concerned**. Although RECSA is in a position to provide support and to assist its members, it cannot replace them, nor take full responsibility for the implementation of the projects conducted nationally. In other words, chances of success for RECSA-supported initiatives crucially depend on states' political will and engagement and not only on RECSA's;
- the **need, for many states of the region, to find long-term solutions** in terms of stockpile management and record-keeping of their own inventories and the absence of adequate storage infrastructures guaranteeing the consolidation of the recent (and often partial) achievements; and, to a smaller extent,
- the **simultaneous membership of some states in different agreements and regional initiatives on SALW**, diverting resources and potentially creating competing priorities.[81]

[81] Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Seychelles and Tanzania are signatories of the Nairobi Protocol and of another regional conventions or protocols. DRC signed three different SALW control regional protocols.

IV. Supporting Africa-China-EU dialogue on conventional arms: assessment and perspectives for future action

According to all the EWG members and the overall majority of partners involved, the outcomes of the project on 'Supporting EU-China-Africa dialogue on conventional arms control' have to be regarded as largely positive.

The establishment of the EWG contributed to creating an unprecedented and unique room for dialogue and information sharing among the research and practitioners' communities of the three regions (Africa, China and EU). As a result, the dialogue environment among the members of the EWG and its associated partners consistently improved over the different meetings and greatly facilitated increased mutual understanding and identification of common perceptions and objectives. In particular, regular exchange of experience allowed each party to better appreciate the efforts undertaken in their respective region to combat illicit SALW, to deepen understanding of the unaddressed challenges in each region, to harmonise views, and to elaborate suggestions for cooperative actions. Prejudices and incomplete knowledge of the various national contexts (both in terms of the impact of illicit circulation of SALW and of existing mechanisms in place to better tackle the effects of the uncontrolled proliferation of these arms), inevitably influencing the experts' initial stands and perceptions, progressively faded as awareness and knowledge increased. Similarly, the dialogue atmosphere regularly improved, creating the space for discussion and consultation on what were considered, in the initial phases of the project, sensitive and delicate issues.
Consistently with these results, the EWG also succeeded in establishing a constructive dialogue with the African diplomatic community in China and to mobilise several African embassies to maintain dialogue with their Chinese counterparts on issues related to peace and security, as well as control of small arms. This initiative also resulted in the establishment, in March 2014, of a group of RECSA Ambassadors in Beijing, with a view to facilitating a RECSA-China direct relationship and to improve the capacity of RECSA member states to channel their requests for assistance to the relevant Chinese ministries and agencies.

The importance of these results should not be underestimated, especially considering the sensitive nature of many of the issues that stand at the centre of the dialogue and the interactions. Similarly, the positive outcome of the EWG activities should be regarded as the starting point for future efforts, rather than a full accomplishment. At this stage, in fact, identifying concrete areas for practical cooperation where China and the EU could provide combined and coordinated assistance to African states and regional organisation remains relatively challenging. The EWG considers that this is due to two major factors: the necessity to enhance and consolidate the level of dialogue at the political and institutional level, on the one hand, and the limited capacity of African stakeholders to identify, prioritise and quantify their needs (and therefore the difficulty for external actors, like China and the EU, to provide adequate assistance) on the other.
Although the results obtained by the EWG can be considered a prerequisite to opening and reinforcing the space of dialogue and interaction among the three parties (China, the EU and African states/organisations), it is beyond the EWG's capacities and prerogatives to take decisions on the nature and the type of assistance to be channelled by the potential providers of such assistance; nor will the EWG formulate requests of cooperation on behalf of the concerned states and agencies in charge of SALW control policies. Using a more metaphorical phrasing, if the EWG proved useful to paving the way, it cannot be expected to conclude the work alone, nor to drive on the way once finished.
Similarly, it is easy to understand that the identification of possible areas of bilateral or trilateral intervention can only be done if the nature of the requested assistance is duly recognised and quantified by the expected beneficiaries, a dimension where, as developed in the section below, further efforts are required.

