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The 2030 Agenda

Supporting a more peaceful, just and inclusive society in Kenya



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Acronyms

CIDPs	County Integrated Development Plans
CSOs	civil society organisations
GDP	gross domestic product
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
KEPSA	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KNFP	Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MTP	Medium Term Plan
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCRC	National Crime Research Centre
NSC	National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States

Executive summary

THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT has great potential to support Kenyan efforts to create a more peaceful, just and inclusive society. Its holistic vision provides a comprehensive framework for addressing the various drivers of conflict and violence which have long undermined Kenya's development progress.

Kenya played a key role in the process leading to the agreement of the 2030 Agenda, and its leaders have expressed commitment to implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Peace is a cross-cutting theme of the 2030 Agenda, with Goal 16 dedicated to "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels". The Goal includes targets on issues such as access to justice, violence reduction and inclusive governance.

This report illustrates how Goal 16 can be leveraged to build a more peaceful, just and inclusive society in Kenya through the use of existing national development and peacebuilding frameworks, strategies and institutions. Drawing on recent Saferworld research in Kenya, the report focuses on three specific targets: 16.1 on violence reduction, 16.4 on transnational threats and 16.7 on inclusive and participatory decision making. These targets were selected because they relate to priority issues for reducing conflict and insecurity in Kenya. However, meeting these targets alone will not bring about the vision of Goal 16 – this will require action on a broader front that addresses a range of other SDG targets.

Kenya has an extensive institutional architecture for addressing issues of peace and conflict, which will be instrumental in achieving Goal 16. This includes Kenya's national development blueprint Vision 2030 and its political pillar, as well as the umbrella body the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, which leads on the implementation of the National Peace Policy – passed in 2015 and aligned with Vision 2030 – and coordinates peacebuilding and conflict management. In addition, structures established for the Millennium Development Goals, such as a national focal point, can be used to coordinate SDG implementation and reporting across government and other stakeholders. There is also a wide range of relevant civil society networks and initiatives in Kenya – including the SDG Kenya Forum – although space for them to operate in Kenya has shrunk in recent years.

Despite the extensive array of strategies and structures to support peaceful and inclusive societies, Kenya has generally had limited success in translating official policies in these areas into practical action that has had lasting benefits for its citizens. In addition, there is low awareness of the SDGs – in particular in terms of the content of Goal 16 – among many government officials, even those who work specifically on peace-related issues. Similarly, many civil society actors have yet to grasp how the SDGs are relevant

for their work, or how they could incorporate the SDGs into their strategies and programmes.

While national development strategies will play a central role in shaping a holistic approach to creating a more peaceful, just and inclusive society in Kenya, the 2030 Agenda provides a valuable reference point against which national action can be framed and aligned. It can be used by change-makers to legitimise their work, reframe national development plans, and hold leaders to account for their political commitment to the 2030 Agenda. Its focus on peace as a cross-cutting priority can also be used to encourage more holistic approaches, focusing on the interlinkages between critical peace-related issues. Finally, the architecture of the 2030 Agenda itself could prove useful in Kenya: the monitoring framework of indicators could be used to track progress on issues related to peace.

However, even with effective alignment of Goal 16 with strategies and plans, the success or failure of the 2030 Agenda will ultimately depend on political will to address the issues contained within it. Therefore high-level political buy-in should be sought by national stakeholders and international partners to secure a strong focus on peace by Kenya's political leadership. In order to help generate political buy-in, the following actions by all relevant stakeholders will be central:

- 1. Map priority SDG targets against existing national priorities:** It will be important to identify priority targets in Goal 16 and other SDGs that are particularly relevant to the Kenya context and map them against existing strategies, policies and practices.
- 2. Identify progress and gaps in meeting Goal 16:** Through engagement in national follow-up and review processes on the 2030 Agenda, stakeholders will be able to highlight where progress towards meeting Goal 16 targets has been made and where it has not.
- 3. Raise awareness of the 2030 Agenda's commitment to peace:** Public as well as targeted awareness-raising aimed at key accountability actors – including parliamentarians, activist groups and the media – will be key if relevant stakeholders are to be held to account for their commitments.
- 4. Act as a community for learning, practice and innovation:** Effective action towards meeting Goal 16 can be achieved if relevant stakeholders are given a space where they can share experiences and lessons learned, and explore avenues for more effective collaboration and joint actions on priority issues.
- 5. Work with data-producers on developing national indicators for Goal 16:** Ensuring genuine ownership of the 2030 Agenda will require the active participation of a range of stakeholders in developing national and context-specific indicators, which will complement the set of global indicators.
- 6. Support stakeholders to take part in monitoring efforts:** While official data providers will play a central role in the production of data for indicators, the potential of non-official data producers should be harnessed through empowering them as active data producers.

1

Introduction

DESPITE MAKING CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS SINCE 2000 in areas such as maternal mortality, primary school enrolment, and growth in gross domestic product (GDP), the sustainability of Kenya's development continues to be jeopardised by the threat of violence and insecurity. The combination of risks associated with issues such as election-related violence, poor security provision, and the proliferation of illicit arms has the potential to derail Kenya's positive development trajectory.

The 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)¹ provide an opportunity for Kenya to address these challenges. The new global development framework, adopted by world leaders in September 2015, identifies peace as one of five cross-cutting priorities. It also includes a dedicated Goal 16, which promotes a positive and sustainable peace by seeking to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. The 12 targets of Goal 16 focus on issues such as inclusive governance, corruption, violence reduction, access to justice and illicit financial and arms flows. There are also key targets for peace across the 2030 Agenda – for example, in Goal 10 on inequality, Goal 5 on gender equality and Goal 1 on poverty.

Countries around the world, including Kenya, need to take action on all of these issues if the vision for peace set out in the 2030 Agenda is to be realised. However, taking action to meet the SDGs is not only the responsibility of governments; United Nations (UN) agencies, civil society groups, businesses, and donors are also expected to play a role in what is envisaged as a multistakeholder implementation partnership.

This report illustrates how Goal 16 could be leveraged to build a more peaceful, just, and inclusive Kenyan society through the use of the existing national development, governance, and peacebuilding frameworks, institutions, and organisations. It draws upon an ongoing research project, the first phases of which were carried out in Kenya between October 2015 and March 2016.² The research focuses on three of the 12 targets under Goal 16 (see Table 1):

- **16.1:** Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere
- **16.4:** Significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime
- **16.7:** Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

¹ United Nations General Assembly (2015), ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (New York: UN General Assembly).

² Research included desk-based research and interviews with 39 key informants from a cross section of civil society organisations (international, national and local), government departments and ministries, international development partners and donors, institutions of higher learning, and individual experts, analysts and practitioners in relevant fields in Kenya.

Aside from reasons of scope, the rationale for focusing on these targets was that they relate to three priority issues for addressing conflict and insecurity in Kenya – namely, violence reduction, illicit arms trafficking, and governance. However, as the report concludes, if these three targets are to be met, action will be required on a more holistic front that addresses a range of other SDG targets.

Table 1: Goal 16 targets

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and all forms of violence against and torture of children
16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all
16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organised crime
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
16.6 Develop effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels
16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance
16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration
16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements
16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence, and combat terrorism and crime
16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development

2

Kenya and the 2030 Agenda

Kenya's engagement in the 2030 Agenda process

Uhuru Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya, addresses the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda. 25 September 2015, United Nations, New York.

