Getting the New Deal right in Somalia

On 19 and 20 November 2014, the Federal Government of Somalia will meet with its international partners in Copenhagen to assess progress on the Somali New Deal Compact one year after its endorsement. As the process moves towards implementation, it is increasingly urgent that it is underpinned by a clear conflict analysis and a commitment to conflict sensitivity alongside greater participation from Somalia’s people and civil society, says Kat Achilles.

The New Deal architecture provides for this to be done through a Fragility Assessment process. This is intended to identify the drivers of conflict and fragility, and of resilience, involving authorities and non-state actors. It is designed to provide an essential base for the future conflict sensitivity of the entire New Deal process, and so is a vital element in the process. But in Somalia, this fragility assessment was never completed. At the Compact’s endorsement in September 2013, parties “emphasised the importance of continued consultations… [to] refine the Compact, building on the interim Fragility Assessment.” Yet the past year has seen no effort or action to build on this in order to ensure that the Somali Compact is clearly conflict sensitive.

As the New Deal process in Somalia moves towards implementation, there are some efforts being made to ensure conflict sensitivity, particularly at the level of the Multi-Partner Funds and in some of the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG) Working Groups. Nonetheless, many government and donor stakeholders maintain that there is simply no time to complete the Fragility Assessment.

This is risky. Without a commonly-shared assessment on the diverse range of conflict- and peace- drivers across the country, there is no framework by which implementation of the Compact can or will respond to these drivers in a coherent and coordinated way. Unless all actions under the New Deal speak to an agreed set of drivers, they risk failing to directly and indirectly address causes of fragility. In the worst case, actions could actually risk exacerbating conflict drivers as the direction of travel risks moving further and further away from addressing the reality of Somalia’s context. Implementation programmes will also be unable to respond to new and emerging drivers of conflict. In short, the process risks repeating the very pitfalls from the past that the New Deal was designed to avoid.

The good news is that it is not too late. The New Deal is iterative by design: it provides space for all of its elements to be reviewed and revised. This needs to include review of its Fragility Assessment, to ensure that the whole process continues to speak to the current context and responds to emerging risks.

Such a process should not be the remit of a few individuals or of the Federal Government alone. It should include coordinating and harmonising ongoing or anticipated conflict analysis processes and sharing information across all New Deal partners in a coherent and transparent manner. As the lead donor in the process, the UK could take the lead in supporting and coordinating this process. It will also require the participation of a wide range of Somali people, including civil society. To date, however, the whole New Deal process has been hampered by its failure to create local ownership and buy-in through bringing in civil society and the broader Somali public. This is surprising given that it is peace and development for people which sits at the centre of the New Deal’s purpose. 

While there have been some recent welcome signs of greater civil society engagement in some New Deal structures, more effort is still required. One year ago, Saferworld urged all stakeholders involved in the Somali New Deal to prioritise the involvement of people and civil society in the process to ensure that its creates opportunities for an effective, sustainable move away from fragility. We must not forget that Somalia’s people are not passive actors in the political economy of Somalia’s conflict. They are active agents that can drive both conflict and peace. This is why the New Deal architecture provides for a country-led and not a state-led process. But people can only lead the process when they have the space and information required for their voices heard. 

This should be a priority over the next year. Greater public outreach, particularly through the media, can help assess the relevance of the priorities set out in the Compact. Providing time and space for the public and civil society to discuss and input into the development of implementation programmes is also needed. Here, civil society can act as a link between the public and the authorities, particularly in locations where the Federal Government, regional administrations and international partners have little access.

Ultimately, the success of the New Deal in Somalia will come down to its impacts on the lives of Somali people.  This means ensuring that the process is conflict sensitive and finding ways to ensure that the public and civil society can play an active role in directing the Compact’s implementation. It is not too late to get the New Deal right and prove that we can do things differently in Somalia.

Kat Achilles is Saferworld’s Regional Policy and Advocacy Advisor for Kenya and the Horn of Africa.

Read more about Saferworld's work in Somalia.

“We must not forget that Somalia’s people are not passive actors in the political economy of Somalia’s conflict. They are active agents that can drive both conflict and peace. This is why the New Deal architecture provides for a country-led and not a state-led process. But people can only lead the process when they have the space and information required for their voices to be heard.”

Kat Achilles