In conclusion, all the EWG's stakeholders agreed with the Expert Members in underlining the

necessity to further consolidate, through a renewed mandate for the EWG, the results obtained during the life cycle of the 2012–2014 project, many of which stand as a preliminary and *sine qua non* condition for future and fine-tuned coordinated cooperation between the three regions.

IV.i Lessons learnt and avenues for future improvements

Regular dialogue among the members of the EWG and the vast round of consultation with practitioners, experts, government officials and policy makers, scholars and representatives of the relevant components of the civil society – more than three hundred from the three regions – highlighted some of the areas where obstacles to enhanced cooperation still remain and where efforts should be undertaken in the future in order to increase concrete avenues for international assistance and collaboration. Far from providing a comprehensive list, the following section captures the domains where the EWG considers that future efforts, both by governments and civil society organisations, are most required.

IV.i.a At the African Level

- **Research.** As shown in several sections of the previous chapter, the knowledge of the different facets of the illicit proliferation and circulation of SALW in Africa remains partial. While many countries (including Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda) conducted national surveys in order to design their national policies and action plans, the majority of these efforts were undertaken in the aftermath of the Nairobi Declaration/Protocol adoption and were neither renewed, nor consistently reviewed. As a result, it remains difficult for a number of states to quantify the impact of the policies and programmes implemented over the past decade. Similarly, knowledge is not sufficient to determine whether the outcome of the surveys conducted in the past still captures the nature and extent of the challenges created by SALW illicit circulation and whether it is to be considered as adequate basis for future action.
- **Increased institutional support.** The majority of National Focal Points (or National Commissions, according to the sub-region of reference) on SALW suffer from inappropriate funding and institutional weakness, and similar observations can be made with respect to the regional institutions (such as RECSA) mandated to support the implementation of national efforts. The National Focal Points' (and RECSA's) dependency on external donors and other governmental institutions' political backing severely reduces their degree of initiative and their operational capacities, in addition to undermining the impact of their action and the consolidation of the positive achievements made in the past. As a direct consequence of this, **many African states experience real difficulties in identifying their most urgent needs and in quantifying the international assistance that is necessary to conceive adequate responses**. Although the EWG framed the majority of its activities in Africa with a view to offering African stakeholders the possibility of formulating requests for support, it is still proving difficult to determine in which areas, under which forms and according to which evidence adequate cooperation should be channelled to many of the different actors in Africa. Improving their ability to elaborate aid requests in the adequate forms, as well as to design programmes with monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, still appears to be a major challenge, as well as an impediment to a better use of the available assistance.
- **Greater ownership by governments**. Although almost all African states endorsed regional commitments to tackle the illicit proliferation of SALW, established National Focal Points (or National Commissions) on SALW and played a proactive and constructive role in the process that led to the adoption of the ATT in 2013, it must be noted that in many cases their efforts in implementing these engagements remained limited to institutional and legislative review processes failing to deliver tangible

concrete impacts on the domestic and regional security environments. If several external factors could explain these modest results, the weakness of the political will often stands as a major obstacle and crucially reduces the chances of benefiting from the appropriate international (whether bilateral, trilateral or multilateral) assistance and cooperation. As several EWG members reiterated during the different activities, the **adoption of more concrete and pragmatic approaches and policies by African actors** (in particular governments) **stands as fundamental step still to be taken.** As is well established and broadly recognised, SALW circulation and misuse are the tangible expression of more complex and in-depth social, economic and political processes rather than a stand-alone issue. Efforts undertaken in tackling SALW proliferation should therefore be part of multi-discipline strategies and undertaken in an environment where the drivers for demand of weapons are effectively addressed. African governments should therefore upgrade their efforts, moving from institutional and legislative processes to more pragmatic initiatives generating inclusive approaches and increased ownership by the expected beneficiary communities or groups.