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KENYA PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE PROCESS leading to the agreement of the 2030 Agenda, with its Permanent Representative to the UN serving as the co-chair of the SDG negotiations. This included co-chairing the Open Working Group, which successfully identified the 17 SDGs and 169 targets in 2014, as well as the inter-governmental negotiations between 193 member states, which commenced in January 2015 and ended in July 2015.



President Uhuru Kenyatta's active participation in the UN Summit, during which the SDGs were adopted, is another indication of Kenya's commitment to the SDGs.³ Kenya's leadership has also signalled that building a more peaceful and inclusive society will be a national priority – during the General Debate of the 70th UN General Assembly in September 2015, President Kenyatta stated that: “We must focus all efforts to ending poverty and to promoting sustainable peace and security... Kenya will pay special attention to fundamental sustainable development issues that were previously

³ Government of Kenya (2015), 'President Kenyatta thanks UN Member States for confidence in Kenya as SDGs adopted', 26 September (www.president.go.ke/2015/09/26/president-kenyatta-thanks-un-member-states-for-confidence-in-kenya-as-sdgs-adopted/#).

left out of the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals] framework, especially... the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies which remain critical for the realization of peace and security, and sustainable development”⁴

Other actors within the Kenyan government have voiced support for Goal 16 specifically. For example, one official highlights the linkages with development:

*“Establishing peace, justice and strong institutions, is more of a development challenge and should not be seen as a security challenge. Assisting countries emerging from conflict requires an approach that incorporates coherence between political, security, development, human rights and the rule of law.”*⁵

In addition, peace, justice and governance are increasingly recognised by Kenyan stakeholders as an integral part of development, as evidenced by explicit references in key strategies, such as Vision 2030, Kenya’s national development blueprint for the period 2008–2030.⁶ Official statements by government representatives also indicate greater understanding of how peace relates to development. For example, in the words of one official:

*“It is not possible to tackle education without addressing Goal 16. Before we can achieve minimum gains in Goal 16, it will be a challenge to achieve other goals such as education. Because today there are teachers who say they can’t go to school because of security...”*⁷

This report seeks to provide some guidance on how this understanding can be translated into practical action by government agencies and other stakeholders.

Implementing the 2030 Agenda in Kenya

Grace, a Turkana Elder, discusses security issues with women in Emeret village, close to Isiolo town. While the village is mostly inhabited by Turkana people, it has been the scene of violence over resource competition with other ethnic groups.

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The 2030 Agenda emphasises the important role of national policies and development strategies in implementing the SDGs. Indeed, it states that: “cohesive nationally owned sustainable development strategies, supported by integrated national financing frameworks, will be at the heart of our efforts”.⁸ The need for governments and public institutions to collaborate with stakeholders such as regional and local authorities, academia, philanthropic organisations and others is also recognised in the 2030 Agenda.



⁴ President Uhuru Kenyatta (2015), General Debate of the 70th United Nations General Assembly, September.

⁵ United Nations (2015), ‘Kenya’s Ambassador, Anthony Andanje, welcoming Sustainable Development Goal 16 during UN Security Council First Open Debate on Root Causes of Conflict’, Press Release, 7 November (www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12124.doc.htm).

⁶ Kenya Vision 2030, ‘Moving to the future as a nation’ (www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/pillars/#tab-id-3).

⁷ Interview, official from the Government of Kenya, Nairobi, February 2016.

⁸ *Op cit* UN General Assembly note 1.

⁹ For more information on the MDG process in Kenya, please see the pull-out box on page 5.

Implementing the SDGs in Kenya will not require ‘reinventing the wheel’, as existing structures can be used that were established for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).⁹ Thus there is already a national focal point for the MDGs within the Ministry of Devolution and Planning, and this will play a similar role for the SDGs. The focal point – the Enablers Coordination Directorate – is intended to offer technical back-stopping for SDG implementation within the government and for other stakeholders. It will periodically track and report on the SDGs in the country and will be responsible for coordinating the preparation of periodic ‘SDGs Progress Reports’.¹⁰ The need for a ‘whole-of-government’ approach became clear during the MDGs period, when the Ministry of Devolution and Planning was solely responsible for leading implementation. Thus, SDG points of contact have been appointed in all of the line ministries to ensure collaboration and coordination during the SDG implementation process.¹¹

The government has reportedly developed a roadmap for SDG implementation, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).¹² This will focus on advocacy and sensitisation as well as on the domestication and mainstreaming of the SDGs into national and local plans, strengthening data capacities, and domestic resource mobilisation. The roadmap is due to be launched in June 2016.¹³ The Ministry of Devolution and Planning is also reportedly developing a consultation process on the SDGs.¹⁴

Box 1: Kenya and the Millennium Development Goals

- MDG¹⁵-based **planning** was launched in Kenya as a response to the Millennium Declaration. It was guided by a 2005 Cabinet Memo directing all ministries, departments, and agencies to mainstream the MDGs into their development processes. Key processes included: the 2001 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) (2003–2007). The first and second Medium Term Plans for Vision 2030 also mainstreamed MDGs into the national development objectives to be pursued to the year 2015 and beyond.
- **Coordination and reporting** on the MDGs in Kenya was conducted through the MDGs national focal point. The focal point reported on MDG progress in the country, and was tasked with coordinating the preparation of the biennial ‘MDGs Progress Reports’.

In the civil society domain, the SDG Kenya Forum was launched in March 2016, and this will serve as a platform for coordination and collaboration among Kenyan civil society organisations (CSOs). It aims to create synergies in implementing the SDGs, and to enhance civil society engagement with the government in areas such as implementation, monitoring, accountability, and financing for development. The creation of the SDG Kenya Forum is an important step towards a more coordinated civil society engagement on the SDGs: it was formed and funded by leaders from 20 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who came together during the negotiations on the SDGs. At the time of writing, the forum was in the process of setting up its structure and developing a strategy.¹⁶

In terms of international partners, UNDP has begun to support the Kenyan government in implementing the SDGs. This has included developing the roadmap for SDG implementation together with the government, and working with several county-level governments to align their local development plans – the County Integrated Development Plans – with the SDGs.¹⁷

¹⁰ Key informant interviews, Nairobi, February 2016.

¹¹ Key informant interview, June 2016.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Key informant interviews, Nairobi, February 2016.

¹⁵ Ministry of Devolution and Planning, Government of Kenya (2013), ‘Millennium Development Goals: Status Report for Kenya 2013’, p 2 (www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/library/mdg/2014-mdg-status-report-for-kenya.html).

¹⁶ Dalitz A (2016), ‘Kenya’s Civil Society Treads the Sustainable Development Pathway’, UNDP Kenya, March (<http://sdgfunders.org/blog/kenyas-civil-society-treads-the-sustainable-development-pathway/lang/en/>).

¹⁷ Key informant interview, June 2016.

Nonetheless, the SDGs and Goal 16 have so far had little influence on the policies and practices of stakeholders concerned with addressing violence and insecurity in Kenya. Aside from the institutional developments mentioned above, it was clear from interviews conducted with state and non-state actors in early 2016, that there was no detailed plan on how to pursue and coordinate specific SDG-related interventions in Kenya.¹⁸

Based on Saferworld's research, it is further apparent that there is low awareness of the SDGs – in particular in terms of the content of Goal 16 – among many government officials, even those who work specifically on peace-related issues. Similarly, many civil society actors have yet to grasp how the SDGs are relevant for their work, or how they could incorporate the SDGs into their strategies and programmes. In part this reflects the widespread view that the primary reference points for their work will continue to be the existing national development plans and Kenya's constitution.