- **Increased coordination among African actors.** While the effects of illicit SALW proliferation and uncontrolled circulation in the different national environments often have regionally interconnected dimensions, national responses and strategies are often elaborated in relative isolation and with insufficient coordination with neighbouring states and relevant (local or international) partners. Increased coordination among the African governments in this area would doubtlessly contribute to generating more solid and sustainable results and probably also to reducing their competition for international assistance.

IV.i.b At China's level

- **Improved understanding of the real importance of SALW issues.** Despite the increasing geopolitical importance of Africa in China's global strategy and policy and the enormous efforts undertaken by the Chinese government to support Africa's development and stability, China's focus on SALW illicit proliferation and its ravaging effects on the African continent remains relatively limited. As expressed by a number of Chinese representatives and scholars during the EWG consultations in China, the rationale behind this approach mainly emerges from the fact that SALW only generate a very small proportion of the Chinese defence industry's income, on the one hand, and from one of China's international policy pillars – the non-interference in internal affairs principle – on the other. In this respect, the EWG undertook to introduce an alternative analysis insisting on the fact that SALW proliferation in Africa indeed represents an important issue for China as instability, armed conflicts and insecurity are significant threats for Chinese investments in Africa, as well as for the Chinese interests and communities living and working on the African continent. Three additional examples that reflect the importance of SALW and their impacts not only for the Africa-China relationships, but for China itself are the increased contribution of China to UN and AU peacekeeping operations in terms of personnel,[82] the direct involvement of the Chinese Navy in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and the reiteration of China's support to African efforts in tackling illicit SALW in the Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015) adopted at the fifth FOCAC Ministerial

[82] Approximately 2,200 Chinese peacekeepers are currently engaged in international peacekeeping operations across Africa (in DRC, Liberia, Mali and South Sudan). For detailed figures, please refer to http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/may14_1.pdf. Although the majority of the Chinese contingents are composed of engineering and medical units, security personnel were recently deployed in Mali. As publicly confirmed by the UN DPKO, the Chinese contribution to peacekeeping operations will be soon increased by the deployment of a full battalion to be merged into the UNMISS contingent. International News box of The New Nation (Juba), 7 June 2014.

Conference.[83] Reinforcing China's understanding and focus on SALW-related matters therefore represents a crucial prerequisite for enhanced and more effective cooperation, not only with African countries, but with the EU and the international community as a whole.

- **Increased knowledge and in-depth research on SALW-related issues.** The overall majority of Chinese policy makers, practitioners and scholars engaged in the area of peace and security dedicate the majority of their attention to non-conventional weapons and major weaponry systems, therefore indirectly confining SALW-related matters to a lower level of concern. The EWG interaction with Chinese stakeholders highlighted this trend and the fact that misunderstanding and misconception of both the SALW problematic among Chinese actors and China's role at the international level among European and African officials and researchers stand – at least partially – as a consequence of the limited knowledge available in China. More importantly, the EWG consultations and exchanges with Chinese interlocutors created new and genuine interest on SALW control-related disciplines. Such a positive achievement could result in a more systematic contribution of China in the area of SALW control, should this attention be maintained and consolidated through more sustained efforts in field research programmes in Africa, by Chinese researchers and scholars, independently from the renewal of the EWG's mandate.
- **Increased coordination and dialogue with African states on the official level.** In order to further consolidate the results generated by the project and elaborate concrete opportunities for practical actions in combating the illicit proliferation of SALW in Africa, it is vital that dialogue and experience sharing is also maintained at the institutional level with African states, notably under the framework of FOCAC, focusing on China's commitments to support African states in addressing the SALW problem. In particular, China should engage in more systematic consultations with African states and African regional organisations (in particular RECSA) in the SALW-related domain, making more systematic use of existing strategies and commitment, such as those contained in the Beijing Action Plan 2013–2015.
- **Enhanced efficiency of post-delivery monitoring and existing risk assessment mechanisms.** Information collected during the EWG field research mission in South Sudan, in June 2013, provided the opportunity to inform the Chinese government about the use of Chinese recently-manufactured ammunition and weapons by a number of rebel forces, in contravention of Chinese policy strictly limiting military supplies to legitimate governments. This evidence, which was the subject of the roundtable meeting held in September 2013, proved to be useful in demonstrating that some of China's African partners fail to comply with end-user clauses, which are key elements of China's export control practices and supply contracts. The EWG considers that China should consider the possibility of increasing its capacity to monitor the final use of exported equipment, for instance supporting field research, with the aim of enhancing the efficiency of the existing risk assessment mechanisms used prior to export authorisations.

IV.i.c At the EU Level

- **Enhanced support for practical initiatives in all aspects of their life cycle.** In order to increase the efficiency of the already vast assistance and cooperation provided to African partners, the EU should support, as a priority, pragmatic actions (as opposed to institutional and legislative processes) designed with adequate monitoring and evaluation components. Experiences gathered during the last decade show clearly that the consequences of engagement in long-term processes can be

[83] The Action Plan was adopted by the Fifth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, in July 2012. Paragraph 2.6.1 of the Plan reiterates that 'the Chinese side will continue to support African countries' effort to combat illegal trade and circulation of small arms and light weapons'.

difficult to envisage at first and should be regularly evaluated in order to guarantee full support throughout the complete life cycle of the initiative. Long-term engagement is, in fact, a key aspect for most of the multi-discipline and long-term SALW programmes (from disarmament programmes to security sector reforms), especially because their chances of success entirely rely on their complete implementation.

- **Increased coordination and dialogue with China and African states at the official level.** In order to further consolidate the results generated by the project and elaborate concrete opportunities for practical actions in combating the illicit proliferation of SALW in Africa, it is vital that dialogue and experience sharing do not remain limited to the space of civil society, but is scaled-up at the governmental level. In particular, the EU should engage in more systematic consultations with China, African states and African regional organisations (in particular RECSA), making use of the existing strategies such as 'The Fight against the Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of Firearms in Africa', the EU-Africa Summits and the 'EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation'.
- **Improved coordination of assistance and cooperation provided by EU member states.** Assistance and technical cooperation delivered to African states from Europe are not limited to that provided by the EU, but also include all forms of aid and support generated in the framework of individual member states' bilateral relationship with their respective African partners. In order to not duplicate efforts and to avoid the emergence of competing (if not contradictory) effects between the EU approach and that of member states, it appears necessary to further increase the level of coordination between member states themselves, on one hand, and between member states and the EU on the other.
- **Pushing EU member states to avoid applying double standards policies in the peace & security area.** The EU adopted, in 1998 a normative framework to establish common standards for the harmonisation of national arms export policies (the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports). This regulatory framework was progressively strengthened through information exchange mechanisms and several reviews, which led in 2008 to the transformation of the Code into a legally-binding Common Position. However, the fact that EU member states apply national foreign policies, inevitably driven by national interests rather than EU external policies towards Africa, contributes – in particular in some specific regions where EU states' national priorities compete – to jeopardise the coherence and credibility of EU (or EU-perceived) initiatives among a number of actors. The EU should therefore use all its influence and prerogatives among its member states to guarantee they fully comply with EU strategies, policies and priorities, in particular in the domain of peace and security (encompassing arms control and SALW reduction).

IV.i.d At the EWG Level

- **Consolidating the results obtained through coordinated field research.** The establishment of a space of dialogue based on mutual trust and common views among EWG members having been achieved, not scaling-up such synergies through common field research involving African, Chinese and European experts would dramatically reduce the added value created during the first two years of the EWG's existence and activities. Of comparable importance, EWG field research and evidence-based analysis would also contribute to better assessing and quantifying the needs of the states selected to be the subjects of research, therefore facilitating the elaboration of adequate assistance requests by the latter. **EWG-coordinated research should, in particular, address the issues related to the illicit proliferation and uncontrolled circulation of ammunition.** The crucial importance of this subject emerges from the importance of ammunition for the functioning of SALW themselves, and the fact that supplies in ammunition are fundamental for perpetuating armed

conflicts and armed violence. In addition, it has also to be noted that, contrary to SALW, industrial capacities for ammunition manufacture do exist in several African states, making ammunition proliferation – at least partially – an endogenous phenomenon. Since illicit ammunition circulating in Africa is not necessary manufactured abroad (as the vast majority of the weapons are), additional and adequate responses are necessary, in addition to those also applying to SALW, mainly articulated around international transfer control mechanisms.