18 Key informant interviews, Nairobi, February 2016.

3

Current risks to peace in Kenya

ALTHOUGH KENYA'S STATED COMMITMENT to implementing the SDGs is encouraging, a number of factors risk derailing efforts to achieve the vision of peaceful, just and inclusive societies set out in the 2030 Agenda. Violence in Kenya has proved a recurring obstacle for development progress. For example, GDP growth shrank considerably in 2009 following election-related violence.¹⁹ The Global Peace Index estimates that in 2013 violence cost Kenya US\$9.8 billion, or 7 per cent of its GDP.²⁰

The following risks – identified through the research process and interviews with key stakeholders – are far from comprehensive, but highlight some of the priority issues to be addressed.

Election-related violence: Kenya has held seven multiparty elections since 1993 and all but two of them (in 2002 and 2013) have been accompanied by violence and displacement. These cycles of electoral violence have been fuelled by political elite manipulation of ethnic identities, exploiting long-running intercommunity tensions, notably over land, and perpetuating a 'winner-takes-all' system of politics.²¹ Perceptions of identity-based exclusion or marginalisation have thus underpinned the cycle of electoral violence in Kenya. Ethnic and political tensions have begun to intensify ahead of the general elections in 2017. Protesters have taken to the streets to call for the Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to be dissolved due to its perceived bias, and the main opposition leaders have threatened to boycott the elections if the IEBC is not reformed.²² Clashes between the police and protesters have already resulted in several deaths, and there are fears of a repeat of the violence that erupted after the 2007 elections.²³

Land and boundary disputes: Closely associated with identity politics, there are two dimensions to localised violent conflict over land. First is land speculation by elites in locations where large flagship development projects are due to be established. The alienation of local communities from their land in such cases has been a major factor in land-related conflicts. Second, despite the creation of a National Land Commission (NLC), many structural and historical problems over land and boundaries remain

¹⁹ *Op cit* Ministry of Devolution and Planning note 15.

²⁰ Institute for Economics and Peace (2015), 'Global Peace Index 2015' (Institute for Economics and Peace)

²¹ Halakhe B.A (2013), "'R2P in Practice": Ethnic Violence, Elections and Atrocity Prevention in Kenya', Occasional Paper Series No. 4 (New York: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect), pp 6–7.

²² Al Jazeera (2016), 'Protests in Kenya as opposition marks "Day of Rage"', Al Jazeera. (www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/protests-kenya-opposition-marks-day-rage-160606072256568.html).

²³ Burke J (2016), 'Kenyan police in fresh clashes with political activists', 23 May, *The Guardian*.

An armed herder looks after his cattle near the border town of Moyale, Kenya.

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unresolved. Thus land disputes and boundary issues are at the heart of community grievances about historical injustices, both real and perceived.

Ideologically motivated violence: Many interviewees regarded ideologically motivated violence to be the primary security threat facing Kenya. Following Kenya's military intervention in Somalia in 2011, al-Shabaab has launched numerous attacks in the country, leading to more than 500 fatalities and the disruption of economic and social life, including in the important tourist sector.²⁴ Interviewees felt that security providers had yet to develop an effective strategy to respond to this threat. State security actors have tended to adopt coercive responses, which have undermined efforts to tackle the issue at root. Civil society actors for their part have not yet clearly defined what peace-building approaches would be most effective in preventing and reducing ideologically motivated violence.²⁵

Exclusion from decision-making processes: A key driver of conflict in Kenya has been political exclusion and marginalisation. Despite some positive developments – including the 2010 constitution, which led to increased public participation in governance and decision-making processes through the devolution of power to counties – several key challenges remain. Although the constitution does not provide for citizenship on ethnic grounds, “the status of ‘outsiders,’ or those who are not indigenous to an area, and that of ‘insiders,’ is at the heart of conflicts in various parts of the country”²⁶ Meanwhile, public awareness and understanding of the devolution process, and of how citizens can participate in that process, remains low. For example, a study by Transparency International from 2014 found that only 15 per cent of Kenyans had participated in citizen consultation forums at the county level in the previous 12 months.²⁷ There have also been cases where people have felt excluded from consultations at the county level, since they did not receive information on planned consultations.²⁸ In addition, various forms of discrimination against women continue to impact on their ability to participate in political processes.²⁹

²⁴ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2015), ‘Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya’, Background report, p 2. (https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_alShabaabGarissaU_April2015.pdf).

²⁵ Key informant interviews, October–November 2015.

²⁶ Kanyinga K (2014), ‘Kenya: Democracy and Political Participation’, Open Society Foundations, pp 73–74 (<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/kenya-democracy-political-participation-20140514.pdf>).

²⁷ Transparency International Kenya (2014), ‘Is it my business? A national opinion poll on devolution and governance in Kenya’, June.

²⁸ Saferworld (2015), ‘Isiolo County conflict analysis’, June.

²⁹ *Ibid* pp 15–17.

Competition over extractive resources: Another increasingly prominent conflict risk factor is over extractive resources. At the local level, the prospect of new resource wealth can exacerbate divisions and existing tensions between groups. For example, recent discoveries of oil deposits in Turkana have aggravated competing boundary claims by rival communities in West Pokot County. This underscores the need for clearer demarcation of boundaries across the country. The bigger picture is about the need for a policy framework based on the principle of benefit-sharing, which can guide present and future natural resource extraction and ensure that the country's resources do not become yet another grievance fuelling political violence.

Cattle rustling: Violence associated with cattle rustling is a long-standing problem in the pastoralist regions of Kenya. It is connected to historical and socio-cultural factors, such as intercommunity rivalries, the paucity of state security provision in peripheral areas, and revenge killings perpetuated by cultural norms. In addition, local business and political elites are increasingly using cattle rustling as a means to make commercial profit and to drive out political and business rivals.³⁰ The persistence of this challenge underscores the importance of long-term peacebuilding processes.

Poor security provision: Interviewees cited the public's low confidence in the police as a significant factor. It is estimated that 49 per cent of Kenyans who came in contact with the police in 2014 paid a bribe.³¹ Claims of human rights violations perpetrated by the police also contribute to the lack of public trust. Previous research has found that the rise in organised gangs and self-armament is fuelled by absence of the state and a lack of confidence in the state security apparatus.³²

Availability of firearms: Illicit arms trafficking and use correlates with urban crime and armed violence, especially in pastoralist areas. Studies on small arms availability in Kenya indicate a reduction in the proportion of households reported to be in possession of firearms.³³ Nevertheless, interviewees remained concerned about the ease of acquiring firearms in the country. The porosity of Kenya's international borders, with several neighbouring countries mired in armed conflict, contributes to the challenge of controlling arms.

A young Pokot warrior herds his cattle with an AKS 47 gun on his shoulder which he carries for protection against attacks from cattle rustlers from the neighbouring Turkana community.

© PANOS/SVEN TORFINN



³⁰ IRIN News (2014), 'Cattle-rustling and the politics of business in Kenya', March 2014.

³¹ Transparency International (2015), 'Global Corruption Barometer 2015: Africa'.