- **Adopting a more proactive and vocal diplomatic approach.** The EWG interacted with a significant number of diplomatic missions and delegations in Africa, China and Europe. These activities resulted in one of the most concrete achievements of the EWG, namely the establishment of a RECSA diplomatic focal point in Beijing, a role currently played by the Tanzanian Ambassador in China. In order to maximise the effectiveness of its efforts, however, the EWG should increase the level of interaction with the diplomatic community (in China, as well as in Europe and in Africa) and adopt a more proactive attitude towards the international institutions engaged in combating illicit SALW (UN agencies, RECSA, the African Union, ECOWAS, SADC or any other relevant entities) and those forums designed to create synergies between Africa, China and the EU (for instance taking advantage of the next FOCAC Ministerial Meeting, scheduled to be held in South Africa in 2015, and future Africa-EU Summits and/or EU-China rounds of high-level consultations). This would not only help provide better visibility of its activities, but also help facilitate the stream of relevant information on SALW initiatives in the three regions (Africa, China and the EU) and promote upgrading of the dialogue initiated by the EWG among African, Chinese and EU officials, decision takers and policy makers.
- **Engaging in a more systematic dialogue with the industry.** If industry representatives were invited to attend some EWG seminars and consultations (in particular those held in Beijing), the EWG would be able to establish a regular channel of interaction with the defence industry. In order to deepen its knowledge and understanding of SALW and ammunition, however, it would be particularly beneficial for the EWG to dedicate more efforts to enlarging the scope of dialogue to the industry (Chinese and European, but also African) and widen it on different issues, including, in particular, pre-delivery risk assessment and reduction of SALW and ammunition diversion. Such a line of dialogue might also contribute to emphasising the long-term interests of the commercial defence entities in the three regions to operate in a global market established upon common sets of rules, to harmonise views to better prevent risks of diversion and to increase the industry's awareness and capacity to operate and communicate according to a single set of common standards.
- **Increasing the EWG activities' visibility.** While the activities and the results obtained by the EWG were broadly commended by the partners involved in the different meetings and rounds of consultation, the public EWG visibility remained quite limited throughout the duration of the project. Should the EWG be provided with the opportunity to continue its activities, it will be of crucial importance to improve the scope of its outreaching activities through more regular interactions with media representatives and a more sophisticated communication strategy.

IV.ii EWG recommendations: areas of possible coordinated cooperation between China and the EU in Africa

Many of the efforts undertaken by the EWG were intended to enable the identification of concrete small-scale interventions to tackle illicit SALW and ammunition in Africa, where mechanisms of coordinated cooperation from China and the EU could provide the necessary assistance, which could simultaneously be used as pilot projects with a view to being replicated in other contexts. While it became clear within the EWG that improving stockpile management (under its different and interconnected components) was an outstanding

priority for the majority of the states scrutinised, identifying potential beneficiary stakeholders capable of quantifying the support needed proved to be more challenging. Unfortunately, the breakout, in December 2013, of the politico-military crisis in South Sudan – where the EWG had previously undertaken a preliminary visit and intended to conduct a technical assessment of the domestic stockpile management architecture to select specific sites where upgrading of storage facilities appeared to be most urgent – severely disrupted the programme the EWG had elaborated for the last six months of activities.

Nevertheless, the EWG considers that joint cooperation and assistance from China and the EU would be both necessary and relatively easy to frame in a number of domains where the need for action in all three aforementioned African countries (and more broadly in the RECSA region and the African continent) is a priority. The technical expertise and experience are well consolidated and readily available in both Beijing and the European Union.