³² See, for example, Ngunyi M, Katumanga M (2014), 'From Monopoly to Oligopoly: Exploration of a Four-Point Hypothesis Regarding Organized and Organic Militia in Kenya' (New York: United Nations Development Programme), p 2.

³³ In a 2003 survey, 6 per cent of households confirmed owning firearms; however, in a 2011 study, only 2.7 per cent of households surveyed admitted to firearms ownership. See Wepundi M et al. (2012), 'Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment', (Geneva: Small Arms Survey) p 42.

4

Aligning national plans and Goal 16

THERE IS GROWING APPRECIATION among Kenya's policymakers and civil society, as well as among international partners, that in order to achieve the SDGs, the existing institutional architecture will need to become more coordinated and action-oriented. Although a detailed plan for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Kenya is yet to be developed, there are several existing national policy frameworks and institutions which potentially align with Goal 16 targets.

This section gives a broad overview of the existing architecture for peaceful, just and inclusive societies in Kenya and how it can be better aligned, and identifies key opportunities as well as challenges that need to be overcome. A more thorough mapping of existing institutions and strategies can be found in Annex 1 on page 22.

Overall architecture for peaceful, just and inclusive societies

Before focusing on specific targets, there are a number of broad-based policy frameworks and institutions that could be leveraged to build peaceful and inclusive societies. For instance, the 2010 constitution recognises the strong link between peace, stability, and prosperity of people. More concretely, the constitution seeks to enhance the participation of people in decision-making processes, give powers of self-governance to the people, promote the interests and rights of minorities, and ensure good access to services.³⁴

Vision 2030, the policy framework to guide Kenya's national development strategy, is the most significant instrument for achieving the vision of peace in the 2030 Agenda. The government's Second Medium Term Plan (MTP) (2013–2017) for Vision 2030, which identifies key actions for its implementation, commits to integrate the SDGs together with the unmet MDG targets of the first MTP.³⁵ Significantly, one of Vision 2030's three pillars is the political pillar, which focuses on the rule of law, democracy, security, transparency and accountability, and peacebuilding and conflict management.³⁶

In terms of government entities, the Vision 2030 Delivery Secretariat is responsible for coordinating, enforcing, and advocating for the implementation of Vision 2030.

³⁴ Constitution of Kenya 2010.

³⁵ See Government of Kenya, Second Medium Term Plan (2013–2017), 'Transforming Kenya: Pathway to devolution, socio-economic development, equity and national unity', Government of Kenya, pp 5–6.

³⁶ *Op cit* Kenya Vision 2030.

Samburu women and baby in Isiolo County, Kenya. Safeworld is working with communities in Isiolo so that they are able to engage with county institutions, who are being encouraged to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches.

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Organised in line with its three pillars, the team leading the political pillar will play a potentially critical role in aligning the peace-related aspects of the SDGs with Kenya's main national development plan. In terms of monitoring progress on issues related to Goal 16, an important role will be played by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), which is the principal agency of the government for collecting, analysing, and disseminating statistical data in Kenya.³⁷ KNBS is reportedly in the early stages of establishing a multistakeholder working group on data collection, with the aim of strengthening data capacities in Kenya.³⁸

Despite the promising array of strategies and structures for peaceful and inclusive societies, Kenya has generally had a poor track record in terms of ensuring that official policies in these areas are actually implemented.³⁹ Several stakeholders interviewed for this research complained that Kenya had more than enough strategies and structures, and that what was needed was action. Indeed, processes of mapping and alignment are of little value if they are not followed up with implementation.

There are also actors outside the government that have an important role to play in building more peaceful and inclusive societies. There is a well-established community of national and international NGOs, and networks working on a number of issues related to Goal 16, such as access to justice, child rights, participatory democracy, freedom of information, and anti-corruption. However, civil society is facing an increasingly challenging environment with the government having imposed restrictions on fundamental freedoms and targeted civil society activists and journalists.⁴⁰

The greatest challenge to Kenyan civil society's role in meeting Goal 16 targets is the ever-shrinking civil society space. This is the result of increasing state controls brought about through new legislation, including a proposed cap on the amount of funds that NGOs can receive from external sources.

Finally, the international community views Kenya as a pivotal state for regional stability in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions, and various development partners are thus working to relieve pressures that generate instability, including election-related violence, violent extremism, and youth unemployment. The UN also has a huge presence in Kenya with a strategy guided by the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Within this larger framework, peace-related targets come under the

³⁷ Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) Mandate (www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=78&Itemid=503).

³⁸ Key informant interview, June 2016.

³⁹ *Op cit* Kanyinga note 26, p 18.

⁴⁰ Civicus (2015), 'Attacks on Civil Society Undermining Democracy and Development in Kenya', March, p 1 (<http://nchrk.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Kenya-Policy-Action-Brief.pdf>).

transformational governance pillar, which is aligned to the political pillar of Kenya's Vision 2030.⁴¹ That Kenya has signed up to this development assistance framework represents a positive step towards implementation of development targets that reinforce peace.

SDG targets on violence reduction, transnational threats, and inclusive decision-making

Target 16.1 on violence reduction

Given the many complex interlinkages between peace, governance and justice issues, and the broad policy frameworks mentioned above, a holistic approach is required to achieve Goal 16. Nonetheless, it is still useful to frame strategic thinking at the level of Goal 16 targets. This will help ensure that relevant actors working on different peace-related issues can coordinate their efforts more effectively. Although not comprehensive, the following section gives an overview of several policy frameworks, institutions, and actors that will be important for meeting the three specific Goal 16 targets.

Kenya has a relatively well-established peacebuilding architecture, which offers potential for reducing violence. The most significant policy framework is the Sessional Paper No. 5 (2014) of the National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management, which was passed in August 2015. It serves to enhance coordination in prevention, mitigation, and management of conflicts, as well as inclusive peacebuilding processes. The National Peace Policy is aligned with Vision 2030, and is intended to enhance the consistency and efficiency with which the government and stakeholders design and implement appropriate interventions aimed at promoting peacebuilding and conflict management.⁴²

In terms of government entities, the Directorate of Peacebuilding and Conflict Management – an agency within the Office of the President – brings together other government bodies, civil society, development partners, and UN agencies under an umbrella body known as the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC). The NSC leads implementation of the National Peace Policy and coordinates peacebuilding and conflict management, as well as early warning and early response initiatives in Kenya. It sits within the Ministry of Interior

Kenyan police patrol the streets following days of unrest in Mombasa, Kenya, in August 2012.

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⁴¹ See: United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2014–2018) for Kenya.

⁴² See: Government of Kenya (2014), National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management, Sessional Paper No. 5.

and Coordination of National Government (part of the Presidency), which is the main government body leading on peacebuilding and arms control in Kenya.⁴³

The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) is another important constitutional body for preventing violence, given its strong focus on national peacebuilding, reconciliation, and cohesion among different ethnic, racial, and religious groups in Kenya.⁴⁴ Finally, the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) can play a key role in monitoring and measuring Kenya's progress in reducing armed violence, given its function as crime observatory.⁴⁵

There is also a range of civil society peacebuilding networks and initiatives in Kenya. For example, the Peace and Development Network (PEACENET) and Partnership for Peace and Security (PfPS) have played a role in complementing government-led initiatives on peace and security. In addition, the private sector – the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) in particular – has been involved in peacebuilding activities, such as efforts to mitigate the risk of violence ahead of the 2013 elections. This included deploying influential business people to convince political candidates to make a commitment to peaceful elections in 2013,⁴⁶ funding media training on conflict-sensitive reporting, and conducting employee seminars in order to build trust and mitigate ethnic tensions.⁴⁷

Target 16.4 on transnational threats

Illicit arms trafficking remains a major security challenge in Kenya, so target 16.4 on addressing transnational threats such as illicit arms flows is highly relevant. The government's Draft Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has the potential to contribute to reducing illicit arms flows in Kenya. One of its objectives is to provide synergy and coordination for the management and control of SALW through legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks. While this policy is still in draft form, the government has committed to finalising it within the Second MTP of Vision 2030.

Small arms and light weapons are destroyed in Kenya. Saferworld has supported the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Kenyan civil society organisations to carry out arms reduction initiatives at both the national and community level.

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⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), 'NCIC Strategic Plan 2015–2020: Consolidating the Foundation for a Cohesive Nation within a Devolved System of Governance', p 35.

⁴⁵ See Articles 4 and 5 of the National Crime Research Centre Act 1997 (rev. 2012).

⁴⁶ Several initiatives engaged in these efforts, including the 'Mkenya Daima' campaign, an initiative by the umbrella business organisation, the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), the primary aim of which was to contribute to peaceful elections. See also: Owuor V, Wisor S (2014), 'The role of Kenya's private sector in peacebuilding: the case of the 2013 election cycle', May. (Broomfield: One Earth Future Foundation)

⁴⁷ *Ibid* One Earth Future et al.

The Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) sits within the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government together with the NSC, and is mandated to coordinate all arms control-related activities in Kenya.⁴⁸ The KNFP is the focal point for interactions between CSOs and the government regarding SALW reduction.

Although it will be important to address the challenge of SALW at the national level, global coordination efforts will also be critical given the cross-border and transnational nature of illicit arms trafficking. Through its peace and small arms policies, the Kenyan government commits itself to collaborate with global actors towards the attainment of international peace and security.⁴⁹

Target 16.7 on inclusive and participatory decision-making

Meeting target 16.7 on inclusive and participatory decision-making will be an important step towards addressing challenges such as election-related violence, and perceptions of identity-based exclusion and marginalisation in Kenya.

In addition, devolution has become an important tool for increasing public inclusion in decision-making, with county-level structures being responsible for delivering basic services to citizens, and having a role to play in local peace and security. Saferworld has argued that “Kenyan citizens have the potential to be involved in processes which could address the legacy of public marginalisation from government decision-making, and increase transparency and accountability”.⁵⁰ Devolution has been identified as one of the government’s priority areas – county governments will play an important role through the implementation of County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs).⁵¹

However, although positive in many regards, the process of devolution to counties risks decentralising dynamics of violence and insecurity. County institutions will require considerable support to carry out their responsibilities and ensure inclusivity, particularly in areas of high ethnic diversity. In addition, there has been limited formal coordination in many counties, despite the promise that informal structures would become formalised. Furthermore, systems for information sharing and coordination are weak, which undermines the counties’ overall effectiveness, and risks information about potential local conflicts not reaching the relevant decision makers at the national level.⁵²

A member of Kisumu Joint Integrated Forum reads the public information board during a Kisumu People’s Parliament meeting.

The people’s parliament became a community action group in the town, with members meeting every afternoon to discuss issues related to governance and development in the county.

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⁴⁸ *Op cit* Government of Kenya note 42.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Saferworld (2015), ‘Conflict sensitivity in county governance: Lessons from Marsabit, Kisumu and Isiolo counties’, June.

⁵¹ *Op cit* Government of Kenya note 35, pp 5–6.

⁵² *Op cit* Saferworld note 50.

At the civil society level, the national civic education programme Uraia Trust is working to enhance citizen participation by ensuring that citizens become more aware of their civic rights and responsibilities under the new constitution, and focuses on citizens' participation in the implementation of devolution.⁵³

Opportunities for alignment and action

Focusing on the three priority Goal 16 targets, table 2 links them to thematic activities that are to be found in various strategies for development in Kenya. As seen below, meeting these targets will help address the key security challenges and risks in the country.

However, it is important to note that this list is by no means exhaustive; rather it represents a first step to map how different actors and institutions can work together to address common issues. This mapping exercise only focuses on three Goal 16 targets. However, meeting these three targets alone will not bring about the vision of Goal 16 – this will require more holistic action. Finally, some of the challenges identified in section 3, such as access to land and natural resources, are not addressed by the targets below but by other targets, such as those under Goal 10 on inequality, target 1.4 on access, ownership, and control over land, or target 16.3 on access to justice.

⁵³ USAID (2014), Uraia Trust Civic Education Program (<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Uraia%20Trust%20Civic%20Education%20Program%20Feb%202014.pdf>).

Table 2: Mapping of three Goal 16 targets with national institutions and strategies

SDG targets	
<p>Associated institutions</p>	<p>16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere</p> <p>Lead institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government – through the NSC National Police Service National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) Judiciary <p>Complementing actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> International development partners CSOs and private sector
<p>Associated interventions within Kenya's development strategies</p>	<p>16.4: Significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime</p> <p>Lead institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government – through KNFP National Police Service <p>Complementing actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> International development partners CSOs and private sector
<p>Associated interventions within Kenya's development strategies</p>	<p>16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels</p> <p>Lead institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Devolution and Planning National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) Judiciary County governments Uraia Trust <p>Complementing actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> International development partners CSOs and private sector
<p>Associated interventions within Kenya's development strategies</p>	<p>Arms control and management</p> <p><i>Focus of interventions: Reduce illicit arms flows</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop and implement a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Management Policy and related national legislation Implement National Action Plans on Arms Control Implement the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control, and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa Implement the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects Implement the international instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons Implement Arms Trade Treaty Create a new border security force / unit <p>Peace building and national cohesion</p> <p><i>Focus of interventions: Reduce all forms of violence</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement Peace Building and Conflict Management Policy Establish effective peace and conflict structures throughout the country Enhance the capacity of international cross-border conflict management Upgrade early warning system and disaster management coordination mechanism in the country Enact and operationalise policies and legal framework towards national cohesion and integration Integrate national cohesion into the curriculum for training staff from the public and private sector <p>Police reforms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deepen security and policing services reforms Community policing Develop and implement the National Policing Policy and National Community Policing Policy Strengthen the new Independent Police Complaints mechanisms <p>Crime prevention</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build research capacity in crime control Develop and implement the National Security Policy Review and implement the National Crime Prevention Strategy <p>Countering violent extremism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review the Anti-Terrorism Strategy to enhance its effectiveness Enhance implementation of Intelligence-Led Policing Model <p>Access to justice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement the Integrated Judiciary Transformation Framework (IJTF) Alternative Dispute Resolutions (ADR) mechanisms, as well as Alternative Justice Systems (AJS)
<p>Associated interventions within Kenya's development strategies</p>	<p>Public participation</p> <p><i>Focus of interventions: Ensure inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public awareness raising on their role promoting accountability and effective service delivery Formulate and implement national guidelines on public participation Implement county public participation guidelines Implement County Integrated Development Plans and ministry, department and agency Strategic Plans Kenya National Civic Education Programme (NCEP)

5

Leveraging the 2030 Agenda for peace

DESPITE SOME IMPRESSIVE GAINS IN DEVELOPMENT, it is clear that Kenya still faces challenges in creating a more peaceful, just, and inclusive society. Working towards this goal will require action on multiple fronts by a wide variety of official and non-official actors.