These domains of intervention include, in particular:

- **Enhancement of stockpile management capacities and physical security.** As elaborated in details in chapter III, current national practices in stockpile management are below internationally-developed standards (ISACS and IATG), therefore increasing the risk of diversion, fuelling illicit flows of weapons and ammunition, and posing serious threats to the physical security of the staff working in storage facilities as well as of the communities living near these infrastructures. Coordinated interventions in this area could address a number of different aspects within the articulated discipline of stockpile management, including:
    - the refurbishing of existing storage facilities (or the building of new ones) in compliance with international security standards;
    - the establishment of national guidelines setting SOPs for all states' security agencies, covering the different areas of stockpile management (from inventory and registration of the equipment, to daily management of the weapons, definition of responsibilities and tasks, identification of surplus, elaboration of destruction programmes etc.) in compliance with ISACS and IATG standards; and
    - training modules for the staff in charge of stockpile management.

  In this area, for instance, the comprehensive assessments of ammunition storage facilities undertaken in Mogadishu in January 2014 (presented in Box 2) provide some practical references and evidence-based data that could be used to design and implement, with relatively small efforts, concrete and much-needed projects requiring external assistance. Direct contributions in those the assessment identified as the three priority areas (namely the rehabilitation of new storage facilities in conformity with international standards, the establishment of SOPs and oversight mechanisms applying international standard in terms of physical security and equipment control, and training and sensitisation of the staff tasked to manage these facilities) should be relatively easy to provide by both China and the EU. Similarly, an agreement on how to share and complement each party's contributions (for instance with one party providing the facilities and the other one the expertise to elaborate management and supervision frameworks and offer training for the national staff) should not be too onerous.
  At the time of writing, evaluation of the possible cost of a three-pillar programme is ongoing, although it is reasonable to believe that necessary resources to meet minimal international standards could be mobilised with a relatively limited amount of funding and within a reasonably short period.[84]

[84] The report on the Technical Assessment is available upon request to the EWG.

- **Full and comprehensive implementation of state-owned weapons marking programmes, including through the adoption of weapons and ammunition registration systems.** Although several states already launched a programme aimed at marking all SALW in the possession of their security agencies, several unexpected or underestimated challenges emerged from their implementation, reducing the pace of the programmes and, in some cases, interrupting them. Coordinated and complementary China and EU assistance in this field of primary importance, as a prerequisite of stockpile management, could be relatively easily provided through the supply of the equipment needed (such as vehicles, compressors, power generators, etc.) to increase mobile marking teams' efficiency and to expand the marking exercises in the peripheral and rural areas.
  Taking advantage of the marking exercise to establish comprehensive inventories and databases is also of fundamental importance, as undertaking registrations of weapons in a second and distinct phase would certainly generate additional challenges and difficulties. The added value of marking weapons without their being properly registered is limited at best. China and the EU may therefore determine, with the agreement of the states concerned, under which form assistance to accelerate the adoption of the software elaborated under RECSA supervision (or any other alternative electronic weapons registration system – EWRS) could be framed. Such assistance could include improvement of local area networks in order to guarantee interconnection of the registers, provision of technical equipment (computers and other relevant items) and training modules for the staff in charge of database management.
- **Reinforcement of national capacities for monitoring and controlling of border areas, as well as air, road, railway and water transport systems.** The impact of trans-border flows of illicit SALW and ammunition has been presented in chapter III and represents a common trend across the African continent. Should specific needs be identified and assessed, China and the EU would certainly be in a position to jointly support African governments in enhancing their capacities to monitor border areas, as well as air, road, railway and water transport systems, in a more effective manner through:
  - supplies of equipment increasing the border control agencies' mobility and efficiency (such as vehicles and remote surveillance systems);
  - provision of adequate training modules for the border control agencies personnel, including support to strengthen inter-agency cooperation and coordination;
  - elaboration of inclusive sensitisation initiatives, peaceful conflict management and awareness programmes among the communities living in the border zones; and
  - design of development programmes responding to communities' needs and requests.