While it is clear that national development strategies – notably the government’s Vision 2030 – as well as specific national policies and practices will play a central role in shaping such a holistic approach, various stakeholders interviewed for this research suggested that the 2030 Agenda also provides a valuable reference point against which national action can be framed and aligned. Indeed, evidence demonstrates that non-binding and voluntary frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda can be used by change-makers (whether civil society activists, reformist politicians, or businesspeople seeking to strengthen the rule of law) to legitimise their work, reframe national development priorities, and hold leaders to account for their political commitment to the agenda, or raise and focus resources. However, it is critical that local actors are able to ‘translate’ global norms to make them relevant to the context, notably through aligning them

Fatuma Nari, a member of the Saferworld supported Peace Task Team in Mrima Likoni, Mombasa County. Fatuma went door to door educating voters on their rights and reasserting the need for peace in Mombasa.

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with existing national strategies and policies.⁵⁴ Indeed, one government official stated that Goal 16 complements Kenya's Vision 2030, which has been criticised for being biased towards the economic pillar, and that Goal 16 could strengthen the political pillar.⁵⁵

The evidence base suggests that the impact of an international framework can be especially high when it is relevant to national issues, such as corruption or human rights, that are being contested within politics or broader society – that is, an international framework can help 'tip the balance'. Impact is also highest when solutions are locally designed and owned, and the 2030 Agenda can serve as a shared platform or reference point for change-agents to collaborate with one another and with broader actors critical for actually delivering change, for example ministries of planning or major NGOs. Indeed, the multistakeholder nature of the 2030 Agenda makes it especially helpful for catalysing joint actions; and that it has been agreed between 193 member states means it provides a basis for international support to these actions.

Furthermore, Goal 16 and the broader call for peace to sit at the heart of sustainable development could encourage more holistic approaches, focusing on the interlinkages between critical peace-related issues. For example, it could encourage multisectoral approaches to address the linkages between intercommunity land conflict, rural access to justice systems, corruption, and the nature of ethnic politics at the local level. If designed strategically and aligned with relevant national strategies and policies, such interventions could foster large-scale and transformative responses, rather than short-term and 'projectised' approaches. Furthermore, the 15-year timeframe of the 2030 Agenda presents the kind of long-term policy and programming window that will be necessary to address what are extremely complex and protracted dynamics.

Finally, the architecture of the 2030 Agenda itself could prove useful in Kenya: the monitoring framework of indicators could be used to track progress on issues related to peace, potentially leading to the creation of new data-sets and quantitative evidence, which can be used by policymakers but also accountability actors (such as civil society, the media or parliamentarians).⁵⁶ Indeed, a government official working on national governance statistics has stated that: "If we are able to get access to the number of crimes or trafficking of small arms, it can give us an idea of how to solve this..."⁵⁷

Evidence suggests that co-monitoring of progress towards international commitments at the country-level by official and civil society actors can act as a strong lever for policy change. The follow-up and review process, which will take place at the national, regional, and global levels, could also provide opportunities for accountability actors to have their voices heard and to shape narratives on Kenya's progress towards creating a more peaceful society.⁵⁸

54 See, for example, Miller-Dawkins M (2015), 'Global Goals and International Agreements: Lessons for the SDGs' (London: Overseas Development Institute); Binat Sarwa M (2015), 'National MDG Implementation: Lessons for the SDG era' (London: Overseas Development Institute); Vernon P, Baksh D (2010), 'Working with the Grain to Change the Gain' (London: International Alert).

55 Interview, official from the Government of Kenya, Nairobi, February 2016.

56 While global indicators have already been identified at the UN level to track progress, significant capacities to provide the necessary data will need to be created in Kenya, at both the official and civil society levels. Moreover, Kenya will need to set its own national indicators to track progress.

57 Interview, official from the Government of Kenya, Nairobi, February 2016.

58 The precise nature of national reviews will be determined at the national level. Global reviews will occur in New York through the High Level Political Forum, with Goal 16 specifically being reviewed in 2019. Nonetheless, the precise format of the global follow-up and review was still being negotiated at the time of writing.

6

Next steps

ALTHOUGH KENYA HAS A NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS and policy instruments that can be leveraged to build a more peaceful, just, and inclusive society, much more work is needed if the SDGs and Goal 16 are to make a significant difference to the lives of Kenya's citizens. This is not surprising at this early stage following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda. Nonetheless, the relatively 'blank slate' should be seen as an opportunity to leverage the 2030 Agenda for peace and sustainable development in Kenya.

As noted above, alignment will be key. There is scope for alignment of the 2030 Agenda with specific peace-related national strategies, notably the National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management. Key national institutions should be given responsibility for leading on the peace-related aspects of the 2030 Agenda, including for example the NSC, which is well placed to play this role given its mandate and linkages to peace forums across the country. The 2030 Agenda's preventative approach to peace could also be used to ensure that the review of the Kenyan government's Anti-Terrorism Strategy leads to a move away from hard, coercive responses, and towards efforts that address the root causes of ideologically motivated violence.

Furthermore, alignment should not be seen as a process applicable only to government: CSOs and international partners should also be invited to explain how their work will be aligned with the SDGs.

At the same time, when it comes to alignment peace must not be put in a silo: several interviewees expressed a concern that peace has still not been adequately mainstreamed into broader national development strategies. With this in mind, there is clear potential for alignment of several key targets for peace with existing priorities identified in the Second MTP of Kenya's Vision 2030. However, it will be equally important to engage with the formation of the third MTP, which will be agreed in 2017.

Even with effective alignment of Goal 16 with strategies and plans, there remains one critical factor if it is to be effective in bringing about a more peaceful, just, and inclusive society – and that is political will. The success or failure of the 2030 Agenda will ultimately depend on political will to address the issues contained within it. Therefore, high-level political buy-in should be sought by national stakeholders and international partners to secure a strong focus on peace by Kenya's political leadership.

In order to help generate political buy-in, a Goal 16 Stakeholder Forum could be established under the guidance of an SDG unit within the Ministry of Devolution and Planning, and potentially in cooperation with the civil society SDG Kenya Forum. Such a forum could bring together the institutions and actors highlighted above in order to discuss how Kenya can most effectively work towards the 2030 Agenda's overall objective of creating a more peaceful society, and Goal 16 in particular. In particular such a forum could:

- **Map priority SDG targets against existing national policies:** Identify priority targets in Goal 16 and other SDGs that are particularly relevant to the Kenya context and map them against existing strategies, policies, and practices. The mapping exercise in table 2 provides an example of this. This mapping process should also be used as an opportunity to identify gaps.
- **Identify progress and gaps in meeting Goal 16:** Engaging in national follow-up and review processes on the 2030 Agenda will help ensure that they are as inclusive as possible, and will provide an opportunity for the forum's members to act by highlighting where progress has been made and where it has not.
- **Raise awareness of the 2030 Agenda's commitment to peace:** Awareness raising will be key to holding relevant stakeholders to account for their commitments. While public awareness raising is important, initial focus should be placed on engagement with accountability actors such as parliamentarians, the media, business groupings, and activist groups to help make them aware of how they can use Goal 16 in their own work.
- **Act as a community for learning, practice, and innovation:** Effective action towards meeting Goal 16 can be achieved by allowing a range of different stakeholders – including representatives from civil society, academia, the government, and the private sector – space for experience sharing, lessons learning, and exploring avenues for more effective collaboration, and collective action to take on priority issues, such as corruption, that are hotly contested and relevant for peace.
- **Work with data producers on developing national indicators for Goal 16:** Given that accountability processes will be made more effective if they are able to draw on meaningful and timely data, the forum can fill an important role by seeking to work with the KNBS and other data producers on the development of national and context-specific indicators, which will complement the set of global indicators.
- **Support stakeholders to take part in monitoring efforts:** Given the potentially contentious nature of Goal 16 issues, it is crucial that multiple stakeholders in Kenya take part in the actual monitoring and validating of the story of progress. While KNBS and other official data providers will play a central role in the production of data for indicators, the contributions of non-official data producers, including civil society and citizens, should be should be harnessed by empowering them as active data producers, especially given the capacity constraints of official data providers. The initiative by KNBS to establish a multistakeholder forum on data collection is welcome. It should be established as soon as possible and should include a diverse group of stakeholders including CSOs, the private sector, academia, and philanthropic organisations.

Box 2: Monitoring Goal 16 in Kenya

The SDGs and targets will be accompanied by a set of indicators to monitor progress. Policymakers need to know where to focus their attention, to strengthen the “basis for evidence-based decision-making”.⁵⁹ Civil society groups, parliamentarians, the media, and other stakeholders need the framework to hold them to account. The UN Statistical Commission has agreed on a set of global indicators to monitor the world's progress towards achieving the SDGs as a whole.⁶⁰ In addition to this, countries are expected to set their own national and context-specific indicators to complement the global set agreed by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group (IAEG).

Getting the national indicators right

This process should not be rushed: the complex nature of the issues contained in Goal 16 – including violence, justice, and governance – demand sensitively selected indicators. Most importantly, it will need to be acknowledged that single indicators alone rarely tell a full, fair story about progress. Goal 16 targets will need to be monitored at the national level using a collection of indicators that measure:

59 United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (2015), 'Report of the Friends of the Chair Group on broader measures of progress' – E/CN.3/2015/2, p 11.

60 UN (2016), 'UN Statistical Commission agrees on global indicator framework', 11 March (www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/03/un-statistical-commission-endorses-global-indicator-framework/).

- Capacity – is governmental and social capacity being developed to enhance peace and prevent violent conflict?
- The ‘objective’ situation⁶¹ – do statistical measures of actual societal situations show that improvements are being achieved?
- Public perceptions – does the public feel that improvements are taking place?

When combined and triangulated, each indicator type can validate the other and highlight the interconnections between the multiple facets of peace, governance, and justice, even within an individual target focused on a single issue. Three-sided indicator sets can provide a valuable picture, whereas single indicators risk creating perverse incentives and misleading results.⁶² Kenya’s national indicators, thus, should seek to complement the global ones in a way that can tell a full story of progress.

Setting quantified targets

In contrast to other goals in the 2030 Agenda, Goal 16 targets are not quantified. To know when targets have been met at the national level, benchmarks can be set at the indicator level. Targets would be considered met at the national level when the agreed benchmarks at the indicator level have been reached. This can be demonstrated using two of the global indicators and two example national indicators it (orange), or is unlikely to meet the target (red).

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere

Global indicators	Baseline 2015	National target 2030	Progress in 2020
Violent homicides per 100,000	7 (2013) ⁶³	5	5
Percentage of people who report that they feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live	40.6 ⁶⁴	60	46

Example national indicators:

Number of people per 100,000 displaced by conflict	0.68 ⁶⁵	0	0.35
Number of riots and protests	187 ⁶⁶	50	93

Multistakeholder data production

CSOs, private companies, and multilateral bodies should also be actively consulted as part of the process of selecting national indicators: they have experience and important perspectives to contribute, while their buy-in will be critical for legitimising the monitoring process.

However, their participation must go further than indicator selection. Given the potentially contentious nature of the issues contained in Goal 16, it is crucial to ensure that multiple stakeholders in Kenya take part in the actual monitoring and validating of the story of progress. While the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and other official data providers will play a central role in the production of data for indicators, the potential of the ‘data revolution’ lies in the wealth of non-official data producers, including civil society groups and citizens themselves.⁶⁷

For more on monitoring Goal 16, see Saferworld (2015), *Measuring Peace from 2015: An indicator framework at work*.

⁶¹ The inverted commas here indicate that the definition of some indicators as ‘subjective’ and others as ‘objective’ is problematic. All quantitative measures have an element of subjectivity, and the potential for bias and imperfect recording of phenomena. See, for example, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2007), ‘Governance indicators: A Users’ Guide’, (New York: UNDP-BDP), pp 5–6.

⁶² Scheye D, Chigas E (2009), ‘Development of a Basket of Conflict, Security and Justice Indicators’, pp 7, 13, 16–17, 19; United Nations (2010), ‘Monitoring Peace Consolidation – United Nations Practitioners’ Guide to Benchmarking’ (New York: United Nations), p 40. On the importance of public confidence and perceptions surveys, see also: World Bank (2011), ‘World Development Report 2011’ (Washington, DC: World Bank); and Overseas Development Institute (2015), ‘Asking people what they think: Using perceptions data to monitor the post-2015 development framework’ (London: ODI). See also: UN Development Programme (2007), ‘Golden Rule 1: Use a range of indicators’, *Governance indicators: A Users’ Guide* (UNDP-BDP), p 12.

⁶³ World Bank, World Development Indicators, International Homicides (per 100,000 people) (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5>).

⁶⁴ World Health Organization (WHO), ‘Report of Kenya’, The World Health Survey (www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/whsken-kenya.pdf).

⁶⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Kenya (www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/kenya/).

⁶⁶ The UN Secretary General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Development (2014), ‘A World that Counts: Mobilizing the data revolution for sustainable development’ (www.undatarevolution.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/A-World-That-Counts2.pdf).

⁶⁷ ACLED (2015) Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project: Kenya Country Data File, 1997–2015. www.acleddata.com

ANNEX 1: Mapping of relevant policy frameworks and actors

Framework/actor	Specific details
Overall architecture for peaceful and inclusive societies	
Vision 2030 (period 2008–2030)	The Second Medium Term Plan (2013–2017) includes commitments to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Promote public-private cooperation and community involvement in ensuring improved safety and security ■ Deepening the policy, legal, and institutional reform for improved enforcement of law and order ■ Institutionalising national and intercommunity dialogue in order to build harmony among ethnic, racial, and other interest groups ■ Promoting peace-building and reconciliation in order to improve conflict management and ensure sustainable peace ■ Promoting a peace culture that restrains people from resorting to armed violence ■ Promoting inter-ethnic peace building founded on mutual respect and resolution of conflicts
Vision 2030 Secretariat	The Vision 2030 Delivery Secretariat is responsible for coordinating, enforcing, and advocating for the implementation of Vision 2030.
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS)	The Statistics Act 2006 mandates KNBS to act as custodian of official statistics and the principal agency of the government for collecting, analysing, and disseminating statistical data in Kenya.
The Constitution of Kenya (2010)	Chapter 11 of the constitution highlights the importance of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Devolved governments in fostering national unity, and giving powers of self-governance to the people ■ Enhancing the participation of the people in making decisions affecting them ■ Promoting the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised communities ■ Promoting social and economic development ■ Provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya ■ Ensuring equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya
International partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Development partners such as the European Union (EU), the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands are working to relieve pressures that generate instability, including election-related violence, violent extremism, financial crises and economic instability, climate change and desertification, youth unemployment, and increasing localised violence and human insecurity.⁶⁸ ■ The UN's strategy is guided by the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).⁶⁹
Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere	
National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management (2015)	The National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management has six pillars critical to the achievement of sustainable peace and stability. These include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Institutional framework – underpins the structure, processes, functions, mandate, roles, and responsibilities of different actors and institutional components. ■ Capacity building – to facilitate continuous capacity building for institutions and stakeholders to enable them promote the peace agenda. ■ Conflict prevention and response – to facilitate proactive and preventive interventions to conflicts. ■ Mediation and preventive diplomacy – to facilitate the establishment and functioning of a mediation support unit. ■ Traditional conflict prevention and mitigation – to mobilise communities to embrace traditional mechanisms for conflict resolutions that are relevant to their cultural orientation and conflict context. ■ Post-conflict recovery and stabilisation – to ensure that peacebuilding initiatives address peace as a long-term issue.
National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Key point of contact and interaction between CSOs and the government for ensuring peace and violence reduction in Kenya. ■ An umbrella body which bring together representatives from relevant government ministries and departments, civil society organisations, development partners, and UN agencies ■ Serves as Kenya's Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU) for the implementation of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (CEWARN) Protocol within the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

⁶⁸ See United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2014–2018) for Kenya.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p5.

The Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The main government body leading on peacebuilding and conflict management, and arms control functions in Kenya.
National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)	<p>The NCIC Strategic Plan 2015–2020 has two relevant strategic objectives for cohesion under the following pillars:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ National identity and values – to build and strengthen the capacity of institutions and the public in fostering national identity and values in accordance with relevant sections of Article 73 of the constitution. ■ Peacebuilding, reconciliation, and integration – to promote national peacebuilding, reconciliation, cohesion, and integration among the different ethnic, racial, and religious groups of Kenya.
National Crime Research Centre (NCRC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Established through an Act of Parliament in 1997. ■ Carries out research into the causes of crime and its prevention and disseminates research findings and recommendations to the government agencies concerned with the administration of criminal justice.
Target 16.4: Significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organised crime	
Draft Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons (to be finalised within the Second Medium Term Plan [2013–2017] of Vision 2030)	<p>Aims to achieve the following objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Reduce all forms of illicit proliferation of SALW and related materials ■ Provide synergy and coordination for the management and control of SALW through legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks ■ Coordinate and promote public awareness raising, education, and sensitisation on SALW ■ Provide for measures to harmonise legislation and enhance international cooperation and information exchange on SALW
Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Key point of contact and interaction between CSOs and the government for arms reduction. ■ Established in line with the United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPOA), as well as the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control, and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. ■ Brings together representatives from relevant government ministries and departments, civil society organisations, development partners, and UN agencies.
The Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ See target 16.1 above.
Target 16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels	
The Constitution of Kenya (2010)	Ensured devolution of power to counties, as well as constitutional provisions for public participation in national and county governance processes. This includes legislative and budget processes. ⁷⁰
County governments	The 2010 constitution divided Kenya into 47 counties, which will be in charge of implementation and service delivery. At least 15 per cent of the national budget will be allocated to these county governments. ⁷¹
The County Government Act 2012	A number of provisions of the constitution and the County Government Act 2012 provide for citizen participation in county governance processes. ⁷²
County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs)	The County Government Act 2012 stipulates the need for all 47 county governments to prepare five-year County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs) – they will replace the District Development Plans (DDPs) that guided development under the previous constitution.
National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)	See target 16.1 above

⁷⁰ The Council of Governors and the Ministry of Devolution and Planning (2015), 'Devolution at a Glance', p 13 (<http://cog.go.ke/images/stories/newsletters/Devolutionatagance.pdf>).

⁷¹ County Government of West Pokot (2013), 'First County Integrated Development Plan 2013–2017', (<http://cog.go.ke/images/stories/CIDPs/WestPokot.pdf>).

⁷² *Op cit* Saferworld note 50.

ANNEX 2: Goal 16 global indicators

<p>16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere</p>	<p>16.1.1 Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age</p> <p>16.1.2 Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population (disaggregated by age group, sex and cause)</p> <p>16.1.3 Percentage of the population subjected to physical, psychological, or sexual violence in the previous 12 months</p> <p>16.1.4 Proportion of people that feel safe walking alone around the area they live</p>
<p>16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and all forms of violence against and torture of children</p>	<p>16.2.1 Percentage of children aged 1–17 who experienced any physical punishment and/or psychological aggression by caregivers in the past month</p> <p>16.2.2 Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age, and form of exploitation</p> <p>16.2.3 Proportion of young women and men aged 18–29 years who experienced sexual violence by age 18</p>
<p>16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all</p>	<p>16.3.1 Percentage of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms</p> <p>16.3.2 Unsensitized detainees as a percentage of overall prison population</p>
<p>16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organised crime</p>	<p>16.4.1 Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars)</p> <p>16.4.2 Percentage of seized small arms and light weapons that are recorded and traced, in accordance with international standards and legal instruments</p>
<p>16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms</p>	<p>16.5.1 Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by these public officials, during the previous 12 months</p> <p>16.5.2 Proportion of businesses who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by these public officials, during the previous 12 months</p>
<p>16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels</p>	<p>16.6.1 Primary government expenditures as a percentage of original approved budget, disaggregated by sector (or by budget codes or similar)</p> <p>16.6.2 Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services</p>
<p>16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels</p>	<p>16.7.1 Proportions of positions (by age group, sex, persons with disabilities, and population groups) in public institutions (national and local legislatures, public service, and judiciary) compared to national distributions</p> <p>16.7.2 Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability, and population group</p>
<p>16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance</p>	<p>16.8.1 Percentage of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organisations</p>
<p>16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration</p>	<p>16.9.1 Percentage of children under 5 whose births have been registered with a civil authority, disaggregated by age</p>
<p>16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements</p>	<p>16.10.1 Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists, and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months</p> <p>16.10.2 Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information</p>
<p>16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime</p>	<p>16.a.1 Existence of independent National Human Rights Institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles</p>
<p>16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development</p>	<p>16.b.1 Percentage of the population reporting having personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international human rights law, disaggregated by age group and sex</p>

Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe in a world where everyone can lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from fear and insecurity.

We are a not-for-profit organisation with programmes in nearly 20 countries and territories across Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe.

COVER PHOTO: Nangiso Mirkarkona (right) lives in Loyangalani, near Lake Turkana. Different pastoralist communities have lived here peacefully together, but rivalries stoked by rumours of attacks have resulted in Turkana people no longer daring to live next to their Samburu neighbours. © PANOS/SVEN TORFINN



SAFERWORLD

UK OFFICE

The Grayston Centre
28 Charles Square
London N1 6HT, UK
Phone: +44 (0)20 7324 4646
Fax: +44 (0)20 7324 4647
Email: general@saferworld.org.uk
Web: www.saferworld.org.uk

KENYA OFFICE

PO Box 21484-00505
1st floor Titan Plaza
Chaka Road, Nairobi
Kenya
Phone: +254 (0)20 2713603 / 2733250 /
2736480 / 84
Fax: +254 (0)20 273 6283

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